LIBEAEY 


Theological   Seminary, 

PRINCETON.    N.  J.  a 

BL  181  .M35  1867 
c    Mahan,  Asa,  1800-1889. 
The  science  of  natural 
theology 


s 


j. 


s 


THE 


SCIENCE 


OF 


NATURAL    THEOLOGY 


GOD  THE  UNCONDITIONED  CAUSE, 


GOD  THE  INFINITE  AND  PERFECT, 


AS  REVEALED  IN  CREATION. 


EEV.  ASA   MAHAN,  D.  D., 

AUTHOR  OF  "THE    SCIENCE    OF    LOGIC,"  "A  SYSTEM  OF  INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY 
"DOCTKLNE  OF  THE  WILL,"  ETC. 


In  the   beginning,   God." 


BOSTON: 

PUBLISHED     BY     HENRY     HOYT 

9    Corn  hill. 

18  67. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1S67,  by 

ASA    MAHAN, 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  for  the  District  of  Michigan. 


Rockwell  &  Rollins,  Stereotypers  and  Printers, 
122  Washington  Street,  Boston. 


PREFACE. 


In  the  judgment  of  the  author  of  the  following  treatise,  the 
time  has  now  arrived  when  the  questions  at  issue  between  Theism 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  various  forms  of  Antitheism  on  the  other, 
may  be  permanently  settled,  and  that  upon  scientific  grounds. 
All  these  questions  now,  in  reality,  stand  out  before  the  world  in 
visible  dependence  upon  a  single  issue,  the  validity  of  the  human 
Intelligence  as  a  faculty  of  world-knowledge.  Antitheism,  in  all  its 
forms,  has  openly  based  itself  upon  the  assumption,  and  this  is  its 
final  stronghold,  that  all  our  world-knowledge,  subjective  and 
objective,  is  exclusively  phenomenal,  mere  appearance,  in  which 
no  reality  of  any  kind  appears;  and  that,  consequently,  "the  real- 
ity existing  behind  all  appearances  is,  and  ever  must  be,  unknown." 
The  fact  is  also  being  "known  and  read  of  all  men,"  that,  this 
principle  being  admitted,  all  questions  in  regard  to  causation, 
proximate  or  ultimate,  are  undeniably  at  an  end.  "What  can 
we  reason  but  from  what  we  know?"  Equally  manifest  to  all 
sober  thinkers  has  the  fact  become,  that  if  it  be  granted  that  we 
have  a  valid  knowledge  of  "  the  things  that  are  made,"  the 
proposition  is  undeniable,  that  we  have  an  equally  valid  knowl- 
edge of  the  being  and  perfections  of  a  personal  God,  "the 
Creator  of  the  heavens  and  the  earth."     "Reason,"  says  the 

in 


IV  PREFACE. 

antitheistic  philosophy,  ''demands  an  unknown  substratum  of 
the  visible,  and  an  unknown  essence  of  the  intelligent,  and  may 
thus  be  led  to  an  unknown  cause  of  both,  wherein  to  find  the 
cause  and  explanation  of  their  marvellous  relationship."  Reason, 
says  the  theistic  philosophy,  demands  a  known  substratum  of  the 
visible,  and  a  known  essence  of  the  intelligent,  and  a  known  cause 
of  both,  wherein  to  find  the  cause  and  explanation  of  their  mar- 
vellous relationship ;  it  being  undeniably  the  perfection  of  absurd- 
ity to  attempt  to  find  "the  cause  and  explanation"  of  relation- 
ships of  the  existence  and  character  of  which  we  affirm  our  igno- 
rance to  be  absolute.  "Whether,  in  the  absolute  nature  of 
things,"  says  Mr.  Thompson,  "  the  mind  is  wholly  distinct  from  the 
world,  or  in  any  way  related  to  it,  is  beyond  the  reach  of  man's 
intelligence."  Is  it  not  an  infinite  marvel,  that  any  thinker 
should  talk  of  finding  in  "an  unknown  cause,"  "the  cause  and 
explanation  "  of  relationships,  even  the  existence  of  which,  as  he 
himself  affirms,  "is  beyond  the  reach  of  man's  intelligence  "?  It 
is  by  the  enunciation  of  such  principles  that  leading  theistic 
thinkers,  such  as  Messrs.  Thompson  and  Mansell,  have  of  late 
years  been  forging  weapons  for  scepticism, —  weapons  which  such 
writers  as  Messrs.  Mill  and  Spencer  are  now  using  with  terrible 
effect  against  religion.  No  deduction  can  be  more  self-evidently 
valid,  and  no  deduction  is  being  more  generally  recognized  as 
absolutely  logical,  than  this,  that  if  it  be  granted  that  we  have, 
and  can  have,  no  valid  knowledge  of  nature,  we  can  have  no 
corresponding  knowledge  of  the  ultimate  cause  of  the  facts  of 
nature.  If,  therefore,  we  would  vindicate  for  religion  "a  reason- 
able service,  and  escape  the  just  charge  of  knowingly  "  worship- 
ping we  know  not  what,"  we  must  assert  and  vindicate  the  valid- 


PREFACE.  V 

ity  of  the  human  Intelligence,  as  a  faculty  of  world-knowledge. 
This,  we  repeat,  is  the  single  issue  on  which  the  conflicting 
claims  of  Theism  and  Antitheism  now  visibly  depend.  Hence, 
the  pains  which  we  have  been  at,  in  the  following  treatise,  to 
assure,  among  other  ends,  a  scientific  settlement  of  this  one 
issue.  All,  who  have  duly  reflected  upon  the  subject,  are  aware, 
that  when  an  appeal  is  made  to  the  intuitive  convictions  of  the 
Universal  Intelligence,  to  the  direct  and  immediate  testimony  of 
Consciousness,  and  to  all  criteria  by  which  forms  of  knowledge 
that  have  absolute  validity  for  the  reality  and  character  of  their 
objects  are  to  be  distinguished  from  those  which  are  void  of  all 
claims  to  such  validity,  the  truth  of  the  theistic  philosophy 
becomes  strictly  demonstrative ;  and  all  this,  while  there  is  the 
equally  manifest  total  absence  of  all  forms  of  proof,  positive 
evidence,  or  antecedent  probability,  in  favor  of  the  opposite 
hypothesis.  So  distinctly  conscious  are  antitheists  of  the  truth 
of  these  statements,  that  they  have  abandoned  all  forms  of  argu- 
ment upon  the  subject  but  one,  the  assumption  that  our  world-con- 
ceptions and  necessary  ideas  must  be  void  of  objective  validity,  for 
the  affirmed  reason  that  they  are  all  self-contradictory  and 
absurd.  Hence  the  care  with  which  we  have  scrutinized  these 
affirmed  contradictions,  these  "antinomies  of  pure  reason."  To 
the  careful  reader  of  the  introduction,  and  the  last  two  chapters 
of  the  following  treatise,  it  will  be  rendered  demonstratively 
evident  that  these  conceptions  and  ideas,  when  taken  as  they 
actually  exist  in  the  mind,  are  utterly  void  of  even  the  appearance 
of  self-contradiction,  no  incompatible  elements  whatever,  being 
found  in  them,  and  that  these  cognitions  are  made  to  appear 
self-contradictory  wholly  by  means  of  totally  false  definitions  and 


VI  PREFACE, 

sophistical  psychological  procedures,  —  procedures  utterly  subver- 
sive of  truth,  and  as  utterly  unworthy  the  dignity  of  science. 

A  fundamental  aim  of  the  author  of  this  treatise  has  been  not 
only  to  subvert  utterly  the  antitheistic  philosophy  in  all  its  actual 
and  possible  forms,  and  to  verify  for  Theism  an  immovable  foun- 
dation ;  but,  also  to  bring  out  into  distinct  isolation  the  real  theis- 
tic  problem  and  syllogism  in  all  its  varied  forms,  so  that  the  argu- 
ment throughout  may  be  seen  to  be,  and  to  have  been,  conducted 
upon  truly  scientific  principles.  With  these  suggestions,  the 
work  is  commended  to  the  most  rigid  scrutiny  of  the  friends  of 

truth. 
Adrian,  Mich.,  July  27,  1867. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Page 

Introduction, 11 

True  and  false  methods  of  discussion, 11-13 

Mystery  and  absurdity  defined  and  elucidated, 13-15 

Existence  involves  a  mystery, 15-19 

The  existence  of  a  power  of  knowledge  involves  a  mystery  equally  pro- 
found,           19-20 

Principles  by  which  we  are  to  determine  our  theory  of  existence,  and 

answer  the  question, "  What  realities  do  in  fact  exist,"          .        .        .  20-21 
The  idea  which  is  to  be  represented  by  the  term  creation  as  employed 

in  a  system  of  natural  theology, 21-23 

Origin  and  genesis  of  the  systems  of  Antitheism  explained,      .        .        .  23-26 

Formulas  and  test  of  valid  knowledge,  .                        20-27 

Distinction  between  presentative  and  representative  knowledge,      .        .  27-28 

The  formulas  stated, 28-30 

The  formulas  and  test  verified, 3Q-32 

Bearing  of  these  principles  upon  the  conflicting  systems  under  considera- 
tion,         m 32 

Bearing  of  these  deductions  upon  our  present  inquiries,     ....  33-36 
First  truths  and  principles  of  science,  and  assumptions  employed  as  such 

truths, 30-39 

The  fundamental  distinction  between  true  and  false  systems  of  knowledge 

or  science, 39-40 

Fundamental  and  common  assumption  of  Materialism  and  Idealism,       .  40-44 
Tiie  special  fundamental  assumption  peculiar  to  Idealism,         .        .        .  44-48 
Coleridge's  attempted  demonstration  of  the  validity  of  the  two  assump- 
tions above  refuted, 48-55 

The  real  nature,  and  true  and  proper  sphere  of  Knowledge  a  priori,        .  50-60 

Error  of  Idealism  on  this  subject, 00-02 

General  consequences  of   such  an  error  in  regard  to  the  nature  and 

sphere  of  Knowledge  a  priori, 62-63 

The  idea  of  God  not  self-contradictory, 63-07 

Idea  of  God  not  negative,  but  positive, G7 

The  idea  of  matter  and  substance  as  a  mere  force, 67-70 

Character  of  systems  of  Knowledge  as  developed  by  the  German  mind, 

and  the  conditions  on  which  such  systems  can  be  refuted,   .        .        .  71-72 
What  we  propose  to  accomplish  in  regard  to  the  claims  of  Theism,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  those  of  the  various  systems  of  Antitheism,  on  the 

other, 72-73 

CHAPTER  II. 

A  priori  or  Analytical  Judgments,  first  truths  or  principles,  in  the  science 

of  Natural  Theology, 74 

Conditions  on  which  we  can  legitimately  reason  from  facts  to  causes,      .  74 

Facts  classified, 74-76 

Characteristics  of  dogmatic  facts, .  76-78 

Analytical  Judgment  or  principle  common  to  all  facts  of  every  kind,  and 

to  all  hypotheses  of  ultimate  causation, 78-79 

Attributes  necessarily  implied  in  the  idea  of  God,  considered  as  the  ulti- 
mate reason  or  first  cause  of  the  facts  of  the  universe,        .        .        .  80-81 

VII 


VIII  CONTENTS. 

Page 

The  grand  problem  in  Natural  Theology, 81 

Fundamental  characteristics  of  the  true  and  proper  solution  of  this 

problem, 81-83 

The  two  hypotheses  of  ultimate  causation  which  necessarily  embrace 

and  imply  all  others, 83-84 

Some  general  remarks  upon  these  distinct  and  opposite  hypotheses,        •      81-89 
Specific  characteristics  of  the  hypothesis  of  Natural  Law,  .        .        .      89-95 

The  hypothesis  of   Theism.    Its  general  characteristics  and  ultimate 

principles, 95-99 

The  Theistic  Syllogisms.  First  form.  Second  form.  Third  and  all-com- 
prehending form, 99-100 

General  remarks  upon  these  Syllogisms, 100-101 

Postulates  of  the  science  of  Natural  Theology, 101-102 

Fundamental  defects  in  the  common  methods  of  developing  the  theistic 

argument, 102-107 

CHAPTER  III. 

The  Theistic  Hypothesis  established  as  a  truth  of  science.   Or,  the  minor 

premises  of  the  Theistic  Syllogism, 108 

SECTION  I. 

The  present  state  of  the  question, 108-109 

No  evidence  exists  in  favor  of  the  doctrine  of  Natural  Law,      .        .        .  109-110 
The  validity  of  the  Hypothesis  of  Theism  possible  as  a  demonstrated 

truth  of  Science, 110 

The  least  form  or  degree  of  evidence  in  favor  of  the  Hypothesis  of 

Theism,  requires  all  men  to  receive  it  as  true, 110 

The  Theistic  Hypothesis  affirmed  as  true  by  the  intuitive  conviction  of 

the  Universal  Intelligence, 110-111 

This  conviction  rests  upon  a  basis  which  Science  can  never  invalidate,    .  111-114 
The  Theistic  Hypothesis  to  be  held  as  true  until  invalidated  by  absolute 

proof.    True  state  of  the  present  issue, 114-115 

SECTION  II. 

The  doctrine  of  the  being  of  God  established  as  a  truth  of  Science  in 
view  of  all  the  facts  now  known  and  which  have  a  fundamental 
bearing  upon  the  subject,    .        .    ' 115 

Facts  of  the  universe  bearing  upon  our  present  inquiries,  .        .        .         117 

I.  Creation,  an  event  occurring  in  time,  and  not  a  reality  existing  from 

eternity 117-124 

The  only  possible  hypothesis  on  which  the  Theistic  deduction  yielded  by 

this'great  fact  cau  be  avoided, 124-127 

Bearing  of  this  great  central  fact  of  the  universe, 127-128 

II.  Creation  in  its  present  form  and  state,  the  result  of  a  Series  of  inde- 
pendent creations.    The  development  theory  refuted,  ....  129-136 

III.  Every  species  of  animal  and  vegetable  organization  originally  pro- 
duced by  original,  independent  acts  of  creation,  ....  136-138 

IV.  All  the  leading  species  of  animated  existence  must  have  been  brought 
into  being  in  such  a  state  of  maturity  as  from  the  first  to  be  capable 

of  self-sustentation, 138-139 

V.  The  order  of  successive  creations  has  been  throughout  in  the  relation 

of  wisely-adjusted  adaptation, 139-140 

General  application  of  the  facts  above  adduced, 140-147 

VI.  Matter  and  .Spirit  —  their  relations,  etc., 148-157 

VII.  Facts  of  mind,  or  of  an  exclusively  mental  character,        .        .        .  158- 166 

VIII.  Laws  of  nature  —  phrase  defined, 1G6-173 

IX.  The  progress  of  creation  has  been  from  one  absolute  ultimate  to  an- 
other of  totally  opposite  character, 174-176 

SECTION  III. 
Facts  applied, 176 

I.  The  Unconditioned  Cause  not  a  fortuitous  concurrence  of  the    sub- 

stances or  powers  of  nature, 177-178 

II.  This  cause  no  inhering  law  or  principle  of  matter,         ....  178-194 

III.  The  Unconditioned  no  inhering  law  of  nature, 194-197 


CONTENTS.  IX 

Page 

IV.  The  Unconditioned  no  necessary  cause  of  any  kind,     ....  197-199 

V.  The  Unconditioned  a  free  will, 199-203 

VI.  The  Unconditioned  a  self-conscious  Intelligence,  ....  203-206 

VII.  Spirituality  an  attribute  of  tiie  Unconditioned, 206-207 

VIII.  The  Unconditioned  a  free,  self-conscious  Personality,       .        .        .  207-210 

IX.  The  Unconditioned  a  moral  agent, 210-211 

X.  The  Unconditioned  the  moral  governor  of  the  universe,        .        .       .  211-212 

SECTION  IV. 

General  suggestions, 212 

Bearing  of  the  different  sciences  upon  our  deductions,        ....  213-224 
Reasons  for  the  apparent  opposition  between  some  of  the  sciences  and 

religion, 224-228 

Method  by  which  the  idea  of  God  is  developed  in  trie  Scriptures,      .        .  228 

Fundamental  defect  in  the  Theistic  argument,  as  developed  by  Paley  and 

others,   229-230 

CHAPTER   IV. 

God  the  Infinite  and  Perfect, 231-252 

CHAPTER  V. 

The  Disjunctive  Argument ;  or,  Realism  as  opposed  to  Materialism,  on 

the  one  hand,  and  Idealism  on  the  other,         ...  .        .         253 

SECTION  I. 

Possible  or  supposable  hypotheses, 255 

Preliminary  topics.      Primary    principles    bearing   upon    our   present 

inquiries, 255-257 

The  only  conceivable  systems  of  Ontology, 257-261 

Tests  to  be  applied,  in  determining  which  of  these  hypotheses  is  valid,  .  261-262 

SECTION   II. 

The  true  hypothesis ;   or,  Realism, 262 

General  characteristics  of  this  hypothesis, 262-263 

Validity  of  this  theory  established, 264-275 

SECTION  III. 
Materialism  refuted, 276-279 

SECTION  IV. 

Idealism, 279 

General  remarks  upon  Idealism  in  its  various  forms, 279-287 

The  common  basis  on  which  this  hypothesis  in  all  its  forms  rests,    .        .  287-288 
Negative  characteristics  of  all  realities  according  to  the  essential  prin- 
ciples of  Idealism, 288-290 

Idealism  refuted.    Violates  its  own  essential  principles,     ....  290-293 

Its  method  false  and  deceptive, 293-298 

A  system  of  partialism, 298-299 

Confounds  truth  with  error, 299-300 

Subversive  of  morality  and  religion, 300-303 

Void  of  all  utility, 303-304 

Limits  mind, 304-306 

Fails  to  meet  the  scientific  wants  of  mind, 306-308 

Bearing  of  this  discussion  on  the  Theistic  problem, 308-309 

CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Disjunctive  Argument  completed ;  or,  Realism  as  contrasted  with 

the  Sceptical  Philosophy, 310 

The  Sceptical  Philosophy  defined, 310-312 

Religious  bearings  of  Scepticism, 312-315 

The  assumption  upon  which  the  Sceptical  Philosophy  is  based,        .       .  315-316 
Fundamental  characteristics  of  the  Sceptical  Philosophy,         .        .        .  316-318 

The  above  statements  verified, 318-324 

Principle  common  to  all  forms  of  the  sensational  theory,         .       .       .  324-325 


X  CONTENTS, 

Page 

Necessary  consequences  of  this  system,         . 325 

The  external  universe,  which  we  contemplate  as  real,  has  no  existence 

out  of  our  own  minds, .        .  325-326 

This  universe  has  no  existence  at  all,  excepting  when  we  are  in  the  very 

act  of  perception, 326-327 

The  things  which  we  invisage  are  not  that  in  themselves  for  which  we 

take  them, 327-328 

The  universe  of  perception  the  exclusive  product  of  the  mind,  itself, 

from  the  materials  furnished,  to  wit,  sensations, 328 

It  is  absolutely  impossible  for  us  to  determine  what  realities,  proximate 

or  ultimate,  finite  or  infinite,  do  or  do  not  exist, 328-332 

According  to  the  fundamental  principles  and  deductions  of  this  philoso- 
phy, an  authenticated  revelation  from  God,  if  we  suppose  him  to 

exist,  is  an  absolute  impossibility, 332-334 

This  philosophy  equally  subversive  of  all  the  principles  of  common 

morality, 334-336 

Bearing  of  the  fundamental  principles  and  necessary  deductions  of  this 

philosophy  upon  the  deductions  of  Scepticism, 336-337 

These  deductions  of  Scepticism  verified  as  necessary  consequences  of  the 

fundamental  principles  of  this  philosophy, 337-345 

This  philosophy  in  its  fundamental  principles  false,  while  that of  Realism 

is  true, 345-354 

The  idea  of  a  positive  religion  having  its  basis  in  the  philosophy  under 

consideration, 354-356 

The  bearing  of  this  philosophy  upon  the  doctrine  of  the  being  of  God, 

considered  as  a  probable  truth, 356-358 

The  high  merit  often  ascribed  to  Kant  in  his  critique  on  the  Theistic 

argument, 358-359 

Mr.  R.  W.  Emerson's  avowed  relations,  as  a  professed  teacher  of  truth, 

to  what  he  announces  as  such, 359-360 

Scepticism  as  a  special  form  of  thought,        .        .        .        .        .        .        .         361 

Not  wholly  negative  in  its  character, 361-363 

Dogma  of  Scepticism  not  intuitively  true, 363-364 

Opposed  to  the  absolute  testimony  of  Consciousness, 364 

Opposed  to  the  intuitive  convictions  of  the  race, 364-365 

Of  no  validity  as  an  inductive  truth, 365 

Rests  on  a  mere  assumption, 365-366 

Arguments  adduced  to  sustain  this  system  false  and  sophistical,       .        .  366-383 
The  destiny  of  these  two  hvpotheses,  the  Sceptical  and  Realistic,  or 

Theistic, 384 

The  one  a  system  of  blank  Atheism.    The  other  Theistic  in  all  its  prin- 
ciples and  deductions, 384-385 

All  thinkers  must  adopt  one  or  the  other  of  these  hypotheses,  .        .  385-386 

The  exclusive  sphere  of  science  in  accordance  with  the  fundamental 

principles  of  each  of  these  hypotheses  is  absolutely  fixed  and  definable,  386-388 
While  the  exclusive  foundation  of  Realism  is  original  intuitions,  that  of 

Scepticism  is  an  unauthorized  assumption, 388-389 

The  principles  of  Realism  accord  with,  and  those  of  Scepticism  are  an- 
tagonistic to,  the  intuitive  convictions  of  the  Universal  Intelligence,  389-390 
Realism  furnishes  infallible  tests  of  truth,  while  Scepticism  utterly  con- 
founds truth  with  error, 390-391 

Their  distinct  and  opposite  tendencies, 391-395 

Realism  the  natural,  and  Scepticism  the  most  unnatural,  state  of  thought 

conceivable, 395-398 

Concluding  thought, 398 

Bearing  of  the  doctrine  of  probability  on  this  subject,       ....         399 


THE  SCIENCE  OF  NATURAL  THEOLOGY. 


CHAPTER  I. 

INTRODUCTION. 

TRUE   AND    FALSE    METHODS    OF   DISCUSSION. 

There  are  two  distinct  and  opposite  methods  in  con- 
formity to  which  the  questions  at  issue  between  the  friends 
of  truth  and  the  advocates  of  error  may  be  investigated 
and  argued.  We  may,  without  any  special  reference  to 
fundamental  principles,  join  issue  at  once  upon  the  points 
of  disagreement;  attempting,  by  force  of  argument,  the 
establishment  of  the  truth,  and  the  refutation  of  error. 
In  this  way,  much  is  often  accomplished  in  both  the  direc- 
tions named.  Yet,  it  almost  as  frequently  happens, 
perhaps,  and  that  with  reference  to  the  most  important 
problems  of  human  thought  and  concern,  that  deep  and 
abiding  mental  satisfaction  and  conviction  are  not  ob- 
tained, while  a  painful  feeling  of  doubt  and  uncertainty  is 
left  permanently  upon  the  mind,  —  a  feeling  which  ultimately 
bears  not  a  few  inquirers  after  the  truth,  into  the  embrace 
of  error.  Mr.  Abercrombie,  for  example,  commences  his 
treatise  on  intellectual  philosophy  with  a  chapter  in  which 
he  attempts  to  prove  the  immateriality  of  the  soul.  No 
analysis  of  the  phenomena  of  the  two  substances,  matter 
and  spirit,  is  given :  no  self-evident  principles  which  may 
be  laid  down  as  the  basis  of  deductions  upon  the  sub- 

11 


1 2  INTJIOD  DCTION. 

ject,  are  developed  and  applied.  On  the  other  hand, 
without  any  such  lights  to  guide  his  investigations,  the 
author  enters  at  once  upon  the  argument,  and  after  pre- 
senting a  multiplicity  of  reasons  for  the  belief  that  spirit 
is  not  matter,  and  matter  is  not  spirit,  he  finally  sums 
up  the  discussion  with  the  following  grave  conclusion : 
"  Whether  in  their  substratum  or  ultimate  essence  they 
are  the  same,  or  whether  they  are  different,  we  know  not, 
and  never  can  know,  in  our  present  state  of  being."  Why, 
then,  argue  at  all,  a  question  about  which,  "  in  our  present 
state  of  being,"  we  can  know  nothing  and  determine 
nothing?*  Yet  this  state  of  painful  doubt  and  uncertainty 
is  the  only  state  to  which  such  a  method  can  conduct  the 
mind  in  reference  to  this  and  kindred  subjects.  As  long 
as  the  great  problems  in  Metaphysics  and  Natural  Theol- 
ogy are  investigated  and  professedly  solved  according  to 
this  method,  they  will  deservedly  stand  before  the  world  as 
ranking  among  the  most  uncertain  of  all  the  sciences,  and 
investigation  and  argument  will  tend  but  to  one  result,  —  to 
deepen  the  prevailing  conviction  that  these  problems  are 
of  impossible  solution. 

According  to  the  principles  of  the  method  which  we  will 
next  consider,  the  friends  of  truth,  in  arguing  the  questions 
at  issue  between  themselves  and  the  advocates  of  error, 
begin  their  inquiries,  first  of  all,  with  a  full  and  distinct 


*  The  result  of  Mr.  Abercrombie's  deductions,  which  at  first  thought  appears 
perfectly  harmless,  does  not  stop  here,  but  will,  in  many  instances,  be  uncon- 
sciously extended  over  the  whole  field  of  inquiry  in  respect  to  ultimate  caus- 
ation, or  the  doctrine  of  the  being  and  perfections  of  God.  For,  if  our  knowl- 
edge of  "  things  that  are  made  "  is  so  uncertain  and  unsatisfactory,  equally  un- 
certain and  unsatisfactory  must  be  all  deductions  based  upon  this  knowledge, 
deductions  pertaining  to  God,  duty,  and  immortality.  It  is  thus  that  Christian 
theologians  and  Christian  philosophers  are  often,  without  being  themselves 
aware  of  the  fact,  laying  the  foundation  for  all  forms  of  unbelief. 


INTRODUCTION.  13 

development  of  the  nature  and  specific  characteristics  of 
these  questions  themselves,  together  with  the  specific  rela- 
tions of  these  distinct  and  opposite  systems  to  one  another. 
There  will,  then,  be  another  determination,  equally  distinct 
and  definite,  of  the  assumptions  or  principles  which  lie  at 
the  basis  of  the  opposing  s}^stems  whose  claims  are  to  be 
investigated,  together  with  the  all-authoritative  principles, 
or  first  truths,  in  the  light  ofivhich  every  problem  presented 
is  to  be  solved,  and  on  the  authority  of  which  every  con- 
clusion reached  is  to  be  deduced.  Last  of  all,  the  great 
facts  bearing  upon  the  questions  at  issue  will.be  adduced 
and  elucidated  in  the  light  of  said  principles,  and  the  con- 
clusions demanded,  deduced  accordingly.  This,  every  one 
will  perceive,  is  the  only  scientific  method  in  conformity  to 
which  deep  and  permanent  mental  satisfaction  and  rational 
conviction  can  be  obtained,  on  any  great  and  important 
subject.  It  is  the  only  method,  in  conformity  to  which  any 
great  truth  of  Metaphysics  or  Natural  Theology  can  be  so 
developed,  that  it  shall  legitimately  take  rank  as  a  truth  of 
science. 

In  the  above  remarks  we  have  indicated  the  method  in 
conformity  to  which  we  shall  attempt,  in  the  following 
Treatise,  to  develop  and  elucidate  the  science  of  Natural 
Theology.  We  propose  in  this,  the  introductory  chapter, 
the  statement  and  elucidation  of  certain  important  princi- 
ples, which  have  a  general,  but  fundamental,  bearing  upon 
our  investigations. 

MYSTERY   AND   ABSURDITY    DEFINED    AND    ELUCIDATED. 

We  will  commence  with  a  definition  of  the  terms  mystery 
and  absurdity, — terms  of  common  use  in  almost  all  depart- 
ments of  human  thought,  but  which,  for  want  of  accurate 

2 


14 


INTRODUCTION. 


philosophical  definition,  are  not  nnfrequently  employed 
with  no  appearance  even  of  scientific  precision.  Every 
one,  on  reflection,  must  become  distinctly  conscious,  that 
before  we  can  intelligently  affirm  of  any  given  judgment  or 
proposition,  that  it  is  absurd,  or  that  it  involves  the  ele- 
ment of  mystery,  we  must  have  in  our  minds  a  scientifically 
accurate  conception  of  the  ideas  represented  by  the  terms 
mystery  and  absurdity,  as  distinguished  the  one  from  the 
other.  What,  then,  are  the  ideas  represented  by  these  two 
terms  ? 

Every  judgment  which  can  properly  be  pronounced  ab- 
surd, will  be  found,  on  analysis,  to  come  under  the  principle 
of  contradiction;  that  is,  it  will  really  affirm  that  the  same 
thing  is,  at  the  same  time,  true  and  not  true  of  the  same 
subject.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  something  is  affirmed 
of  an  object  undeniably  incompatible  with  its  known  and 
existing  attributes.  Such  affirmation  is  equivalent  to  the 
assertion  that  said  attributes  do,  and  do  not,  at  the  same 
moment,  belong  to  the  same  subject.  All  such  judgments, 
therefore,  are  absurd,  and  none  of  them  can,  by  any  possi- 
bility, be  true.  So  also,  when  all  the  elements  represented 
by  the  subject  and  predicate  of  a  given  proposition  are 
fully  and  distinctly  apprehended  by  the  mind,  any  proposi- 
tion affirming  the  opposite  of  what  the  intelligence  perceives 
must  be  true  of  the  relations  of  said  subject  and  predicate 
to  each  other,  involves  an  absurdity,  and  must  be  false. 
The  opposite  supposition  would  imply  that  the  intelligence 
might  affirm  the  same  thing  to  be,  at  the  same  time,  true 
and  not  true  of  the  same  subject. 

On  the  other  hand,  let  us  suppose  that  an  event  stands 
revealed  to  us  as  a  fact  of  actual  occurrence,  while  the  rea- 
son or  cause  of  its  occurrence  is  wholly  unknown  and  undis- 


INTR  01)  UCTION.  1 5 

coverable  by  us.  The  event,  in  that  case,  would  take  rank 
as  a  fact  falling  within  the  sphere  of  actual  knowledge, 
while  its  cause  would  belong  to  the  class  represented  by  the 
term  Mystery.  On  the  other  hand,  let  us  suppose  that  the 
elements  represented  by  a  given  term  —  God,  for  example  — 
are  in  part  known,  and  in  part  unknown,  to  the  mind.  One 
proposition  may  be  affirmed  of  the  object  represented  by 
that  term,  in  view  of  what  we  know,  and  its  opposite,  in 
view  of  what  we  do  not  know.  There  would  be  then  a 
mystery  involved  in  the  relations  of  these  propositions  to 
each  other.  They  could  not,  however,  be  properly  ranked 
together  under  the  principle  of  contradiction.  The  truth 
and  harmony  of  the  two  propositions  might  be  admitted  as 
facts,  while  the  grounds  of  their  harmony  and  validity 
might  remain  a  mystery.  Suppose  a  class  of  disembodied 
rational  beings,  to  whom  mankind  are  known  only  as  ra- 
tional beings  like  themselves,  should  find,  in  an  admitted 
revelation  from  God,  the  two  following  propositions  :  "  All 
men  are  immortal  beings,"  and  "  All  men  are  mortal  be- 
ings." The  rational  beings  referred  to  might  very  properly 
conclude,  that  the  first  proposition  pertains  to  men  as  ra- 
tional beings  exclusively,  and  that  the  second  refers  to 
them  in  some  other  relations  not  revealed,  and  hence,  that 
both  alike  may  be  true  of  the  same  class  of  existences. 
In  other  words,  they  would  recognize  themselves  as  in  the 
presence  of  a  mystery,  but  not  of  an  absurdity.  Let  us 
now  consider  some  important  deductions  arising  from  the 
principles  and  distinctions  above  elucidated. 

EXISTENCE    INVOLVES    A   MYSTERY. 

On  reflection,  it  will  be  perceived,  at  once,  that  existence 
is  and  ever  must  be,  to  our  minds,  a  profound  and  impene- 


16  INTRODUCTION. 

trable  mystery.  We  may  know,  absolutely,  that  a  certain 
substance  does,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  exist.  But  when  we 
attempt  to  go  bejTond  the  mere  fact,  and  to  determine  the 
question  why  the  substance  does  exist  instead  of  not  exist, 
we  find  that  we  can  discover,  neither  in  the  fact  referred  to, 
nor  in  the  nature  or  relations  of  the  substance  revealed  as 
existing,  any  light  whatever  in  regard  to  such  inquiries. 
We  often  meet  with  the  affirmation,  for  example,  that  God 
exists  of  necessity.  If  the  idea  intended  to  be  conveyed 
by  such  a  statement  is  this,  that  the  divine  existence  is 
necessarily  supposed  by  the  .facts  of  the  universe,  said 
statement  presents  an  important  truth.  But  if  it  is  meant 
that  there  is,  in  the  divine  nature,  a  reason  why  God  ex- 
ists, —  that  is,  a  reason  why  he  is  an  existing  instead  of  a 
non-existing  being,  —  the  statement,  in  that  case,  means 
nothing,  or  affirms  as  true  what  is  self-contradictory.  To 
affirm  that  there  is  a  reason,  in  the  divine  nature  itself,  why 
God  exists,  implies,  if  it  convej^s  any  intelligible  meaning 
at  all,  that  this  reason  is  the  cause  of  the  divine  existence, 
which  is  an  undeniable  self-contradiction.* 

*  The  idea  of  God  is  commonly  and  correctly  affirmed  to  be  necessary.  The 
sense  in  which  it  is  necessary,  however,  has  not,  for  the  most  part,  been  con- 
sidered. The  ideas  of  space  and  time  are  necessary  and  absolute,  for  the  reason 
that  it  is  absolutely  impossible  for  us  to  conceive  of  their  objects  as  not  being. 
The  ideas  of  substance  and  cause,  on  the  other  hand,  are  necessary  relatively  to 
qualities  and  events.  If  the  latter  are  real,  the  former  objects  must  exist.  But 
if  we  do  not  suppose  qualities  and  events  to  be  real,  we  are  not  necessitated  to 
suppose  the  reality  of  substances  or  causes.  The  ideas  of  substance  and  cause, 
then,  are  conditionally  necessary,  not  absolutely  so,  like  those  of  time  and  space. 
Now,  since  the  idea  of  God  is  that  of  a  cause,  it  can  be  only  conditionally  neces- 
sary, like  those  of  substance  and  cause,  and  not  absolutely  so,  like  those  of  time 
and  space.  The  want  of  this  important  distinction  has  given  rise,  in  the  cases 
of  Dr.  Clarke  and  others,  to  the  logical  fiction  of  an  a  priori  proof  of  the  being 
of  God.  From  the  fact  that  the  idea  of  God  relatively  to  the  facts  of  the  uni- 
verse, like  that  of  cause  relatively  to  events  universally,  is  necessary,  it  has  been 
inferred  that  there  must  be,  in  the  divine  nature,  an  absolute  reason  why  God 
does  exist,  rather  than  not  exist,  Which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  a  fundamental 
mistake.    From  this  mistake  another  not  unimportant  one  has  arisen,  to  wit, 


1NTR0D  UCTION.  1 7 

These  remarks  are  equally  applicable  to  all  classes  of 
substances  of  every  kind  —  substances  finite  and  infinite, 
material  and  mental.  That  matter  as  a  substance  possessed 
of  extension  and  form,  and  mind  as  possessed  of  the  fac- 
ulties of  thought,  feeling,  and  voluntary  determination, 
exist  as  a  matter  of  fact,  we  know  absolutely ;  because  we 
have  a  direct  and  immediate  perception  (presentative  knowl- 
edge) of  them  as  existing,  and  as  such  existences.  That 
God  exists,  we  perceive  with  equal  absoluteness,  because, 
as  we  shall  see  hereafter,  the  fact  of  his  existence  is  neces- 
sarily implied  by  the  facts  of  nature,  which  are  to  us,  as 
facts,  objects  of  absolute  knowledge.  But  why  mind,  on 
the  one  hand,  or  matter,  on  the  other,  exist,  we  cannot,  b}7 
any  possibility,  find  any  reason  whatever  in  the  nature  of 
the  substances  themselves,  nor  in  their  relations  to  each 
other.  We  can  perceive  no  more  reasons  in  the  nature  of 
mind,  why  matter  should  exist,  rather  than  not  exist,  than 
we  can  find  in  matter  why  mind  should  exist,  rather  than 
not  exist. 

It  follows  as  a  necessary  deduction  from  the  above  state- 
ments, the  validity  of  which  we  are  quite  sure  none  will 
deiry,  that  all  knowledge  with  us,  without  a  revelation  from 
a  higher  power,  must  be  wholly  and  exclusive!}-  confined  to 

the  attempt  to  determine,  a  priori,  what  the  character  of  God,  as  a"necessary 
being,  must  be.  From  the  element  of  necessity  in  the  divine  nature,  supposing 
it  to  exist,  we  can  determine  nothing  relatively  to  the  divine  character.  This 
element  does  exist  in  time  and  space.  Yet,  as  realities,  they  are  fundamentally 
unlike  each  other,  and  Ave  cannot  determine  from  the  element  of  necessity, 
common  to  both  alike,  what  either  in  fact  is.  So  if  the  same  element,  in  the 
same  sense,  did  attach  to  the  idea  of  God,  we  could  not  determine  from  it  alone 
what  His  particular  attributes  must  be.  When,  on  the  other  hand,  a  certain 
reality  is  necessarily  supposed  by  certain  facts,  its  character  must  be  determined 
through  said  facts,  and  not  from  the  one  element  under  consideration.  From 
the  facts  of  the  universe  we  reason  to  the  being  and  perfections  of  God,  and 
from  the  character  of  the  facts,  exclusively,  must  we  determine  the  attributes  of 
God.  Any  departure  from  this  principle  is  fraught  with  error. 
2* 


1 8  INTROD  UCTION, 

the  mere  facts,  nature,  and  modes  of  existence.  That  we 
may  not  be  misunderstood  here,  we  would  remark  that  the 
questions  why  an  object  exists,  and  how  we  know  it  to  ex- 
ist, are  ^questions  totally  diverse  from  one  another,  and 
should  never  be  confounded  the  one  with  the  other.  To 
the  latter  question  we  are  able  to  give  a  definite  answer. 
In  regard  to  the  former,  our  ignorance  is,  and  must  be, 
absolute. 

From  the  fact  that  we  know,  and  can  know,  absolutely 
nothing  in  regard  to  the  question,  why  any  substance  does 
exist  rather  than  not  exist,  it  follows,  as  a  deduction  equally 
absolute,  that  we  cannot,  in  any  form,  determine  a  priori 
what  substances  do  and  do  not  exist,  whether  one  or  more 
substances  actually  exist,  or  in  what  modes,  conditions,  or 
relations,  they  do  exist,  or  we  shall  find  them  existing.  If 
we  cannot  determine  a  priori,  or  a.  posteriori  either,  why 
substances  exist,  we  cannot  determine  surely  in  the  former 
sense,  what  substances  do  and  do  not  exist,  or  in  what 
modes  and  relations  they  actually  exist. 

Hence  we  remark,  in  the  next  place,  that  the  supposition 
that  one  class  of  substances  exists,  is  just  as  reasonable, 
in  itself,  as  the  supposition  that  any  other  exists  ;  and  the 
supposition  that  two  or  more  distinct  and  separate  sub- 
stances exists,  is  a  supposition  just  as  reasonable  and 
admissible  in  itself,  as  the  supposition  that  but  one  sub- 
stance exists,  and  vice  versa.  Of  the  two  substances,  mat- 
ter and  spirit,  we  can,  as  we  have  seen,  perceive  no  reason 
in  the  fact  that  one  does  exist,  why  the  other  should  exist. 
It  is  equally  self-evident,  that  we  can  perceive  no  reason  in 
the  fact  that  one  of  these  substances  does  exist,  why  the 
other  should  not  exist.  In  the  fact,  also,  that  matter  and 
finite  mind  do  exist,  we  can  perceive  no  reason  why  God 


introd  uction:  1 9 

should  not  exist.  The  propositions,  matter  exists,  mind 
(finite  mind)  exists,  and  God  as  infinite  and  perfect  exists, 
are  not  contradictory,  or  in  any  form  incompatible  propo- 
sitions. 

Our  final  deduction  from  the  train  of  thought  thus  far 
pursued  is  this :  facts  of  existence,  that  is,  the  questions, 
what  substances  do,  in  realit}7,  exist,  what  is  their  nature, 
and  what  are  their  relations  as  such  existences,  must  be 
determined  wholly  a  posteriori,  and  in  no  form  a  priori.  As 
we  cannot  determine  a  priori,  what  substances  may  and 
may  not  exist,  much  less  can  we  thus  determine  what  sub- 
stances do  and  do  not  exist.  A  knowledge  of  all  such 
facts,  if  obtained  at  all,  must  be  obtained  wholly  a  poste- 
riori.    There  is  no  possibility  of  escaping  this  conclusion. 

TJie  existence  of  a  power  of  knowledge  involves  a  mystery 
equally  profound. 

The  entire  remarks  made  above  in  regard  to  existence  it- 
self, are,  in  all  respects,  equally  applicable  to  the  existence 
of  a  power  of  knowledge.  That  such  a  power  does  exist, 
in  fact,  we  perceive  as  a  matter  of  consciousness.  But 
when  we  ask  why  it  exists  at  all,  and  exists  as  such  a  power, 
we  find,  at  once,  that  we  have  gone  wholly  beyond  our 
depth,  and  that  we  can  obtain  no  light  whatever  in  respect 
to  such  questions.  "We  know  absolutely,  and  that  a  priori, 
that  the  sphere  of  the  conceivably  knowable  is  all  exist- 
ences and  all  modes  and  relations  of  existence  —  that  the 
exclusive  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  knowledge,  in  all 
cases,  are  the  existence  of  objects,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of 
a  power  of  knowledge  relatively,  to  such  objects,  on  the  other, 
and  these  (the  power  and  objects  of  knowledge),  in  such 
relations  to  each  other,  that  knowledge  necessarily  arises 


2  0  INTR  OD  UCT10N. 

in  consequence  of  the  correlation  referred  to  —  and  that 
the  extent  and  limits  of  the  actually  knowable  in  any  given 
case,  depend  upon  the  fulfilment  of  the  conditions  of 
knowledge,  in  the  first  instance,  and,  in  the  next,  upon  the 
extent  and  limits  of  the  correlation  under  consideration. 
All  this  we  know  must  be  true,  because  the  opposite  sup- 
position involves  a  contradiction.  But  when  we  ask  the 
questions,  What  power  of  knowledge  does  or  does  not  ex- 
ist, and  why  it  exists  as  such  a  power,  what  are  to  it  par- 
ticular objects  of  knowledge,  whether  any  conditions  at  all 
are  requisite  to  the  actual  exercise  of  the  power,  why  knowl- 
edge arises  when  such  conditions  are  fulfilled,  and  what  are 
the  limits  and  extent  of  knowledge  in  any  given  case,  we 
find  that  we  can  determine  absolutely  nothing  a  priori  in 
regard  to  such  questions.  It  is  undeniable  that  the  great 
question  in  science,  "What  can  we  know?"  can  be  an- 
swered correctly,  but  through  another,  to  wit,  what  do  we 
know,  and  what  is  implied  in  the  facts  of  such  knowledge? 
The  fact  of  knowledge,  and  that  alone,  reveals  and  can  re- 
veal the  existence  and  nature  of  the  power  of  knowledge, 
together  with  the  extent  and  limits  of  the  sphere  of  said 
power. 

Principles  by  which  ive  are  to  determine  our  theory  of  exist- 
ence, and  answer  the  question,  "  What  realities  do  in  fact 
exist?'* 

The  principles  by  which  we  are  to  determine  our  theory 
of  existence,  or  answer  the  question,  What  realities  do 
exist  ?  now  admit  of  a  ready  statement.  No  reality  can  be- 
come known  to  the  faculty  of  knowledge,  as  actually  exist- 
ing, but  upon  one  condition,  that  it  is  actually  manifested 


INTRODUCTION.  21 

to  said  faculty  as  existing.     The  following,  then,  are  the 
principles  referred  to : 

1.  Nothing  is  to  be  admitted  as  existing,  which  has  not 
been  manifested  as  real. 

2.  All  that  is  thus  manifested,  that  is,  all  that  the  fac- 
ulty of  knowledge  directly  and  immediately  perceives  to 
exist,  and  all  that  is  implied  as  existing,  by  the  reality  of 
such  existence,  are  to  be  admitted  as  real.  The  existence 
of  one  reality  may  be  necessarily  implied  in  that  of  an- 
other. In  admitting  the  existence  of  the  latter,  we  must 
admit  that  of  the  former.  Nothing  on  this  subject,  not  fall- 
ing under  the  principle  of  contradiction,  is  to  be,  or  can  be 
determined  a  priori,  but  all  a  posteriori  exclusively.* 

The  idea  ivhich  is  to  be  represented  by  the  term  creation  as 
employed  in  a  system  of  Natural  Theology. 

Two  distinct  and  opposite  ideas  are  represented  b}^ 
the  term  creation,  as  that  term  is  commonly  emplo3red,  to 

*  If  a  reason  for  the  validity  of  the  above  principle  be  asked  for,  an  answer 
can  very  readily  be  given.  When  any  object  whatever  is  directly  and  imme- 
diately manifested  to  the  knowing  faculty  as  a  real  existence  possessed  of  cer- 
tain manifested  qualities,  the  fact  of  such  manifestation  must  be  held  as  ab- 
solute proof  of  the  reality  of  the  object  and  characteristics  referred  to,  unless 
reasons  still  more  absolute  exist  for  the  opposite  supposition.  But  no  such 
reasons,  in  any  form  or  degree,  in  the  case  referred  to,  do  or  can  exist.  Exist- 
ence being,  in  itself,  an  absolute  mystery,  no  positive  evidence  of  any  form  or 
degree,  not  even  the  remotest  antecedent  probability,  does  or  can  present  itself, 
that  said  object  does  not  exist,  and  exist  as  manifested  to  the  intelligence ;  and 
the  proof  that  it  does  thus  exist  must  be  held  as  absolute.  Suppose,  for  example, 
that  matter  is  thus  manifest,  as  a  reality,  having  actual  extension  and  form.  As 
the  supposition  that  it  does  thus  exist,  as  such  object,  is  just  as  conceivable,  and 
therefore  just  as  probable  in  itself,  as  the  opposite  supposition,  and  as  we  can 
know  absolutely  nothing  of  the  object  but  as  manifested,  we  have  in  favor  of  its 
existence  as  the  object  referred  to,  and  in  opposition  to  the  opposite  supposition, 
absolute  knowledge  on  the  one  side,  as  opposed  to  the  total  absence  of  all  forms 
and  degrees  of  evidence  on  the  other.  We  violate  all  the  laws  and  principles  of 
science,  when  we  refuse,  in  any  like  instance,  to  admit  the  fact  that  we  are  in 
the  presence  of  a  known  entity,  having  the  actual  qualities  manifested  to  our  in- 
teligence  as  real. 


22  INTRODUCTION. 

wit,  formation,  that  is,  from  pre-existing  materials  pro- 
ducing something  which  had  no  existence  before,  and  es- 
pecially inducing  organization  and  order  from  a  state  of 
disorganization  and  disorder,  —  and  origination,  that  is, 
bringing  into  being  substances  which  had  no  existence  be- 
fore. By  some  of  the  first  thinkers,  such,  for  example,  as 
Sir  William  Hamilton,  the  possibility  of  creation,  in  this 
last  sense,  has  been  denied.  They  affirm  that  the  true 
meaning  of  the  undeniable  principle,  Ex  nihilo  nihil  fit,  is 
not  this,  that  non-beiug  cannot  originate  any  real  existing 
substance,  but  that  no  power  whatever  can,  from  nothing, 
produce  a  real  substance  which,  as  a  substance,  did  not 
exist  before.  On  reflection,  it  will  appear  undeniable,  that 
the  possibility  of  creation  in  this  sense  is,  to  say  the  least, 
to  our  minds  absolutely  inconceivable.  Power,  in  the  only 
form  in  which  we  can  conceive  of  it,  is  a  relative  term,  and 
supposes  an  object  upon  which  it  may  be  exerted.  Let  us 
suppose  a  power  absolutely  infinite  to  exist,  and  that  ab- 
solutely alone,  no  other  substance  whatever  having  beiug. 
It  is  undeniable,  that  there  are  but  two  directions  conceiv- 
able or  possible  in  which  this  power  can  act.  In  the  first 
place,  its  direction  may  be  internal,  that  is,  upon  the  sub- 
ject itself.  In  that  case,  the  result  would  be  simply  and 
exclusively  a  change  of  state  in  said  subject.  If  this 
change  of  subjective  state  is  called  creation,  it  would  be  a 
creation  according  to  the  principles  of  Pantheism.  Or  we 
may  suppose  the  direction  of  the  action  under  consideration 
to  be  outward,  or  in  the  direction  out  of  the  subject.  But 
here  absolutely  nothing,  or  nonentity,  exists  as  an  object 
of  power.  What  can  be  made  of  this  nonentity  ?  Is  it 
conceivable  that  real  being  can  be  drawn  from  non-being, 
real  substance  from  absolute  nonentity?     If  such  power 


INTRODUCTION.  23 

does  exist  in  the  divine  nature,  the  fact  can  become  known 
to  us  only  by  express  revelation.  The  idea  of  creation  in 
this  sense,  therefore,  does  not  belong  to  our  present  in- 
quiries, in  which  we  determine  the  evidence  of  the  being  of 
God,  and  not  truths  which,  if  they  are  such,  can  be  knowu 
to  us  but  by  an  express  revelation  from  God  already  known 
as  existing.  Facts  of  creation,  in  the  former  sense  of  the 
term,  to  wit,  that  of  formation,  constitute  the  exclusive 
basis  of  all  our  deductions  in  Natural  Theology.  It  is  of 
the  highest  importance  that  this  principle  be  kept  distinctly 
in  mind,  in  all  our  investigations  and  deductions.  We 
shall  employ  the  terms  creation  and  creator  in  accordance 
with  this  one  idea  exclusively,  excepting  in  cases  when 
their  use,  according  to  the  former  idea,  is,  at  the  time, 
expressly  indicated.* 

Origin  and  genesis  of  the  systems  of  Antitlieism  explained. 

The  origin  and  genesis  of  the  various  systems  of  Anti- 
theism  now  admit  of  a  ready  explanation.  They  all  rest] 
upon  an  absolute  denial  of  the  possibility  of  creation,  in 
any  other  than  the  one  sense  exclusively,  that  of  forma- 
tion. Then  they  all,  the  s}^stem  of  Ideal  Dualism  excepted, 
assume,  as  a  first  truth,  and  the  basis  of  all  subsequent 
deductions,  the  original  existence  of  but  one  substance  with 
its  inhering  laws.     Facts  of  creation,  then,  must  be  the 

*  The  principle  which  we  have  laid  down  is  identical  with  that  really  assumed 
by  Paley  and  other  writers  on  Natural  Theology.  They  base  their  deductions 
upon  relations  of  existence,  and  not  upon  the  mere  fact  that  objects  exist.  The 
latter  principle  Paley  formally  repudiates.  So,  in  reality,  does  the  whole  design 
argument.  That  we  may  not  be  misunderstood  here,  we  would  say,  that  we  do  not 
deny  the  power  in-God  of  creation  in  the  sense  of  origination.  What  we  main- 
tain is  this,  that  this  attribute,  if  it  exists,  can  become  known  to  us  only  by 
special  revelation.  The  evidence  of  the  being  of  God,  therefore,  is  not  to  be 
argued  from  the  mere  fact  that  something  else  exists,  but  from  the  relations  of 
existing  things. 


24  INTRODUCTION. 

exclusive  result  of  the  actiou  of  said  substance  upon  itself 
through  and  in  accordance  with  said  laws.  If  matter  be 
assumed  as  this  substance,  then  creation  is  nothing  but  the 
phenomena  of  matter  self-developed  through  its  own  inher- 
ing laws,  and  we  have  the  system  of  material  Pantheism. 
If  we  assume  the  real  existence  of  two  and  only  two  un- 
known and  unknowable  somethings,  as  constituting  all  that 
really  exists,  and  that  the  phenomena  of  creation  are  the 
exclusive  results  of  the  mutual  action  and  reaction  of  these 
two  entities  (noumena)  upon  each  other,  we  then  have  the 
system  of  Ideal  Dualism,  of  which  Kant  is  the  great  ex- 
pounder. If,  in  connection  with  the  maxim  that  no  new 
substance  can  be  originated,  we  assume  spirit  to  be  the  only 
reality,  two  systems  arise.  We  may  assume  the  I,  the  sub- 
ject, to  be  this  reality.  Creation,  with  all  its  facts,  would 
then  be  nothing  but  the  phenomena  of  this  subject  in  its 
process  of  self-development.  Hence  arises  the  system  of 
Subjective  Idealism  of  which  Fichte  is  the  prominent  rep- 
resentative. Or  we  may  assume  the  Absolute  to  be  this 
sole  reality.  Creation,  with  all  its  facts,  would  then  be  the 
phenomena  of  this  one  substance  in  its  processes  of  self- 
evolution,  and  we  have  the  system  of  Pantheism  proper,  of 
which  Schelling  is  the  great  modern  expounder.  Or,  finally, 
we  ma}''  assume  that  thought  itself,  with  its  inhering  laws,  is 
this  sole  existence.  Creation,  with  all  its  facts,  would,  in 
that  case,  be  nothing  but  the  phenomena  of  pure  thought  in 
its  processes  of  self-development.  This  gives  us  the  sys- 
tem of  Pure  Idealism,  of  which  Hegel  is  the  great  modern 
expounder.  Each  of  these  s}Tstems  is  the  logical  conse- 
quence of  the  one  principle,  that  Creation,  in  the  sense  of 
origination  of  substance  from  non-being,  is  an  absolute 
impossibility,  and  of  the  peculiar  and  special  assumption 


INTRODUCTION.  25 

of  said  S3Tstem,  in  regard  to  what  does  originally  exist  as 
the  sole  and  exclusive  reality.  Grant  to  any  one  of  these 
systems  this  principle  and  its  own  assumption  in  respect  to 
what  is  the  original  and  sole  reality,  and  all  its  subsequent 
deductions  follow  by  a  logical  necessity. 

The  fundamental  error  that  lies  at  the  basis  of  each  and 
all  of  these  systems  is  this,  the  assumption,  that  if  the  prin- 
ciple that  creation,  in  the  sense  of  origination  from  noth- 
ing, is  an  absolute  impossibility,  be  granted,  then  but  one 
substance,  or  at  most  but  the  two  unknown  and  unknow- 
able entities  of  Kant,  do  or  can  exist.  Now,  the  question 
what  substances  do,  in  fact,  exist,  has  no  connection  what- 
ever with  that  of  the  validity  or  non-validity  of  the  princi- 
ple under  consideration.  Suppose  we  should  affirm  that 
because  creation  from  nothing  is  an  impossibilit}',  therefore 
no  substance  or  reality  at  all  can  or  does  exist.  What  con- 
nection is  there  between  the  premise  and  conclusion  in  such 
a  case  ?  Just  as  much  as  between  the  same  principle  and 
the  assumption  that,  therefore,  there  is  but  "  one  principle 
of  all  things,"  or  but  two,  according  to  Kant.  Grant  the 
principle  in  all  its  force,  and,  for  all  this,  there  may  be, 
notwithstanding,  a  creation  constituted  of  two  distinct  and 
opposite  entities,  matter  and  spirit,  a  creation  originated 
and  presided  over  by  one  all-wise  and  all-perfect  creator, 
God.  The  questions  whether  creation  from  nothing  is  pos- 
sible, and  what  realities  do  in  fact  exist,  are  questions 
totally  independent  of  each  other,  and  the  solution  of  the 
one  has  no  connection  whatever  with  that  of  the  other. 
Each  is  to  be  investigated  upoir totally  independent  grounds. 
When  we  raise  the  question,  what  realities  do  in  fact  exist, 
we  have  but  one  principle  to  guide  us,  to  wit,  whatever  is 
directly  and  immediately  manifested  as  existing,  and  all 
3 


2  5  INTR  OD  UCTION. 

realities  implied  by  those  thus  manifested,  and  none  others, 
must  be  admitted  as  real. 

FORMULAS    AND   TEST   OF   VALID    KNOWLEDGE. 

The  question,  What  can  I  know  ?  has  ever  been  regarded 
as  one  of  the  grand  problems  of  philosophy,  and  all  sys- 
tems of  ontology  of  every  kind  —  Realism,  Materialism, 
Idealism,  for  example  —  have,  without  exception,  their  ex- 
clusive basis  in  certain  definite  answers  to  this  one  ques- 
tion. Materialism  affirms  that  we  do  have  valid  knowl- 
edge of  matter,  and  can  have  such  knowledge  of  nothing 
else,  and  hence  denies  the  existence  of  every  affirmed  real- 
ity not  material.  Idealism  affirms  that  nothing  is  or  can 
be,  to  the  knowing  faculty,  an  object  of  real  knowledge, 
but  states  of  the  subject  of  knowledge,  that  real  or  valid 
knowledge  and  its  objects  must  pertain  exclusively  to  one 
and  the  same  subject.  Hence  this  system,  in  all  its  forms, 
Ideal  Dualism  apparently  excepted,  denies  absolutely  the 
possibility  of  valid  knowledge  of  "  things  without  us," 
and  consequently  the  reality  of  external  existences.  Real- 
ism, on  the  other  hand,  affirms  that  we  have,  in  fact,  valid 
knowledge  of  the  subject,  finite  mind,  on  the  one  hand,  of 
the  external  object,  matter,  on  the  other,  and  through  these, 
->f  God,  the  Infinite  and  Perfect,  as  the  creator  and  gov- 
.nor  of  the  universe,  and  that,  consequently,  all  these  are 
to  be  held  as  real  existences.  How  shall  the  claims  of 
these  conflicting  and  totally  incompatible  systems  be  deter- 
mined? On  one  condition  exclusive^.  We  must  have  a 
strictly  universal  and  absolute  criterion  of  valid  knowledge. 
Till  we  have  obtained  such  a  criterion,  we  are  not,  and 
cannot  be,  prepared  to  take,  upon  scientific  grounds,  a  sin- 
gle step  in  the  discussion  of  the  question  before  us.     In 


INTRODUCTION.        „  27 

the  Logic  we  have  attempted  to  meet  this  great  scientific 
want,  by  giving  the  criterion  demanded.  On  account  of 
the  fundamental  bearings  of  this  subject  upon  our  present 
inquiries,  we  will  give  an  extract  which  contains  the  crite- 
rion referred  to  : 

"  Distinction  betiveen  Presentative   and  Representative 
Knowledge. 

"As  preparatory  to  the  solution,  we  would  restate  a 
distinction  made  in  a  previous  department  of  this  treatise 
between  presentative  and  representative  knowledge.  We 
will  give  the  distinction  in  the  language  of  Sir  William 
Hamilton  : 

"  1.  A  thing  is  known  immediately  or  proximately  when 
we  cognize  it  in  itself ;  mediately  or  remotely  when  we  cog- 
nize it  in  or  through  something  numerically  different  from 
itself.  Immediate  cognition  —  thus,  the  knowledge  of  a 
thing  in  itself —  involves  the  fact  of  its  existence  ;  mediate 
cognition  —  thus,  the  knowledge  of  a  thing  in  or  through 
something  not  itself —  involves  only  the  possibility  of  its 
existence. 

"  2.  An  immediate  cognition,  inasmuch  as  the  thing 
known  is  itself  presented  to  observation,  may  be  called  a 
presentative  ;  and  inasmuch  as  the  thing  presented  is,  as  it 
were,  viewed  by  the  mind  face  to  face,  may  be  called  an 
intuitive  cognition.  A  mediate  cognition,  inasmuch  as  the 
thing  known  is  held  up  or  mirrored  to  the  mind  in  a  vica- 
rious representation,  may  be  called  a  representative  cogni- 
tion. 

"  3.  A  thing  known  is  called  an  object  of  knowledge. 

"  4.  In  a  presentative  or  immediate  cognition  there  is 
one   sole  object ;  the  thing  (immediately)  known  and  the 


28  INTRODUCTION. 

thing  existing  being  one  and  the  same.  In  a  representa- 
tive or  mediate  cognition  there  may  be  discriminated  two 
objects,  the  thing  immediately  known  and  the  thing  exist- 
ing being  numerically  different." 

That  we  have  these  two  kinds  of  knowledge,  no  one  does 
or  can  doubt.  Of  some  realities,  to  say  the  least,  we  have 
a  direct  and  immediate  knowledge.  Of  other  realities  our 
knowledge  is  not  direct  and  immediate,  but  indirect  and 
mediate.  All  forms  of  mediate  knowledge,  as  all  admit, 
are  originally  given  through  one  source  —  sensation.  We 
shall  employ  the  words  presentative  knowledge  to  repre- 
sent knowledge  of  the  first  kind,  and  representative  for 
that  of  the  second. 

In  addition  to  these  two  kinds  of  knowledge,  we  have 
two  other  kinds  also,  which  have  the  same  validity  as  these, 
to  wit,  those  truths  which  are  necessarily  presupposed  by 
these  as  their  logical  antecedents,  and  those  which  necessa- 
rily result  from  them  as  logical  consequents.  All  that  is 
logically  presupposed  and  which  logically  follows  from  any 
form  of  knowledge,  must  undeniably  have  the  same  validity 
that  the  latter  has.  No  one  will  or  can  doubt  the  truth  of 
this  principle. 

The  Formula  stated. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  give  a  distinct  statement  of  the 
formula  above  suggested.  It  is  this :  Presentative  knowl- 
edge, ivith  all  its  logical  antecedents  and  consequences,  must  be 
held  as  universally  and  absolutely  valid  for  the  reality  and 
character  of  the  objects  to  which  it  pertains. 

Representative  knowledge,  with  its  logical  antecedents 
and  consequences,  must  be  held  as  relatively  valid.  In 
the  consciousness  of  a  sensation,  for  example,  we  at  once 


introduction:  29 

recognize  the  fact  that  it  had  a  cause  —  a  cause  adequate 
and  adapted,  while  we  remain  constituted  as  we  are,  and 
that  cause  sustains  its  present  relation  to  us,  to  affect  us  as 
it  now  does.  So  far  our  knowledge  of  that  cause,  with  all 
that  is  necessarily  implied  in  its  existence,  must  be  held  as 
having  the  same  validity  that  our  knowledge  of  the  sensa- 
tion has. 

The  test,  the  criterion,  by  which  we  are  to  determine 
whether  any  given  form  of  knowledge  is  presentative,  or 
representative,  is  consciousness.  If  we  are  conscious  of  a 
direct  and  immediate  perception  of  any  object  whatever, 
we  must  admit  that  our  knowledge  of  that  object  is  pre- 
sentative. If  we  are  conscious  of  knowing  the  object 
through  the  medium  of  sensation,  then  our  knowledge  of 
said  object  must  be  held  as  representative. 

The  question  whether  any  particular  cognition  must  bt 
held  as  absolutely  valid  for  the  reality  and  character  of  its 
object,  will  in  reality  stand  thus  : 

Presentative  knowledge,  with  its  logical  antecedents  and 
consequences,  is  universally  and  absolutely  valid  for  the 
real  nature  and  character  of  its  objects. 

These  cognitions  are  or  are  not  constituted  of  this  one 
form  of  knowledge.     Proof —  consciousness. 
These  cognitions,  consequently,  are  or  are  not  thus  valid. 
The  syllogism  of  representative  knowledge  will   stand 
thus: 

Representative  knowledge,  with  its  logical  antecedents 
and  consequences,  is  universally  valid  for  the  relative  char- 
acter of  its  respective  objects. 

These  cognitions  are  or  are  not  constituted  of  this  form 
of  knowledge.     Proof —  consciousness. 
Therefore  they  are  or  are  not  thus  valid. 
3* 


30  INTRODUCTION. 

As  all  cognitions  are,  in  fact,  presentative  or  representa- 
tive, these  formulas  must,  of  necessit}',  include  all  forms 
of  knowledge.  The  only  question  which  here  arises  is 
this :  Are  these  formulas  themselves  really  valid  for  the 
high  purpose  here  assigned  to  them  ?  That  they  are,  we 
argue  from  the  following  considerations  : 

jTJie  formulas  and  test  verified. 

1.  We  must  admit  their  absolute  and  universal  validity, 
or  deny  that  of  all  knowledge  of  every  kind.  Presentative 
is,  in  fact,  the  highest  form  of  knowledge  of  which  we  can, 
by  any  possibility,  form  any  conception.  Its  validity  can 
be  denied  on  but  one  condition,  the  impeachment  of  the 
integrity  of  the  intelligence  itself  as  a  faculty  of  knowl- 
edge, and  pronouncing  the  idea  of  valid  knowledge  on  any 
subject  whatever  an  absolute  chimera. 

2.  No  other  formulas  and  test  beside  these  are  even 
conceivable.  We  must,  consequently,  admit  their  validity, 
or  affirm,  that  if  valid  or  invalid  cognitions  do  exist,  we 
have  no  criteria  bj-  which  we  can  distinguish  one  class  from 
the  other.  Those  who  deny  the  validity  of  these,  are  bound 
to  furnish  some  others  possessing  really  valid  claims.  This, 
we  are  quite  confident,  they  will  never  even  attempt  to 
do. 

3.  Every  form  and  system  of  knowledge,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  admits  the  validity  of  these  formulas  and  test  in  cer- 
tain cases, — in  all  cases  where  they  profess  to  find  valid 
knowledge,  —  and  all  profess  to  find  such  as  far  as  their  own 
fundamental  principles  and  deductions  are  concerned.  No 
one  will  deny  these  statements.  Now  the  validity  of  these 
formulas  and  test  is  to  be  admitted  universally,  or  denied  uni- 
versally.    If  one  form  of  knowledge  given  in  conciousness 


INTIi  OD  UCTION.  3 1 

as  presentative,  and  for  the  reason  that  it  is  thus  given,  is 
to  be  received  as  valid  for  the  nature  and  character  of  its 
object,  —  and  all  admit  that  some  forms  thus  given  are 
thus  valid,  and  none  pretend  that  any  form  not  thus  given 
is  thus  valid,  and  that  any  form  of  knowledge  can  be  valid 
for  any  other  reason,  —  if  any  form  of  knowledge  given 
in  consciousness  as  presentative,  is,  we  say,  for  the  reason 
that  it  is  thus  given,  to  be  regarded  as  valid,  every  other 
form  thus  given  must  be  regarded  as  thus  valid ;  or  we 
make  a  discrimination  without  a  difference,  and  assume 
that  things  which  are  equal  to  the  same  things  may  not  be 
equal  to  each  other.  With  these  considerations  the  sub- 
ject is  left  to  the  reflection  of  the  thoughtful  reader. 

The  validity  of  the  above  formulas  and  test  can  be  denied 
but  upon  one  sole  condition,  the  assumption  that  the  intelli- 
gence itself  is  a  lie,  and  that  it  is  perfectly  absurd  to  attempt 
to  obtain  real  knowledge  on  any  subject  whatever.  If  knowl- 
edge which  pertains,  by  direct  and  immediate  intuition  or  per- 
ception, to  its  object,  is  not  to  be  held  as  valid  for  the  exist- 
ence and  character  of  said  object,  no  other  form  can  be  re- 
garded, without  absurdity,  as  possessed  of  any  degree  of 
validity  whatever.  These  formulas  and  test,  we  would  also 
remark,  must  be  regarded  as  having  absolutely  universal 
validity,  or  none  at  all,  on  any  subject.  No  conceivable 
reasons  can  be  assigned  why  presentative  knowledge,  for 
example,  should  have  validity  in  any  one  case,  and  not  equal 
validity  in  every  other.  These  criteria,  then,  are  to  be 
denied  universally,  or  admitted  universally.  None  will 
dare  deny  their  absolute  validity  in  certain  cases.  We 
must,  therefore,  admit  their  universal  validity,  or  involve 
ourselves  in  the  most  palpable  absurdity  and  contradiction. 


32  INTRODUCTION. 


Bearing   of  these  principles  upon  the   Conflicting  Syste?ns 
■under  consideration. 

Yet  the  admission  of  the  validity  of  these  criteria  enables 
us  to  settle,  at  once  and  forever,  and  that  upon  purely 
scientific  grounds,  the  conflicting  claims  of  the  systems 
above  named,  to  wit,  Realism,  Materialism,  and  Idealism 
in  all  its  forms.  That  we  are  distinctly  and  absolute^ 
conscious  of  a  direct  and  immediate,  that  is,  presentative 
knowledge  of  matter  as  a  substance  possessed  of  the  quali- 
ties of  extension  and  form,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  mind 
as  a  distinct  and  separate  substance,  possessed  of  the  powers 
of  thought,  feeling,  and  voluntary  determination,  on  the 
other,  no  one  will  deny.  The  reality  of  these  two  sub- 
stances, as  distinct,  and  separate,  and  also  toiown,  entities, 
must  be  admitted  as  truths  of  science,  and  as  such,  laid  at 
the  basis  of  all  our  deductions.  Realism,  consequently, 
stands  revealed  as  a  system  whose  validity  has  been  demon- 
strated on  scientific  grounds  ;  and  Materialism,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  Idealism  in  all  its  forms,  on  the  other,  as  s}ts- 
tems  demonstrated,  upon  similar  grounds,  to  be  false. 
Neither  the  one  nor  the  other  of  these  S3rstems  last  referred 
to,  can,  by  any  possibility,  be  true,  if  presentative  knowl- 
edge, with  all  its  logical  antecedents  and  consequences,  is 
to  be  held  as  valid  for  the  reality  and  character  of  its  ob- 
jects ;  and  the  question  whether  our  knowledge  of  matter, 
On  the  one  hand,  and  of  mind  on  the  other,  is  of  this  char- 
acter, is  to  be  decided  by  an  appeal  to  consciousness,  and 
if  the  validity  of  this  formula  and  test  is  admitted  ;  and  it 
cannot  be  denied,  the  system  of  Realism  must  be  true. 


INTRODUCTION.  33 

Bearing  of  these  deductions  upon  our  present  Inquiries. 

In  thus  demonstrating,  upon  scientific  grounds,  the  valid- 
ity of  the  claims  of  Realism,  in  opposition  to  all  othc 
systems  incompatible  with  it,  we  have  practically  settled 
and  established  the  claims  of  Theism  in  opposition  to  Anti- 
theism  in  all  its  forms.  The  validity  of  the  claims  of  The- 
ism has  never,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  in  any  age  of  the  world's 
history,  been  denied,  or  questioned  even,  but  upon  one  ex- 
clusive condition,  the  confounding  of  the  distinction  between 
matter  and  spirit  as  distinct,  and  separate,  and  known  en- 
tities, and  resolving  all  existences  into  matter  and  its  laws, 
on  the  one  hand,  or  into  spirit  or  its  phenomena,  on  the 
other.  Admitting  the  real  existence  of  these  two  sub- 
stances, as  distinct,  and  separate,  and  known  entities,  and 
the  argument  for  the  divine  existence  becomes  so  obviously 
demonstrative,  that  no  Antitheist  would,  for  a  moment, 
think  of  joining  issue  with  the  advocate  of  Theism. 

On  the  other  hand,  let  us  suppose  that  this  distinction  is 
confounded,  in  the  first  instant,  by  resolving  all  realities 
into  matter.  What  place  have  we,  then,  for  a  God  ?  What 
idea  will  the  term,  then,  represent?  Nothing  but  an  in- 
hering law  of  this  one  substance.  This  is  undeniable,  and 
the  advocate  of  Materialism  is  well  aware  of  the  fact. 
Hence,  the  tenacity  with  which  he  adheres  to  his  system. 

Let  us  suppose  again  that  this  distinction  is  confounded 
by  resolving  all  realities  into  spirit  or  its  phenomena.  In 
that  case,  the  intelligence  itself,  in  having  so  absolutely 
affirmed  the  distinct  and  separate  existence  of  itself,  as 
the  subject,  and  of  matter  as  the  object  of  presentative 
knowledge  in  external  perception,  is  so  undeniably  con- 
victed of  fundamental  error,  that  it  stands  unmasked  before 


3  4  INTR  OD  UCTION. 

the  world  as  nothing  else  than  a  "  liar  from  the  beginning," 
and  all  attempts  to  arrive  at  truth  through  its  intuitions  or 
deductions,  on  any  subject  whatever,  become  absurd  and 
ridiculous.  We  have  before  us  no  actually  existing  nature 
of  which  we  can  know  or  afUrm  anything  certain,  and 
through  which,  consequent1^,  we  can  "  travel  up  to  nature's 
God."  All  we  can  say  of  God  is,  that  he  is  the  internal 
principle  of  we  know  not,  and  cannot  know  what,  a  mere 
"regulative  idea"  of  no  objective  validity  whatever,  or  a 
simple  law  of  thought,  and  no  distinct  and  separate,  much 
less  self-conscious,  existence,  whatever. 

Once  more,  we  raay  suppose  the  distinction  under  con- 
sideration confounded  by  the  affirmation  of  the  reality  of 
two  wholly  unknown  and  unknowable  entities,  called  the 
subject  and  object.  This  is  the  system  of  Ideal  Dualism. 
According  to  its  fundamental  teachings,  the  universe  given 
in  our  intelligence  as  real  has  no  existence  out  of  the  intel- 
ligence itself.  The  God  given  b}^  such  a  universe  can  be 
nothing  but  a  "regulative  idea,"  a  wholly  subjective  law 
of  thought.  If  from  this  universe  we  turn  our  thoughts  to 
the  somethings  assumed  as  really  existing,  as  these  by  the 
hypothesis  are  in  themselves  wholty  unknown  and  must  re- 
main so,  they  afford  no  basis  whatever  for  any  deductions 
of  any  kind,  on  any  subject.  Whether  they  are  created  or 
uncreated,  controlled  or  uncontrolled  objects,  and,  conse- 
quently, whether  any  such  creator  or  governor  exists,  on 
this  and  all  other  subjects,  we  can  know  absolutely  nothing, 
and  of  course  can  draw  from  them  no  deductions  whatever 
relatively  to  the  being  or  character  of  God. 

Such  are  the  necessary  logical  consequences  of  confound- 

\ing  the  distinction  under  consideration.     They  are  nothing 

less  than  an  utter  subversion  of  religion  in  all  its  forms, 


INTRODUCTION.  35 

and,  we  may  add,  of  truth  itself  on  all  subjects  alike.  Grant- 
ing the  distinction  to  be  real,  however,  admitting  the  ex- 
istence of  both  matter  and  spirit  as  wholly  distinct,  separate, 
opposite,  and,  at  the  same  time,  known  entities,  and  the 
claims  of  Theism  then  stand  out  visibly,  as  having  a  basis 
no  less  immovable  than  eternal  rock.  To  us  it  has  ap- 
peared a  matter  of  surprise,  that  the  advocates  of  the  truth 
have  not  seemed  to  perceive  how  perfectly  fundamental 
this  one  distinction  is  to  the  validity  of  the  theistic  argu- 
ment, in  all  its  forms.  The  validity  of  this  distinction  has, 
we  believe,  been  settled  upon  scientific  grounds.  For  the 
sake  of  distinctness  we  will  give  the  argument  upon  the 
subject  in  the  syllogistic  form. 

Presentative  knowledge,  with  its  logical  antecedents  and 
consequents,  must  be  held  as  universally  valid  for  the 
nature  and  character  of  its  objects,  and  whatever  form  of 
knowledge  is  given  in  consciousness  as  presentative,  must 
be  held  as  such. 

Our  knowledge  of  matter  and  spirit,  as  distinct  and  sep- 
arate entities,  the  former  as  having  real  extension  and  form, 
and  the  latter  as  possessed  of  the  powers  of  thought,  feel- 
ing, and  voluntary  determination,  is  given  in  consciousness 
as  exclusively  presentative. 

This  knowledge  is,  therefore,  valid  for  the  reality  and 
character  of  said  objects,  and  they  must,  as  the  basis  of  all 
our  deductions,  be  held  as  distinct,  and  separate,  and  known 
entities,  having  the  real  qualities  referred  to. 

This  conclusion  can  be  evaded  but  by  a  denial  of  the 
validity  of  the  major  premise  of  this  S}ilogism,  and  no  man 
can  deny  its  validity  but  by  falsifying  his  own  immutable 
convictions  of  what  is  and  must  be  true,  without  falsifying 
his  own  denial  the  moment  he  begins  to  reason  on  any  sub- 


36 


INTRODUCTION. 


jeet  whatever,  and  without  rendering  it  absurd  for  him 
to  attempt  to  reason  on  any  subject.  Those  who  would  see 
this  whole  subject  fully  discussed  are  referred  to  the  article 
on  Sense,  in  the  Intellectual  Philosophy,  and  to  Part  IV.  in 
the  Science  of  Logic,  and  also  to  what  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton has  published  on  this  fundamental  subject.  We  think 
we  are  quite  safe  in  saying,  that  the  opposers  of  Theism 
will  never  join  issue  with  the  argument,  as  presented  in 
either  of  the  works  above  referred  to ;  nor  will  they  ever 
attempt  to  invalidate  the  claims  of  Theism  but  by  con- 
founding the  distinction,  which,  in  said  works,  is  demon- 
strated to  be  real. 

FIEST    TRUTHS    AND    PRINCIPLES     OF    SCIENCE,   AND     ASSUMP- 
TIONS  EMPLOYED   AS    SUCH   TRUTHS. 

Every  thinker  is  aware  that  there  is  a  fundamental  dis- 
tinction between  first  truths,  or  principles  of  science,  that 
is,  universal  and  necessary  intuitive  (analytical)  judgments, 
and  mere  assumptions  employed  as  such  truths  in  the  con- 
struction of  professed  systems  of  science.  Every  such 
person  is  also  equally  aware  of  the  fact,  that  while  the 
former  class  of  judgments  have  universal  and  absolute  va- 
lidity, as  the  basis  of  deductions  which  are  to  be  regarded 
as  having  correspondingly  absolute  validity  for  truth,  any 
deductions  arising  from  the  latter  class  of  judgments  have 
no  validity  for  truth  whatever.  Yet  nothing  is  more  com- 
mon in  the  construction  of  systems  of  knowledge  than  the 
confounding  of  these  two  classes  of  judgments,  employing 
the  latter  as  belonging  to  the  former  class.  Hence  the  vast 
importance  of  universal  criteria,  by  which  we  can  scien- 
tifically distinguish  the  one  class  of  judgments  from  the 
other.     These  criteria  we  have  attempted  to  furnish  in  the 


INTRODUCTION.  37 

Logic,  and,  on  account  of  their  fundamental  bearings  upon 
our  present  inquiries,  will  here  repeat  the  substance  of  what 
is  there  fully  elucidated. 

What,  then,  is  an  analytical  judgment  (first  truth),  as 
distinguished  from  mere  assumptions  ?  It  is  a  judgment 
whose  certainty  is  immediately  evinced  by  an  anatysis  of, 
or  reflection  on,  the  conceptions  constituting  the  subject  and 
predicate  of  the  judgment  itself.  Those  judgments  which 
are  evincible  only  through  other  and  more  elementary  ones, 
are  called  synthetical  judgments.  All  analytical  judg- 
ments, those  having  immediate  and  intuitive  certainty,  will 
be  found  to  be  comprehended  in  one  or  the  other  of  the 
following  classes :  1.  Those  in  which  the  predicate  rep- 
resents an  essential  or  known  and  admitted  quality  of  the 
subject,  as  in  the  judgment,  All  bodies  are  extended. 
The  predicate,  in  this  case,  represents  a  necessary  quality 
and  element  of  the  subject,  it  being  impossible  for  us  to 
conceive  of  a  body  which  has  not  extension.  Such  judg- 
ments, therefore,  are  analytical,  that  is,  have  and  must  have, 
from  a  mere  analysis  of  the  subject  and  predicate,  intuitive 
certainty.  2.  Those  in  which  the  predicate  is  the  logical 
antecedent  of  the  subject,  that  is,  when  the  reality  of  the 
object  represented  by  the  former  conception  is  necessarily 
implied  by  the  reality  of  that  represented  by  the  latter ;  as 
in  the  judgment,  Body  implies  space.  The  fundamental 
conception  that  we  have  of  body,  is  that  of  an  object  exist- 
ing in,  and  occupying  space.  If  body  exists,  therefore, 
space  must  exist.  Hence  the  proposition,  Body  implies 
space,  has  necessary,  intuitive  certainty ;  that  is,  it  is  an 
analytical  judgment.  So  of  the  judgments,  Succession  im- 
plies time,  Events,  a  cause,  and  Phenomena,  substance, 
&c.  3.  We  may  reckon  as  belonging  to  the  same  class, 
4 


38  INTRODUCTION, 

those  judgments  in  which,  by  definition,  there  is  an  intui- 
tive incompatibility  between  the  subject  and  predicate,  and 
when  the  judgment  affirms  this  incompatibility.  Of  this 
character  is  the  judgment,  A  straight  line  cannot  inclose 
space.  By  definition  the  predicate  represents  a  portion  of 
space  included  within  a  line  which  departs  from  a  given 
point  in  certain  directions,  by  which  it  returns  to  the  point 
of  departure.  A  straight  line,  on  the  other  hand,  is  one 
which  never  returns  to  said  point,  but  always  advances  to 
greater  and  greater  distances  from  it.  The  idea  of  a 
straight  line,  therefore,  and  of  one  including  space,  are  in- 
compatible with  each  other,  and  cannot  be  predicated  of 
the  same  subject ;  and  the  judgment  affirming  this  incom- 
patibility is  analytical,  having  necessary  intuitive  certainty. 
This  last  class  is  not  referred  to  in  the  Logic,  and  is  here 
adduced  for  the  sake  of  distinctness. 

Now,  we  affirm  that,  upon  no  other  conditions,  actual  or 
conceivable,  than  the  above,  can  any  judgment  have  intui- 
tive certainty,  and  consequently  have  any  validity,  when 
employed  as  a  first  truth  or  principle  of  science,  and  we 
have  here  the  scientific  criteria  of  all  such  truths,  those 
criteria  given  by  Dr.  Reid  and  others,  being  rather  acci- 
dents than  scientific  characteristics  of  such  truths.  What 
now  are  the  essential  characteristics  of  assumptions  as 
distinguished  from  such  truths  ?  We  answer :  An  as- 
sumption is  a  judgment  not  known  to  be  true,  but  employed  in 
the  constructioyi  of  systems  of  knowledge,  as  a  first  truth  or 
principle,  that  is,  a  judgment  having  necessary  intuitive  cer- 
tainty, or  one  evinced  as  true.  Every  such  judgment  will 
possess  one  or  the  other  of  the  following  characteristics  : 
1.  It  may  be  a  problematical  judgment  which  is  true  in 
itself,  but  whose  truth  has  not  yet  been  ascertained.  2.    It 


INTRODUCTION.  39 

may  be  a  judgment  which,  whether  true  or  false,  cannot  be 
proved  to  be  true.  3.  It  may  be  a  judgment  which  is,  in 
fact,  false,  and  one  the  error  of  which  can  be  established,  it 
being  in  itself  contradictory,  or  undeniably  incompatible 
with  some  other  judgment  known  to  be  true.  Suppose  that 
any  of  the  above  classes  of  judgments  be  employed  as  prin- 
ciples, or  as  ascertained  truths,  in  the  construction  of  sys- 
tems of  knowledge.  Such  systems  are  nothing  but  logical 
fictions,  and  we  are  false  to  all  the  demands  of  science 
upon  us,  if  we  give  them  any  higher  place  in  our  regard. 
All  deductions  arising  from  such  judgments  are  fallacies 
and  nothing  else.  "We  will  elucidate  these  distinctions  by 
a  few  examples. 

Tlie  fundamental  distinction  between  true  and  false  systems 
of  Knowledge  or  /Science. 

We  will  suppose  that  two  professed  systems  of  science 
are  before  us,  each  possessing  equal  claims  with  the  other, 
as  far  as  accuracy  of  definition,  perfection  of  logical  divis- 
ion, and  arraugement  of  topics,  and  logical  connection  with 
the  assumed  principles  which  lie  at  the  basis  of  the  deduc- 
tions throughout,  are  concerned.  Yet  one  system  presents 
and  embodies  throughout  nothing  but  important  truth,  and 
the  other  is,  throughout,  fraught  with  fundamental  error, 
or  with  deductions  which  have  no  claim  to  validity.  What 
are  the  fundamental  differences  between  these  systems  ? 

In  regard  to  the  former,  it  will  be  found  to  possess  the 
following  essential  characteristics:  1.  The  principles  On 
which  the  whole  superstructure  is  based,  and  from  which 
all  its  conclusions  are  deduced,  are  exclusively  analytical 
judgments,  necessary  intuitive  judgments,  which  can,  by 
no  possibility,  be  false.      2.  All  its  deductions  are    the 


40  INTRODUCTION. 

necessary  logical  consequents  of  these  principles,  and  the 
fundamental  and  well-ascertained  facts  ranged  under  said 
principles.  3.  Hence  all  such  deductions  legitimately  take 
rank  as  truths  of  science.  The  above  are  the  immutable 
characteristics  of  all  systems  of  knowledge  scientifically 
developed,  and  no  deductions  not  resting  upon  such  a  basis 
can  have  any  claims  whatever  to  be  regarded  as  truths  of 
science,  that  is,  real  truths. 

In  examining  systems  of  the  second  class,  we  shall  find, 
that  however  fixed  the  connections  may  be  between  their 
deductions  and  the  facts  adduced,  and  the  assumed  princi- 
ples under  which  said  facts  are  ranged,  all  such  systems 
have  one  or  the  other  of  the  two  following  characteristics : 
1.  The  facts  adduced  are  unreal,  or  not  properly  authen- 
ticated. 2.  The  principles  assumed  as  known,  first,  or 
ascertained  truths  of  science,  are  mere  assumptions,  with 
no  claims  to  validity  whatever.  Hence  said  systems  stand 
revealed  as  nothing  but  logical  fictions. 

Fundamental  and  common  assumption  of  Materialism  and 
Idealism. 

In  examining  fundamentally  the  system  of  Materialism, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  of  Idealism  in  all  its  forms,  on  the 
other,  we  shall  find  that  both  systems  alike,  Ideal  Dualism 
apparently  excepted,  rest  upon  one  and  the  same  assump- 
tion, to  wit,  that  when  we  pass  from  phenomena  to  sub- 
stance (real  being),  or  from  the  facts  of  the  universe  to  the 
substratum  (real  existences)  which  underlie  and  determine 
these  facts,  that  there  really  and  truly  exists  but  one  sub- 
stance, a  substance  which  remains  ever  one  and  the  same 
amid  the  ever-varying  phenomena  which  it  exhibits,  and 
that  these  phenomena  or  facts  are  nothing  but  the  necessaiy 


INTRODUCTION,  41 

results  of  the  necessary  activity  of  this  one  substance  in 
its  self-necessitated  processes  of  self-evolution  and  self- 
development.  Such  is  the  principle.  What  are  its  funda- 
mental characteristics  ?    To  this  inquiry  we  answer  : 

1.  It  is  not  in  any  form  an  analytical  judgment,  that  is,' 
a  self-evident,  intuitive,  and  consequently  universal  and 
necessary  truth.  Let  us  look,  for  a  moment,  on  the  propo- 
sition itself,  to  wit,  the  phenomena  of  nature,  or  the  facts 
of  the  universe,  are  nothing  but  the  manifested  results  of 
one  single  substance  in  its  self-necessitated  processes  of 
self-evolution  and  self-development.  Is  there  any  neces- 
sary connection  between  the  subject  and  predicate  of  this 
judgment?  Does  the  predicate  represent  a  necessary  ele- 
ment of  the  subject  ?  In  other  words,  do  the  facts  of  the 
universe,  by  necessary  implication,  imply  the  existence  of 
one  and  but  one  substance,  and  contradict  ever}'  other  sup- 
position? Oris  the  conception  represented  by  the  predi- 
cate of  this  proposition,  the  logical  antecedent  of  that  rep- 
resented by  the  subject?  In  other  words,  is  the  reality  of 
the  object  represented  by  the  predicate  of  this  proposition, 
the  idea  that  but  one  substance  does  exist,  necessarily  im- 
plied by  the  supposition  that  the  facts  represented  by  the 
subject  are  realities,  and  supposed  for  the  same  reason  that 
the  reality  of  space  is  necessarily  implied  in  the  supposi- 
tion that  body  really  exists  ?  No  one  will  dare  pretend  to 
believe  any  such  thing.  If  the  proposition  before  us  is 
true,  no  one  will  pretend  that  its  truth  is  self-evident.  It 
has,  then,  no  claims  to  take  rank  as  a  first  truth  of  science. 

2.  Nor  is  the  truth  of  this  principle,  capable  of  being 
established  by  any  process  of  argumentation.  There  is  no 
self-evident  truth  lying  back  of  this  proposition,  nor  any 
facts  falling  under  such  truth,  from  which  the  validity  of 

4* 


42  INTRODUCTION. 

any  such  proposition  as  this  can  be  logically  deduced.  This 
is  self-evident,  and  will  not  be  denied.  What  have  we, 
then,  in  the  proposition  before  us?  Nothing  but  a  mere 
assumption,  an  assumption  which  is  not,  and  cannot,  by 
any  possibility,  be  known  to  be  true.  All  the  deductions 
based  upon  it,  therefore,  are  nothing  else  but  logical  fic- 
tions, without  any  claims  to  validity  whatever. 

3.  But  this  is  not  the  worst  that  can  truly  be  said  of 
this  baseless  assumption.  It  has,  we  remark,  in  the  next 
place,  no  antecedent  or  deductive  probability  even,  in  its  fa- 
vor. Of  these  two  substances,  matter  and  spirit,  it  is  just 
as  antecedently  probable  that  one  exists,  as  that  the  other 
exists,  and  just  as  probable,  in  itself,  that  both  exist  to- 
gether, as  that  one  exists  alone.  This  is  absolutely  unde- 
niable. The  supposition  that  the  Finite  exists  presents  no 
antecedent  probability  against  the  supposition  that  the  Infi- 
nite and  Perfect  exists  also.  Nor  does  the  supposition  that 
the  latter  exists,  involve  the  least  antecedent  probability 
against  the  supposition  that  the  former  also  exists,  and  the 
supposition  that  both  exist  is  just  as  probable  in  itself  as 
the  hypothesis  that  one  exists  alone.  Existence  in  all  its 
forms,  we  should  ever  bear  in  mind,  is  a  profound  mystery. 
We  know  that  realities  do  exist.  Beyond  the  mere  fact  of 
their  existence,  actual  nature,  and  relations,  we  know  and 
can  know  absolutely  nothing.  Of  all  conceivable  forms  of 
existence,  not  involving  a  contradiction,  the  supposition 
that  any  one  form  is  real  is  just  as  antecedently  probable 
as  the  hypothesis  that  any  other  is,  and  the  hypothesis  that 
all  actually  exist  is  just  as  antecedently  probable  as  any 
other  hypothesis  upon  the  subject.  The  hypothesis  of  one 
and  only  one  real  substance,  substratum  of  all  things,  has 
not  a  shadow  of  antecedent  probability  in  its  favor. 


INTRODUCTION.  43 

4.  There  is,  on  the  other  hand,  the  highest  antecedent 
probability  against  this  hypothesis.  How  a  substance  ab- 
solulety  simple,  without  separable  parts,  with  nothing  else* 
in  existence  upon  which  it  may  act,  and  by  which  it  may 
be  acted  upon,  should  act  at  all,  in  any  direction  whatever, 
is,  of  all  suppositions,  the  most  incomprehensible.  The 
supposition  of  a  process  of  self-evolution  or  self-develop- 
ment in  such  a  substance,  makes  an  approach,  to  say  the 
least,  towards  the  principle  of  contradiction.  That  two  or 
more  substances  existing  together  should  act  and  react 
upon  each  other,  is  much  more  conceivable,  and  hence  the 
hypothesis,  that  the  facts  of  the  universe  are  the  result  of 
such  form  of  activit}^,  is  far  more  antecedently  probable, 
than  the  supposition  that  they  are  the  result  of  the  action 
of  any  one  single  and  simple  substance,  in  a  process  of 
self-evolution  and  development. 

5.  We  have,  we  remark  finally,  in  every  act  of  external 
perception,  the  most  absolute  knowledge  of  the  fact  that 
this  hypothesis  is  not,  and  cannot  be  true.  In  every  such 
act,  two  distinct,  separate,  and  opposite  substances  stand 
revealed,  with  absolute  distinctness,  to  the  mind,  as  reali- 
ties. Here  are  the  subject  and  object,  "the  me,  and  the  not 
me,"  directly  and  immediately  revealed  to  the  conscious- 
ness, not  as  one  substance,  but  as  two  distinct  and  oppo- 
site realities,  the  knowledge  that  one  exists  being  just  as 
absolute  as  the  knowledge  that  the  other  does,  and  the 
knowledge  that  both,  as  distinct,  separate,  and  opposite, 
entities  exist,  being  just  as  absolute  as  the  knowledge  that 
either  or  any  other  reality  exists  at  all.  Either  the  universal 
intelligence  is  a  lie,  or  this  lrypothesis  is  and  must  be  false. 

Such  is  the  baseless  assumption  before  us,  the  assump- 
tion upon  which  world-makers  have  so  long  been  erecting 


44  INTRODUCTION. 

their  logical  fictions,  and  then  imposing  these  upon  the 
world  as  the  highest  deductions  of  science.  Take  away 
this  one  assumption,  and  we  have  absolutely  no  foundation 
on  which  we  can,  by  any  possibilit}T,  erect  the  superstructure 
of  Materialism,  on  the  one  hand,  or  Idealism,  on  the  other. 

The  special  fundamental  assumption  peculiar  to  Idealism. 

In  addition  to  the  assumption  above  refuted,  there  are 
two  others  peculiar  to  Idealism  in  its  different  forms,  and 
these  are  fundamental  to  its  claims  to  validity.  They  are 
the  two  following  :  that  in  all  instances  of  valid  knowledge 
"  there  is,  1,  a  synthesis  of  being  and  knowing  in  the  J," — 
that  is,  that  the  condition  of  valid  knowledge  is  this,  that 
the  subject  of  knowledge  and  the  object  of  knowledge  are 
always  one  and  identical,  —  in  other  words  still,  that  valid 
knowledge  alwaj^s  pertains  to  the  attributes  or  states  of 
the  subject  of  knowledge,  and  to  nothing  exterior  to  said 
subject ;  or,  2,  that  there  is,  in  all  forms  of  valid  knowl- 
edge, "  an  actual  identity  of  being  and  knowing" — that  is, 
that  knowledge  itself,  and  the  object  of  knowledge,  are 
always  one  and  identical.  Upon  the  former  assumption, 
such  forms  of  Idealism  as  Pantheism  and  Subjective  Ideal- 
ism rest ;  and  upon  the  latter  that  of  Pure  Idealism.  If 
we  grant  the  assumption,  that  there  really  and  truly  exists 
but  one  substance,  or  principle,  of  all  things,  and  that  in 
all  cases  of  valid  knowledge,  the  subject  and  object  of 
knowledge  are  one  and  identical,  then  one  of  the  two  forms 
of  Idealism  first  named  must  be  true.  The  subject  of 
knowledge,  spirit,  must  be  the  only  reality,  and  that  sub- 
ject must  be  one  and  only  one  substance.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  we  grant  the  doctrine  of  one  and  only  one  substance, 


INTRODUCTION.  45 

and  also  the  principle,  that  being  and  knowing  are  one  and 
identical,  —  that  is,  that  thought  and  the  object  of  thought, 
arc,  and  must  be,  one  and  the  same,  —  then  thought  is,  and 
must  be  the  only  reality,  and  Pure  Idealism  is,  and  must 
be,  the  011I37  form  of  real  truth.  Let  us  now  examine  these 
two  assumptions,  that  of  "  a  syn thesis  of  being  and  know- 
ing in  the  I,"  and  that  of  "an  absolute  identity  of  being 
and  knowing."  On  reflection,  it  will  be  seen  at  once  that 
the  same  remarks  made  above  in  regard  to  the  assumption 
of  one  substance  or  principle  of  all  things,  are  equally  ap- 
plicable to  each  of  the  assumptions  before  us. 

1.  Neither  of  these  assumptions  has  the  least  possible 
claims  to  be  regarded  or  employed  as  First  Truths  or  Prin- 
ciples of  science.  If  the}'  are  true,  their  truth  is  not  self- 
evident  ;  in  other  words,  they  have  noue  of  the  character- 
istics whatever  of  analytical  judgments.  How  do  we,  how 
can  we  know,  a  priori,  that  there  may  not  be  two  realities, 
one  sustaining  to  the  other  the  relation  of  a  poiver,  while 
the  latter  sustains  to  the  former  that  of  an  object  of  knowl- 
edge? A  priori  we  do  not  and  cannot  know  that  any 
power  of  knowledge  exists  at  all,  much  less  what  is  its 
nature,  and  the  conditions  of  its  valid  action.  Neither  of 
these  assumptions  has  any  claim  whatever  to  the  place 
which  they  occupy  in  the  different  s^ystems  of  Idealism, 
that  of  principles  in  science,  and  all  the  consequents  de- 
duced from  them  have  no  claims  to  validity  in  any  form. 

2.  Nor  can  the  validity  of  either  of  these  assumptions,  as 
problematical  judgments,  be  established  by  proof.  There 
are  no  analytical  judgments,  or  First  Truths,  nor  any  facts 
of  consciousness,  nor  of  any  other  kind,  from  which  the 
validity  of  these  assumptions  can  be  deduced.  This  is 
undeniable.     They  are,  then,  mere   assumptions,  without 


46  INTRODUCTION. 

any  a  priori  or  a  posteriori  claims  to  regard  as  original  or 
deduced  principles  of  science. 

3.  Equally  evident  is  it,  that  they  are  both  alike,  utterly 
void  of  any  form  of  antecedent  probability  in  their  favor. 
Equally  probable,  in  itself,  as  either  of  these,  is  the  assump- 
tion that  there  may  be,  and  in  fact  is,  a  power  of  knowl- 
edge, on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other,  realities  wholly 
exterior  to  said  power,  realities  sustaining  to  it  the  relation 
of  objects  of  real  valid  knowledge.  From  aught  that  we  do 
or  can  know  a  priori,  there  may  be,  in  some  cases,  an  actual 
identity  of  being  and  knowing,  —  that  is,  thought  may  be 
an  object  of  thought,  and  the  fact  of  knowledge  an  object  of 
knowledge.  In  others,  there  may  be  a  S3rnthesis  of  being 
and  knowing,  —  that  is,  the  subject  of  knowledge  may  be  to 
itself  an  object  of  knowledge.  In  others  still,  the  subject 
and  object  of  knowledge  may  be  entirely  distinct  and  sep- 
arate entities.  That  real  valid  knowledge,  in  all  these 
forms,  should  exist,  is  just  as  antecedently  probable,  as 
that  it  should  exist  in  either  form  exclusively,  which  is 
claimed  by  Idealism. 

4.  Hence,  we  remark  finally,  that  each  of  these  assump- 
tions, when  presented  as  universal  and  exclusive  principles 
of  science,  are  demonstrably  false.  That  valid  knowledge  in 
the  two  forms  implied  in  these  assumptions  does  exist,  is,  as 
stated  above,  to  be  admitted,  because  that  both  forms  alike 
are  given  as  real  in  consciousness.  Equally  direct  and  ab- 
solute is  the  testimony  of  consciousness  to  the  existence  of 
real  valid  knowledge  in  the  third  form,  that  is,  to  a  form 
of  real  knowledge  in  which  the  subject  and  the  object  are 
given  as  distinct  and  separate  entities.  We  might,  with 
the  same  propriety,  claim  this  last  as  the  only  real  form  of 
valid  knowledge  as  either  of  the  other  cases. 


IXTB  OD  UCTION.  4  < 

The  assumptions  under  consideration,  when  presented  as 
they  are  in  systems  of  Idealism,  as  First  Truths  or  princi- 
ples of  science,  and  as  including  the  exclusive  forms  of 
valid  knowledge,  are  not  only  mere  assumptions,  utterly 
void  of  all  claims  to  validity  of  any  kind,  but  are  demon- 
strably false  in  fact.  In  traversing  systems  based  upon 
these  assumptions,  we  are  ever  to  bear  distinctly  in  mind, 
that  we  are  in  the  regions  of  exclusive  scientific  fictions 
and  baseless  error,  and  nowhere  else. 

Now,  if  we  take  away  the  assumption  of  one  substance  or 
principle  of  all  things,  and  the  two  under  consideration, 
we  have  removed,  entirely,  the  foundation  on  which  every 
form  of  Idealism  rests,  Ideal  Dualism  apparently,  but  not 
really,  excepted.  The  authors  and  expounders  of  these 
systems  have,  without  exception,  laid  down  these  assump- 
tions as  the  exclusive  basis  of  all  their  deductions.  What 
claims,  then,  have  these  systems  upon  our  regard  ?  They 
have  no  more  claims  to  be  regarded  as  systems  of  valid 
knowledge,  than  the  Arabian  Night's  Tales  have  to  be  re- 
garded as  true  authentic  records  of  real  facts  of  history. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  have  the  same  reasons  to  regard 
these  systems  as  systems  of  error,  that  we  have  to  regard 
these  tales  as  not  being  authentic  historical  records.  Rest- 
ing, as  they  undeniably  and  exclusively  do,  upon  mere  as- 
sumptions and  nothing  else,  they  have  and  can  have  no 
higher  merits  than  logical  fictions  imposed  upon  the  world 
as  systems  of  eternal  truth.  As  resting  exclusively  upon 
assumptions  demonstrably  false,  in  fact,  they  also  stand 
revealed  as  nothing  but  systems  of  error.  These  state- 
ments and  deductions  will  be  verified  at  full  length  in  a 
subsequent  part  of  this  treatise. 


48  INTRODUCTION. 

Coleridge's  attempted  demonstration  of  the  Validity  of  the 
two  assumptions  above  refuted. 

Coleridge,  in  his  "  Biographia  Literaria,"  has  attempted 
to  prove  the  validity  of  the  two  assumptions  above  refuted. 
Let  us  consider,  for  a  moment,  his  argument  upon  the  sub- 
ject. "  During  the  act  of  knowledge  itself,"  he  says,  "  the 
objective  and  subjective  are  so  instantly  united  that  we  can- 
not tell  to  which  of  the  two  the  priority  belongs.  There  is 
here  no  first  and  no  second  ;  both  are  coinstantaneous  and 
one.  While  I  am  attempting  to  explain  this  intimate  coali- 
tion, I  must  suppose  it  dissolved.  I  must  necessarily  set 
out  from  the  one,  to  which,  therefore,  I  must  give  hypo- 
thetical antecedence,  in  order  to  arrive  at  the  other.  But 
as  there  are  but  two  factors  or  elements  in  the  problem, 
subject  and  object,  and  as  it  is  left  indeterminate  from 
which  of  them  I  should  commence,  there  are  two  cases 
equally  possible. 

"  1.  Either  the  objective  is  taken  as  the  first,  and  then  we 
have  to  account  for  the  supervention  of  the  subjective  which 
coalesces  with  it. 

"2.  Or  the  subjective  is  taken  as  the  first,  and  the  prob- 
lem, then,  is,  how  there  supervenes  to  it  a  coincident  ob- 
jective." "  The  final  consequence  logically  deducible  from 
each  of  these  hypotheses  alike,"  he  concludes,  "  is  the  doc- 
trine of  a  perfect  identity  between  the  subject  and  object ; 
that  is,  between  the  self,  the  intelligence  which  knows,  aud 
the  object  known."  How  this  consequence  follows  from 
these  suppositions,  our  author  fails  wholly  to  show  us.  He 
only  affirms  that  it  must  be  so.  But  how  does  the  mind  get 
rid  of  the  natural  belief  in  the  reality  of  an  external  uni- 
verse, and  arrive  at  the  conclusion  of  a  perfect  identity  of 


INTRODUCTION.  49 

the  subject  and  object?  By  an  act  of  will,  in  the  first 
instance,  assuming  that  our  belief  in  the  reality  of  said 
universe  is  invalid  ;  and  in  the  next,  by  a  similar  act,  com- 
pelling ourselves  to  treat  this  innate  and  necessary  belief, 
as  nothing  but  a  prejudice.  On  this  subject  we  will  permit 
our  author  to  speak  for  himself.  The  reader  will  then  per- 
ceive that  we  have  not  misunderstood  or  misrepresented 
him.  "This  purification  of  the  mind,"  he  says,  "is 
effected  by  an  absolute  and  scientific  scepticism  to  which 
the  mind  voluntarity  determines  itself  for  the  specific  pur- 
pose of  future  certainty."  Descartes,  who  (in  his  medita- 
tions) himself  first,  at  least  of  the  moderns,  gave  a  beautiful 
example  of  this  voluntary  doubt,  this  self-determined  inde- 
termination,  happily  expresses  its  utter  difference  from  the 
scepticism  of  vanity  or  irreligion :  "  Nee  tamen  in  eo  scep- 
ticos  imitabar,  qui  dubitant  tantum  ut  dubitent,  et  preter  in- 
certitudinem  ipsam  nihil  qucerant.  Nam  conira  totus  in  eo 
eram  ut  aliquid  certi  repirirem"  —  Descartes,  de  Metliodo. 
Nor  is  it  less  distinct  in  its  motives  and  final  aim,  than  in 
its  proper  objects,  which  are  not,  as  an  ordinary  scepti- 
cism, the  prejudices  of  education  and  circumstances,  but 
those  original  and  innate  prejudices  which  nature  herself 
has  implanted  in  all  men,  and  which,  to  all  but  the  philoso- 
pher, are  the  first  principles  of  knowledge  and  the  final  test 
of  truth. 

Now,  these  essential  prejudices  are  all  reducible  to  the 
one  fundamental  assumption  that  there  exist  things 
without  us.  As  this,  on  the  one  hand,  originates  neither 
in  grounds  nor  arguments,  and  yet  on  the  other  hand  re- 
mains proof  against  all  attempts  to  remove  it  by  grounds 
or  argument  {naturam  furca  expellas  tamen  usque  redibit)  ; 
on  the  one  hand  lays  claim  to  immediate  certainty  as  a 

5 


50  INTRODUCTION. 

position  at  once  indemonstrable  and  irresistible,  and  yet, 
on  the  other  hand,  inasmuch  as  it  refers  to  something  essen- 
tially different  from  ourselves,  nay,  even  in  opposition  to 
ourselves,  leaves  it  inconceivable  how  it  could  possibly 
become  a  part  of  our  immediate  consciousness  (in  other 
words,  how  that  which  ex-hypothesi  is  and  continues  to  be 
intrinsic  and  alien  to  our  being),  the  philosopher  therefore 
compels  himself  to  treat  this  faith  as  nothing  more  than  a 
prejudice,  innate,  indeed,  and  connatural,  but  still  a  preju- 
dice?" 

The  procedure  described  above  accords  perfectly  with 
the  fundamental  method  of  Idealism  in  all  its  forms,  as 
explained  by  all  its  great  expounders.  "  I  put  myself," 
says  Krug,  the  successor  of  Kant,  "  when  I  begin  to  philos- 
ophize, into  the  state  of  not  knowing,  since  I  am  to  produce 
in  me  for  the  first  time  a  knowledge."  "  I  accordingly,"  he 
adds,  "  regard  all  my  previous  knowledge  as  uncertain,  and 
strive  after  a  higher  knowledge  that  shall  be  certain  or  be 
made  so."  This  accords  with  the  method  of  all  idealistic 
philosophers,  from  Descartes  down  to  Hegel.  The  con- 
viction of  the  coexistence  of  two  known  realities,  the 
knowing  subject  and  the  object  known,  is  wholly  and  at 
once  set  aside  by  a  mere  assumption  that  all  "previous 
knowledge  "  is  invalid.  In  reference  to  the  subject,  as  now 
presented,  we  would  invite  special  attention  to  the  following 
suggestions : 

1.  The  consequences  which  Mr.  Coleridge  adduces  from 
the  two  hypotheses  which  be  lays  down  do  not  logically  fol- 
low from  those  hypotheses,  granting  their  validity.  If,  for 
example,  we  suppose,  in  the  first  instance,  the  object  of 
knowledge  to  exist,  it  by  no  means  follows  that  in  order  to 
find  a  subject,  —  that  is,  one  which  shall  sustain  to  the  object 


iyTE  OD  UCTION.  5 1 

a  power  of  real  valid  knowledge,  —  this  power  must  be  one 
and  identical  with  its  object.  For  aught  that  we  do  or  can 
know  either  by  intuition  or  deduction  from  valid  princi- 
ples, the  object  and  power  of  knowledge  may  be  distinct 
and  separate  entities.  The  same  holds  equalty,  if  we  as- 
sume the  subject  (the  power  of  knowledge)  to  be  real,  and 
attempt  to  find  for  it  an  object  of  knowledge.  It  is  neither 
intuitively  certaiu,  nor  can  it  be  rendered  so  b}'  deduction, 
that,  in  order  to  find  for  said  subject  an  object  of  knowl- 
edge, we  must  find  it  by  supposing  an  identity  between  the 
subject  and  object.  For  aught  that  we  do  or  can  know,  a 
'priori  or  a  posteriori,  the  object,  as  a  reality,  may  be  wholly 
distinct  from  the  subject. 

2.  If  we  grant,  on  the  other  hand,  that  this  common 
consequent,  the  real  and  absolute  identity  of  the  subject 
and  object  of  knowledge,  does  follow  from  each  of  the 
hypotheses  given  by  our  author,  the  validity  of  this  doc- 
trine of  identity  is  by  no  means  established  thereby.  The 
reason  is  obvious  ;  we  need  not  begin  with  either  of  these 
hypotheses,  and  Mr.  Coleridge  erred  fundamentally  in  as- 
suming that  "  we  must  necessarily  set  out "  from  one  or 
the  other  of  them.  Without  either  taking  the  subject  or 
object  first,  we  may  take  both  together  as  coexisting  but 
separate  and  distinct  substances,  and  suppose  that  one  sus- 
tains to  the  other  the  relation  of  a  power,  while  the  latter 
sustains  to  the  former  the  relation  of  an  object  of  real 
knowledge.  Valid  knowledge  on  this  is  just  as  conceivable, 
and,  consequently,  as  antecedently  probable,  as  on  the  the- 
ory of  an  absolute  identity  of  the  subject  and  object. 

3.  While  it  is  true  that  in  some  cases  there  is  an  iden- 
tity of  subject  and  object  in  the  act  of  knowledge,  as  in  all 
cases    of  exclusive  self-knowledge,  it  is  also  equally  true 


52  INTRODUCTION. 

that  in  other  instances  knowledge  equally  valid  arises  in 
accordance  with  the  other  principle.  In  every  act  of  exter- 
nal knowledge,  the  mind  becomes  equally  and  absolutely 
conscious  of  the  self,  as  the  subject,  and  of  a  not-self,  a 
reality  wholly  separate  and  distinct  from  the  self,  as  the 
object  of  knowledge.  What  the  universal  intelligence  has 
thus  distinctly  and  absolutely  separated,  nothing  but  "  sci- 
ence falsely  so  called  "  will  ever  attempt  to  confound. 

The  reasons  assigned  by  Mr.  Coleridge  why  "  the  philos- 
opher compels  himself"  to  treat  what  he  himself  admits  to 
be  a  natural,  innate,  and  necessary  intuition  of  the  univer- 
sal Intelligence,  "that  there  exist  things  without  us," 
"  as  nothing  more  than  a  prejudice,"  next  demands  our 
special  attention.  The  reason  given  is  simply  this  :  It  is 
"  inconceivable  how  it  could  be  possible  "  that  an  object 
"  essentially  different  from  ourselves,  nay,  even  in  opposi- 
tion to  ourselves,"  should  ;'  become  a  part  of  our  immediate 
consciousness ;  "  that  is,  be  to  the  mind  an  object  of  direct 
perception  or  knoYvledge.  Suppose  that  the  author  had 
asked  himself  this  one  question,  How  is  it  practicable  for 
us  to  conceive  of  the  possibility  of  the  same  entity  being, 
at  the  same  time,  both  the  subject  and  object  of  knowledge? 
Especially  how  is  it  possible  that  that  which  is  exclusively 
subjective,  and  has  no  existence  exterior  to  the  mind,  but 
exclusively  as  a  part  of  its  own  being  and  substance, 
should  be  given  in  consciousness  as  "  something  essentially 
different  from  ourselves,  nay,  even  in  opposition  to  our- 
selves ?  "  Had  he  reflected  at  all  upon  the  subject,  he  would 
have  perceived  that  it  is  just  as  difficult,  and  no  more  so, 
to  conceive  of  the  possibility  of  knowledge  in  this  form  as 
in  the  other.  Had  he  further  asked  himself  the  question, 
How  is  knowledge  in  any  form  whatever  possible  ?  he  would 


IXTROD  UCTION.  5  3 

have  perceived  at  once  that  but  one  answer  can  be  given,  to 
wit,  such  is  the  nature  of  mind,  as  a  faculty  of  knowledge. 
Whatever  is  to  the  mind  an  object  of  knowledge,  whether 
it  be  the  mind  itself  or  a  part  of  its  substance,  or  some  of 
its  states,  or,  finally,  something  wholly  exterior  and  inde- 
pendent as  an  existence,  of  the  mind,  it  must  be  such  ob- 
ject upon  one  exclusive  condition,  and  can  possibly  be 
upon  no  other,  to  wit,  that  such  is  the  correlated  nature  of 
the  object,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  mind,  on  the  other,  that 
as  a  consequence  of  this  correlation,  the  former  is  to  the 
latter,  when  the  requisite  conditions  are  fulfilled,  an  object, 
and  the  latter  is  to  the  former  a  power  of  real  knowledge. 
Now  this,  the  only  possible  reason  for  knowledge  of  any 
reality  whatever,  renders  the  possibility  of  a  knowledge  of 
what  is  external  to  the  mind,  just  as  conceivable  as  a 
knowledge  of  what  is  exclusively  subjective.  This  also 
leaves  us  open  to  the  simple  question,  What  do  we  know? 
One  form  of  knowledge  has  the  same  antecedent  probabil- 
ity in  its  favor,  as  far  as  the  question  of  its  possibility  or 
actual  existence  is  concerned,  as  another. 

But  suppose  we  could  not  conceive  how  a  knowledge  of 
objects  external  to  the  mind  is  possible.  How  infinitely 
absurd  and  contradictory  to  all  principles  of  true  science  is 
it,  for  such  a  reason,  to  assume  that,  therefore,  such  knowl- 
edge does  not  and  cannot  exist,  and  then  compel  ourselves 
to  treat  an  innate,  necessary,  and  universal  intuition  of  the 
intelligence  "  as  nothing  but  a  prejudice/'  and  to  construct 
our  s}rstem  of  existence  upon  the  presumption  that  such  an 
intuition  is,  in  fact,  a  lie !  This  attempt  to  determine  a 
priori  what  the  mind  does  and  does  not  know,  and  especially 
the  act  of  setting  aside  and  repudiating  acknowledged  neces- 
sary intuitions  of  the  universal  intelligence,  on  the  ground 
5* 


54  INTRODUCTION. 

of  mere  assumptions,  is  one  of  the  darkest  errors  of  the 
dark  ages. 

5.  Let  us  now  consider  the  necessary  consequences  of 
the  assumption  of  our  author,  that  those  intuitive  convic- 
tions which  "  nature  herself  has  implanted  in  all  men,  and 
which,  to  all  but  the  philosopher,  are  the  first  principles  of 
knowledge  and  the  final  test  of  truth,"  are  "  nothing  more 
than  a  prejudice,  innate,  indeed,  and  connatural,  but  still  a 
prejudice  ;  "  that  is,  innate  and  connatural  intuitions  of  the 
universal  intelligence  which  are  not  only  void  of  validity, 
but  false  in  fact.  This  is  the  dogma  of  Idealism  in  all  its 
forms.  Kant,  for  example,  affirms  that  the  belief  that 
"  there  exist  things  without  us,"  is  not  a  prejudice  of  edu- 
cation, which  may  be  eradicated  by  reasoning,  but  a  prin- 
ciple "  inhering  in  reason  itself,"  a  principle  consequently 
which,  as  he  himself  affirms,  philosophy  can  never  eradi- 
cate. What  are  the  consequences  of  such  an  assumption? 
One  undeniable  consequence  is  this:  the  deductions  of 
philosophy  and  the  innate,  connatural,  and  necessary  intui- 
tions of  the  universal  intelligence  are,  in  fact,  irreconcil- 
able antagonisms.  The  next  consequence  is  this :  if  the 
assumptions  and  deductions  of  Idealism  are  valid,  then  the 
intelligence  itself  is  "  a  liar  from  the  beginning;  "  for  it 
commences  its  activity  by  the  absolute  intuitive  affirma- 
tion that  that  which  is  exclusively  subjective  according  to 
the  teachings  of  this  philosophy,  is  as  exclusively  objective 
and  exterior  to  and  independent  in  existence  of  the  mind. 
The  last  consequence  is,  that  we  arc  bound  to  consider  all 
the  assumptions  and  deductions  of  this  philosophy  as  noth- 
ing but  a  mass  of  error  and  delusion  ;  for  the  assumptions 
and  deductions  are  given  exclusively  by  this  very  intelli- 
gence which  fundamentally  errs  and  falsifies  in  its  primary 


INTR  OD  UCTION.  5  5 

and  necessary  intuitions.  Such  are  the  necessary  and  un- 
deniable conseauences  of  the  fundamental  assumption  of 
Idealism  in  all  its  forms. 

G.  We  are  now  prepared  to  notice  the  real  character  of 
Idealism  in  all  the  various  forms  which  it  assumes.  We 
would  here  remark,  in  general,  that  there  is  an  absolutely 
necessary  connection  between  the  principles  that  lie  at  the) 
basis  of  every  form  which  this  system  assumes  and  all  its 
subsequent  deductions.  When  we  depart  from  these  prin- 
ciples no  fallacy  whatever  appears  in  the  subsequent  pro- 
cesses. All  here  has  the  most  absolute  logical  consistency. 
When  we  examine  the  fundamental  principles  on  which  the 
superstructure  is  so  proudly  and  imposingly  reared,  we 
find  that,  without  exception,  they  are  mere  assumptions, 
utterly  void  of  all  a  priori  or  a  posteriori  claims  to  validity, 
assumptions  utterly  void,  too,  of  all  antecedent  probability 
in  their  favor,  on  the  one  hand,  and  demonstrably  false,  be- 
ing undeniably  contradictor  to  known  intuitive  truths,  on 
the  other.  The  philosopher  of  this  school  assumes,  as  we 
have  seen,  in  the  first  instance,  that  all  our  present  knowl- 
edge, intuitive  or  deductive,  is  invalid.  His  next  ass; 
tion  is,  that  there  exists,  in  realit}-,  but  one  substance,  one 
principle  of  all  things  ;  and  his  last,  that  in  all  cases  of 
valid  knowledge  there  is  and  must  be  real  synthesis  or  iden- 
tity of  being  and  knowing.  Granting  these  assumptions, 
and  Idealism  must  be  true.  But  what  is  their  character  ? 
As  we  have  already  shown,  they  are  not  only  utterly  desti- 
tute of  all  claims  of  any  kind,  intuitive  or  deductive,  to 
validity,  but  demonstrably  false.  Systems  thus  con- 
structed can  be  nothing  better  than  logical  fictions,  on  the 
one  hand,  but  must  be  systems  of  fundamental  error  on 
the  other. 


5  6  INTROD  UCTI03, . 

The  real  nature,  and  true  proper  sphere  of  Knoivledge  a 
priori. 

We  know  of  no  philosopher  of  any  standing  who  main- 
tains the  validity  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  phi- 
losophy of  Locke,  to  wit,  that  the  elements  of  all  ideas  and 
of  all  forms  of  knowledge  existing  in  the  human  mind 
were  originally  derived  from  one  source  exclusively,  expe- 
rience, or  external  and  internal  perception.  All  now  ad- 
mit, that  while  there  are,  in  the  mind,  forms  of  knowledge 
given  by  experience,  there  are  also,  in  the  same  intelligence, 
universal  and  necessary  truths  and  principles  which  could 
by  no  possibility  have  been  given  by  experience,  —  the  ideas 
of  space,  time,  substance,  and  personal  identity,  and  the 
principles,  Body  implies  space  ;  Succession,  time  ;  Events, 
a  cause  ;  and  Things  equal  to  the  same  things  are  equal  to 
each  other,  for  example.  For  the  sake  of  convenience  and 
in  accordance  with  scientific  usage,  we  will  call  the  forms 
of  knowledge  first  named  empirical,  and  those  last  named 
a  priori.  The  elements  of  empirical  knowledge  are  of  two 
kinds,  the  external  and  the  internal,  those  pertaining  to 
matter,  and  those  pertaining  to  mind.  The  function  of  the 
intelligence  which  gives  us  the  former  class  of  elements, 
we  denominate  sense,  or  the  faculty  of  external  perception, 
and  that  which  gives  us  the  latter  we  denominate  conscious- 
ness, or  the  faculty  of  internal  perception.  That  function 
which  gives  us  necessary  ideas,  those  of  space,  time,  sub- 
stance, etc.,  we  denominate  Reason.  These  three  are  the 
primary  functions  of  the  intelligence.  From  these  exclu- 
sively the  elements  of  all  our  knowledge  are  and  must  be 
derived.  Of  the  secondary  functions  of  the  intelligence 
we  will  here  specify  but  two,  —  the  Understanding  which 


IN TR  OD  UCT10N.  5  7 

blends  the  elements  given  by  the  primary  faculties  into 
notions  or  conceptions  particular  and  general,  and  the  Judg- 
ment which  affirms  the  relations  existing  between  these 
conceptions  ;  as,  for  example,  A  is  or  is  not  B. 

On  a  moment's  reflection  it  will  be  perceived,  that  it  is  a 
question  of  fundamental  importance  in  science,  what  are 
the  real  relations  of  the  a  priori  and  a  posteriori  elements 
of  knowledge  to  each  other?  To  this  question  we  believe 
that  the  only  true  answer  has  been  given  in  the  u  Intellectual 
Philosophy,"  pp.  38-46,  and  the  Logic,  pp.  312-320.  The 
substance  of  the  answer  there  given  is  this  :  When  we  con- 
template any  intuitively  valid  judgment,  in  which  one  con- 
ception is  an  empirical  and  the  other  an  a  priori  conception, 
as  in  the  proposition,  Body  implies  space,  we  shall  find  thii 
to  be  the  immutable  and  universal  relation  existing  betweer 
them,  to  wit,  the  reality  of  the  object  of  the  hitter  concep- 
tion is  necessarily  implied  by  that  of  the  object  of  the 
former.  The  reality  of  epace,  the  object  of  the  a  prior 
conception  in  the  above  proposition,  is  necessarily  implied 
by  that  of  body,  the  object  of  the  empirical  conception.  Se 
of  the  judgments,  Succession  implies  time,  Events  a  cause 
and  Phenomena  substance,  and  in  all  instances  of  simila: 
classes  of  judgments.  This,  then,  is  the  fixed  relation  be 
tween  the  a  priori  and  a  posteriori  elements  of  thought, 
The  validity  of  the  latter  presupposes  that  of  the  former, 
and  the  object  of  the  latter  can  be  known  only  as  thus  pre- 
supposed. In  the  order  of  development  in  the  intelligence 
therefore,  the  a  posteriori  element  always  arises  prior  to  its 
implied  d  priori  element.  In  the  logical  order,  however 
the  a  priori,  or  implied  element,  is  always  first.  In  othei 
words,  it  is  the  logical  antecedent  of  the  a  posteriori  ele- 
ment.    This,  then,  is  the  exclusive  relation  of  Reason  te 


58  INTRODUCTION. 

the  other  functions  of  the  intelligence.  In  the  primary 
action  of  the  Intelligence,  Sense  and  Consciousness  give 
the  phenomena,  facts,  and  qualities  of  matter  and  mind, 
while  Reason  gives  the  necessary  truths  implied  by  such 
phenomena,  to  wit,  space,  time,  substance,  and  cause,  etc. 
The  secondary  ideas  of  Reason,  those  of  right  and  wrong, 
the  beautiful,  the  true,  the  good,  the  perfect,  the  infinite, 
&c,  are  similiarly  related  to  conceptions  and  affirmations 
of  the  Understanding  and  Judgment.  Reason  is  always 
and  exclusively,  in  the  order  of  time,  secondary  in  its 
action,  giving  what  is  implied  by  the  facts  affirmed  as 
realities  by  the  other  faculties.  Thus,  when  by  Sense  and 
Consciousness  body,  succession,  phenomena,  and  events 
are  perceived,  Reason  gives  the  ideas  of  space,  time,  sub- 
stance, and  cause,  as  the  truths  implied  in  and  by  the  facts 
above  named.  When  the  conception  of  an  agent  possessing 
certain  powers,  and  existing  in  certain  relations,  is  given 
by  the  Understanding,  Reason  gives  its  logical  antecedents, 
the  ideas  of  right  and  wrong,  obligation,  &c.  Such  is  the 
exclusive  sphere  of  a  priori  elements  of  thought,  and  of 
Reason  as  the  organ  of  said  elements.  From  this  view 
of  this  fundamental  subject,  a  view  which  a  careful  analysis 
of  intellectual  phenomena  will  not  fail  to  recognize  as  cor- 
rect, the  following  consequences  necessarily  arise  : 

1 .  We  see  why  it  is  that  all  a  priori  elements  of  thought 
are  valid  not  only  relatively,  but  for  truth  itself.  That  which 
is  necessarily  implied  in  something  else,  must  undeniably 
have  the  same  validity  as  that  by  which  it  is  implied.  Now, 
all  a  priori  elements  of  thought  are,  in  fact,  implied  and  nec- 
essarily so,  by  forms  of  empirical  knowledge  which  are  valid, 
not  merely  subjectively,  but  for  truth  itself,  that  is,  for 
realities  as  they  are  in  themselves.     This  we  have  already 


INTRODUCTION.  59 

rendered  demonstratively  evident.  All  a  priori  elements 
of  thought,  then,  are  valid,  not  merely  in  a  relative  sense, 
but  for  realities  as  they  are,  or  for  objects  in  themselves. 

2.  We  see  why  all  the  deductions  of  the  pure,  or  a  priori 
sciences,  such  as  the  pure  mathematics,  are  applicable  to 
all  facts  of  observation  and  experience  in  the  universe 
around  us.  These  deductions  are  the  logical  consequences 
of  a  priori  ideas  and  principles  which  are  implied  in  and  by 
those  facts,  and  must,  of  course,  have  the  same  validity, 
relatively  to  them,  that  those  ideas  and  principles  have. 
That,  for  example,  which  is  true  of  any  parts  of  space 
occupied  by  any  material  substances  (bodies)  must  be  true 
of  the  bodies  which  occupy  said  parts.  So  in  all  other  in- 
stances. We  always  explain  facts  by  a  reference  to  what 
is  implied  by  them.  For  this  reason  knowledge  a  posteriori 
is  explained  by  knowledge  a  priori. 

3.  We  are  now  able  to  explain  the  nature  and  character 
of  all  First  Truths,  Principles  of  science.  They  are  analyt- 
ical judgments,  that  is,  judgments  whose  necessary  and 
universal  validity  is  directly  and  immediately  implied  in  a 
view  of  the  nature  and  necessary  relations  of  the  subject 
and  predicate  of  such  judgments.  There  are  and  can  be, 
as  we  have  seen,  but  three  relations  which  do  or  can  yield 
such  judgments,  to  wit,  —  those  in  which  the  predicate  rep- 
resents an  essential  element  of  the  subject,  as  in  the  judg- 
ment, All  bodies  have  extension,  —  those  in  which  the 
reality  of  the  objects  to  which  the  predicate  pertains  is  im- 
plied in  and  by  the  reality  of  that  to  which  the  subject  per- 
tains —  and,  finalty,  those  in  which,  by  definition,  the  subject 
and  predicate  sustain  to  each  other  the  relation  of  incom- 
patibility, and  the  judgment  affirms  that  incompatibility,  as 
in  the  judgment,  A  circle  is  not  a  square. 


6  0  INTR  OB  UCTION. 

4.  We  are  now  prepared  to  state  definitely  the  distinction 
between  the  sciences,  pure  and  mixed,  together  with  the  fun- 
damental characteristics  of  each.  In  the  mixed  sciences, 
the  elements  of  empirical  knowledge,  the  facts  of  matter 
and  mind,  are  explained  and  elucidated  in  the  light  of 
analytical  judgments,  or  valid  first  truths.  In  the  pure 
sciences,  the  mathematics,  for  example,  the  facts  of  a  priori 
knowledge,  such  as  quantity,  number,  power,  cause,  &c, 
are  explained  and  elucidated  in  the  light  of  similar  judg- 
ments. 

5.  We  see  why  it  is,  we  remark,  in  the  last  place,  that 
the  sciences,  when  rightly  conducted,  are  to  be  regarded  as 
the  valid  interpreters,  not  of  knowledge,  which  has  a  mere 
relative  and  no  real  validity,  but  of  truth  itself.  The  great 
facts  elucidated  by  each  class  of  the  sciences  alike  pertain, 
as  we  have  shown,  to  realities  as  they  are  in  themselves, 
and  the  principles,  in  the  light  of  which  these  facts  are 
explained,  have  an  absolute  or  apodictic  certaintj^. 

Error  of  Idealism  on  this  subject. 

Now,  what  is  the  nature  and  sphere  of  knowledge  a  priori 
according  to  Idealism,  as  interpreted  by  all  its  great  ex- 
pounders from  Kant  to  Kegel  ?    To  this  inquiry  we  answer  : 

1.  From  laws  inhering  in  Reason  itself,  such  knowledge 
arises  in  the  mind  wholly  independent  of  and  prior  to  all 
knowledge  a  posteriori.  Here  is  the  first  and  great  error 
of  this  system  in  all  its  forms.  Knowledge  a  priori,  in 
fact,  is,  in  its  origin,  subsequent  to,  and  in  consciousness 
is  given  as  implied  in,  knowledge  a  posteriori. 

2.  According  to  the  universal  teachings  of  Idealism, 
knowledge  a  priori,  in  the  order  of  actual  development,  is 
not  only  prior  to  all  elements  and  forms  of  knowledge  a 


INTRODUCTION.  61 

posteriori,  but  as  laws  of  thought,  the  former  generates 
and  determines  the  entire  characteristics  of  the  latter.  The 
ideas  of  space  and  time,  in  the  first  instance,  determine  ex- 
ternal perception  by  causing  a  mere  objective  state,  a  sen- 
sation, to  appear  as  an  extended  object  existing  externally 
to  and  independent  of  the  mind  itself.  Here  we  have  the 
second  great  error  of  this  system.  Knowledge  a  priori 
does  not,  in  fact,  as  this  system  affirms,  originate  in  the 
intelligence  prior,  but  subsequent,  to  knowledge  d  poste- 
riori, and  the  former,  instead  of  originating  and  determin- 
ing the  latter,  is  itself  originated,  and  in  important  senses 
determined,  by  the  latter,  being  given  in  consciousness  as 
implied  by  it,  and  not  as  implying  it. 

3.  If  we  grant,  as  this  system  affirms,  that  Reason  sim- 
ply and  exclusively  by  virtue  of  its  own  inherent  laws 
originates,  in  the  first  instance,  knowledge  a  priori  in  all 
its  forms,  and  then,  in  the  next,  originates  and  determines 
the  character  of  all  forms  of  knowledge  a  posteriori^  the 
following  consequences  deduced  by  the  expounders  of  the 
system  follow  by  a  logical  necesshy.  (1.)  Knowledge  a 
priori  has  a  mere  subjective,  and  can,  by  no  possibility,  have 
any  objective  validity.  That  which  is  originated  exclusively 
by  laws  inhering  in  the  subject  can  have  no  legitimate 
claims  to  validity  relatively  to  anything  external  and  , 
foreign  to  said  subject.  This  is  undeniable.  (2.)  As 
knowledge  a  posteriori  is  originated  and  determined  by 
knowledge  a  priori,  the  former  can  have  no  higher  claims 
to  validity  than  the  latter.  This  also  is  self-evident. 
(3.)  All  procedures  of  the  intelligence,  whatever  their 
form,  and  to  whatever  they  pertain,  are  alike  void,  and 
utterly  so,  of  all  claims  to  objective  validity.  The  sciences 
are  not  the  interpreters  of  truth  itself,  but  of  cognitions 
6 


62  INTRODUCTION. 

which  are  valid  representatives  of  no  realities  of  any  kind. 
These  are  the  necessary  logical  consequences  of  the  funda- 
mental psychological  errors  above  elucidated.  Every  one 
who  admits  that  the  nature  and  sphere  of  knowledge  a 
priori  is  rightly  given  in  the  system  under  consideration, 
must,  to  be  logically  consistent,  take  these  consequences 
in  all  their  length  and  breadth.  All  knowledge  must  be 
admitted  to  be  nothing  but  empty  shadows  of  no  realities 
whatever,  mere  appearance  in  which  absolutely  no  reality 
of  any  kind  appears.  Those  who  have  rightly  interpreted 
the  nature  and  sphere  of  knowledge  a  priori  and  a  poste- 
riori both,  will  not  fail  to  perceive  that  all  such  persons 
have,  as  we  have  stated  in  another  work,  been  deluded  by 
a  false  philosophy  into  the  belief  that  they  are  looking  only 
at  shadows,  when,  in  fact,  they  are  beholding  with  open 
face  realities  as  they  are. 

General  consequences  of  such  an  error  in  regard  to  the  nature 
and  sphere  of  Knowledge  d  priori. 

As  knowledge  a  priori,  that  is,  a  priori  principles,  lie  at 
the  foundation  of  all  S3Tstems  of  knowledge,  a  natural  con- 
sequence, which  cannot  fail  to  arise  from  the  error  which 
we  have  pointed  out  in  regard  to  the  nature  and  sphere  of 
this  form  of  knowledge,  should  not  be  overlooked  in  this 
connection.  It  is  this.  Such  an  error  cannot  fail  to  occa- 
sion the  wildest  and  most  unauthorized  assumptions  in  the 
construction  of  systems  of  philosoplry.  It  will,  almost  of 
necessitj^,  lead  the  subject  to  confound  in  his  own  mind 
the  distinctions  between  the  merest  assumptions  and  real 
analytical  judgments,  or  first  truths,  and  to  mistake  the 
wildest  conjectures  for  eternal  verities,  and  to  place  the 
former  at  the  foundation  of  systems  of  science. 


INTRODUCTION.  63 

THE   IDEA    OF    GOD    NOT    SELF-CONTRADICTORY. 

Within  a  few  years  past,  a  dogma  has  been  pushed  into 
the  sphere  of  religious  thought,  a  dogma  which,  if  admitted 
to  be  valid,  renders  all  theistic  inquiries  the  perfection  of 
absurdity.  We  refer  to  the  dogma  that  all  our  ideas  of 
God  are  self-contradictory,  in  other  words,  intrinsically  ab- 
surd and  of  impossible  validity.  "  The  conception  of  the 
Absolute  and  Infinite,"  says  Mr.  Hansel,  "  from  whatever 
side  we  view  it,  appears  encompassed  with  contradictions. 
There  is  a  contradiction  in  supposing  such  an  object  to 
exist,  whether  alone  or  in  conjunction  with  others ;  and 
there  is  a  contradiction  in  supposing  it  not  to  exist.  There 
is  a  contradiction  in  conceiving  it  as  one  ;  and  there  is  a 
contradiction  in  conceiving  it  as  many.  There  is  a  contra- 
diction in  conceiving  it  as  personal ;  and  there  is  a  contra- 
diction in  conceiving  it  as  impersonal.  It  cannot,  without 
contradiction,  be  represented  as  active  ;  nor  without  equal 
contradiction  be  represented  as  inactive.  It  cannot  be 
conceived  as  the  sum  of  all  existence ;  nor  yet  can  it  be 
conceived  as  a  part  only  of  that  sum."  Yet  this  same  au- 
thor affirms  that  "it  is  our  duty  to  think  of  God  as  per- 
sonal ;  and  it  is  our  duty  to  believe  that  he  is  infinite."  In 
other  words,  it  is  our  duty  to  hold,  as  valid,  ideas  known 
to  be  self-contradictory  and  absurd.  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer 
says,  that  if  Mr.  Hansel's  argument  is  valid,  "  duty  re- 
quires us  neither  to  affirm  nor  deny  personality."  We 
affirm,  that,  if  Mr.  Hansel's  reasoning  is  correct,  duty 
requires  us  to  affirm  that  God  exists,  and  to  deny  that  he 
exists  ;  to  affirm  that  he  is  infinite,  and  to  deny  that  he  is 
infinite  ;  to  affirm  that  he  is  personal,  and  to  deny  that  he 
is  personal ;  to  affirm  that  he  is  active,  and  to  affirm  that 


64  INTRODUCTION. 

he  is  inactive  ;  to  affirm  that  he  is  the  sum  of  all  reality, 
and  that  he  is  only  a  part  of  that  sum.  By  the  immutable 
law  of  contradiction  we  are  absolutely  bound  to  affirm  every 
self-contradictory  proposition  to  be  utterly  false.  By  this 
law,  therefore,  according  to  Mr.  Hansel,  we  are  absolutely 
bound  to  affirm  and  to  deny  of  God,  and  that  in  the  same 
sense,  existence  and  non-existence,  finiteness  and  infinity, 
personality  and  impersonality,  activity  and  inactivity,  unity 
and  plurality.  Mr.  Manse}  tells  us,  that  it  is  a  contradic- 
tion to  affirm  that  God  exists.  Then,  if  he  is  correct,  we 
are  immutably  bound  to  deny  the  divine  existence.  Again, 
he  tells  us  that  it  is  a  contradiction  to  affirm  that  God  does 
not  exist.  Then  again,  if  he  is  still  correct,  we  are  under 
obligations  equally  absolute  to  affirm  that  God" does  exist. 
The  same  holds  true  in  all  the  cases  referred  to,  and  in  all 
relations  in  which  the  principle  of  contradiction  really 
obtains. 

But  how  does  Mr.  Mansel  verify,  or  attempt  to  verify, 
the  validity  of  these  contradictions  ?  By  special  definitions 
of  the  terms  infinite  and  absolute  ;  definitions  whose  validity 
can  be  sustained  by  a  reference  to  no  standard  lexicon  or 
authority  in  existence,  and  which  no  intelligent  theist  will 
accept,  or  ought  to  accept,  as  representing  his  idea  of  God. 
"  The  metaphysical  representation  of  Deity,  as  Infinite  and 
Absolute/'  says  Mr.  Mansel,  "  must  necessarily,  as  the 
profoundest  metaphysicians  have  acknowledged,  amount  to 
nothing  less  than  the  sum  of  all  reality."  Again,  "  If  the 
Absolute  and  Infinite  is  an  object  of  human  conception  at 
all,  this  and  none  other  is  the  conception  required."  If  this 
be  the  only  true  representation  of  God  as  the  Infinite  and 
Absolute,  then,  in  the  name  of  all  intelligent  theists,  we 
affirm   that   God  is   not   the   Infinite  and    Absolute,  and 


INTRODUCTION.  G5 

we  never  thought  of  him  as  such.  In  our  representation, 
we  have  ever  separated  the  Most  High  from  infinite  space 
and  duration,  on  the  one  hand,  and  from  all  finite  realities, 
on  the  other.  "  God,"  in  our  representation,  "  is  a  spirit," 
a  self-conscious  personality,  infinite  and  perfect,  and,  as 
such,  possessed  of  a  certain  number  of  definable  attributes. 
It  is  only  in  view  of  these  attributes,  and  of  his  known 
relations,  as  the  unconditional  cause,  to  all  forms  of  condi- 
tional existence,  that  we  have  ever  represented  God  as  the 
Infinite  and  Absolute.  In  this,  the  only  true  representa- 
tion, no  metaphysician  can  detect  even  the  appearance  of 
contradiction.  Nor  do  we  discover  the  element  of  contra- 
diction that  our  author  professes  to  find  in  his  own  defini- 
tion of  the  idea  of  God  as  the  Infinite  and  Absolute.  His 
idea,  as  he  defines  it,  is  identical  with  that  expressed  by  the 
words,  "  the  sum  of  all  reality,"  and  these  words  may  be 
substituted  for  the  term  God  in  the  proposition,  God  exists. 
Let  us,  then,  contemplate  this  proposition  in  this  form,  to 
wit,  The  sum  of  all  reality  exists.  In  other  words,  All  that 
is  real  is  real.  Where  is  the  contradiction  here  ?  Further, 
if  the  idea  represented  by  the  term  God  is  identical  with 
that  represented  by  the  words  "  the  sum  of  all  reality," 
then  it  is  no  more  a  contradiction  to  affirm  of  God  that  he 
is  both  finite  and  infinite,  cause  and  effect,  personal  and 
impersonal,  a  unity  and  a  plurality,  than  it  is  to  affirm  of 
man  that  he  is  mortal  and  immortal. 

If  we  further  contemplate  the  separate  definitions  that 
Mr.  Mansel  has  given  of  the  terms  infinite  and  absolute, 
we  shall  perceive  at  once  that  neither  of  them  is  more  ap- 
plicable to  the  proper  idea  represented  by  the  term  God, 
than  it  is  to  infinite  space  or  duration.  "  To  conceive  the 
Deity  as  he  is,"  says  Mr.  Mansel,  "  we  must  conceive  him 
G* 


G  6  IX  TR  OD  UCTION. 

as  First  Cause,  as  Absolute,  and  as  Infinite.  By  First 
Cause,  is  meant  that  which  produces  all  things,  and  is  pro- 
duced of  none.  By  the  Absolute,  is  meant  that  which  exists 
in  and  b}r  itself,  having  no  necessary  relation  to  any  other 
being.  By  the  Infinite,  is  meant  that  which  is  free  from  all 
possible  limitation,  that  than  which  a  greater  is  inconceiv- 
able ;  and  which,  consequently,  can  receive  no  additional 
attribute  or  mode  of  existence  which  it  had  not  from  all 
eternity."  It  is  by  a  play  upon  these  three  terms,  First 
Cause,  Absolute,  and  Infinite,  that  all  our  author's  theistic 
contradictions  are  made  out.  To  conceive  of  God  as  a 
cause,  for  example,  is  to  conceive  of  him  as  related  "  to  the 
things  that  are  made,"  and  that  contradicts  our  idea  of  him 
as  Absolute,  which  "  implies  a  possible  existence  out  of  all 
relation."  If  we  should  escape  this  difficulty  by  saying 
that,  "the  Absolute  exists  first  by  itself,  and  afterwards 
becomes  a  Cause,"  "  we  are  checked  by  a  third  conception, 
that  of  the  Infinite."  "  How  can  the  Infinite  become  that 
which  it  was  not  from  eternity  ?  "  In  reply,  we  would  say 
that,  "if  we  would  conceive  of  Deity  as  he  is,"  we  must 
not  conceive  of  him  as  Absolute  or  Infinite,  according  to  the 
above  definitions  of  those  terms.  In  creation  and  by  rev- 
elation, God  is  revealed  to  us,  not  out  of  all  relations,  but 
as  a  Cause,  "  the  Creator  of  the  heavens  and  the  earth,"  the 
unconditioned  Cause  of  all  conditional  existences.  To 
conceive  of  him  out  of  all  relation,  is  to  conceive  him  as 
he  is  not,  and  not  as  he  is.  According  to  our  author's  defi- 
nition of  the  term  Infinite,  God  cannot  be  infinite,  unless, 
from  eternity  to  eternity,  he  exists  in  a  state  of  absolute 
inaction,  or  at  each  moment  of  duration  repeats  the  identi- 
cal act  which  he  puts  forth  at  every  other  moment.  Now 
this  we  hesitate  not  to  pronounce  the  most  senseless  idea 


INTRODUCTION.  67 

of  the  Divine  Infinity  of  which  we  can  well  form  a  concep- 
tion. If  we  would  conceive  of  Deity  as  he  is,  we  must 
conceive  of  him  as  a  free,  intelligent,  self-conscious  per- 
sonality, infinite  and  perfect.  Nothing  can  be  more  for- 
eign to  smy  proper  idea  of  such  a  being  than  the  conception 
that  infinity  in  him  implies  absolute  and  eternal  inactivity, 
or  an  eternal  repetition  of  one  and  the  same  act.  Take 
away,  these  utterly  false  and  unauthorized  definitions  of  the 
terms  Absolute  and  Infinite,  and  all  contradictions  which 
our  author  professedly  finds  in  the  theistic  idea  wholly  dis- 
appear. 

IDEA    OF    GOD    NOT    NEGATIVE,    BUT    POSITIVE. 

Nor  is  the  Theistic  Idea,  as  Sir  William  Hamilton  and  I 
others  affirm,  an  exclusively  negative  idea.  The  idea  of 
Cause  is  an  absolutely  positive  idea,  and  this  is  the  central 
element  of  that  of  God.  Power,  wisdom,  goodness,  eter- 
nity, ubiquity,  and  immutability,  are  all  in  common  posi- 
tive elements  of  thought,  and  these  are  fundamental  ele- 
ments of  the  divine  idea.  Nor  when  we  conceive  of  God 
as  in  respect  to  all  his  attributes,  infinite  and  perfect,  does 
that  conception  fade  away  into  "  a  bundle  of  negations." 
Our  idea  of  God  is,  in  no  form,  negative,  but  in  the  respects 
in  which  we  deny  materiality,  finiteness,  and  imperfection 
of  him.  In  all  other  respects,  that  idea  is  as  absolutely 
positive  as  any  other  is,  or  can  be. 

THE  IDEA  OF  MATTER  AND  SUBSTANCE  AS  A  MERE  FORCE. 

In  opposition  to  the  teachings  of  the  doctrine  of  Real- 
ism, a  certain  class  of  philosophers  now  affirm  that  matter, 
and  all  substances  in  common,  exist  and  act  in  space  as 
mere  forces,  forces  void  of  extension  and  form.     That  sub- 


6  8  IXTROD  UCTION. 

stances  of  all  kinds  are  real  powers  or  forces,  no  reflecting 
mind  will  deny.  What  has  such  an  admission,  however, 
to  do  with  the  question,  what  .substances  or  forces  do 
exist,  or  what  are  their  nature  and  attributes?  A  force 
possessed  of  real  extension  and  form  is  just  as  conceivable 
as  one  void  of  these  attributes.  A  priori,  as  we  have  seen, 
we  can  determine  nothing  whatever  in  regard  to  the  nature 
or  attributes  of  the  forces  which  exist  in  space.  A  poste- 
riori, the  evidence  is  absolute,  that  forces  having  real  solid- 
ity, extension,  and  form,  do  exist  in  space  and  occupy 
space.  Nor  can  the  so-called  philosophers  who  deny  the 
reality  of  such  forces  adduce  the  remotest  degree  of  proof, 
evidence,  or  antecedent  probability,  to  sustain  such  denial. 
The  dogma  of  impalpable,  immaterial,  and  ^indefinable  forces, 
and  the  substitution  of  said  forces  for  the  goodly  creation 
affirmed  as  real  by  the  universal  Intelligence,  rests  exclu- 
sively upon  mere  assumptions,  unsustained  by  any  form  or 
degree  of  evidence  of  any  kind.  The  advocates  of  such  a 
senseless  dogma  are  themselves  perfectly  aware  that  they 
are  building  up  their  theory  of  existence  upon  the  wildest 
conjectures  that  ever  dauced  in  the  brain  of  a  crazy  philoso- 
phy. According  to  the  universal  and  fundamental  teach- 
ings of  this  philosophy,  all  our  knowledge  of  realities  within 
and  around  us,  if  such  realities  do,  in  fact,  exist,  is  wholly 
indirect  and  mediate,  and  has,  consequently,  only  a  rela- 
tive, and  no  real  validity.  All  that  we  know  of  what  we 
we  call  matter,  or  the  external  world,  for  example,  we 
know,  it  is  affirmed,  exclusively  through  sensation,  our  real 
knowledge,  in  no  form,  extending  beyond  this  exclusively 
mental  and  sensitive  state.  Of  sensation,  all  that  we  can 
do  or  can  know  is,  that  it  has  some  cause.  But  what  that 
cause  is,  whether  it  is  external  or  internal,  finite  or  infinite, 


INTRODUCTION.  69 

material  or  spiritual,  extended  or  unextended,  remains,  and 
must  remain,  as  far  as  sensation  itself  is  concerned,  forever 
undetermined  and  indeterminable.  Such  are  the  immuta- 
ble teachings  of  this  philosoplry,  as  universally  expounded 
by  its  advocates.  By  the  immutable  principles  of  that 
philosoph3r,  therefore,  said  philosophers  are  held  absolutely 
bound  to  a  profession  of  absolute  ignorance  of  the  charac- 
ter of  the  substances  which  we  call  nature,  and  of  all 
other  realities  in  common,  and  forever  to  cease  all  attempts 
and  pretensions  to  develop  and  teach  the  nature,  forms, 
principles,  and  laws  of  that  of  which,  by  profession,  they 
know  absolutely  nothing. 

Yet  these  so-called  philosophers,  after  affirming  their 
own  absolute  and  hopeless  ignorance  on  all  these  subjects, 
dogmatically  assume  an  absolute  knowledge  of  what  they 
themselves  affirm  to  be  the  unknowable  and  unknown,  and 
imperiously  impose  upon  us  their  science  of  the  same.  Mr. 
Herbert  Spencer,  for.example,  after  affirming  all  our  knowl- 
edge of  nature,  external  and  internal,  to  be  exclusively 
phenomenal,  that  is,  appearance?  gives  us  the  following 
proposition  as  embodying  the  ultimate  and  immutable  de- 
duction from  the  necessary  principles  of  this  philosophy, 
to  wit,  "  the  reality  existing  behind  all  appearances  is,  andj 
must  ever  be,  unknown."  Permit  us  here,  in  sober  earnest- 
ness, to  ask  Mr.  Spencer,  before  the  world,  the  following 
questions:  1.  Is  he  not  bound,  by  his  own  deduction,  to 
eternal  silence  in  respect  to  the  nature,  properties,  laws, 
and  ultimate  cause  of  this  reality?  2.  How  does  he  know 
but  that  behind  all  appearances  there  does,  in  fact,  exist  a 
real  universe,  constituted,  on  the  one  hand,  of  actual  enti- 
ties, having  real  extension  and  form,  and,  on  the  other,  of 
actually  embodied  spirits,  endowed  with  the  attributes  of 


7  0  IN  77?  OD  UCTION. 

thought,  feeling,  and  voluntary  determination,  —  a  universe 
"  made  by  the  word  of  God,"  and  presided  over  by  a  free, 
intelligent,  and  self-conscious  personality,  infinite  and  per- 
fect?    3.  In  his  attempt  to  reconcile  the  Theist  to  the  loss 
of  his  God,  our  author  tells  us  that  "  the  choice  is  not  be- 
tween personality  and  something  lower  than  personality ; 
whereas  the  choice  is  between  personality  and  something 
higher.     Is  it  not  just  as  possible  that  there  is  a  mode  of 
being  as  much  transcending  Intelligence  and  Will,  as  these 
transcend  mechanical  motion?"     Permit  us  to  ask,  in  this 
connection,  if  we  have  not  here  as  near  an   approach  to 
absolute   philosophic   idiocy    as   thought   can   make?      A 
thing,  a  higher  mode  of  being  than  a  person !     A  thing 
utterly  void   of  Intelligence,  Sensibility,  Will,    a  higher 
form  of  being  than  a  free,  self-conscious  Personality  abso- 
lutely infinite  and  perfect !     In  what  locality  but  a  brain  in 
which  Philosophy  has  run  mad,  could  such  a  thought  find  a 
place  ?     It  is  not  at  all  wonderful  that,  in  the  esteem  of  such 
a  mind,  the  idea  that  we  are  the  descendants  of  a  monkey 
ancestry  is  afar  higher  and  more  ennobling  conception,  than 
that  involved  in  the  idea  that  "  we  are  the  offspring  of 
God."     4.  The  idea  that  nature,  as  now  organized,  is  the 
result  of  the  all-formative  agency  of  infinite  Intelligence 
and  almighty  Power,  is  undeniably,  aside  from  the  ques- 
tion of  its  validity,  the  highest,  the  most  sublime,  and  per- 
fect conception,  that  ever  entered  the  human  mind.     On 
what  grounds,  then,  can  this  writer  justify  himself  before 
the  world  for  sneering   at   that  idea,  as   "  the    carpenter 
theory  "  ?     But  enough  of  this  for  the  present,  as  the  sub- 
ject will  come  up  again  in  another  connection. 


INTRODUCTION.  71 

Character  of  systems  of  Knowledge  as  developed  by  the  Ger- 
man mind,  and  the  conditions  on  which  such  systems  can 
be  refuted. 

In  examining  professed  systems  of  knowledge  developed 
by  the  great  thinkers  of  Germany,  systems  which  are  now 
being  urged  upon  the  public  mind  in  this  country  and  Great 
Britain,  the  intelligent  reader  will  hardly  fail  to  recognize 
the  absolute  logical  consecutiveness  which  everywhere  ob- 
tains between  the  principles  and  subsequent  deductions, 
which  appear  in  all  such  systems  without  exception.  In 
their  deductions  these  thinkers  very  seldom  err.  He  who 
adopts  their  principles  must,  to  be  logically  consistent, 
adopt  in  full  their  remotest  deductions. 

In  arguing  against  such  systems,  with  very  few,  if  any, 
exceptions,  it  is  perfectly  vain  to  attempt  to  break  the 
connection  between  the  principles  and  facts  assumed  and 
the  consequences  deduced  from  them,  on  the  one  hand,  or  by 
declaiming  against  said  consequences,  on  the  other.  The 
connection  referred  to  cannot  be  broken,  and  the  conse- 
quences have  been  adopted  con  amore  by  the  expounders 
and  advocates  of  these  sys terns.  The  only  successful 
points  of  attack  are  the  assumptions  which  lie  at  the  basis 
of  these  systems,  and  the  facts  adduced  as  the  foundation 
for  deductions.  Here,  of  almost  all  men  that  ever  appeared 
in  the  sphere  of  philosophy,  these  thinkers  are  the  weakest 
and  most  easily  vanquished.  Of  all  thinkers,  the  schools 
of  Idealism  are  the  most  rigidly  exact  and  consecutive  in 
deduction,  and  the  most  reckless  in  the  assumptions  of 
principle,  and  the  most  careless  in  the  induction  of  facts. 
The  great  scientific  want  of  the  present  age  is  a  funda- 
mental examination  and  refutation  of  these  imposing  and 


72  INTRODUCTION. 

logically  consistent  systems  upon  strictly  scientific  grounds, 
that  is,  by  a  fundamental  examination  of  the  assumptions 
which  lie  at  the  basis  of  these  systems,  and  the  character 
of  the  facts  adduced  in  their  construction.  This,  in  ad- 
dition to  what  we  have  already  done,  we  shall  attempt  to 
accomplish  in  a  subsequent  part  of  this  treatise. 

The  errors  into  which  the  advocates  of  Theism  have 
commonly  fallen  in  their  assaults  upon  these  systems,  now 
become  manifest.  One  class  begin  with  admitting  the 
principles  assumed,  especially  that  in  regard  to  the  nature 
and  sphere  of  knowledge  a  priori,  now  under  consideration, 
and  then  attempt  to  escape  the  final  deductions  of  said  s}ts- 
tems.  In  doiug  this,  they  only  reveal  their  own  logical 
inconsistency,  and  thus  really  betray  the  truth  into  the 
hands  of  its  enemies.  The  other  class,  without  a  scientific 
examination  of  the  systems  in  their  principles,  facts,  or  de- 
ductions, array  arguments  against  the  logical  consequences 
of  said  systems.  By  such  a  method,  they  only  array  be- 
fore the  world  consequences  for  which  the  systems  them- 
selves were,  in  fact,  constructed  and  are  now  advocated, 
and  which  commend  said  systems  to  the  heart  of  fallen 
humanity  in  its  alienation  from  the  only  living  and  true 
God.  These  systems  must,  upon  purely  scientific  grounds, 
be  demonstrated  to  be  systems  of  error,  or  they  will  con- 
tinue to  maintain  their  hold  upon  the  public  mind. 

WHAT  WE  PROPOSE  TO  ACCOMPLISH  IN  REGARD  TO  THE 
CLAIMS  OF  THEISM,  ON  THE  ONE  HAND,  AND  THOSE  OF 
THE     VARIOUS    SYSTEMS     OF     ANTITHEISM,     ON    THE     OTHER. 

"We  are  now  prepared  to  state  distinctly  what  we  propose 
to  accomplish  in  the  following  treatise,  in  respect  to  the 


INTRODUCTION.  73 

claims  of  Theism,  on  the  one  hand,  and  in  respect  to  those 
of  the  various  systems  of  Antitheism  on  the  other. 

In  regard  to  the  claims  of  Theism,  we  propose  to  show, 
1.  That  at  the  basis  of  the  theistic  deductions,  in  their  en- 
tireness,  there  are  valid  analytical  judgments,  that  is,  uni- 
versally absolute  and  necessary  intuitive  truths.  2.  That 
under  these  principles  the  entire  facts  of  the  universe,  bear- 
ing legitimately  upon  our  inquiries,  do,  in  fact,  take  rank. 
3.  That  all  these  deductions  are  the  necessary  logical  con- 
sequences of  these  facts  and  principles,  and  therefore  have 
not  merely  a  relative,  but  real  and  absolute  validity.  Con- 
sequently, 4.  The  deductions  of  Theism  are,  in  fact,  really 
and  truly  truths  of  science. 

In  regard  to  the  claims  of  the  various  systems  of  Anti- 
theism,  we  propose  to  prove,  that  these  systems,  with- 
out exception,  rest  ultimately  upon  mere  assumptions,  — 
assumptions  which  are  not  intuitively  true,  which  are 
wholly  incapable  of  being  verified  by  argument,  which 
have  no  antecedent  probability,  even,  in  their  favor,  but 
which,  on  the  other  hand,  are  demonstrably  false. 


74  NATURAL   THEOLOGY. 


CHAPTER  II. 

A  PRIORI  OR    ANALYTICAL    JUDGMENTS,  FIRST 

TRUTHS  OR  PRINCIPLES,  IN  THE  SCIENCE 

OF  NATURAL  THEOLOGY. 

CONDITIONS    ON   WHICH  WE    CAN   LEGITIMATELY  REASON   FROM 
FACTS   TO   CAUSES. 

Whenever  we  reason  from  facts  (events)  to  causes, 
causes  immediate  or  ultimate,  —  and  all  men  do  and  must 
thus  reason,  —  we  assume  that  facts  of  a  certain  character  do 
reveal  the  causes  by  which  they  (the  events)  are  produced. 
What  we  assume  as  true  in  this  case  is  not  a  mere  unau- 
thorized assumption,  but  an  analytical  judgment  which  lies 
at  the  bases  of  all  the  inductive  sciences.  Every  step  we 
take  in  scientific  investigation  is  taken  upon  the  authority 
of  the  principle,  that  facts  may  be  of  such  a  character  as 
to  reveal  their  particular  causes,  and  that  the  facts  under 
consideration  are  of  this  very  class. 

Facts  classified. 

All  facts,  actual  and  conceivable,  must,  in  their  relations 
to  their  real  and  proper  causes,  belong  to  some  one  of  the 
three  following  classes  :  1.  Those  which  present  no  indi- 
cations whatever  of  their  particular  causes,  immediate  or 
ultimate.  All  that  we  do  or  can  know  of  them  is  their 
actual  occurrence  as  facts,  and  also,  as  every  event  must 


FIRST    TRUTHS  OR    PRINCIPLES.  75 

have  a  cause,  that  these  facts  have  some  real  and  adequate 
cause ;  while  the  nature  and  character  of  this  cause  is 
wholly  unknown  and  beyond  our  conception.  Such  facts, 
to  employ  a  term  manufactured  for  the  occasion,  may 
be  denominated  non-indicative,  or  un-inclicative  facts. 
2.  Those  which  suggest  a  certain  number  of  particular  hy- 
potheses as  each  possibly  true,  and  that  without  affirming 
cither,  in  distinction  from  the  others,  as  true.  In  all  such 
cases  the  facts  will  sustain  such  relations  to  the  lrypotheses 
referred  to,  that  it  vail  be  perceived  that  one  of  them  must 
be  true,  while  said  facts  are  all,  without  exception,  equally 
accordant  with,  and  consequently  explicable  by,  either  of 
these  hypotheses.  In  explaining  facts  of  this  character, 
we  may  assume  either  of  these  hypotheses  as  true,  provided 
we  grant  that  either  of  the  others  might  as  properly  be 
assumed  for  the  same  purpose.  Facts  of  this  character 
may  properly  be  denominated  sceptical  facts.  This  term 
is  particularly  applied  to  hypotheses  of  ultimate  causation. 
The  sceptical  philosophy  affirms  that  the  entire  facts  of 
creation,  as  given  in  the  universal  intelligence,  are  of  such 
a  character  as  merely  to  suggest  a  certain  number  of 
distinct  and  opposite  hypotheses  of  this  kind,  without 
affirming  either  in  distinction  from  any  of  the  others  as 
true,  all  of  the  facts  being  equally  consistent  with  each 
and  every  hypothesis,  and  consequently  sustaining  to  each 
the  same  relations.  All  that  we  can  say  of  these  hypoth- 
eses is,  that  some  one  of  them  must  fie,  and  that  each  alike 
may  be,  true,  and  hence,  as  convenience  requires,  either  may 
be  assumed  as  true,  provided  the  same  liberty  is  granted 
relatively  to  all  the  others.  In  reference  to  our  knowl- 
edge of  the  universe,  scepticism  affirms  that  we  cannot 
prove  or  know  our  knowledge  of  it  to  be  valid  or  not  valid. 


76  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

In  regard  to  the  hypotheses  of  Theism,  Materialism,  and 
Idealism,  it  affirms  of  each  alike,  that  we  cannot  either 
prove  or  disprove  this  hypothesis,  and  hence  must  not 
affirm  it,  in  distinction  from  the  others,  as  true.  3.  The 
third  class  of  facts  are  of  such  a  nature  and  character  that 
they  not  only  suggest  a  given  number  of  hypotheses,  but 
affirm  some  one  of  these,  in  opposition  to  all  the  others,  to 
be  true.  The  facts  not  only  affirm  this  one  hypothesis  as 
true,  but  with  the  same  absoluteness  contradict  all  the  oth- 
ers. This  class  of  facts  may  be  denominated  dogmatic  or 
dogmatical,  or  more  properly,  perhaps,  indicative,  requiring 
us  to  hold  some  specific  hypothesis  as  true,  and  all  others 
of  a  contradictory  character  as  false.  Dogmatic  theories 
of  ultimate  causation  each  alike  affirms  that  the  facts  of 
the  universe,  relatively  to  such  questions,  are  of  this  spe- 
cific character. 

Characteristics  of  dogmatic  facts. 

Dogmatic  facts  of  every  kind  possess  the  following  char- 
acteristics :  1.  They  yield  or  suppose  certain  analytical 
judgments  which,  on  the  supposition  that  facts  of  a  spe- 
cific character  do  exist,  affirm  absolutely  the  one  specific 
lrypothesis,    and    as    absolutely   contradict    every   other. 

2.  The  facts  referred  to  take  legitimate  rank  under  this  one 
hypothesis,  and  cannot  be  made  to  accord  with  any  other. 

3.  The  validity  of  this  one  hypothesis  as  a  truth  of  science, 
then  follows  by  a  logical  necessity,  and  all  opposing  theo- 
-ries  must  be  held  as  false.  These  analytical  judgments  are 
the  major  premises,  the  first  truths  or  principles,  in  all  the 
syllogisms  which  yield  scientific  deductions  in  regard  to 
any  class  or  classes  of  facts  in  the  universe  of  matter  or 
mind.     The  facts  ranged  under  these  principles  constitute 


FIRST   TRUTHS  OR    PRINCIPLES.  77 

the  minor  premises  in  such  syllogisms.  It  is  only  by  means 
of  such  principles  and  such. facts  that  we  do  or  can  obtain 
real  or  scientific  conclusions  relatively  to  questions  of  prox- 
imate or  ultimate  causation.  In  order  to  determine,  in 
accordance  with  the  true  principles  of  scientific  deduction, 
which  of  the  hypotheses  of  ultimate  causation,  the  theistic 
or  antitheistic,  is,  in  fact,  true,  and  which  consequently 
false,  we  must  first  of  all  determine  what  specific  analytical 
judgments,  supposing  the  facts  of  the  universe  to  accord 
with  the  same,  would  affirm  each  of  these  hypotheses  and 
deny  all  others,  and  then  determine  under  which  of  them 
real  facts  do,  in  truth,  take  rank.  The  hypothesis  thus  af- 
firmed as  true  then  legitimately  becomes  a  truth  of  science, 
and  no  hypothesis  can  become  such  on  any  other  conditions. 
Our  first  procedure,  then,  is  to  find  these  analytical  judg- 
ments, and  this  is  the  specific  design  of  the  present  chapter. 
Note.  —  The  error  and  absurdity  of  the  common  suppo- 
sition, that  there  are  different  modes  of  proof  of  the  being 
and  character  of  God,  such  as  the  a  priori,  the  a  posteriori , 
the  ontological,  teleological,  &c,  now  becomes  sufficiently 
manifest.  The  absurdity  of  such  methods  would,  as  we 
have  shown  in  the  Logic,  become  manifest,  if  they  were  ap- 
plied to  the  determination  of  the  nature  and  character  of 
proximate  causes  in  the  universe  around  us.  A  question 
arises,  to  wit,  what  is  the  immediate  or  proximate  cause  of 
a  given  class  of  specific  facts,  the  rise  and  fall  of  mercury 
in  a  tube,  for  example  ?  A  philosopher  proposes  a  given 
hypothesis  upon  the  subject,  and  then  presents,  1st,  an 
a  priori;  2d,  an  a  posteriori;  3d,  an  ontological ;  4th,  a  tele- 
ological argument  to  prove  said  hypothesis.  What  would 
the  world  think  of  such  a  procedure  ?  Yet,  such  a  method 
would  be  no  more  erroneous  and  absurd  in  such  a  case  than 
7* 


78  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

when  adopted  in  the  attempted  determination  of  questions 
pertaining  to  ultimate  causation.  Every  truly  scientific 
argument  in  reference  to  questions  of  causation,  of  every 
kind  alike,  whether  proximate  or  ultimate,  has  and  must 
have,  two  and  only  two  elements,  and  can  have  no  more 
than  these,  —  the  a  priori,  embracing  the  anatytical  judg- 
ments referred  to,  and  the  a  posteriori,  containing  the  valid 
facts,  which,  as  the  minor  premise,  are  arranged  under  said 
judgments.  Had  the  opposite  method  obtained  in  the  con- 
duct of  the  natural  sciences,  the  world  would  now  be  in 
doubt,  if  not  disbelief,  in  respect  to  the  possibility  of  phi- 
losophy in  general,  just  as  manj^  who  have  most  profoundly 
studied  the  supposed  forms  of  proof  of  the  being  of  God, 
and  that  under  the  conviction  that  these  arc  the  only  forms 
of  real  proof  that  do  exist,  are  in  painful  doubt  in  regard 
to  the  possibility  of  certainty  in  the  sphere  of  Natural 
Theolog}^. 

ANALYTICAL  JUDGMENT  OR  PRINCIPLE  COMMON  TO  ALL 
FACTS  OF  EVERY  KIND,  AND  TO  ALL  HYPOTHESES  OF  UL- 
TIMATE   CAUSATION. 

All  hope  of  attaining  to  real  unity  of  conviction  and 
sentiment,  in  the  investigation  of  any  question  of  common 
interest,  depends  upon  the  fact  that  there  is  some  one  prin- 
ciple bearing  fundamentally  upon  that  question,  a  principle 
the  validity  of  which  all  alike  admit.  Such  a  principle  does 
in  fact  exist  relatively  to  the  inquiries  before  us.  We  thus 
have  a  common  ground  on  which  ail  inquiries  maj^  and 
must  meet,  and  from  which  all  our  investigations  must  take 
their  departure.  The  principle  to  which  we  refer  is  this  : 
There  is  an  ultimate  reason  why  the  order  and  arrange- 
ment existing  in  the  universe  within  and  around  us  are 


FIRST    TRUTHS    OR    PRINCIPLES.  79 

what  the}'  are,  and  why  the  sequence  of  events  occurs  as  it 
does,  and  not  otherwise.  This  is  strictly  an  analytical 
judgment,  its  opposite  being  inconceivable  and  impossible. 
Every  event,  of  whatever  character  it  may  be,  necessarily  im- 
plies it,  inasmuch  as  there  can  be  no  event  without  a  cause, 
and  consequently  without  an  ultimate  cause.  Every  theory 
of  ultimate  causation,  and  all  have  some  theory  upon  the 
subject,  affirms  by  necessary  implication  the  validity  of  this 
same  principle,  the  inquiry  itself  being  after  this  one  reason 
or  cause.  All  inquirers  after  truth,  too,  admit  and  assume, 
whatever  their  views  of  nature  or  the  facts  of  the  uni- 
verse may  be,  the  absolute  and  necessary  validity  of  this 
same  principle,  and  no  one  will  deny  its  validity. 

Now,  if  we  call  this  common  and  universally  admitted 
reason  or  first  cause,  God,  then  all  men  do,  in  fact,  believe 
in  God,  and  no  one  denies,  or  wishes  to  be  understood  as 
denying,  his  existence.  The  only  question  in  difference 
must  pertain  to  his  attributes,  and  not  at  all  to  the  ques- 
tion of  his  existence. 

Further,  whatever  is  necessarily  implied  in  the  one  great 
fact  before  us,  the  reality  of  this  ultimate  reason,  or  first 
cause,  must  necessarity  be  true  of  God  considered  simply 
as  such  cause.  This,  all  will  and  must  admit.  The  ques- 
tion which  here  arises,  and  which  should  be  specifically 
determined  in  this  connection,  is  this  :  What  are  the  attri- 
butes necessarily  implied  in  the  idea  of  God  as  the  ultimate 
reason  or  first  cause  of  the  facts  of  the  universe?  To  this 
question  we  will  now  proceed  to  give  the  answer  required. 
Among  these  attributes  we  notice  the  following : 


80  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

Attributes  necessarily  implied  in  the  idea  of  God,  considered 
as  the  ultimate  reason  or  first  cause  of  the  facts  of  the 
universe. 

1.  The  first  that  we  notice  is  eternity.  Did  not  this 
cause  exist  from  eternity,  it  would  be  the  effect  of  some 
other  cause,  and  therefore  would  not  itself  be  the  first  or 
ultimate  cause. 

2.  Immutability  is  another  attribute  which  must  be  af- 
firmed of  God  as  the  cause  under  consideration.  That 
which  is  itself  mutable  must  be  determined,  in  its  activity, 
by  something  besides  itself,  and  that  which  thus  determines, 
and  not  the  determined,  must  be  the  ultimate  or  first  cause. 
God  then,  as  such  cause,  must  possess  this  one  attribute. 
That  which  conditions  all  facts  must,  self-evidently,  be 
itself  unconditioned. 

3.  The  next  implied  attribute  that  we  notice  is  unity. 
The  very  idea  of  an  ultimate  reason  or  cause  implies  that 
this  reason  or  cause  is  one,  and  not  many.  If  we  suppose 
many  realities  eternally  to  exist,  and  that  the  facts  of  the 
universe  are  the  results  of  the  action  and  reaction  of  such 
realities  upon  one  another,  still  the  direction  of  this  activ- 
ity and  its  peculiar  results  would  b>e  determined  by  the 
common  correlated  nature  of  said  realities.  This  common 
nature,  then,  which  must  ever  be  on#  and  identical,  would 
be  the  ultimate  reason  or  first  cause  of  the  facts  under  con- 
sideration. In  whatever  point  of  light  we  consider  the 
subject,  therefore,  we  must  affirm  a  certain  form  of  abso- 
lute unity  of  God  considered  as  the  cause  after  which  we 
are  inquiring. 

4.  God  considered  as  this  eternally  existing  and  immuta- 
ble unity  must  also  possess  intrinsic  efficiency,  adequacy, 


FIRST   TRUTHS    OR   PRINCIPLES.  81 

and  adaptation  to  produce  the  great  facts  under  considera- 
tion. Did  he  not  possess  efficiencj^,  he  could  be  the  cause 
of  no  facts  whatever.  Did  he  not  possess  the  adequacy 
and  adaptation  referred  to,  he  could  by  no  possibility  be 
the  cause  of  these  particular  facts. 

5.  Hence  we  remark,  finally,  that  the  particular  cause 
assigned  for  these  facts  must  possess  an  intelligible  ade- 
quacy and  adaptation  to  produce  said  facts.  The  cause  is 
assigned  for  the  specific  purpose  of  accounting  intelligibly 
for  these  specific  facts.  If  it  does  not  possess  an  intelligi- 
ble, that  is,  perceived  adequacy  and  adaptation  to  produce 
the  facts,  then  they  are  not  accounted  for,  and  the  lrypoth- 
esis  assigned  comes  under  the  principle  of  contradiction, 
and  may  and  ought  to  be  set  aside  as  an  absolute  absurdity. 

THE  GRAND  PROBLEM  IN  NATURAL  THEOLOGY. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  state  definitely  the  grand  prob- 
lem in  Natural  Theology.  It  is  to  find  an  eternally  exist- 
ing and  immutable  unit}T,  which  alone,  in  distinction  from 
and  in  opposition  to  all  other  conceivable  Irypotheses  of 
ultimate  causation,  shall  possess  an  intelligible  efficiency, 
adequacy,  and  adaptation  to  produce  the  great  facts  of  the 
universe  which  fall  within  the  sphere  of  our  investigations, 
and  to  which  consequently  these  facts  must  be  assigned,  as 
their  first  or  ultimate  cause.  This  is  the  problem,  the  sci- 
entific solution  of  which  is  undeniably  the  great  scientific 
want  of  the  world  at  the  present  time.  This,  we  judge,  no 
one  will  deny. 

Fundamental  characteristics  of  the  true  and  proper  solution 
of  this  problem. 

The  fundamental  characteristics  of  the  true  and  proper 


82  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

scientific  solution  of  this  problem  next  claim  our  attention. 
They  are  the  following  : 

1.  The  solution  will  take  into  account  all  the  valid  facts 
of  the  universe  bearing  upon  the  case,  with  all  their  essen- 
tial characteristics.  Nothing  will  be  supposed  which  is  not 
real,  and  nothing  omitted,  ignored,  or  denied,  which  is  real. 
If  any  real  facts  bearing  upon  the  question,  or  any  of  their 
essential  characteristics,  are  omitted  or  denied  ;  or  if  any 
not  real  are  assumed  in  the  argument,  — this  would  utterly 
vitiate  the  whole  proceeding. 

2.  The  hypothesis  assigned  must  intelligibly  account  for 
all  the  facts,  with  all  their  essential  characteristics  in  their 
entireness.  If  anything  really  involved  in  the  issue  is 
left  unaccounted  for,  especially  if  it  should  appear  that 
such  things  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  the  hypothesis 
assigned,  this  would  undeniably  indicate  that  the  true  one 
has  not  been  found. 

3.  The  facts  must  be  shown  not  only  to  be  perfectly 
compatible  with  this  one  hypothesis,  but  obviously  and  un- 
deniably incompatible  with,  and  contradictory  to,  every  other. 
If  the  facts  can  be  shown  to  consist  with  two  or  more  dis- 
tinct and  opposite  hypotheses,  then  said  facts  are  sceptical 
in  their  character,  and  each  hypothesis  has  equal  claims. 
Nothing  whatever  is  proven.  Any  one  hypothesis  of  ulti- 
mate causation  demonstrated  to  sustain  all  the  above-named 
relations  to  the  facts  under  consideration,  would  thereby 
have  an  absolute  claim  to  take  rank  as  a  truth  of  science. 

The  problem  of  Natural  Theology  stated  in  another  form 
is  this, — to  find  an  eternally  existing  and  immutable  unity 
sustaining  precisely  these  relations  to  the  facts  under  con- 
sideration. This  being  accomplished,  Natural  Theology 
legitimately  becomes  a  science,  and  that  in  the  true  and 


FIRST   TRUTHS    OR   PRINCIPLES.  83 

proper  sense  of  the  term.  On  no  other  conditions  can  it 
properly  be  ranked  among  the  sciences.  If,  on  investiga- 
tion, the  facts  of  the  universe  bearing  upon  our  inquiries 
shall  be  found  to  be  dogmatic,  that  is,  indicative  in  their 
character,  they  will  yield  us  such  an  hypothesis,  and  we 
shall  have  a  science  of  Natural  Theology.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  they  should  be  found  to  be  sceptical  or  wholly  unin- 
dicative,  then  we  shall  find  a  certain  given  number  of 
hypotheses,  each  having  equal  claims  with  every  other,  or 
shall  be  landed  in  the  conclusion  that  there  is  some  final 
cause,  with  no  indications  whatever  of  its  real  or  possible 
nature.  In  either  of  these  cases,  Natural  Theology,  as  a 
science,  will  be  shown  to  be  an  utter  impossibility. 

THE   TWO   HYPOTHESES  OF   ULTIMATE    CAUSATION   WHICH   NEC- 
ESSARILY   EMBRACE    AND    IMPLY    ALL    OTHERS. 

There  are  two  distinct  and  opposite  hypotheses  of  ulti- 
mate causation  which  necessarily  include  and  imply  all 
others.  The  first  is  that  which  assumes  nature  with  its 
inhering  laws  to  be  the  only  reality,  and  refers  all  the  facts 
of  the  universe  to  these  laws  as  their  ultimate  cause.  The 
second  is  that  which  affirms  that  this  cause  is  a  reality  out 
of  and  above  nature,  a  reality  which  originated  and  estab- 
lished nature's  laws,  and  exercises  an  absolute  control  over 
nature  itself.  Every  one  will  perceive,  on  a  moment's  re- 
flection, that  these  two  hypotheses  do  and  must  embrace 
all  others,  and  that  consequently  one  of  them,  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  the  other,  must  be  true.  Whatever  our  ideas  of 
nature  may  be,  whether  they  accord  with  the  doctrine  of 
Realism,  Materialism,  or  Idealism  in  any  one  or  all  of  its 
various  forms,  we  must  admit  that  the  real  first  cause  of  the 
facts  of  the  universe  is  an  inhering  law  of  nature  itself,  or 


84  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

a  reality  out  of,  above,  and  independent  of,  nature,  and 
exercising  a  supreme  control  over  it.  The  latter  is  the 
hypothesis  of  Theism,  the  former  that  of  Natural  Law.  If 
we  select  the  term  G.  to  represent  the  idea  of  the  ultimate 
cause  after  which  we  are  inquiring,  and  T.  to  represent  the 
hypothesis  of  Theism,  and  L.  to  represent  that  of  Natural 
Law,  then  the  problem  of  Natural  Theology  may  be  thus 
announced  :  G.  is  either  T.  or  L.,  and  the  question  to  be 
determined  is,  which? 

The  validity  of  the  above  statement  of  the  problem  none 
will  deny.  Every  theory  of  ultimate  causation  which  ever 
has  been,  or  can  be  presented,  as  standing  opposed  to  that 
of  Theism,  whether  its  advocate  affirms  matter,  spirit,  or 
some  attribute  of  spirit,  or  finally  something  wholly  un- 
known, to  be  nature,  presents  natural  law  as  the  exclusive 
ultimate  cause  of  the  facts  or  phenomena  of  nature.  This, 
then,  is  the  generic  hypothesis  which  stands  opposed  to 
that  of  Theism,  and  which  includes  all  specific  ones  which 
are  thus  opposed.  If  we  should  prove  the  former,  the 
generical  one,  true,  the  question  would  subsequently  arise, 
which  of  the  latter,  the  speciflcal  ones,  is  true.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  we  should  prove  this  one  hypothesis  false,  we 
should  disprove  it,  in  all  the  forms  which  it  ever  has 
assumed,  or  ever  can  assume.  We  would  now  invite 
special  attention  to  the  following  general  remarks  upon 
these  two  distinct  and  opposite  trypotheses. 

Some  general  remarks  upon    these  distinct  and  opposite 
hypotheses. 

1.  The  truth  of  each,  in  common,  is,  in  itself,  equally 
conceivable,  and  therefore  possible.  The  doctrine  of  Nat- 
ural Law  is  no  more  self-contradictory  than  that  of  Theism. 


FIRST   TRUTHS    OR   PRINCIPLES.  85 

Mr.  Hume  has  undeniably  announced  the  truth  as  it  is  upon 
this  subject,  to  wit,  that  the  idea  of  a  nature  eternally  ex- 
isting in  a  state  of  order  without  a  cause  other  than  the 
eternally  inhering  laws  of  nature,  is  no  more  self-contra- 
dictory than  the  idea  of  an  eternally  existing  and  infinite 
mind  who  originated  this  order,  a  mind  existing  without  a 
cause.  The  idea  of  order  in  the  Finite  without  a  cause,  is 
no  more  self-contradictory  than  the  idea  of  order  in  the  In- 
finite without  a  cause. 

2.  Hence  we  remark,  that  the  question  which  of  these 
hypotheses  is,  and  which  is  not,  true,  cannot  be  determined 
a  priori.  As  the  truth  of  each  in  common  is  given,  as  in 
itself  equally  conceivable  and  equally  possible  with  the 
other,  there  can,  by  no  possibility,  be  any  form  or  degree 
of  evidence  or  proof  a  priori  of  the  truth  of  one,  in  dis- 
tinction from  the  other.  The  question,  which  is,  and  which 
is  not,  true,  must  ever  remain  in  itself  problematical,  and 
must  be  determined  by  an  appeal  to  facts. 

We  shall  be  necessitated  to  adopt  the  same  conclusion, 
if  we  refer  to  the  nature  of,  so-called,  a  priori  ideas  existing 
in  the  mind, — ideas  such  as  those  of  space  and  time,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  of  cause,  power,  and  substance  finite  and  in- 
finite, on  the  other, — realities  given  as  existing  in  space  and 
time.  Space  and  time  must  be,  whether  anything  else  does 
or  does  not  exist.  The  ideas  of  these  realities,  therefore, 
are  given  in  the  universal  intelligence,  as  in  themselves 
not  only  necessary,  but  absolute.  In  other  words,  the 
objects  of  these  ideas  are  given  as  existing  unconditionally, 
—  that  is,  whether  any  other  reality  does  or  does  not  exist. 
But  while  we  thus  conceive  of  space  and  time,  we  do  not 
conceive  of  the  ideas  of  cause,  power,  and  substance,  —  reali- 
ties existing  in  space  and  time,  as  in  themselves,  thus  un- 
8 


86 


NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 


conditioned  and  absolute.  The  reason  is  obvious.  When- 
ever we  conceive  of  any  reality  as  existing  in  time  and 
space,  and  that  without  reference  to  facts  which  necessarily 
imply  its  existence,  we  find  the  idea  of  the  being,  or  non- 
being  of  that  object  as,  in  itself,  equally  conceivable.  The 
hypothesis  of  Natural  Law,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  The- 
ism, on  the  other,  for  example,  is  each,  as  we  have  seen,  in 
itself,  equally  conceivable.  The  idea  of  neither,  then,  is 
absolute,  like  the  ideas  of  space  and  time.  If  events  are 
real,  cause  must  be,  for  there  can  be  no  event  without  a 
cause.  The  idea  of  cause,  then,  is  not  absolutely,  but 
conditionally  necessary,  and  this  holds  just  as  true  of  ulti- 
mate as  of  proximate  causation.  A  priori,  therefore,  we 
cannot  determine  what  causes,  finite  or  infinite,  do  or  do 
not  exist. 

Some  maintain  that  by  Reason  we  have  a  direct  and  im- 
mediate perception  of  the  being  and  perfections  of  God, 
just  as  we  do  of  mental  and  material  facts  by  external  and 
internal  perception.  If  this  were  so,  our  knowledge  of  God 
would  not  be,  as  the  advocates  of  this  theory  affirm,  a  priori 
at  all,  but  wholly  empirical.  The  fundamental  element  of 
our  idea  of  God  is  that  of  a  cause,  the  unconditioned  cause 
of  all  that  conditionally  exists.  Now,  causes  of  every  kind 
are  known,  not  a  priori,  but  wholly  through  the  effects  which 
they  produce.  It  is  equally  a  doctrine  of  science  and  reve- 
lation both,  that  God  is  known,  not  a  priori,  nor  by  insight 
of  Reason,  but  "by  the  wonders  which  he  performs,"  "  by 
the  things  that  are  made."  There  is  no  chimera  more 
wild  than  the  idea  that  there  is  any  a  priori  proof  of  the 
being  of  God,  or  that  he  is  known  by  the  direct  and 
immediate  insight  of  Reason,  and  not  "  by  the  things  that 
are  made." 


FIRST   TRUTHS    OR   PRINCIPLES.  87 

3.  Equally  undeniable  and  self-evident  is  the  proposition 
that  the  question,  which  of  these  hypotheses  is,  and  which 
is  not  true,  cannot  be  determined  by  a  mere  reference  to 
facts  of  order  existing  in  nature, —  facts  of  order,  irrespective 
of  their  intrinsic  character  and  origin.  Every  hypothesis 
of  ultimate  causation  does  and  must,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  involve  the  idea  of  order  without  a  cause.  Mere 
facts  of  order,  then,  —  the  idea  of  such  facts  being  the  com- 
mon element  of  all  hypotheses  upon  the  subject,  —  cannot 
determine  which  particular  hypothesis  is,  and  which  is  not 
true. 

4.  Nor  can  the  question  under  consideration,  we  remark 
finally,  be  determined  by  any  argument  drawn  from  the 
idea  of  an  infinite  series  of  events.  The  possibility  %of 
accounting  for  the  facts  of  nature  through  natural  law,  has, 
by  many  theists,  been  denied,  on  the  ground  that  such  a 
supposition  involves  a  necessary  contradiction,  implying, 
as  it  does,  an  infinite  series  of  events.  The  argument 
urged  against  this  dogma  is  this  :  a  series  of  events  implies 
a  first,  and  an  infinite  series  implies  that  the  event  which 
stands  at  the  head  of  the  whole  is  at  an  infinite  distance, 
while  the  one  which  stands  next  in  order  is  only  at  a  finite 
distance  from  the  present  moment.  Thus  an  infinite  dis- 
tance must  be  supposed  to  exist  between  two  immediately 
successive  events,  —  events  removed  at  the  distance  of  but  a 
single  moment  from  each  other.  This  is  a  contradiction. 
Such  is  the  argument  against  this  doctrine.  In  reply  we 
remark : 

(1.)  That  the  series  under  consideration  is  one  which,  by 
hypothesis,  has  no  first.  The  eternity  past  has  no  begin- 
ning, and  a  series  coextensive  with  it  could  have  no  indi- 
vidual standing  at  its  head.  The  objection,  therefore,  does 
not  hold. 


88  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

(2.)  The  reality  of  objects  actually  existing  from  eternity 
must  be  admitted  as  a  matter  of  fact, — the  fact  that  anything 
now  exists,  implying,  of  necessity,  that  something  must 
have  existed  from  eternity.  Now,  that  which  existed  from 
eternity  must  have  existed  in  a  state  of  activity  or  inac- 
tivity, both  suppositions  being  equally  conceivable.  In 
the  former  case,  we  have  an  infinite  series  of  acts  ;  in  other 
words,  we  have,  in  fact,  a  series,  the  possibility  of  which 
is  denied  in  the  argument  before  us.  In  the  latter  case, 
we  have  an  infinite  succession  of  moments,  in  which  the 
reality  referred  to  did  not  act.  Here,  too,  is  an  actual 
series,  absolutely  infinite ;  and  the  argument  affirming  the 
impossibility  of  such  a  series,  in  any  form,  stands  revealed 
as  a  demonstrated  fallacy. 

(3.)  Duration  itself,  we  remark  again,  must  be  admitted 
as,  relatively  to  the  past,  absolutely  infinite.  Now,  infinite 
duration  implies  necessarily  an  infinite  series  of  successive 
moments  ;  in  other  words,  it  implies  the  reality  of  the  series 
itself  objected  against.  Further,  if  there  may  be  an  in- 
finite series  of  successive  moments,  —  and  the  fact  of  its 
existence  cannot  be  denied,  —  then  there  may  be  a  similar 
series  of  successive  acts  on  the  part  of  substances  or  pow- 
ers which  must  have  existed  from  eternity. 

(4.)  That  God  has  existed  from  eternity,  we  remark, 
finally,  those  who  urge  the  argument  under  consideration 
admit  and  affirm.  Now,  if  he  thus  existed,  he  may,  in 
some  form  or  other,  have  acted  from  eternity,  and  at  each 
moment  of  the  eternity  past.  Here,  too,  we  have  undenia- 
bly an  infinite  series  of  actual  or  possible  acts  or  events. 
In  whatever  point  of  light  the  argument  against  the  possi- 
bility of  an  infinite  series  of  events  is  scientifically  viewed, 
it  stands  revealed  as  nothing  but  a  logical  fallacy.     The 


FIRST   TRUTHS    OR   PRINCIPLES.  89 

doctrine,  then,  of  ultimate  causation  by  natural  law  cannot 
be  overthrown  by  any  objections  urged  against  the  idea  of 
an  infinite  series  of  events  as  involved  in  that  doctrine. 
We  now  advance  to  a  consideration  of  some  of  the 

Specific  Characteristics  of  the  hypothesis  of  Natural  Law. 
If  this  hypothesis  is  true,  it  is  undeniable  that  the  order, 
arrangement,  and  general  laws,  which  now  exist  and  obtain 
in  the  universe,  must  have  existed  and  obtained  from  eter- 
nity. Any  inhering  law  of  nature  which  would,  from  eter- 
nity up  to  any  given  period,  prevent  and  consequently  ren- 
der absolutely  impossible  the  existence  of  order,  arrange- 
ment, and  general  laws  in  the  universe,  would  prevent  and 
render  impossible  the  existence  of  the  same  to  eternity. 
Inhering  law,  or  any  other  cause,  acting  from  necessity 
which,  from  eternity  to  any  one  period,  prevented,  and  con- 
sequently rendered  impossible,  the  existence  of  the  present 
order,  arrangement,  and  general  laws  of  the  universe,  would 
do  the  same  to  eternity.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  here 
that  what  occurs  through  Natural  Law,  with  no  existing 
extraneous  power  to  prevent  its  acting  or  change  its  direc- 
tion, must  of  necessity  occur,  and  whatever  does  not  occur 
is,  in  the  circumstances,  of  impossible  occurrence.  If  nat- 
ural inhering  law  is  the  ultimate,  determining,  and  exclu- 
sive cause  of  the  facts  of  the  universe,  then  whatever,  from 
eternity  to  any  given  period,  did  not  occur,  was,  during  that 
whole  prior  eternity,  of  impossible  occurrence.  If,  then, 
from  eternity  to  any  given  conceivable  or  actual  moment, 
order,  arrangement,  and  general  laws,  or  any  particular 
form  of  the  same,  did  not  obtain,  the  absence  of  order, 
arrangement,  and  general  laws,  or  a  state  the  opposite  of 
the  particular  forms  referred  to,  is  and  must  be  an  abso- 
8* 


90  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

lutely  fixed  and  immutable  law  of  nature,  and  by  no  possi- 
bility through  said  law  could  the  events  under  consideration 
occur  to  eternity.  The  conclusion  is  absolutely  undeniable 
that  if  inhering  Natural  Law  is  the  exclusive,  first,  and  de- 
termining cause  of  the  facts  of  the  universe,  then  the  present 
order,  arrangement,  and  general  laws  of  nature  must,  in 
all  their  essential  features  and  forms,  have  existed  from 
eternity. 

According  to  this  hypothesis,  also,  the  entire  series  of 
events,  from  eternity  to  eternity,  must  be  throughout  in  the 
absolute  relation  of  immediate  and  necessary  antecedence 
and  consequence.  There  can  be  no  break  in  the  chain  ;  not 
a  solitary  link  can  be  wanting,  and  each  one  must  hang  in 
absolute  dependence  upon  and  be  in  all  respects,  and  by 
absolute  necessity,  what  it  is  from  what  immediately  pre- 
ceded it.  On  no  other  conditions  can  the  facts  of  the 
universe  be  determined  by  Natural  Law  as  their  exclusive 
first  or  ultimate  cause.     This  is  self-evident. 

According  to  the  same  hypothesis,  we  remark,  once  more, 
there  can  be  in  nature  no  law  of  progression  from  the 
less  towards  the  more  perfect,  or  vice-versa ;  nor  can  the 
series  of  events  be  of  this  character.  Each  of  these  sup- 
positions implies  a  beginning,  a  commencement  of  the  exist- 
ing order  of  events.  A  series  by  Natural  Law,  however, 
can  have  no  beginning.  Were  the  series  of  events  in 
nature  exclusively  by  Natural  Law,  and  were  there  in  nature 
a  law  of  progression  from  the  less  towards  the  more  per- 
fect, there  would  be  in  nature  now  absolute  infinity  and  per- 
fection ;  for  that  which  has  been  growing  from  eternity, 
must  now,  to  say  the  least,  be  infinite.  How  strange  it  is, 
that  believers  in  this  theory  of  Natural  Law,  also  nearly,  if 
not  quite  universally,  hold  and  glory  in  a  doctrine  of  a  law 


FIRST    TRUTHS    OR   PRINCIPLES.  91 

of  progression  in  nature  from  the  less  towards  the  more 
perfect,  —  thus  affirming  and  denying  the  same  thing  ;  attrib- 
uting the  facts  of  nature  exclusively  to  Natural  Law,  and 
then  affirming  the  existence  in  nature  of  an  immutable  law, 
absolutely  incompatible  with  that  theory.  This  prepares 
us  to  appreciate  fully  the  following  undeniable  specific  facts 
and  considerations  which  have  a  fundamental  bearing  upon 
this  hypothesis. 

1.  On  no  conditions  whatever  can  this  hypothesis  be 
established  as  true.  If  it  is  true,  the  fact  of  its  validity  is 
wholly  unsusceptible  of  proof.  If  we  suppose  the  series  of 
events  in  the  universe  to  have  had,  in  fact,  no  beginninsf, 
and  to  have  possessed  from  eternity  the  appearance  of  im- 
mediate and  uninterrupted  antecedence  and  consequence,  — 
facts  which,  if  real,  we  can  never  know,  but  which  we  have 
absolute  evidence  are  not  real,  —  if  all  this,  however,  be 
granted,  still  the  facts  are  just  as  consistent  with  and  ex- 
plicable by  a  reference  to  a  cause  out  of  and  above  nature, 
as  by  the  theory  of  inhering  law.  No  conceivable  arrange- 
ment or  condition  of  facts  can  do  any  more  than  prove  this 
last  hypothesis  as  a  possible  truth.  By  no  possibility  can 
it  be  established  as  actually  true.     This  is  undeniable. 

2.  Nor  is  it  possible  to  adduce  in  favor  of  the  doctrine 
of  Natural  Law  any  form  or  degree  of  positive  evidence 
ivhatever.  Facts  equally  consistent,  in  all  respects,  with 
two  distinct  and  opposite  hypotheses,  not  only  fail  wholly 
to  prove  or  disprove  either,  but  they  present,  and  can  pre- 
sent no  form  or  degree  of  positive  evidence  in  favor  of  one 
and  in  opposition  to  the  other.  Now,  every  fact  of  nature 
which  can  be  adduced  in  favor  of  the  doctrine  of  Natural 
Law  is  equally  explicable  on  the  opposite  hypothesis.  This 
is  undeniable.     The  doctrine  under  consideration  is  not  only 


92  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

insusceptible  of  proof,  but  no  form  or  degree  of  positive 
evidence  of  any  kind  can,  by  any  possibility,  be  adduced  in 
its  favor.     There  is  no  evading  this  conclusion. 

3.  Equally  evident  and  undeniable  is  the  fact  that  this 
theory  has,  and  can  have,  on  no  conditions  actual  or  possi- 
ble, any  antecedent  probability  in  its  favor,  over  and  above 
that  of  Theism.  The  existence  of  nature,  of  any  finite 
reality,  or  of  all  such  forms  of  existence  actual  and  con- 
ceivable, does  not  render,  in  any  form,  the  being,  perfec- 
tions, and  universal  dominion  of  a  God  of  nature  in  all 
respects  absolutely  infinite  and  perfect,  in  any  sense  even 
an  improbability.  The  hypothesis  of  Natural  Law  can  never 
be  held  as  true,  even  on  the  ground  of  an  antecedent  prob- 
ability in  its  favor,  without  a  palpable  violation  of  all  the 
laws  and  principles  of  reason  and  science. 

4.  Such  being  the  undeniable  facts  of  the  case,  any  form 
of  positive  evidence  against  the  theory  of  Natural  Law, 
and  in  favor  of  that  of  Theism,  would  bind  us,  by  all  the 
laws  of  scientific  deduction  bearing  upon  such  subjects,  to 
hold  and  treat  the  latter  hypothesis  as  true,  and  the  former 
as  false.  Of  two  opposite  lrypotheses,  when  no  positive  or 
even  probable  evidence  does  or  can  exist  in  favor  of  one, 
and  in  opposition  to  the  other,  any  positive  evidence  of 
any  kind  in  favor  of  the  latter  binds  us  to  hold  it  as  alone 
true,  and  the  other  as  false.  This  cannot  be  denied.  If, 
then,  we  can  adduce  any  real  positive  evidence  in  favor  of 
the  hypothesis  of  Theism,  and  in  opposition  to  that  of  Nat- 
ural Law,  this  fact  would  bind  the  conscience  of  every  man 
to  hold  and  treat  the  latter  as  false  and  the  opposite  as  true. 
There  is  no  escaping  this  conclusion. 

5.  Another  undeniable  consideration  having  a  fundamental 
bearing  upon  this  hypothesis  here  claims  our  special  atten- 


FIRST   TRUTHS    OR   PRINCIPLES.  93 

tion.  We  refer  to  the  only  conceivable  or  possible  condi- 
tions on  which  said  hypothesis  can  be  shown  to  be  evenpossi- 
bly  true,  —  conditions,  which,  by  no  possibility  of  human 
observation  or  experience,  can  be  fulfilled.  It  must  be 
established  undeniably,  (1st,)  that  the  present  order  of  na- 
ture, in  its  essential  forms,  has  had,  as  far  as  we  have  any 
evidence  bearing  upon  the  case,  no  beginning ;  (2d,)  that 
there  has  been,  as  far  as  we  can  trace  the  chain  of  events, 
no  break  in  it, — that  the  order  of  succession,  as  far  as  we 
can  perceive,  has  never  been  broken,  the  entire  facts  of  any 
one  moment  being  as  adequately  accounted  for,  by  an  ex- 
clusive reference  to  what  went  immediately  before,  as  in 
airy  other  case  of  apparent  causation ;  and  (3d,)  that  there 
are  no  other  known  facts  indicating  any  other  power  in  or 
over  nature  than  that  of  inhering  law.  If  all  this  can  be 
shown,  then  the  impossibility  of  proving  the  theistic 
Irypothesis  has  been  demonstrated,  and  the  fact  of  ultimate 
causation  by  Natural  Law  has  been  correspondingly  proven 
as  a  possible  truth.  This,  then,  is  the  burden  resting  upon 
the  advocate  of  the  doctrine  of  Natural  Law,  and  this  is  the 
least  that  can  be  reasonably  required  of  him.  If  he  will 
advance  into  the  theatre  of  the  great  facts  of  the  universe, 
and  show  by  irresistible  arguments  that  the  series  of  events 
around  us  had  no  beginning,  as  far  as  any  evidence  exists 
to  the  contrary,  that  no  break  whatever  appears  anywhere  in 
the  chain,  and  that  other  facts  of  a  contradictory  character 
do  not  anywhere  exist, — then,  and  then  only,  is  he  permitted 
to  hold  up  his  hypothesis  as  a  possible  truth.  If  he  fails 
in  any  of  these  fundamental  respects,  his  theory  stands  re- 
vealed as  demonstrably  false. 

6.  While  the  theory  of  Natural  Law  cannot  be  proven 
true,  it  may,  on  certain  conditions,  be  rendered  demon stra- 


94  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

bly  false.  Let  us  suppose  that  the  order  and  arrangements 
of  nature  stand  revealed  as  having  had  a  beginning,  and 
as  having  been,  from  time  to  time,  interrupted,  in  forms 
which  can  be  accounted  for  by  no  reference  to  any  inhering 
law  or  laws  of  nature,  and,  finally,  that  other  great  facts  do 
exist,  facts  of  mind,  for  example,  which  undeniably  indi- 
cate the  truth  of  Theism.  Then  we  should  have  absolute 
proof  that  the  hypothesis  of  Natural  Law  is  and  must  be 
false.  "While  no  form  of  evidence  whatever  can  be  ad- 
duced in  favor  of  the  theory  of  Natural  Law,  on  certain 
conceivable  conditions,  it  stands  revealed  as  demonstrably 
false,  and  the  opposite  hypothesis  as  demonstrably  true. 
This  will  be  the  case  relatively  to  these  hypotheses,  one 
of  which  must  be  true,  should  the  facts  of  the  universe  be 
found  to  accord  with  such  conditions. 

7.  Our  last  remark  upon  the  theory  of  Natural  Law  is 
this :  No  man  can  hold  this  hypothesis  as  positively  true, 
and  that  of  Theism  as  false,  without  a  palpable  and  unde- 
niable violation  of  all  the  laws  of  true  science.  In  that 
case,  he  holds  a  theory  as  true,  for  the  truth  of  which  there 
can,  on  any  conditions,  actual  or  conceivable,  exist  not 
only  no  positive  proof,  but  not  even  any  form  of  antecedent 
probability  in  its  favor  ;  while  he  holds  another  hypothesis 
as  false,  for  the  truth  of  which  there  may  exist,  and  for 
aught  he  does  or  can  know,  does  exist  somewhere  in  the 
universe,  to  say  the  least,  demonstrative  evidence.  Such, 
undeniably,  is  the  lrypothesis  of  Natural  Law.  We  will 
now  advance  to  a  consideration  of  the  essential  character- 
istics, and  of  the  fundamental  principles  which  pertain  to 
the  opposite  hypothesis,  that  of  Theism. 


FIRST  TRUTHS    OR   PRINCIPLES.  95 

Tlie  hypothesis  of  Theism.     Its  general  characteristics  and 
ultimate  principles. 

In  regard  to  this  hypothesis,  we  would  remark,  in  gen- 
eral, that,  as  we  have  already  seen,  it  may  be  true  in  fact ; 
that  against  it  no  antecedent  probabilities  of  any  kind  do 
or  can  exist ;  and  that  on  certain  conditions  its  validity  may 
become  demonstrably  evident.  The  question  which  now 
arises  is  this  :  What  are  the  conditions  referred  to?  What 
are  the  conditions  on  which  we  should  be  bound  to  receive 
and  hold  the  theistic  hypothesis  as  a  truth  of  science  ?  Let 
us  suppose  that  God  exists  as  a  self-conscious  personality, 
possessed  of  all  the  attributes  implied  in  the  ideas  of  infin- 
ity and  perfection,  and  that  it  was  his  purpose  to  reveal  to 
his  intelligent  offspring,  through  the  arrangements  and  op- 
erations of  nature,  his  being  and  perfections.  By  what 
means  conceivable  to  us  might  this  revelation  be  made  ? 
They  are  the  following  : 

1.  If  we  suppose  that  the  order  and  harmony  in  nature 
had  an  actual  beginning  in  time,  and  did  not  exist  from 
eternity,  and  that  such  is  the  nature  and  character  of  the 
leading  facts  of  creation,  that  the  fact  of  its  having  had 
such  a  beginning  stands  distinctly  revealed  to  the  universal 
intelligence,  and  is  absolutely  affirmed  by  all  the  deduc- 
tions of  science  bearing  upon  the  subject ;  if  we  suppose 
the  facts  of  creation  to  be  of  such  a  character  as  this,  we 
must  affirm,  as  a  necessary  and  absolute  deduction,  that 
the  ultimate  cause  of  the  facts  of  the  universe  is,  not  an 
inhering  law  of  nature,  but  an  all-controlling  power  out  of 
and  above  nature.  Order  having  its  origin  and  ultimate 
cause  in  an  inhering  law  of  nature,  must  have  existed  from 
eternity,  and  could,  by  no  possibility,  have  had  a  real  be- 


96  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

ginning  or  origin  in  time.  This  is  undeniably  a  necessary 
intuitive  truth.  If,  then,  the  scientific  order  and  harmony, 
existing  everywhere  in  nature,  once  did  not  exist,  and  had 
an  actual  and  manifested  origin  in  time,  the  deduction  is 
demonstrative,  that  the  cause  of  this  order  is  a  power  out 
of  and  above  nature,  and  not  an  inhering  law  of  the  same. 
No  antitheist  will,  we  are  quite  certain,  deny  or  doubt  the 
absolute  validity  of  this  principle. 

2.  If  we  suppose  that  the  order  of  nature  and  the  current 
of  events  have,  from  time  to  time,  been  interrupted  and 
changed  in  their  direction,  in  forms  which  cannot  possibly 
be  accounted  for  by  a  reference  to  natural  law,  and  that 
these  facts  are  distinctly  revealed  to  the  mind,  then  also 
the  deduction  becomes  demonstratively  evident,  that  the 
ultimate  cause  of  the  facts  of  nature  is  not  an  inhering 
law,  but  a  power  out  of  and  above  nature  ;  and  such  facts 
would  yield  this  deduction  wholly  independent  of  the  ques- 
tion of  the  origin  of  the  order  existing  in  nature.  Any 
series  of  events  resulting  exclusively  from  an  inhering  law 
of  nature  must,  of  necessity,  as  we  have  before  seen,  be 
everywhere  and  at  all  times  alike,  absolutely,  uninterrupt- 
edly, and  immediately  successive  in  its  progress.  There 
can  be  no  break  in  the  chain,  and  no  fundamental  change 
in  the  nature  or  directions  of  the  order  of  events.  If,  in 
tracing  out  the  series  of  events,  we  find  that  from  time  to 
time  the  chain  has  undeniably  been  broken  ;  if  we  find  the 
order  of  facts  assuming,  before  and  after  the  break  referred 
to,  in  essential  particulars  entirely  new  characteristics  and 
moving  in  correspondingly  new  directions  ;  if,  in  short,  vast 
chasms  present  themselves,  rendering  impossible  a  connec- 
tion by  natural  law  in  the  relation  of  determining  antece- 
dence and  consequence  between  the  order  of  events  on  the 


FIRST   TRUTHS   OR   PRINCIPLES.  97 

one  side  with  that  on  the  other,  — then  the  theistic  lrypothesis 
of  a  first  cause  out  of  and  above  nature  possesses  demon- 
strative certainty.  If  we  further  find  that  the  parts  of  this 
chain,  though  thus  separated  and  distinguishable,  yet  sus- 
tain to  each  other  the  relation  of  p>arts  to  an  intelligible 
whole,  such  as  an  all-wise,  all-controlling,  and  all-compre- 
hending personality  might  and  would  originate,  then  we 
obtain  positive  revelations  in  regard  to  the  character  of  the 
great  First  Cause. 

3.  There  may  be,  in  the  arrangement  of  the  parts  of 
given  series  of  events  presented  in  certain  portions  of  the  uni 
verse,  —  series  having  an  undeniable  origin  in  time,  —  there 
may  be,  we  say,  in  such  series  such  an  arrangement  of  the 
parts  as  to  indicate  absolutely  that  the  series  could  not  have 
been  determined  by  any  law  inhering  in  nature  itself.  Sup- 
pose that  it  is  demonstrably  evident  that  the  series,  if  de- 
termined by  natural  law,  must  have  a  certain  fixed  arrange- 
ment, and  could  have  no  other,  and  that  another,  different, 
and  opposite  order  does  in  fact  obtain.  In  this  case  we 
should  have  absolute  disproof  of  the  theory  of  natural  law, 
and  proof  equally  absolute  of  that  of  Theism.  In  this 
form,  also,  as  we  clearly  perceive,  an  intelligent  Creator 
might  distinctly  and  absolutely  reveal  his  being  and  con- 
trolling agency  in  nature. 

4.  We  may  suppose,  finally,  that  nature,  in  all  its  mate- 
rial departments,  should  stand  revealed  to  the  universal 
intelligence,  as  arranged  throughout  as  a  means  to  one  end, 
the  wants  of  mind  ;  that  mind  should  be  so  constituted  that 
it  should  necessarily  conceive,  as  it  progressed  in  knowl- 
edge, of  the  Creator  of  the  universe  as  a  free,  intelligent, 
self-conscious  personality,  possessed  of  the  attributes  in- 
volved in  the  ideas  of  infinity  and  perfection,  on  the  one 

9 


98  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

hand,  while,  on  the  other,  all  the  spiritual  and  higher  de- 
partments of  its  nature  should  stand  revealed  to  itself  in  con- 
scious and  immutable  correlation  to  this  one  idea  of  ultimate 
causation,  and  in  corresponding  opposition  to  every  other, 
so  that  the  existence  of  such  a  personality  should  be  an  ab- 
solute demand  of  the  nature  of  the  mind  itself.  We  may 
suppose,  still  further,  that  mind  exists  in  conscious  corre- 
lation, equally  absolute,  to  another  idea,  that  of  immortality, 
and  is  self-conscious  of  the  possession,  in  its  nature  and  the 
laws  of  its  being,  of  the  elements  of  endless  progression. 
In  such  an  arrangement  of  the  facts  of  nature,  the  theistic 
hypothesis,  in  its  final  and  highest  form,  the  idea  of  God  as 
a  self-conscious  personality  absolutely  infinite  and  perfect, 
would  be  brought  under  the  universal  principle  absolutely 
revealed  in  nature  ;  that  for  every  want  of  sentient  exist- 
ence there  is  a  correlated  provision,  and  for  every  funda- 
mental adaptation  of  such  existences  a  correlated  sphere 
of  action.  We  must,  then,  conclude  that  the  First  Cause 
of  all  is  such  a  personality ;  or  assume,  contrary  to  all 
known  and  universally  acknowledged  facts  of  the  universe, 
that  nature  itself,  in  its  highest  manifestations,  the  immu- 
table laws  of  mind,  is  a  lie,  and  refuse  to  reason  at  all,  from 
the  facts  within  or  around  us,  to  any  questions  of  imme- 
diate or  ultimate  causation.  The  conditions  now  under 
consideration  would  reveal  absolutely  the  being  and  per- 
fections of  God,  as  infinite  and  perfect,  and  that  indepen- 
dently of  those  above  elucidated.  By  such  an  arrangement 
of  the  facts  of  the  universe  as  is  given  in  the  above  formu- 
las, God,  supposing  him  to  exist  as  a  self-conscious  per- 
sonality, infinite  and  perfect,  might  give  to  his  intelligent 
offspring  an  absolutely  authoritative  and  demonstrative  rev- 
elation of  his  being  and  perfections  ;  and  when  the  fact  has 


FIRST   TRUTHS    OR    PRINCIPLES.  99 

been  established  that  such  are  really  and  truly  the  facts  of 
creation  and  providence,  the  theistic  hypothesis  will  then 
take  rank  as  a  demonstrated  truth  of  science.  We  will 
now  present  the  theistic  syllogism  in  its  different  forms  as 
arranged  under  the  above  formulas,  including,  as  we  con- 
veniently may,  numbers  two  and  three  under  one  formula. 

THE    THEISTIC    SYLLOGISM. 

First  Form. 

The  supposition  that  the  order  and  arrangement  existing 
in  nature  had  a  beginning,  —  that  is,  tfiat  they  once  did  not 
exist  and  began  to  be; — necessarily  implies  that  the  ultimate 
cause  of  this  order  and  arrangement  is  a  power  out  of  and 
above  nature,  and  not  an  inhering  law  of  nature  itself. 

The  order  and  arrangement  existing  in  nature  had  a 
beginning  in  time,  and  did  not  exist  from  eternity. 

The  ultimate  cause  of  this  order  and  arrangement  is, 
therefore,  a  power  out  of  and  above  nature,  and  not  an 
inhering  law  of  nature  itself. 

Second  Form. 

The  supposition  that  the  order  of  events  in  nature  has 
been,  from  time  to  time,  changed,  and  that  parts  of  given 
series  of  events  are  arranged  in  forms  which  can,  by  no 
possibility,  be  accounted  for  by  a  reference  to  natural  law, 
necessarily  implies  that  the  ultimate  cause  of  the  facts  of 
the  universe  is  a  power  out  of  and  above  nature,  and  not 
an  inhering  law  of  the  same. 

Fundamental  facts  of  each  of  these  classes  do  exist  in 
nature. 

The  ultimate  cause  of  the  facts  of  the  universe,  there- 


100  NATURAL   THEOLOGY. 

fore,  is  a  power  out  of  and  above,  and  not  an  inhering  law 
of,  nature. 

Third  and  all-comprehending  Form. 

The  supposition  that  mind,  for  which  all  things  else  are 
arranged  and  determined,  exists  in  absolute  and  exclusive 
correlation  to  one  idea  of  ultimate  causation,  that  of  an 
infinite  and  perfect  self-conscious  personality,  necessarily 
implies,  that  the  first  cause  of  the  facts  of  the  universe  is 
such  a  personality. 

Mind  docs,  in  fact,  exist  in  absolute  and  exclusive  corre- 
lation to  this  one  idea  of  the  ultimate  cause  of  the  facts  of 
the  universe. 

The  ultimate  cause  of  these  facts  is,  therefore,  an  infinite 
and  perfect  self-conscious  personality. 

General  remarks  upon  these  syllogisms. 

Such  are  the  various  forms  of  the  theistic  syllogism. 
In  regard  to  them  we  would  request  special  attention  to 
the  following  general  remarks  :  — 

1.  In  no  mind  will  there  be  any  doubt  of  the  validity  of 
the  major  premises  in  any  of  the  forms  of  this  syllogism 
above  presented,  each  of  these  premises  being  strictly  an 
analytical  judgment  whose  validity  none  will  question. 
The  only  division  of  opinion  that  can  arise  will  pertain 
exclusively  to  matters  of  fact  in  regard  to  the  minor  prem- 
ises, to  wit,  do  the  facts  of  the  universe  in  reality  accord 
with  the  formulas  under  which  they  are  arranged  ? 

2.  This  accords  strictly  with  the  demands  of  science,  to 
wit,  that  in  every  argument  the  major  premise  shall  be  a 
universally  admitted  truth,  —  an  admitted  first,  or  a  demon- 
strated, truth,  —  while  all  matters  in  dispute  shall  pertain 


FIRST   TRUTHS    OR   PRINCIPLES.  101 

exclusively  to  the  minor  premise,  that  is,  to  the  matters  of 
fact  ranged  under  said  truths. 

3.  If,  then,  these  several  premises,  the  minors,  or  any 
one  of  them,  be  undeniably  established,  the  theistic  hy- 
pothesis will  legitimately  take  rank  as  a  demonstrated  truth 
of  science.  The  necessary  connection  between  the  premises 
and  the  conclusions  deduced  from  them  will  not  be  ques- 
tioned. The  major  premises  will  be  granted  as  self-evident 
and  universally  valid  truths.  The  minor  premises,  then, 
being  established,  no  one  will  question  the  right  of  the  theis- 
tic deductions  from  said  premises,  to  a  place  among  the 
immutable  and  eternal  truths  of  science. 

Postulates  of  the  science  of  Natural  Theology. 

Every  valid  science  has  its  scientific  postulates  as  well 
as  axioms.  Of  the  postulates  of  the  science  of  Natural 
Theology,  we  need  specify  only  the  two  following : 

1.  Mind,  relatively  to  the  facts  of  the  universe  bearing 
upon  our  present  inquiries,  is  a  faculty,  and  they  are  to  it 
objects  of  valid  knowledge. 

2.  Whatever  conclusions  bearing  upon  questions  of  ulti- 
mate causation  are  necessarily  implied,  either  immediately 
or  deductively,  in  the  facts  of  the  universe  given  in  con- 
sciousness as  the  objects  of  immediate,  intuitive,  or  presen- 
tative  knowledge,  must  be  received  as  valid  absolutely  for 
truth  on  these  subjects. 

No  one  can  deny  the  validity  of  either  of  these  postulates, 
without  a  universal  impeachment  of  the  integrity  of  the 
faculty  of  knowledge  itself,  on  all  subjects  alike,  and  thus 
destroying  the  validity  even  of  his  own  impeachment  of  said 
power.  To  deny  the  validity  of  intuitive  or  presentative 
knowledge  for  the  the  reality  and  character  of  its  objects, 


102  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

or  of  what  is  immediately  or  deductively  implied  in  such 
knowledge,  renders  infinitely  absurd  any  attempts  to  arrive 
at  truth  on  any  subject  whatever.  A  witness  may  invali- 
date his  own  testimony  by  affirming  himself  void  of  integ- 
rity. The  human  intelligence,  however,  possesses  no  such 
power  of  self-impeachment  and  self-invalidation,  and  that 
surely  must  be  "  science  falsely  so  called"  which  attempts 
to  employ  the  intelligence  itself  to  invalidate  any  of  its 
own  presentative  intuitions. 

FUNDAMENTAL    DEFECTS    IN   THE    COMMON    METHODS    OF    DE- 
VELOPING   THE    THEISTIC    ARGUMENT. 

In  the  Intellectual  Philosophy  and  Logic  we  have  fully 
expressed  our  views  of  the  general  method  in  which  the 
theistic  argument  is  developed  in  the  common  treatises  on 
Natural  Theology.  We  would,  in  this  connection,  simply 
indicate  a  few  of  the  thoughts,  which,  in  the  works  referred 
to,  are  expressed  at  full  length. 

1.  One  fundamental  defect  we  have  alluded  to  in  the  In- 
troduction, the  assumption  that  there  are  different  kinds  of 
proof  of  the  being  of  God,  such,  for  example,  as  the  a  pri- 
ori, a  posteriori,  the  ontological,  and  teleological.  No  one 
can  examine  any  one  of  these  forms  of  proof  b}^  itself,  without 
pronouncing  it  totally  inadequate  to  the  accomplishment  of 
the  end  for  which  it  is  erupted.*     When  these  are  as- 

*  It  may  be  well,  in  tins  connection,  to  give  an  illustration  of  one  form  of  the 
professedly  theistic  argument,  as  developed  by  one  of  the  greatest  thinkers  of 
the  age.  We  refer  to  Dr.  Emmons.  His  argument  is  this :  1.  "  The  world 
might  have  had  a  beginning."  2.  "  If  this  world  might  have  begun  to  exist,  then 
it  might  have  had  a  cause  of  its  existence."  3.  "  If  the  world  might  have  had  a 
cause,  then  it  must  have  had  a  cause."  It  is  said,  that  when  this  argument  rose 
before  the  mind  of  this  great,  thinker,  he  was  almost  as  much  atfected  by  it  as 
was  Archimedes,  when  he  made  the  great  discovery  which  has  immortalized  his 
name.  Yet  there  never  was  an  argument  more  utterly  fallacious.  Throughout 
it  is  utterly  a  priori  in  its  character.    The  fact  that  the  world  might  have  had  a 


FIRST    TRUTHS    OR    PRINCIPLES.  103 

sumed  as  the  only  forms  of  proof  that  do  exist,  the  impres- 
sion is  thus  left  upon  the  mind,  that  there  are  no  really 
valid  proofs  of  the  divine  existence,  the  case  coming  ap- 
parently under  the  principle,  that  what  is  true  of  all  the 
parts  of  a  given  whole,  must  be  true  of  the  whole  itself.  Let 
it  be  assumed  that  there  are  only  a  certain  number  of  pos- 
sible forms  of  the  proof  of  the  being  of  God,  and  let  each 
of  these  forms,  on  a  critical  examination,  be  found  to  be  in 
its  nature  fundamentally  inadequate,  and  the  impression 
can  hardly  fail  to  be  left  upon  the  mind,  that  we  have,  and 
can  have,  no  valid  proof  upon  the  subject.  From  all  these 
difficulties  we  are  at  once  relieved  by  the  disclosure  of  the 
fact,  that  the  assumption  that  there  are,  or  can  be,  such  di- 
verse forms  of  proof  on  this  or  any  other  kindred  subject,  is 
a  violation  of  all  the  laws  of  inductive  science.  From  the 
nature  of  all  questions  of  causation,  immediate  or  ultimate, 
there  can  be  but  one  method  of  proof  upon  such  subjects, 
and  that  in  one  or  the  other  or  both  together  of  its  two 
forms,  the  direct  or  indirect. 

2.  The  want  of  a  proper  development  of  the  real  ques- 
tion at  issue  between  the  theist  and  anti-theist  is  another 
fundamental  defect  in  the  common  treatises  on  the  science 
under  consideration.  To  argue  any  such  question  with  any 
reasonable  hope  of  success,  there  must,  first  of  all,  be  a  dis- 
tinct statement  of  the  point  in  debate  between  the  parties 
concerned  in  the  issue, — the  principles  and  facts  upon  the 

beginning  and  a  cause,  is  affirmed  simply  and  exclusively  from  the  undeniable 
fact  that  we  can  conceive  that  it  had  a  beginning  and  a  cause.  From  the  fact 
that  it  is  possible  for  us  to  conceive  of  the  world  as  having  had  a  beginning  and 
a  cause,  the  absolute  deduction  is  drawn  that  it  must  have  had  a  cause.  Now,  no 
such  connection  of  necessary  antecedent  and  consequence  exists  between  the 
conceivably  possible  and  necessarily  real  as  has  been  affirmed.  No  premises 
yield,  or  can  yield,  a  deduction  more  absolute  than  themselves.  From  what 
may  be,  we  can,  in  no  case,  affirm  what  must  be. 


104  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

point  about  which  they  agree,  the  nature  and  character  of 
the  hypotheses  which  each  party  holds  and  is  bound  to 
prove,  the  kind  of  proof  of  which  such  an  hypothesis  admits, 
and  the  principles  and  facts  which  will  yield  such  proof,  etc. 
Most,  to  say  the  least,  of  these  indispensable  preliminaries 
are  wholly  neglected  in  the  common  treatises  upon  this  sci- 
ence. Without  such  preparatory  processes,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  argument  is  commenced,  and,  as  might  be  ex- 
pected, no  very  definite  or  satisfactory  results  are  reached. 
In  the  opening  chapters  of  this  treatise  there  is  an  attempt 
to  remedy  these  fundamental  defects.  In  the  present  and 
preceding  chapter,  these  necessary  preliminary  questions, 
which  have  more  remotely  or  immediately  a  fundamental 
bearing  upon  our  present  inquiries,  have  been  subjected  to 
a  rigid  scrutinjT,  and  have,  as  we  hope,  received  a  suffi- 
ciently distinct  and  satisfactory  elucidation.  The  way  is 
thus  prepared  to  enter,  with  a  reasonable  hope  of  a  satis- 
factory result,  upon  the  examination  of  the  only  remaining 
question  at  issue,  to  wit,  the  matters  of  fact  constituting 
the  minor  premises  of  the  different  forms  of  the  theistic 
s^yllogism. 

3.  In  the  method  of  argumentation  commonly  pursued  on 
this  subject,  the  principle  has  been  assumed  that  the  burden 
of  proof  rests  almost  if  not  quite  exclusively  with  the  ad- 
vocate of  theism.  The  antitheist  is  permitted  to  assume 
almost  exclusively  the  position  of  an  objector,  and  to  select 
from  time  to  time  any  hypothesis  he  pleases,  as  the  ground 
of  his  objections.  Now,  this  is  a  fundamental  defect  in  the 
conduct  of  an  argument  on  almost  any  subject,  and  above 
all  on  such  an  one  as  that  under  consideration.  In  all  such 
cases  the  real  question  at  issue  should  be  fully  and  most 
distinctly  disclosed,  and  the  exact  position  which  the  oppo- 


FIRST  TRUTHS    OR    PRINCIPLES.  105 

nent  must  assume  should  be  as  fully  and  distinctly  ex- 
pressed, and  he  should  be  compelled  to  defend  his  own 
position  as  well  as  assail  that  of  his  adversary.  All  these 
conditions,  as  we  judge,  are  fulfilled  in  the  method  accord- 
ins:  to  which  the  argument  is  conducted  in  this  treatise. 
After  the  discussion  of  other  fundamental  preliminaries,  we 
are  shown,  first  of  all,  the  principle  in  respect  to  which 
there  is  a  perfect  agreement  between  the  theists  and  anti- 
theists  of  all  schools,  to  wit,  that  there  is  an  ultimate  rea- 
son or  cause  for  the  facts  of  the  universe  being  what  they 
are,  and  not  otherwise,  and  that  the  only  point  about  which 
they  do  or  can  differ  is  the  single  question,  What  is  the 
nature  of  this  reason  or  cause  ?  It  is  then  shown  that  this 
cause  must  be  an  inhering  law  of  nature,  or  a  power  out  of 
and  above  nature  ;  while  the  nature  and  character  of  each 
hypothesis  are  as  distinctly  disclosed,  together  with  the 
forms  of  proof  possible  to  each.  The  antitheist,  like  his 
opponent,  is  thus  compelled  to  enter  the  field  as  the  advo- 
cate of  a  definite,  exclusive,  and  visibly  assailable,  hypothe- 
sis, —  an  hypothesis  which  he  must  successfully  defend,  or 
yield  the  whole  ground  to  the  theist.  We  may  reasonably 
hope,  then,  for  a  final  and  satisfactory  settlement  of  the 
great  question  before  us. 

4.  The  last  defect  which  we  notice  is  found  in  the  nature 
of  the  theistic  syllogism  as  given  in  the  common  treatises 
on  the  subject,  together  with  the  conduct  of  the  argument 
under  that  syllogism.     The  syllogism  referred  to  is  this  : 

Marks  of  design,  that  is,  facts  of  order,  imply  an  intelli- 
gent cause  of  such  facts. 

The  universe  presents  such  facts. 

Therefore  the  universe  has  an  intelligent  author. 

Every  one,  on  a  moment's  reflection,  will  perceive  that 


106  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

the  minor  premise  of  this  syllogism  presents  an  absolutely 
universally  admitted  truth.  No  one,  whether  he  is  a  the- 
ist  or  an  antitheist,  does  or  can  doubt,  or  was  ever  known 
to  deny,  that  facts  of  order  do  exist  in  the  universe  around 
us.  The  major  premise,  on  the  other  hand,  is  denied  by  all 
antitheists  of  every  school.  In  this  denial,  also,  they  are 
sustained  by  many  of  the  first  thinkers  among  the  theists. 
It  is  assumed,  in  this  premise,  that  facts  of  order  do  not  and 
cannot  exist  unless  they  are  produced  by  some  cause,  and 
that  an  intelligent  one.  Now,  in  the  divine  mind,  order,  or 
facts  of  order,  do  exist  without  a  cause.  If  order  may  exist 
in  mind  without  a  cause,  for  aught  that  we  can  do  or  can 
know  to  the  contrary,  it  may  exist  in  matter,  or  any  real 
substance,  without  a  cause.  The  principle,  then,  constitut- 
ing the  major  premise  of  this  syllogism  is  not  a  self-evident 
truth,  as  it  is  assumed  to  be,  on  the  one  hand,  nor  is  it,  in 
the  form  presented,  a  real  truth,  on  the  other.  In  the  con- 
duct of  the  argument,  also,  we  have  this  one  very  singular, 
and,  as  far  as  our  knowledge  extends,  unexampled  phenome- 
non. The  major  or  disputed  premise  is  very  seldom,  aside 
from  a  few  illustrations,  argued  at  all,  while  the  minor,  the 
universally  admitted  one,  is  argued  as  if  the  whole  issue 
depended  exclusively  upon  sustaining  its  validity.  The 
theistic  syllogism,  therefore,  as  commonly  stated  and  ar- 
gued, presents  the  following  very  singular  violations  of  all 
the  laws  of  true  scientific  procedure,  —  to  wit,  a  syllogism 
with  a  disputed  major,  and  a  universally  admitted  minor 
premise,  while  the  former  is  assumed  as  a  universally  ad- 
mitted principle,  and  the  latter  argued  as  the  only  disputed 
premise.  Who  can  wonder  that  even  the  Christian  student, 
when  traversing  such  works  as  that  of  Pale}',  begins,  it 
may  be  for  the  first  time  in  his  life,  to  doubt  the  possibility 


FIRST  TRUTHS    OR   PRINCIPLES.  107 

of  valid  proof  of  the  fundamental  article  of  all  religion,  the 
being  of  God  ?  Nothing  higher  can  be  reasonably  expected 
from  such  a  method. 

In  regard  to  the  theistic  syllogism,  as  presented  in  the 
present  treatise,  no  one  will  question  the  fact  of  a  neces- 
sary connection  between  the  premises,  and  the  conclusion 
deduced  from  them.  Nor  will  there,  .or  can  there  be,  any 
doubt  of  the  absolute  validitjr  of  the  major  premises.  The 
minor,  in  all  probability,  will  be  disputed,  and  this  is  just 
what  should  occur,  if  a  dispute  does  arise  in  the  conduct  of 
an  argument.  Such  disputes  should  always  pertain  to  the 
matters  of  fact  ranged  under  the  general  principle,  and 
not  to  the  principle,  or  major  premise,  itself.  The  minor 
premise  then,  in  our  syllogism,  being  established,  the  the- 
istic deduction  will  possess  demonstrative  certainty.  The 
verification  of  this  one  premise,  and  the  subsequent  deduc- 
tion of  the  consequences  thence  resulting,  is  the  task  which 
we  now  assume. 


108  NATURAL   THEOLOGY. 


CHAPTEE  III. 

THE  THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS  ESTABLISHED  AS  A 
TRUTH  OF  SCIENCE.     OR,  THE  MINOR  PREM- 
ISES OF  THE  THEISTIC   SYLLOGISM. 

We  now  proceed  to  the  accomplishment  of  the  funda- 
mental aim  of  this  treatise,  the  establishment  of  the  Theis- 
tic  Hypothesis,  as  a  truth  of  science.  Two  and  only  two 
hypotheses  of  Ultimate  Causation  lie  out  before  us, —  the 
theory  of  Natural  Law,  on  the  one  hand,  and  that  of  The- 
ism, on  the  other.  One  of  these  must  be  true.  Iu  favor 
of  the  former,  as  we  have  seen,  no  form  or  degree  of  proof, 
evidence,  or  antecedent  probability,  can  be  adduced.  The 
latter  —  on  certain  definable  and  defined  conditions  —  may 
justly  take  rank,  as  a  demonstrated  truth  of  science.  "We 
now  proceed  to  vindicate,  for  this  hypothesis,  this  its  proper 
place  in  the  sphere  of  human  thought.  In  the  present 
chapter  we  propose  to  consider,  in  order,  the  following 
topics :  —  the  present  state  of  the  question ;  the  great 
leading  facts  which  lie  at  the  basis  of  the  Theistic  deduc- 
tions ;  and  the  deductions  necessarily  resulting  from 
these  facts  ;  closing  with  certain  suggestions  of  a  gen- 
eral nature. 

SECTION  I. 

THE    PRESENT    STATE    OF   THE    QUESTION. 

In  arguing  any  important  question,  it  is  of  fundamental 
moment  that  we  distinctly  apprehend,  and  keep  constantly 


THE    THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS  109 

in  mind,  not  only  the  real  issue  presented,  but  the  actual 
state  of  the  case,  as,  at  the  present  time,  it  lies  out  before 
the  general  intelligence.  From  this  one  stand-point,  let 
us  now  turn  our  attention  upon  the  two  distinct  and  oppo- 
site hypotheses  of  Ultimate  Causation  under  considera- 
tion.    On  this  topic  we  remark,  — 

No  evidence  whatever  exists  in  favor  of  the  doctrine  of  Nat- 
ural Law. 

1.  The  present  question  is  not  an  issue  between  contra- 
dictory hypotheses,  in  favor  of  each  of  which  real  valid 
evidence  may  be  adduced.  From  the  nature  of  the  case, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  doctrine  of  Natural  Law,  as  we  have 
already  shown,  is  absolutely  incapable  of  being  proven  as 
true.  Nor  can  the  remotest  form  or  degree  of  positive  evi- 
dence, or  even  of  antecedent  probability,  be  adduced  in  its 
favor.  Take,  as  an  illustration,  the  assumption  set  for- 
ward recently  by  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  and  others,  in  favor 
of  this  doctrine,  to  wit,  that  the  conviction  is  rapidly 
becoming  general  among  scientific  men,  that  nature 
throughout  is  governed  by  fixed  laws, — a  dogma,  the  va- 
lidity of  which  has  never  yet  been  established.  This 
dogma,  if  we  grant  its  universal  validity,  —  which  we  do  not 
and  ought  not  to  grant,  —  is  equally  compatible  with  each 
of  the  lrypotheses  under  consideration,  and  from  it,  not  a 
shadow  of  proof,  positive  evidence,  or  antecedent  probabil- 
ity, can  be  drawn  in  favor  of  either  against  the  other.  If 
we  suppose  nature  to  be  under  the  supreme  dominion  of  a 
self-conscious  Spirit,  infinite  and  perfect,  and  that  it  is 
best  that  nature  should  be  immutably  governed  by  fixed 
laws,  we  should  have  the  precise  form  of  government  in 
nature  that  these  philosophers  assume  as  existing.  In 
10 


110  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

whatever  light  the  subject  is  viewed,  the  principle  holds  a 
demonstrated  truth,  that  not  the  remotest  degree  of  proof, 
positive  evidence,  or  antecedent  probability,  can  be  ad- 
duced in  favor  of  the  Dogma  of  Natural  Law. 

The  validity  of  the  Hypothesis  of  Theism  possible  as  a 
demonstrated  truth  of  Science. 

2.  On  the  other  hand,  on  definite  and  assignable  con- 
ditions, the  error  of  the  Dogma  of  Natural  Law,  and  the 
validity  of  the  Hypothesis  of  Theism,  may  be  established 
as  an  absolutely  demonstrated  truth  of  Science.  The 
validity  of  this  statement  has  already  been  verified,  and  it 
is  repeated  here  but  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  distinctly 
into  mind,  the  real  state  of  the  issue  before  us. 

The  least  form  or  degree  of  evidence  in  favor  of  the  Hypoth- 
esis of  Theism  requires  all  men  to  receive  it  as  true. 

3.  While,  for  these  undeniable  reasons,  no  one,  without 
a  palpable  violation  of  all  the  demands  of  true  science,  can 
receive  the  Dogma  of  Natural  Law  as  true,  the  least  form 
or  degree  of  positive  evidence  in  favor  of  the  Hypothesis 
of  Theism  absolutely  requires  every  man  to  receive  and 
adopt  it  as  the  great  central  truth  in  the  sphere  of  human 
thought  and  action.  Ity  no  possibility,  as  we  have  before 
seen,  can  we  escape  this  conclusion. 

The  Theistic  Hypothesis  affirmed  as  true  by  the  intuitive  con- 
victions of  the  Universal  Intelligence. 

4.  While  all  the  above  statements  are  absolutely  unde- 
niable, and  have  a  fundamental  bearing  upon  our  present 
inquiries,  the  validity  of  the  Theistic  Hypothesis  has  been 


THE    THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS.  Ill 

absolutely  affirmed  by  the  intuitive  convictions  and  deduc- 
tions of  the  Universal  Intelligence. 

From  its  nature  and  laws,  mind  cannot  exist,  without  an 
idea  of  Ultimate  Causation,  any  more  than  it  can  exist, 
without  those  of  Right  and  Wrong,  Duty,  Immortality,  and 
Retribution.  Hence  it  is,  that,  among  all  nations  and 
tribes  of  men,  the  ideas  represented  by  the  terms  Creation 
and  Creator  are  omnipresent,  and  that  with  an  immutable 
conviction  of  their  absolute  validity.  In  the  convictions  of 
universal  mind,  also,  in  its  spontaneous,  intuitive  proced- 
ures the  Creator  and  Governor  of  all  is  not  an  unconscious 
Principle,  or  Law  of  Nature,  but  a  free,  self-conscious  Per- 
sonality. The  belief  in  a  Personal  God,  excepting  where 
that  conviction  has  been  clouded  by  "  the  Antitheses  of 
Science  falsely  so  called,"  is,  in  fact,  coeval  and  coexten- 
sive with  the  human  race.  The  validity  of  these  state- 
ments none  will  deny. 

Tliis  conviction  rests  upon  a  basis  which  Science  can  never 
invalidate. 

5.  This  conviction,  also,  not  only  exists  in  the  Univer- 
sal Intelligence,  but  rests  there  upon  a  basis  which  Science 
can  never  invalidate.  In  its  spontaneous  and  intuitive 
procedures,  the  Intelligence  has  universally  and  fundamen- 
tally distinguished  between  matter  and  spirit,  never  con- 
founding, or  identifying,  these  two  substances,  the  one  with 
the  other,  any  more  than  it  has  "scarlet  color  with -the 
sound  of  a  trumpet."  To  universal  mind,  unbewildered 
by  false  Science,  these  two  distinct  and  opposite  entities 
are  omnipresent,  —  the  one  as  possessed  of  real  exteriority, 
solidity,  extension,  and  form,  and  the  other  with  the  attri- 
butes of  subjectivity,  intelligence,  sensibility,  and  will,  — 


112  NA TUBAL    THEOLOGY. 

each  being  present  as  possessed  of  essential  attributes,  in 
all  respects  fundamentally  unlike  those  possessed  by  the 
other.  To  universal  mind,  also,  these  distinct  and  sepa- 
rate entities  are  ever  present,  not  as  unknown  and  unknow- 
able somethings,  but  as  directly,  and  immediately,  and 
absolutely  known  realities.  To  universal  mind,  also,  cre- 
ation is  omnipresent  as  an  event  of  time.  There  is  not  a 
nation  or  tribe  of  men  on  earth  that  does  not  entertain  this 
distinct  belief,  that  creation  had  a  beginning,  and,  as  a  nec- 
essary intuitive  consequence,  that  "  in  the  beginning  God 
created  the  heavens  and  the  earth."  Such  is  the  basis  of 
the  immutable  conviction,  existing  in  universal  mind,  of  the 
being  and  perfections  of  a  personal  God.  All  men  intui- 
tively believe  in  nature,  the  world  of  matter  and  spirit,  as 
known  and  knowable  realities.  As  a  consequence,  all  men 
intuitively  believe  in  a  God  of  nature.  All  men  believe  that 
creation  had  a  beginning  in  time.  As  a  necessary  intuitive 
deduction  from  that  belief,  all  men  intuitively  believe  that 
"  the  worlds  were  made  by  the  word  of  God." 

Now,  this  intuitive  belief  of  the  race  in  a  personal  God, 
rests  upon  a  basis  which  Science  in  its  valid  procedures  will 
and  must  confirm  and  strengthen,  but  can  never,  by  any 
possibility,  overthrow .  No  philosopher  of  any  school,  in  any 
age  of  the  world  —  we  repeat  what  we  have  said  before  — 
ever  questioned  the  validity  of  this  belief  without  basing 
his  denial  exclusively  upon  a  formal  impeachment  of  the 
validity  of  our  knowledge  of  nature,  of  the  world  of  matter 
or  of  spirit,  or  of  both  united.  Upon  what  has  that  im- 
peachment ever  been  based?  Upon  a  mere  assumption 
exclusively,  —  an  assumption,  as  we  have  shown,  wholly 
unsusceptible  of  proof,  and  in  favor  of  which  no  form  or 


THE    THE  IS  TIC  HYPOTHESIS.  113 

degree  of  positive  evidence  or  antecedent  probability  can  be 
adduced. 

The  fact,  that  this  impeachment  rests  upon  a  mere  as- 
sumption, these  philosophers  themselves,  as  we  have  shown, 
distinctly  admit.  The  connatural  and  necessary  belief  of 
the  race  in  an  external  world,  "  the  philosopher,"  Coleridge 
tells  us,  "  compels  himself  to  treat  as  a  prejudice."  The 
same  fact,  as  we  have  also  shown,  Kant  admits  and  affirms, 
and  no  philosopher  of  any  note  denies.  Now,  an  intuitive 
and  necessary  natural  belief  in  universal  mind  can  never 
be  weakened,  much  less  invalidated,  by  a  mere  assumption  ; 
and  mere  assumption  is  all  that  can  be  adduced  against 
the  belief  under  consideration.  If  our  knowledge  of  the 
essential  facts  of  nature  is  merely  relative,  no  philosopher 
can  prove  the  fact,  or  render  its  truth,  upon  scientific 
grounds,  even  probable.  To  accomplish  such  an  object  he 
must  impeach  the  Intelligence  by  the  Intelligence,  and 
compel  it,  on  the  authority  of  assumptions  or  derivative 
knowledge,  to  pronounce  invalid  its  own  original,  connatu- 
ral, necessary,  and  consciously  presentative  intuitions.  The 
idea  that  Science,  in  any  stage  of  its  advancement,  can  in- 
validate a  necessary,  primitive,  and  consciously  present- 
ative intuition,  is  one  of  the  most  palpable  absurdities  of 
which  we  can  form  a  conception.  Science  must  accomplish 
this  very  end  before  it  can,  in  the  least  degree,  invalidate  the 
necessary  belief  of  humanity  in  nature  or  in  nature's  God. 

The  only  show  of  argument  that  has  ever  been  presented, 
in  favor  of  the  validity  of  the  impeachment  under  consid- 
eration, has  been  based  wholly  upon  the  old  "Antitheses  of 
Science  falsely  so  called,"  and  upon  u  the  antinomies  of 
Pure  Reason  "  as  presented  by  Kant,  and  by  Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer  made  the  basis  of  all  his  deductions  and  sweeping 
10* 


114  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

generalities.  In  the  "Intellectual  Philosophy,"  pp.  117— 
119,  we  have  fully  explained  these  antitheses  and  antino- 
mies, and  shown  them  to  be,  in  reality,  nothing  but  paral- 
logisms,  —  mere  philosophical  puzzles  utterly  unworthy  of 
the  insight  and  dignity  either  of  ancient  or  modern  science. 
While  Science,  also,  can  by  no  possibility  invalidate  the 
faith  of  humanity  in  nature  as  a  known  reality,  it  is  equally 
impotent  against  the  great  central  fact  on  which  the  belief 
in  a  personal  God  is  based,  —  the  idea  of  creation  as  as 
event  of  time.  Science,  on  the  other  hand,  as  we  shall 
hereafter  show,  absolutely  verifies  this  belief,  and  thus  re- 
veals faith  in  a  personal  God  as  resting  upon  no  other  basis 
than  the  rock  of  eternal  truth. 

The  Theistic  Hypothesis  to  be  held  as  true,  until  invalidated 
by  absolute  proof. 

6.  While  Science  can  never  disprove  the  facts  which  lie 
at  the  basis  of  the  theistic  deduction  as  affirmed  by  the 
general  Intelligence,  nor  invalidate  the  deduction  drawn 
from  the  same,  this  deduction  must  be  held,  and  must  com- 
mand the  conscience,  as  true,  until  its  invalidity  has  been 
absolutely  demonstrated.  In  denying  this  deduction,  anti- 
theism  impeaches  the  original  and  intuitive  procedures  of 
the  general  Intelligence  of  fundamental  error.  That  im- 
peachment, by  all  the  demands  of  true  Science,  must  be  held 
as  utterly  invalid,  and  the  faith  impeached  be  held  as  true, 
until  the  validity  of  said  impeachment  has  been  established 
by  absolute  proof,  —  proof  which,  as  we  have  shown,  can 
never  be  adduced. 

True  state  of  the  present  issue. 

7.  The  real  state  of  the  present  issue  now  admits  of  a 


THE    THEISTIC   HYPOTHESIS.  115 

very  ready  explication.  We  are  in  the  presence  of  a  case 
in  which,  in  the  undeniable  absence  of  all  evidence  on  one 
side,  the  least  positive  evidence  affirming  the  validity  of  the 
other,  must  absolutely  bind  the  intellect  and  the  conscience. 
We  have  also  before  us  two  distinct  and  opposite  hypothe- 
ses, one  of  which  must  be  true  and  the  other  false.  In  favor 
of  one  of  these,  that  of  natural  law,  no  form  or  degree  of 
real  proof,  valid  evidence,  or  antecedent  probability,  can 
be  adduced.  In  favor  of  the  other,  that  of  theism,  a  form 
of  proof  does  exist  which  Science  can,  by  no  possibility,  in- 
validate. In  proof  of  this  hypothesis,  therefore,  the  issue  is, 
in  fact,  and  that  upon  undeniable  scientific  grounds,  immu- 
tably settled,  and  we  are  now  to  enter  upon  our  subsequent 
investigations  without  a  shadow  of  doubt  in  our  minds 
about  the  validity  of  the  hypothesis  for  the  foundations  of 
the  proof  which  we  are  searching.  We  are,  in  short,  in  the 
presence,  not  of  a  problematical  judgment,  which  we  are  to 
prove  true  or  false,  but  of  a  proposition  known  to  be  true, 
and  the  proof  of  the  validity  of  which  we  are  to  find.  In 
our  search  for  this  proof,  we  are  not  for  a  moment  to  doubt 
the  validity  of  our  common  faith,  nor  cease  to  be  true  and 
earnest  worshippers  of  the  Father  of  our  spirits. 


SECTION  II. 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  BEING  OF  GOD  ESTABLISHED  AS  A  TRUTH 
OF  SCIENCE  IN  VIEW  OF  ALL  THE  FACTS  NOW  KNOWN  AND 
WHICH  HAVE  A  FUNDAMENTAL  BEARING  UPON  THE  SUBJECT. 

In  the  argument,  as  conducted  in  the  preceding  section, 
we  purposely  took  into  account  those  facts  only  in  view  of 
which  the  universal  Intelligence  has  affirmed  the  being  and 


116  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

perfections  of  God.  In  the  present  argument  a  wider  in- 
duction will  be  made,  including  all  the  facts  bearing  upon 
the  subject  which  science  has  developed.  In  arguing  from 
facts  to  causes  two  forms  of  procedure  present  themselves, 
either  of  which  may  be  adopted.  We  may,  after  stating  the 
conclusion  to  be  reached,  adduce  single  facts  or  classes  of 
facts,  and  then  immediately  show  their  bearing  ;  or,  we  may 
first  classify  and  arrange  all  the  facts  to  be  adduced,  and 
then,  in  view  of  their  combined  results,  make  our  deduc- 
tions. The  latter  is  the  method  which  we  have  chosen  for 
the  conduct  of  the  present  argument.*  As  our  present  de- 
ductions are  to  be  drawn  from  a  distinct  view  of  all  facts 
bearing  upon  the  subject,  the  reader  will  find,  in  a  few 
instances,  a  restatement,  in  other  forms,  of  facts  and  argu- 
ments adduced  in  preceding  chapters.  There  are  two  dis- 
tinct, and  in  some  respects  opposite,  points  of  light,  in 
which  the  theistic  idea  of  the  being  and  character  of  God 
may  be  contemplated,  to  wit,  the  idea  of  Him  as  a  free,  self- 
conscious  personality,  sustaining  to  the  facts  of  the  universe 
the  relation  of  unconditioned  cause,  and  as  such  a  person- 
ality possessed  of  all  the  attributes  involved  in  the  ideas  of 
infinity  and  perfection.  Facts,  which  have  a  fundamental 
bearing  upon  the  idea  of  God  in  the  form  first  stated,  might 
have  no  bearing  whatever  upon  it  in  the  second.  What  we 
propose  to  accomplish  in  the  present  chapter  is,  the  demon- 
stration of  the  validity  of  the  doctrine  of  the  being  of  God  as 
a  free,  self-conscious  personality,  sustaining  to  the  facts  of  the 
universe  the  relation  of  unconditioned  cause.     The  class  of 


*  When  a  given  class  of  facts  has  been  elucidated,  we  shall,  in  some  instances, 
show  their  bearing  upon  the  doctrine  of  natural  law  as  opposed  to  the  theistic 
hypothesis  of  ultimate  causation.  After  all  the  facts  bearing  upon  this  question 
have  been  elucidated,  their  united  bearing  upon  this  question  will  be  shown. 


THE    THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS.  117 

facts  which  we  shall  now  adduce  will  have  a  special  bearing 
upon  this  one  proposition.  The  evidence  of  the  divine  in- 
finity and  perfection  will  be  presented  in  the  next  chapter. 
The  validity  of  the  idea  of  God,  considered  simply  as 
the  ultimate  or  unconditioned  cause  of  the  facts  of  the 
universe,  we  would  further  remark,  we  have  assumed  as  a 
universally  admitted  truth.  The  attributes  necessarily  im- 
plied in  this  idea,  and  which  must  be  admitted  as  real,  are, 
as  we  have  seen,  eternity,  immutability,  and  adequacy  and 
adaptation  to  produce  the  facts  referred  to.  So  far,  there 
is  a  perfect  agreement  among  the  advocates  and  opposers 
of  Theism.  The  problem  before  us,  then,  is  this  :  to  find  a 
cause  existing  from  eternity  to  eternity,  unchangeably  and 
immutably  the  same,  and  having  an  intelligible  adequacy 
and  adaptation  to  produce  these  facts  and  render  them,  in 
all  respects,  what  they  are  ;  a  cause,  too,  necessarily  implied, 
in  and  affirmed  by  these  facts.  We  will  now  proceed  to 
an  induction  of  the  facts  bearing  upon  this  problem  in  the 
form  in  which  it  is  to  be  argued  in  the  present  chapter. 

FACTS     OP    THE    UNIVERSE    BEARING   UPON    OUR   PRESENT 
INQUIRIES. 

Among  the  great  facts  of  the  universe  bearing  upon  our 
present  inquiries,  very  special  attention  is  invited  to  the 
following :  — 

Creation,  an  event  occurring  in  time,  and  not  a  reality  exist- 
ing from  eternity. 

I.  Creation  is  an  event  occurring  in  time,  and  not  a  reality 
existing  from  eternity.  In  other  words,  the  order  existing 
in  nature  once  did  not  exist,  and,  at  some  point  of  time  in 


118  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

the  past,  began  to  be.  As  this  idea  of  creation  is  perfectly 
fundamental  to  our  whole  argument,  we  shall  argue  its 
validity  at  full  length.  What,  then,  is  the  evidence  that 
the  present  order  of  things  in  the  universe  had  a  begin- 
ning ?     To  this  question  we  answer : 

1.  The  universe,  material  and  mental,  we  remark,  in  the 
first  place,  presents  us  with  not  a  solitary  fact  or  indica- 
tion which  bears  in  the  least  degree  against  the  idea  that 
creation  had  a  beginning,  an  origin  in  time,  and  in  favor 
of  the  hypothesis  of  the  eternity  of  the  present  order  of  things. 
Nothing  known  to  the  race,  and  absolutely  nothing  devel- 
oped by  any  of  the  sciences,  presents  us  with  any  such  fact  or 
indication.  While  there  is,  as  we  shall  see,  the  most  absolute 
proof  of  the  non-eternity  of  the  present  order  of  things, 
there  is  absolutely  no  evidence  whatever  against  this  hypoth- 
esis. No  one  has  ever  attempted,  and  no  one  of  common 
understanding  ever  will  attempt,  to  arrange  the  known  facts 
of  the  universe  so  as  to  make  them  even  consist  with,  much 
less  affirm,  the  opposite  hypothesis.  Creation  throughout, 
as  we  shall  see,  wears  but  one  aspect,  that  of  absolute  in- 
fancy of  age,  as  compared  with  the  eternity  that  is  past ; 
and  not  a  solitary  known  fact  gives  any  other  indications. 
We  have  shown,  in  a  former  chapter,  that  the  present  order 
of  things  must,  if  the  facts  of  the  universe  owe  their  origin 
to  any  inhering  law  of  nature  as  their  unconditioned  cause, 
have  been,  in  all  essential  particulars,  eternally  the  same 
and  could  not,  by  any  possibilit}^,  have  been  originated 
in  time,  or  have  had  a  beginning.  On  the  supposition  of 
its  eternal  existence,  the  order  of  succession  would  present 
no  indications  of  recency  of  origin,  much  less  of  having  had 
a  beginning  in  time.  This  is  undeniable.  Now  the  facts 
are,  in  all  respects,  the  opposite  of  what  they  could  not  but 


THE    THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS.  119 

be  were  this  hypothesis  true.  Not  a  solitary  fact  appears, 
presenting  the  remotest  indications  that  the  present  order 
of  things  had  no  beginning.  All  the  facts  of  the  universe, 
on  the  other  hand,  arrange  themselves  in  favor  of  the  oppo- 
site hypothesis.     This  leads  us  to  remark, 

2.  That  the  non-eternity  of  the  present  order  of  things  is 
positively  affirmed  by  the  united  intuitive  convictions  of 
the  race.  No  known  tribe  or  nation  of  men  exists,  with- 
out an  avowed  belief  of  this  one  fact.  This  doctrine  is  in- 
deed one  of  the  great  central  convictions  of  the  race,  in 
regard  to  the  universe.  Now,  an  intuitive  conviction  so 
universal  and  absolute  can  be  accounted  for  but  upon  one 
supposition,  that  the  facts  of  the  universe,  as  presented  to 
the  entire  race,  wear  but  one  aspect,  the  most  absolute  in- 
dication of  a  recency  of  origin  ;  and  this  conviction  must  be 
held  as  valid,  till  absolute  proof  to  the  contrary  is  pre- 
sented. The  burden  of  proof  lies  wholly  upon  him  who 
denies  this  doctrine.  No  such  proof,  however,  does  exist, 
and  we  may  rest  in  the  absolute  assurance  that  none  such 
will  ever  be  presented. 

3.  All  forms  of  authentic  and  unauthentic  historyvrest 
upon  this  one  assumption,  and  all  relics  of  tradition  affirm 
the  same  thing.  The  history  and  traditions  of  different 
nations  may  carry  back  the  origin  of  the  race  and  the  be- 
ginning of  the  present  order  of  things  to  different  periods  ; 
but  all  absolutely  harmonize  in  this,  that  both  alike  have 
their  limits,  in  other  words,  had  their  beginning  in  time. 
The  most  adverse  sceptic  will  not  deny  the  truth  of 
these  statements,  and  the  highest  reasons  require  us  to 
hold  them  as  true,  until  absolute  proof  to  the  contrary 
is  adduced.* 

*  Each  of  the  above  arguments,  when  stated  in  a  negative  form,  have  all  the 
force  of  absolute  demonstration.    If  the  present  order  of  things  has  existed  from 


120  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

4.  All  theories  of  the  universe,  theories  which  profess  to 
account  for  the  great  leading  facts  of  creation,  agree  in  this 
one  fundamental  principle,  the  doctrine  that  the  present 
order  of  things  had  a  beginning  in  time.  The  history  of 
the  race,  we  believe,  presents  no  exception  to  this  state- 
ment. Diverse  theories  assume  the  eternity  of  matter,  on 
the  one  hand,  or  of  spirit,  on  the  other.  None,  however, 
affirm  it  of  either  in  their  present  forms  of  development ; 
but  all  alike  assume  the  opposite.  The  fundamental  agree- 
ment of  all  theories  in  this  one  central  principle,  dem 
onstrates  the  doctrine,  that  the  facts  of  creation  are  expli- 
cable upon  no  other  principle. 

5.  We  now  adduce  another  fundamental  fact  of  nature, — 
a  fact  which  admits  of  but  one  possible  explanation,  —  to 
wit,  the  non-eternity  of  the  present  order  of  things .  We  re- 
fer to  the  fact,  that  creation  is,  and  from  the  first  has  been, 
progressive,  and  progressive  in  one  fixed  direction,  from 
the  less  towards  the  more  perfect.  The  fixed  and  changeless 
progress  of  creation  in  this  one  direction,  is  affirmed  by 
undeniable  facts,  and  admitted  in  all  theories  of  the  uni- 
verse of  every  kind.  Materialism  and  Idealism,  in  all 
their  forms  and  teachings,  agree  in  this  one  fundamental 

eternity,  then  mankind  have  thus  existed.  This  is  undeniable.  Now  the  eter- 
nity of  the  human  race  is  absolutely  contradicted  by  the  most  fundamental  and 
decisive  facts  conceivable.  There  is  no  accounting,  on  such  an  hypothesis,  for  the 
existence  of  the  universal  conviction,  among  mankind,  of  the  origin  of  the  entire 
race  within  a  few  thousand  years  past.  If  the  race  has  existed  from  eternity, 
and  consequently  had  no  beginning,  how  could  the  conviction  of  the  recency  of 
its  origin  be  lodged  in  the  breast  of  every  member  of  the  human  family  without 
exception  ?  The  thing  is  absolutely  inconceivable  and  impossible.  If  the  above 
supposition  was  true,  history  and  tradition  would  also  extend  infinitely  farther 
back  toward  the  eternity  past  than  they  now  do.  There  would  be  monuments 
also  of  human  events  which  occurred  interminable  ages  ago.  No  such  things, 
however,  appear,  and  their  total  non-appearance  can  be  accounted  for  but  upon 
one  supposition,  the  origin  of  the  present  order  of  things  in  time. 


THE     THE  IS  TIC    HYPOTHESIS.  121 

particular,  in  maintaining  the  doctrine  of  universal  progres- 
sion, and  progression  in  the  one  direction  under  considera- 
tion, from  the  less  towards  the  more  perfect,  and  maintain- 
ing this  as  an  immutuable  law  of  nature.  The  existence 
of  this  law  is  also  affirmed  b}r  all  the  valid  facts  of  the  uni- 
verse known  to  us.  Now,  progression,  in  this  one  direc- 
tion, implies  a  beginning.  The  very  nature  of  the  great 
leading  law  of  the  universe,  therefore,  implies  that  this  very 
law  once  did  not  exist  in  nature,  and  was  consequently  in- 
troduced into  it,  by .  a  power  out  of  and  above  nature. 
There  is  no  explanation  of  undeniable  facts  on  any  other 
supposition. 

All  the  legitimate  deductions  of  science,  bearing  upon  the 
subject,  affirm  absolutely  the  same  great  fact,  the  non- 
eternity  of  the  present  order  of  things,  or  their  beginning 
in  time. 

6.  The  entire  deductions  and  observations  of  the  science 
of  Geology,  for  example,  culminate  in  this  one  conclusion 
exclusively,  that  the  time  was,  when  all  the  varied  races  of 
animals,  human  and  brute,  now  existing  upon  the  face  of  the 
earth  had  no  existence  upon  it.  Advancing  still  further 
in  our  researches,  all  indication  of  the  existence  of  animals 
or  plants  of  any  kind  disappear  totally.  A  still  further 
advance  presents,  with  equal  distinctness  and  absoluteness, 
the  total  disappearance  of  the  vital  principle  in  all  its 
forms,  and  even  of  organization  of  any  kind.  Prior  to  or- 
ganization, matter  existed  in  a  state  purely  elemental. 
"  The  earth  was  without  form  and  void,  and  darkness  was 
upon  the  face  of  the  deep."  Such  are  the  undeniable  and 
absolute  teachings  of  Geology  on  this  great  subject.  If  it 
has  not  established  the  non-eternity  of  all  forms  of  organiza- 
11 


122  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

tion,  animal,  vegetable,  and  mineral,  it  has  established  noth- 
ing whatever.  All  the  great  geological  eras  of  the  earth's 
history  are  most  clearly  marked  as  having  had  their  origin  in 
time.  In  these  eras,  also,  there  is  a  progression;  a  progres- 
sion not  such  as  is  affirmed  by  the  "  development  theory," 
but  a  real  progression,  by  successive  creations,  from  the 
less  to  the  more  perfect.  Such  progression  as  above  re- 
marked, necessarily  supposes  a  beginning  in  time,  however 
remote  that  period  may  have  been.  We  have  given  the 
above  as  a  great  central  fact  of  creation,  a  fact  in  the  as- 
sertion of  which  the  entire  deductions  of  geological  science 
culminate. 

Now,  what  is  so  undeniably  true  of  the  world  we  inhabit, 
we  are  bound  to  hold  as  true  of  the  entire  material  uni- 
verse, of  which  the  earth  constitutes  a  part.  If  the  earth 
existed  in  a  state  of  total  isolation  from  the  rest  of  the  uni- 
verse, analogy  even  then  would  favor  the  conclusion  be- 
fore us  ;  but  not  so  strongly  as  at  present.  The  universe, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  one  great  systematized  whole.  That 
therefore,  which  is  an  essential  characteristic  of  any  one 
part  of  the  system,  we  must  hold  as  belonging  to  the  sys- 
tem itself.  If  a  single  wheel  of  a  given  organism  presents 
undeniable  indications  of  being  the  product  of  a  designing 
artist,  the  same,  of  course,  without  farther  examination, 
we  might  safely  affirm  of  all  the  other  wheels  of  said  or- 
ganism which  work  into  this  one.  If  one  wheel  gives  ab- 
solute indications  of  an  origin  in  time,  no  further  examina- 
tion is  requisite  as  the  basis  of  the  affirmation,  that  all  the 
others  had  a  similar  origin.  A  relation,  precisely  similar, 
exists  between  our  world  and  the  entire  S3rstem  of  worlds 
of  which  this  is  a  part.  Since  creation,  as  far  as  our  world 
is  concerned,  is  an  event  occurring  in  time,  the  same  must 


THE    THEIST1C   HYPOTHESIS.  123 

be  held  as  true  of  all  others.     There  is  no  escaping  this 
conclusion. 

The  science  of  astronomy  also  presents  another,  and  en- 
tirely independent  proof  of  the  great  fact  under  considera- 
tion. We  refer  to  the  ascertained  existence  of  a  resisting 
medium  in  the  portion  of  space  occupied  by  the  material 
universe.  The  argument,  from  this  source,  is  so  happily 
and  concisely  expressed  by  Mr.  Harris,  that  we  will  give  it 
in  his  own  language.  "  The  non-eternity  of  the  planetary 
system,"  he  says,  "  or  the  fact  that  the  present  order  of 
things  had  a  commencement,  might  be  argued  from  the  ad- 
mitted existence  of  a  resisting  medium  in  space.  The  ar- 
gument is  mathematical,  and  may  be  regarded  as  the  con- 
tinuous summation  of  infinitely  small  quantities.  For,  only 
admit  that  planetary  motion  encounters  resistance,  and 
though  it  be  so  small  as  to  be  inappreciable  within  a  thou- 
sand millions  of  3rears,  still,  if  it  had  been  from  eternit}', 
the  motion  resisted  must  have  come  to  an  end.  Now,  the 
motion  of  Enck's  comet,  as  well  as  that  discovered  by  M. 
Beila,  renders  the  existence  of  such  a  medium  almost  cer- 
tain. True,  its  effect  even  upon  the  whisp-like  vapor  of  a 
comet  may  be  so  small  as  to  require  between  twenty  and 
thirty  thousand  years  to  reduce  the  cometary  motion  to  one 
half  its  present  value.  To  reduce  the  present  velocity  of 
Jupiter  by  one  half,  might  require  a  period  of  four  hundred 
and  ninety  millions  of  years.  Still,  as  that  reduction 
has  not  taken  place,  the  planet  cannot  have  existed  from 
eternity.  Its  motion  must  have  a  beginning.  The  chro- 
nometer of  the  heavens  must  have  been  wound  up  within  a 
limited  time,  for  it  has  not  }^et  run  down." 

The  entire  creation,  then,  as  now  organized,  had  a  be- 
ginning.    The  time  was  when  the  entire  present  system 


124  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

of  nature  bad  no  existence  ;  when  space  was  not  peopled 
with  the  systems  of  suns  and  worlds  that  it  now  is  ;  when 
"  the  earth  was  without  form  and  void,"  and  when  it  was 
the  habitation  of  no  living  beings  whatever,  and  when 
none  of  the  forms  of  verdure  and  beauty,  with  which  it.  is 
now  adorned,  had  any  existence  upon  it.  The  time,  also, 
was,  when,  from  some  cause,  creation  began  to  take  form  ; 
when  light  first  began  to  shine  out  of  darkness,  and  order 
to  rise  out  of  confusion.  The  reality  of  this  great  fact  is 
undeniable.  We  lay  down,  then,  in  the  first  place,  as  an 
immovable  rock,  on  which  to  base  our  future  deductions, 
the  great  fact  of  creation  as  an  event  happening  in  time, 
and  not  a  reality  existing  from  eternity. 

Tlie  only  possible  hypothesis  on  which  the  theistic  deduction 
yielded  by  lids  great  fact  can  be  avoided. 

The  non-eternit}^  of  the  present  order  of  things  is  a  fact 
so  obvious  and  so  universally  admitted,  that  no  sane  mind 
would  dare  assert  the  opposite  hypothesis  before  the  world. 
There  is  but  one  conceivable  hypothesis  in  which  the  the- 
istic deduction  yielded  by  this  great  fact  can,  by  any  possi- 
bilit3T,  be  avoided  ;  to  wit,  that  there  is  in  nature  an  in- 
hering law  of  this  character, — a  law  which,  while  the  original 
elements  of  which  creation  is  now  constructed,  are  in  a  state 
of  universal  chaos,  organizes  the  same  into  a  universe  such 
as  now  exists,  and  continues  said  organization  for  certain 
periods,  and  then  resolves  all  things  into  their  original 
chaos,  from  which  state  the  process  of  reorganization  again 
commences,  and  so  on  from  eternity  to  eternity.  We  thus 
have  an  infinite  series  of  creations  from  natural  law,  —  crea- 
tions in  the  progress  of  one  of  which  we  now  are.  This  the- 
ory, let  us  say  in  general,  has  but  one  claim  upon  our  regard, 


THE    THE  IS  TIC    HYPOTHESIS.  125 

—  its  utter  remoteness  from  all  facts  of  observation,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  its  intrinsic  and  monstrous  absurdity  on  the 
other.  Nothing  conceivable  can  be  more  absurd  than  such 
a  theory  when  compared  with  any  or  all  the  known  facts  of 
matter  and  spirit,  and  we  can  only,  in  such  cases  as  these, 
reason  from  the  known  to  the  unknown.  Indeed,  no  one, 
to  our  knowledge,  ever  hinted  such  an  hypothesis  as  even 
possibly  true,  but  upon  one  assumption,  that  matter  and 
spirit  are  both  alike  absolutely  unknown  to  us  ;  thus  ren- 
dering all  deductions  from  the  then  imaginary  facts  of  either 
the  perfection  of  absurdity.  We  do,  on  the  other  hand, 
know  matter  and  spirit  both,  and  do  know  their  laws,  and 
are  therefore  fully  qualified  to  reason  from  said  laws  to 
this  and  other  theories  of  a  kindred  nature.  In  regard  to 
the  theory  before  us,  the  following  remarks  only  are  deemed 
requisite,  in  addition  to  those  made  above  : 

1.  This  theory  is  nothing  but  an  imaginary  assumption, 
un sustained,  and  unindicated  as  even  possibly  true  by  any 
known  fact  of  matter  or  spirit.     This  none  will  deny. 

2.  No  hypothesis  conceivable  appears  more  intrinsically 
absurd,  when  compared  with  the  known  facts  and  laws  of 
nature.  The  only  power  even  apparently  existing  in  na- 
ture of  producing  vital  organizations  of  any  kind,  an  insect 
or  vegetable,  is  that  of  perpetuating ',  according  to  immutable 
laws  of  propagation,  species  of  organization  already  exist- 
ing. Nature,  if  we  may  reason  from  her  known  laws,  is  not 
an  originator  at  all,  but  simply  and  exclusively  a  propa- 
gator. No  other  inhering  law  is  even  remotely  indicated 
by  any  known  facts  of  the  universe.  This  is  undeniable. 
Nothing  is  more  intrinsically  absurd  than  the  supposition 
that  nature,  for  a  time,  acts  simply  and  exclusively  as  an 
originator,  and  then  instantly  substitutes  this  mode  of  op- 

11* 


126  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

eration  for  a  different  and  opposite  one,  —  that  of  propaga- 
tion, —  and  all  this  through  necessary  natural  law.  Natu- 
ral law  is  not  thus  mutable  and  self-contradictory.  If  there 
is  any  principle  which  is  both  self-evident  and  affirmed  as 
true,  it  is  this,  —  that  nature  never  changes  her  own  laws, 
and,  above  all,  never  carries  on  a  system  of  operations  ac- 
cording to  one  fixed  and  immutable  law  up  to  a  given  period, 
and  then  drops  that  wholly  and  completes  the  system  by 
another  and  opposite  law.  No  greater  absurdity  can  be 
conceived  of  than  this  ;  and  this  very  absurdity  this  theory 
assumes  as  the  basis  of  an  explanation  of  the  facts  of  the 
universe.  First,  original  production  is  the  exclusive  and 
universal  law.  Then  this  is  wholly  dropped,  and  another 
and  totally  different  one  is  substituted  as  the  equally  uni- 
versal and  exclusive  law,  — to  wit,  that  of  mere  propagation 
of  species  previously  produced.  This  is  continued  for  a 
time,  and  is  then  as  wholly  replaced  by  another  and  still 
different  law,  that  of  utter  destruction  and  dissolution. 
This  principle  having  completed  its  mission,  is  wholly 
dropped,  and  the  one  first  named  again  becomes  the  exclu- 
sive law  of  universal  nature  ;  and  so  on  forever.  An  indi- 
vidual must  have  an  almost  infinite  power  of  digesting 
absurdities  who  will  attempt  to  explain  the  facts  of  the  uni- 
verse on  such  an  hypothesis  as  this,  and  all  this  without  a 
single  fact  or  consideration  indicative  of  even  the  possibility 
that  this  theory  can  be  true. 

3.  This  theory  reverses  all  the  principles  of  scientific  de- 
duction. Science  requires  us  to  explain  facts  by  law,  only 
when  said  law  is  revealed  and  affirmed  as  real  by  the  facts 
explained  by  it.  This  theory,  on  the  other  hand,  requires 
us  to  explain  all  the  facts  and  present  laws  of  the  universe 
by  a  law  nowhere  now  existing  or  operating  in  nature,  and 


THE     THEISTIC    HYPOTHESIS.  127 

not  only  not  affirmed  as  real  by  present  known  facts  and 
laws,  bnt  palpably  contradicted  by  the  same. 

4.  As  we  shall  see  hereafter,  the  origin  of  the  present 
order  of  things  cannot  be  explained  by  a  reference  to  any 
conceivable  inhering  law  of  nature,  but  must  be  referred  to 
a  power  out  of  and  above  nature.  The  supposition,  there- 
fore, of  an  eternal  series  of  universes,  produced  by  natural 
law,  becomes  simply  an  infinite  absurdity. 

5.  On  the  supposition  that  the  theistic  hypothesis  is  the 
true  one,  nothing  is  more  contradictory  than  the  supposition, 
that  from  eternity  God  has  been  creating  and  annihilating 
universes.  This  none  will  pretend  to  question.  All  our  de- 
ductions, then,  in  the  sphere  of  natural  theology,  must  be 
based  upon  the  principle  that  the  present  order  of  things 
furnishes  the  only  facts  from  which  we  are  to  reason,  and 
that  this  order  of  things  had  a  beginning  in  time. 

Bearing  of  this  great  central  fact  of  the  universe. 

The  realit}^  of  this  great  central  fact  of  the  universe, 
we  now  assume  as  an  admitted  truth.  We  are  thus  fur- 
nished with  the  minor  premise  of  the  first  form  of  the  the- 
istic syllogism,  as  given  in  Chapter  II.,  to  wit : 

Facts  of  order,  having  a  beginning  in  time,  suppose  a 
cause  out  of  and  above  nature. 

The  facts  of  order  in  nature  are  of  this  inclusive  charac- 
ter. 

They  are,  therefore,  to  be  referred  to  a  cause  out  of  and 
above  nature. 

The  individual  who  denies  this  conclusion  is  confronted 
by  a  self-evident  principle  on  the  one  hand,  and  by  undeni- 
able facts  on  the  other. 

This  central  fact,  we  remark  further,  not  only  affirms  the 


128  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

reality  of  such  a  cause,  but  also  furnishes  us  with  proof 
equalty  absolute  of  the  specific  nature  of  that  cause.  The 
fact,  that  the  order  existing  in  nature  had  a  beginning  in 
time,  implies,  in  the  Unconditioned  Cause,  which  must  be 
held  as  forever  immutably  one  and  the  same,  and  determined 
in  its  activity  by  no  cause  out  of  itself,  a  power,  at  each 
moment  of  duration  from  eternity  to  eternhvv,  to  create  or 
not  to  create  ;  because,  when  it  put  forth  the  first  creative 
fiat,  it  was  determined  to  that  act  by  no  cause  ab  extra,  and 
by  no  change  within.  The  first  great  problem  before  us 
is  consequently  to  find  such  a  cause.  We  make  this  sug- 
gestion here  to  prepare  the  way  for  our  necessary  deduc- 
tions, when  our  induction  of  facts  shall  have  been  completed. 
"We  would  here  simply  present  the  suggestion,  and  leave  it, 
for  the  present,  for  the  reflection  of  the  reader,  whether  any 
conceivable  power  can,  by  any  possibility,  fulfil  these  con- 
ditions but  a  Free  Will,  —  a  Free  Will  as  opposed  to  all 
form  of  necessitated  causation. 

Creation,  in  its  present  form  and  state,  the  result  of  a  series 
of  independent  creations. 

II.  The  next  great  leading  fact  of  the  universe  which  we 
adduce  is  this  :  Creation  in  its  present  state  is  the  result 
of  a  series  of  independent  formations.  If  geological  science 
has  established  anything,  it  has  rendered  two  facts  demon- 
stratively evident :  1  Creation  had  a  beginning.  In  other 
words,  the  order  and  arrangement  now  existing  in  the  uni- 
verse once  was  not,  and  began  to  be.  2.  The  present  order 
of  things  is  the  result  of  a  series  of  creations,  each  of  which, 
though  related  to  what  went  before  it,  was  not  derived 
from  it,  in  the  order  of  natural  and  necessary  antecedence 
and  consequence.     We  need  only  allude  here,  in  illustra- 


THE    THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS.  129 

tion,  to  four  great  eras  of  transformation ;  eras  whiph 
gave  character  to  a  corresponding  number  of  periods  in  the 
earth's  history  ;  periods  which  some  geologists  have  denom- 
inated the  reign  of  fishes  —  the  reign  of  reptiles  —  the  reign 
of  mammals  —  and  the  reign  of  man.  The  state  of  the 
earth,  in  neither  of  these  periods,  together  with  the  orders 
of  sentient  existences  which  then  existed  upon  it,  can  be 
explained  by  a  reference  to  the  preceding  era.  The  for- 
mer was  preparatory  to  the  latter,  but  cannot,  upon  sci- 
entific grounds,  be  referred  to  it  as  its  originating  cause. 
The  beginning  of  order  was  not  more  independent,  in  its 
origination,  of  the  chaos  which  preceded  it,  than  was  any 
of  these  secondary  creations  of  the  state  of  order  by  which 
it  was  preceded. 

The  development  theory  refuted. 

There  are  two,  and  only  two,  theories,  in  conformity  to 
which  the  facts  of  the  universe  can  be  explained,  —  the  La- 
in arckian,  or  the  theory  of  development,  and  that  of  succes- 
sive, separate,  independent  creations.  Between  these 
two  exclusively,  philosophers  and  the  world  must  make 
their  election.  Now,  in  favor  of  the  latter,  and  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  former,  we  urge  the  following  most  decisive 
facts  and  considerations : 

1.  The  History  of  the  world,  since  the  origin  of  the 
human  race,  presents  us,  with  not  a  solitary  fact,  indicat- 
ing the  remotest  tendency,  on  the  part  of  any  one  species 
of  animals  or  plants,  towards  a  transmutation  into  a  dif- 
ferent or  opposite  species.  Each  species  is  a  fixed  fact, 
no  changes  occurring,  except  such  as  are  necessitated  by 
climate  or  cultivation,  and  none  occurring  even  under  such 
influences,  indicating  any  tendency  towards  a  transmutation 


130  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

into  fundamentally  different  or  opposite  species.  In  this 
respect  it  is  literally  and  absolutely  true,  that  "  all  things 
remain  as  they  were  from  the  beginniug  of  the  creation." 
Now,  if  this  tendency  to  transmutation  ever  existed  as  a  law 
of  nature,  and,  above  all,  as  the  exclusive,  ultimate  and  un- 
conditioned law  of  creation,  then  it  exists  as  such  law  now, 
and  no  reasons  can  be  assigned  why  we  should  not  be  con- 
tinued spectators  of  its  results.  Nothing  conceivable  can 
be  more  absurd  and  unphilosophical  than  an  attempt  to 
explain  the  entire  facts  of  the  universe  upon  an  hypothesis 
most  undeniably  and  palpably  contradicted  by  all  the  pres- 
ent known  facts  of  the  universe. 

2.  Each  existing  and  extinct  species  of  animals  were 
as  perfect  in  their  organization,  at  their  origin,  as  at  the 
time  of  their  extinction,  or  as  they  are  now,  and,  during  the 
entire  period  of  their  existence,  present  no  indication  of  an 
intrinsic  tendency  towards  different  or  higher  forms  of  or- 
ganization. The  teachings  of  observation  and  science  are 
absolute  on  this  point,  and  at  no  period  of  the  earth's  his- 
tory do  any  facts  present  themselves  of  an  opposite  char- 
acter. All  the  facts  of  the  universe  could  not  but  be  the 
opposite  of  what  they  are,  were  the  Lamarckian  theory 
true,  and  that  of  a  series  of  separate,  independent  creations 
false. 

3.  If  the  Lamarckian  theory  were  true,  —  if  fish  were 
developed  into  reptiles,  reptiles  into  mammals,  and  mon- 
keys into  men,  —  then  the  creatures  first  formed  would  and 
could  not  but  be  most  remote  and  opposite  in  their  or- 
ganization, from  those  into  wThich  they  were  finally  devel- 
oped, and  vice  versa.  Now,  the  opposite  of  this  is  true  in 
many  important  particulars.  "  Of  the  vertebrata,"  says 
Mr.  Hugh  Miller,  "  fishes  rank  lowest,  and  in  geological 


THE    TREISTIC   HYPOTHESIS.  131 

history  appear  first.  We  find  their  remains  in  the  upper 
and  lower  Silurians,  in  the  lower,  middle  and  upper  Old 
Eed  Sandstone,  in  the  mountain  limestone,  and  in  the  coal 
measures  ;  and  in  the  latter  formation  the  first  reptiles  ap- 
pear. Fishes  seem  to  have  been  the  master  existences  of 
two  great  systems,  mayhap  of  three,  as  the  age  of  reptiles 
began.  Now  fishes  differ  very  much  among  themselves  ; 
some  rank  nearly  as  low  as  worms,  some  nearly  as  high  as 
reptiles  ;  and  if  fish  could  have  risen  into  reptiles,  and  reptiles 
into  mammalia,  we  would  necessarily  expect  to  find  lower 
orders  of  fish  passing  into  higher,  and  taking  precedence  of 
the  higher  in  their  appearance  in  point  of  time  ;  just  as  in 
the  Winter's  Tale,  we  see  the  infant  preceding  the  adult.  If 
such  be  not  the  case,  —  if  fish  make  their  first  appearance, 
not  in  their  least  perfect  but  in  their  most  perfect  state,  — 
not  in  their  nearest  approximation  to  the  worm,  but  in  their 
nearest  approximation  to  the  reptile,  —  there  is  no  room 
for  progression,  and  the  argument  falls.  Now,  it  is  a  geo- 
logical fact,  that  it  is  fish  of  the  higher  orders  that  appear 
first  on  the  stage,  and  that  they  are  found  to  occupy  exactly 
the  same  level  during  the  vast  period  represented  by  five 
succeeding  formations.  There  is  no  progression.  If  fish 
rose  into  reptiles,  it  must  have  by  sudden  transformation  ; 
it  must  have  been  as  if  a  man  who  had  stood  still  for 
half  a  lifetime,  should  bestir  himself  all  at  once,  and  take 
seven  leagues  at  a  stride.  There  is  no  getting  rid  of  mir- 
acle in  the  case ;  there  is  no  alternative  between  creation 
and  metamorphosis.  The  infidel  substitutes  progression 
for  Deity ,  geology  robs  him  of  his  God."  How  absurd 
and  unphilosophical  to  attempt  to  explain  the  entire  phe- 
nomena of  the  universe  by  a  theory  which  is  so  palpably 


132  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

contradicted  by  such  undeniable  and  fundamental  facts  as 
these. 

4.  The  different  orders  of  animals  and  plants  which 
have  appeared  on  earth  are  connected  together  by  no  inter- 
mediate links  indicating,  in  the  remotest  degree,  the  present 
or  past  existence  and  operation  of  the  law  of  transmutation. 
Where  is  the  intermediate  order  between  the  fish  and  the 
reptile,  the  reptile  and  the  mammal,  the  monkey  and  the 
man,  to  indicate  the  passage  of  creation  from  one  species  to 
the  other?  There  are  intermediate  links  in  abundance,  but 
absolutely  none  of  the  character  under  consideration,  and 
creation  could  not  but  abound  in  such,  were  the  Lamarckian 
theory  true.  "  Geology,"  says  Hugh  Miller,  again,  "abounds 
with  creatures  of  the  intermediate  class ;  there  are  none  of 
its  links  more  numerous  than  its  connecting  links ;  and 
hence  its  interest,  as  a  field  of  speculation,  to  the  asserters 
of  the  transmutation  of  races.  But  there  is  a  fatal  incom- 
pleteness in  the  evidence,  that  destroys  its  character  as 
such.  It  supplies  in  abundance  those  links  of  generic  con- 
nection, which,  as  it  were,  marry  together  dissimilar  races  ; 
but  it  furnishes  no  genealogical  link  to  show  that  the  exist- 
ences of  one  race  derive  their  lineage  from  the  existences 
of  another.  The  scene  shifts  as  we  pass  from  formation  to 
formation ;  we  are  introduced  in  each  to  a  new  dramatis 
personce;  and  there  exist  such  proofs  of  their  being  at 
once  different  and  yet  the  same,  as  those  produced  in  the 
Winter's  Tale,  to  show  that  the  grown  shepherdess  of  the 
one  scene  is  identical  with  the  exposed  infant  of  the  scene 
that  went  before.  Na}*,  the  reverse  is  well-nigh  as  strik- 
ingly the  case,  as  if  the  grown  shepherdess  had  been  intro- 
duced into  the  earlier  scenes  of  the  drama,  and  the  child 
into  its  concluding  scenes."     That  certainly  is  a  false  phi- 


THE    THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS.  133 

losophy  of  the  universe  which  is  not  only  not  sustained  by 
any  fundamental  facts,  but  which  is  so  palpably  contradicted 
by  all  the  facts  of  the  universe  bearing  upon  the  subject. 

5.  Comparative  Anatomy  places  an  impassable  gulf 
between  existing  and  extinct  species  of  animals,  fully 
demonstrating,  from  a  development  of  their  external  and 
internal  constitution,  that  the  latter  cannot  have  been  origi- 
nated by  transmutation,  from  the  former.  It-is  a  self-evident 
truth  that  the  process  of  transmutation,  if  it  has  occurred 
at  all,  must  have  been  very  gradual,  preserving  through- 
out fundamental  resemblances  as  far  as  internal  structure 
especially  is  concerned.  Now,  no  such  resemblances  ap- 
pear. On  the  other  hand,  where  a  fundamental  resemblance 
must  exist,  if  the  theory  of  transmutation  were  true,  a  fun- 
damental difference  presents  itself. 

6.  The  different  races  of  animals,  which  have  existed 
on  the  earth,  sustain  external  relations  to  each  other  the 
opposite  of  what  they  would  sustain  were  the  development 
theory  true.  The  following  extract  from  the  "  Footprints 
of  the  Creator  "  will  present  this  department  of  our  subject 
in  its  true  light :  —  "  There  are  two  kinds  of  generation  in 
the  world,"  says  Professor  Lorenzo  Oken,  in  his  "  Ele- 
ments of  Physio-Philosophy,"  u  the  creatiou  proper,  and 
the  propagation  that  is  sequent  thereupon,  —  or  the  genera- 
tio  originaria  et  secundaria.  Consequently,  no  organism  has 
been  created  larger  than  an  infusorial  point.  No  organism 
is,  nor  ever  has  one  been,  created,  which  is  not  micro- 
scopic. Whatever  is  larger,  has  not  been  created,  but  devel- 
oped. Man  has  not  been  created,  but  developed."  Such, 
in  a  few  brief  dogmatic  sentences,  is  the  development  the- 
ory. What,  in  order  to  establish  its  truth,  or  even  to  ren- 
der it  in  some  degree  probable,  ought  to  be  the  geological 

12 


134  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

evidence  regarding  it?  The  reply  seems  obvious.  In  the 
first  place,  the  earlier  fossils  ought  to  be  very  small  in  size  ; 
in  the  second,  very  low  in  organization.  In  cutting  into  the 
stony  womb  of  nature,  in  order  to  determine  what  it  con- 
tained mayhap  millions  of  ages  ago,  we  must  expect,  if  the 
development  theory  be  true,  to  look  upon  mere  embryos  and 
foetuses.  And  if  we  find,  instead,  the  full-grown  and  the 
mature,  then  must  we  hold  that  the  testimony  of  Geology 
is  not  only  not  in  accordance  with  the  theory,  but  in  oppo- 
sition to  it.  Such,  palpably,  is  the  principle  on  which,  in 
this  matter,  we  ought  to  decide.  What  are  the  facts?" 
The  author  then  demonstrates,  as  far  as  any  truth  can  be 
rendered  demonstrably  evident,  by  facts,  that  geological 
facts  are  fundamentally  the  reverse  of  what  they  could  not 
but  be  if  this  theory  were  true.  The  earliest  fossils  are  not 
very  small  in  size  nor  very  low  in  organization,  but  in 
many  important  respects  the  opposite.  Such  is  the  univer- 
sal testimony  of  Geology  on  this  subject. 

7.  Equally  absolute  are  the  teachings  of  the  science  of 
Astronomy  against  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  devel- 
opment theory.  According  to  the  necessary  demands  of 
that  theory,  the  distances  of  the  planets  from  the  sun  would, 
and  must,  be  as  their  specific  gravity,  with  very  little  if 
any  variation,  and  the  motions  of  all,  together  with  their 
satellites,  would  be  "  all  in  one  direction  from  west  to  east." 
Such  is  the  statement  of  the  author  of  "  the  Vestiges  "  him- 
self. Now,  precisely  the  opposite  is  true  of  the  solar  sys- 
tem, in  very  important  and  fundamental  particulars.  Plan- 
ets at  different  distances  from  the  sun,  — Venus,  Earth,  and 
Mars,  for  example,  —  possess  nearly  the  same  density,  that 
of  Mars  being  greater  than  that  of  Venus  and  less  than  that 
of  the  Earth,  while  that  of  Mercury  is  greater  than  that  of 


THE     THE  I  STIC    HYPOTHESIS,  135 

either  of  them,  or  any  other  in  the  system.  The  density 
of  Uranus  is  greater  than  that  of  Saturn,  which  is  nearer 
the  sun ;  and  that  of  Neptune,  still  more  distant,  much 
greater  than  that  of  either  of  them.  The  motion  of  the 
satellites  of  the  former  are  retrograde,  or  contrary  to  that  of 
all  the  other  planets  and  their  satellites,  and  their  orbits 
are,  moreover,  nearly  perpendicular  to  the  ecliptic.  The  ve- 
locity of  the  planets  is  equally  inexplicable  on  the  develop- 
ment hypothesis.  If  this  theory  were  true,  the  velocity  of 
these  bodies  could  not  but  be  as  their  distance  from  the  sun, 
while  the  reverse  is  true  in  particulars  perfectly  fundamen- 
tal,—  velocity  in  the  case  of  Mars,  for  example,  being  slower 
than  in  that  of  the  Earth,  and  slower  in  Saturn  than  in  Jupi- 
ter. All  these  are  very  remarkable  peculiarities,  and  wholly 
inexplicable  by  the  development  hypothesis.  The  difficulties 
of  this  hypothesis,  however,  do  not  end  here.  The  asteroids 
present  difficulties  nearly,  if  not  quite,  as  fatal  to  the  claims 
of  this  theory,  while  the  "comets,"  in  the  language  of  the 
"  Edinburgh  Review,"  "  cut  in  eccentric  orbits  through  our 
whole  system  and  obey  a  common  central  law,  }ret  seem  to 
scorn  all  kinship  to  rings  thrown  off  by  a  revolving  sphere." 
Where  absolute  uniformity  should,  and  could  not  but  ap- 
pear, were  this  theory  true,  a  wide  diversity  presents  itself. 
Where  diversity  is  demanded,  there  a  striking  uniformity 
presents  itself ;  and  the  uniformity,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
diversity  on  the  other,  are  exactly  the  reverse  of  what  they 
could  not  but  be,  were  this  theory  true.  "The  collocation 
and  motion  of  the  system,"  as  Mr.  Harris  has  well  observed, 
"  cannot  be  referred  to  chance,  because  of  its  calculated 
uniformity,  nor  to  natural  law,  owing  to  its  departures  from 
uniformity."  It  is  only  among  those  who  have  the  most 
superficial  acquaintance  with  the  facts  of  the  universe,  or 


136  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

who,  with  their  eyes  closed  to  all  the  real  teachings  of  true 
science  upon  the  subject,  have  obstinately  given  themselves 
up  to  the  belief  of  baseless  assumptions,  that  the  develop- 
ment theory  can  obtain  credence  for  a  single  hour.  As  the 
development  hypothesis,  or  that  which  we  maintain,  must 
be  true,  and  as  the  former  cannot  be  true,  we  are  at  liberty 
to  lay  down  the  doctrine  that  the  present  order  of  things  in 
the  universe  is  the  result  of  a  series  of  independent  crea- 
tions, and  to  lay  down  this  great  fact  as  the  basis  of  future 
deductions  in  relation  to  the  great  inquiry  before  us.  It  is 
undeniable,  that  if  the  present  order  of  things  in  nature 
was  the  result  of  any  inhering  law  of  nature,  then  the  prog- 
ress of  creation  would  and  must  be  in  exact  accordance 
with  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  "development  theory. 
We  are  accordingly  furnished  with  another  minor  premise 
of  the  theistic  syllogism.  The  argument  stands  thus  :  Facts 
of  order  which  can  be  accounted  for  by  a  reference  to  no 
inhering  law  or  laws  of  nature  must  be  referred  to  a  cause 
out  of  and  above  nature.  The  order  of  creation  is  of  this 
precise  character.  This  order,  therefore,  supposes  a  cause 
out  of  and  above  nature. 

Every  species  of  animal  and  vegetable  organization  originally 
produced  by  original,  independent  acts  of  creation. 

Jll.  Not  only  has  the  earth  been  the  theatre  of  succes- 
sive independent  creations,  but  every  species  of  organized 
beings  that  now  exists,  or  ever  has  existed  upon  it,  owes 
that  existence  to  such  a  creative  fiat.  This  follows  of 
necessity  from  the  train  of  argument  just  completed.  Every 
distinct  form  and  species  of  animal  and  vegetable  organiza- 
tion, the  first  excepted,  became  what  it  is  or  was  by  trans- 
mutation, or   by   some  immediate   originating   fiat.     The 


THE     THEIST1C    HYPOTHESIS.  137 

former  hypothesis  cannot  be  true.  The  latter,  therefore, 
must  be  true.  Then  all  the  facts  of  observation  and  science 
affirm,  most  absolutely,  the  same  thing.  "Had  spontane- 
ous production  and  the  transmutation  of  species,"  says  Mr. 
Harris,  "  been  among  the  processes  of  nature,  we  might 
have  expected  to  meet  with  abundant  indications  in  the  bo- 
som of  the  earth.  The  subterraneous  fossil  museum  might 
have  been  expected  to  be  created  with  monstrous  malforma- 
tions. The  fact  is,  however,  that,  amidst  all  the  vast  accu- 
mulations of  animal  remains,  not  a  single  abnormal  speci- 
men has  yet  been  found.  Every  organic  part  is  finished  ; 
every  animal  complete,  —  the  first  of  his  race  as  complete  as 
its  offspring  of  the  present  day  ;  every  species  articulating 
with  every  other  species,  and  falling  into  the  place  appointed 
for  it,  in  a  perfect,  all-comprehending  plan.  Accordingly, 
the  verdict  returned  by  all  the  enlightened  geologists  of  the 
clay — some  of  them  by  no  means  unduly  biased  in  favor  of 
the  view  —  is,  that  species  have  a  real  existence,  and  that 
each  was  endowed  at  the  time  of  its  creation  with  the  attri- 
butes and  organs  by  which  it  is  now  distinguished."  "  It 
is  necessary,"  says  Professor  Agassiz,  "  that  we  recur  to  a 
cause  more  exalted  "  (than  the  scheme  of  natural  produc- 
tion or  development),  "  and  recognize  influences  more 
powerful,  exercising  over  all  nature  an  action  more  direct, 
if  we  would  not  move  eternally  in  a  vicious  circle.  For  my- 
self, I  have  the  conviction  that  species  have  been  created 
successively  at  distinct  intervals,  and  that  the  changes 
which  they  have  undergone  during  a  geological  epoch  are 
very  secondary,  relating  only  to  their  fecundity,  and  to 
migrations  dependent  on  epochal  influences."  Every  spe- 
cies, then,  has  an  independent  origin,  and  owes  that  origin 
to  some  originating  fiat  which  brought  it  into  being  in  a 
12* 


138  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

state  of  absolute  completeness  of  organization,  with  all  the 
laws  of  sustentation  and  propagation  immutably  established 
from  the  beginning.  This  also  is  a  great  fundamental  fact 
to  be  laid  clown  as  the  basis  of  our  subsequent  deductions. 

All  the  leading  species  of  animated  existence  must  have  been 
brought  into  being  in  such  a  state  of  maturity  as  from  the 
first  to  be  capable  of  self -sustentation. 

IV.  All  the  leading  forms  and  species  of  animated  exist- 
ence, that  now  people  or  ever  have  peopled  the  earth,  must 
have  been  originally  created,  not  in  an  embryo  or  infantile 
state,  but  in  a  state  of  maturity,  such  a  degree  of  maturity 
as  to  be  capable,  from  their  origin,  of  self-preservation. 
This  is  self-evident,  when  we  have  rejected,  as  we  have  seen 
that  we  must  do,  the  theory  of  transmutation.  All  the  lead- 
ing tribes  of  animals  that  ever  have  appeared,  and  man  the 
most  of  all,  are  in  the  state  first  named,  totally  incapaci- 
tated for  the  sustentation  of  themselves,  and  can  be  pre- 
served only  through  parental  care  or  miraculous  interposi- 
tions. Admitting,  then,  the  direct  and  original  creation  of 
all  the  various  species  of  animated  existences  which  have 
peopled  the  earth,  and  the  form  of  that  creation  becomes 
self-evident.  There  was  a  period  when  they  had  no  exist- 
ence. The  next  moment  they  have  being  in  a  state  of  per- 
fection and  maturity  of  organization  capable  of  self-preser- 
vation. Such  are  the  facts,  —  facts  which,  we  repeat,  cannot 
be  denied  but  upon  the  theory  of  transmutation,  which,  as 
we  have  seen,  is  most  palpably  contradicted  by  all  the  lead- 
ing facts  of  the  universe,  and  favored  by  absolutely  none 
of  them.  The  immutable  law  of  creation  has  been  undeni- 
ably this  :  Each  species  of  organized  being  is,  at  the  begin- 
ning, originated  in  a  state  of  maturity  capable,  from  the 


THE    THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS.  139 

first,  of  self-sustentation,  and  that  with  its  organization  per- 
fected, and  its  laws  of  propagation  and  perpetuation  immu- 
tably fixed,  and  fixed  in  this  form,  that  the  original  pair  is, 
in  all  fundamental  particulars,  the  t}Tpe  of  the  species,  from 
the  commencement  to  the  close  of  its  existence. 

Tlie  order  of  successive  creations  has  been  throughout  in  the 
relation  of  wisely  adjusted  adaptation. 

The  successive  creations  of  distinct  and  separate  races 
and  species  of  animated  existences,  together  with  the  ex- 
tinction of  preceding  ones,  have  all  been,  we  remark  in 
the  next  place,  attended  with  revolutions  on  the  earth's 
surface,  which  have  sustained  to  said  creations  a  fixed  and 
immutable  relation  of  wisely  adjusted  adaptation.  The  ex- 
tinction of  one  race  has  been  occasioned  by  a  revolution, 
often  violent,  and  not  unfrequently  general,  in  the  physical 
condition  of  the  earth,  —  a  revolution  which,  in  its  final 
necessary  results,  has  prepared  it  as  a  habitation  for  the 
race  or  races  which  were  subsequently  introduced  upon  it. 
The  revolution  was  the  means,  and  the  existence  and  well- 
being  of  the  races  referred  to,  the  end.  Everything  wears 
the  indications  of  intelligent  foresight.  All  things  are  just 
what  they  would  be  if  resulting  from  such  foresight  in  the 
great  first  cause,  and  what  we  should  suppose  they  would  not 
be  if  not  resulting  from  such  a  cause.  Every  stage  in  the 
progress  of  creation  from  the  beginning  has  been  in  one 
direction  exclusively,  from  the  less  to  the  more  perfect, 
and  all  as  a  means  to  one  end  exclusively,  the  preparation 
of  the  earth  as  a  fitting  habitation  for  man.  If  the  great 
first  cause  did  indeed  "  see  the  end  from  the  beginning," 
and  most  wisely  arrange  all  the  movements  of  creation 
accordingly,  the  world,  as  the  grand  theatre  for  the  reign 


140  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

of  man,  would  not  be  different  from  what  it  is.  How  im- 
measurably remote  are  many  of  the  formations  beneath  the 
earth's  surface,  the  coal  formations  for  example,  and  yet 
how  wisely  adapted,  and  how  indispensable  to  the  wants 
of  man,  and  how  utterly  useless  for  any  other  purpose ! 
The  progress  of  creation  has  undeniably  been  that  of  a 
"  wise  master-builder."  The  foundations  were  laid  with  a 
wise  reference  to  the  goodly  superstructure  that  was  to 
be  reared  upon  it.  Each  stone  was  previously  prepared 
for  the  place  it  was  subsequently  to  occupy,  and,  through- 
out the  whole,  the  ideas  of  order,  fitness,  proportion,  and 
wisely  adjusted  adaptation,  are  most  perfectly  realized. 
These  are  the  facts,  and  they  are  undeniable  and  undenied. 
The  conclusions  to  be  deduced  from  them  we  are  to  con- 
sider in  another  place. 

General  application  of  the  facts  above  adduced. 

In  reasoning  from  facts  to  ultimate  causes,  we  must,  if 
we  would  proceed  with  any  rational  hope  of  success,  most 
rigidly  adhere  to  facts  just  as  they  are,  with  all  their  es- 
sential characteristics.  In  whatever  form  we  contemplate 
the  universe,  whether  we  turn  our  thoughts  upon  the  sys- 
tem of  nature  in  general,  as  organized  into  systems  of  suns 
and  worlds,  or  fix  attention  upon  the  various  classes  of  or- 
ganized existences,  mineral,  animal,  and  vegetable,  im- 
mediately around  us,  we  must  bear  this  one  great  fact  in 
mind,  that  the  time  was  when,  as  science  itself  absolutely 
affirms,  no  such  organizations  whatever  existed.  All 
things  as  they  now  exist,  once  were  not  and  began  to  be. 
Nothing  whatever  in  the  form  of  an  eternal  series  presents 
itself.  Every  series,  on  the  other  hand,  had  a  beginning. 
If  we  suppose  that  the  elementary  substances,  of  which 


TI1E    THEISTIC  IIYPOTIIESIS.  141 

these  forms  of  being  are  constituted,  existed  from  eternity, 
we  must  suppose,  as  we  have  before  shown,  that,  from  eter- 
nity to  a  certain  period,  they  existed  with  no  inhering  power 
of  taking  on  any  such  forms.  At  a  certain  moment  of  the 
past  they  began  to  take  on  such  forms.  Order,  which  is 
now  the  universal  law  of  nature,  was  once  unknown  to  na- 
ture. It  is  itself  a  great  central  fact  of  the  universe,  —  a  fact 
which  once  was  not,  and  then  began  to  be.  It  is,  there- 
fore, a  fact  to  be  accounted  for,  —  an  event  for  which  we  are 
to  find  a  cause.  What,  then,  must  this  cause  be?  It  must 
be,  as  we  have  already  shown,  a  natural,  or  inhering  law 
of  nature  itself,  or  a  power  out  of  and  above  nature.  In 
our  attempts  to  determine  which  of  these  hypotheses  is  the 
true  one,  we  are  to  reason  wholly  and  exclusively  —  we  re- 
peat what  we  have  said  before  —  from  the  known  facts  and 
laws  of  nature,  and  from  what  is  implied  in  the  same.  All 
mere  conjectures  and  assumptions  are  to  be  wholly  excluded. 
Now,  nothing  can  be  more  demonstrably  evident  than 
the  proposition,  that  taking  nature  in  its  elementary  state, 
the  state  in  which  it  undeniably  was  prior  to  all  forms  of 
organization,  and  by  no  conceivable  hypothesis  of  inhering 
law,  and  above  all,  by  none  indicated  by  the  known  facts 
and  laws  of  nature,  can  we  account  for  the  facts  of  order 
subsequently  developed.  Prior  to  the  existence  of  the 
planetary  universe,  for  example,  matter  existed  with  no  in- 
hering law  of  self-organization  into  such  a  system.  On 
that  hypothesis,  said  universe  must  have  been,  not  an  event 
of  time,  but  with  no  beginning.  In  other  words,  on  the. 
theory  of  natural  law,  matter  must  have  existed  from  eter- 
nity in  the  form  of  a  planetary  system,  or  it  could  never 
have  assumed  that  form.  This  great  central  truth  aside, 
however,  we  will  now  suppose  matter  to  exist  in  the  ele- 


142  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

mentary  state  referred  to,  with  an  inhering  tendenc}r  to  or- 
ganize itself  into  a  planetary  system.  Through  such  ten- 
dency, we  should  have  a  system  of  this  character  of  some 
kind  ;  but,  by  no  possibility,  could  we  have  the  system 
which  now  exists.  Nature  is  strictly  uniform  in  her  oper- 
ations. This  is  one  of  her  immutable  laws.  In  the  same 
circumstances,  she  invariably  produces  the  same  results. 
Any  theory  of  the  universe  which  palpably  contradicts  this 
principle  is  demonstrably  false.  In  a  planetary  system  organ- 
ized by  natural  law,  supposing  the  event  possible,  a  law  in- 
hering in  matter  in  an  elementary  and  totally  unorganized 
state,  there  would  undeniably  be  throughout,  a  mechanical 
uniformity  in  the  structure  of  said  system ;  that  is,  there 
would  be  a  very  strict  relation  of  uniformity  between  the 
relative  density  and  velocity  of  planets,  and  their  respective 
distances  from  the  central  body  about  which  they  revolve. 
The  direction  of  the  motion  of  the  planets  and  their  satel- 
lites about  their  own  axes,  and  around  their  central  orbs, 
all  being  immutably  determined  by  one  and  the  same  im- 
mutable law,  could  not  but  be  in  the  same  direction  ;  so  of 
the  system  in  all  other  important  particulars.  Now,  the 
S}^stem  which  we  have  in  fact,  is,  as  we  have  seen,  in  par- 
ticulars perfectly  fundamental,  the  reverse  of  what  is  immu- 
tably demanded  of  any  system  developed  exclusively  by 
natural  law.  In  the  system  we  have,  we  find  a  fixed  and 
intelligible  order  which  demonstrates  the  all-pervading 
presence  of  law.  At  the  same  time,  the  nature  of  this  or- 
der is  such  as  to  indicate  with  the  same  absoluteness  that 
the  dwelling-place  of  that  law  is  not  in,  but  out  of  and  above 
nature.  The  orbits  of  the  comets  inclined  at  all  angles  to 
the  sun's  equator,  and  often  totally  out  of  the  plane  of  his 
rotation  ;  the  moons  of  Uranus  revolving  in  directions  con- 


THE    THE  IS  TIC  HYPOTHESIS.  143 

trary  to  all  other  bodies  ;  planets  nearer  the  sun  of  far  less 
density  than  others  much  more  remote  from  that  central 
orb,  and  planets  more  remote  moving  with  velocities  much 
less  than  others  more  near  the  common  centre  ;  present  funda- 
mental exceptions  to  the  facts  of  the  universe,  —  exceptions 
which  can,  by  no  possibility,  be  accounted  for,  on  any  hy- 
pothesis of  natural  law.  There  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  fact, 
that  the  Author  of  nature*  anticipating  the  progress  of  as- 
tronomical science,  intentionally  thus  arranged  the  plane- 
tary universe,  so  as  to  confront,  confound,  and  annihilate 
every  such  hypothesis.  The  facts  can  be  intelligibly  ac- 
counted for  on  no  other  supposition. 

The  same  remarks  are  equally  applicable  to  the  great 
facts  recorded  in  the  volume  of  nature  by  the  science  of 
Geology.  Every  conceivable  system  of  creation  by  natural 
law  falls  to  pieces  on  these  great  facts.  Here,  again,  we 
have  an  omnipresent  order,  the  all-pervading  presence  of 
law.  It  is  order,  however,  interrupted  and  changed  in  its 
directions,  in  forms  demonstrably  indicating  the  truth,  that 
these  facts  of  order,  or  laws,  are  not  principles  inhering  in 
nature,  but  are  themselves,  on  the  other  hand,  the  exclusive 
results  of  the  action  of  a  cause  out  of  and  above  nature. 
Animal  and  vegetable  creation  exclusively  by  natural  law 
must  be,  a  fact  which  all  admit,  first,  the  origination  of  in- 
fusoria containing  in  germine  all  forms  and  species  of  vital- 
ized existence  which  subsequently  appear,  and  these  in- 
fusoria must  then  be  very  slowly  and  gradually  developed 
into  forms  next  higher,  these  into  others  more  perfect,  and 
so  on,  till  the  series  is  perfected,  —  the  series  constituting 
all  the  diversified  classes,  races,  and  species,  vegetable  and 
animal,  which  now  exist,  or  ever  have  existed,  on  earth. 
Now,  the  order  of  nature,  or  the  progress  of  creation,  can, 


144  NATURAL    TIIEOLOGY. 

by  no  possibility,  be  made  to  conform  to  what  cannot  but 
be  the  character  of  any  series  of  organizations  thus  origi- 
nated. The  series  which  is,  as  compared  with  any  which 
must  result  from  any  infusorial  creations  by  natural  law, 
does  not  and  cannot  be  made  to  appear  as  a  connected 
chain,  every  link  of  which  hangs  in  natural  dependence 
upon  the  one  which  goes  before,  and  so  on  to  the  beginning 
of  the  series.  All,  on  the  other  hand,  presents  but  one  ap- 
pearance, that  of  masses  of  broken  links,  which  cannot  be 
brought  together.  The  series,  from  time  to  time,  is  broken 
and  the  parts  separated  by  impassable  gulfs,  across  which  no 
cable  can  possibly  be  stretched.  At  the  same  time,  the 
character  and  direction  of  the  series  are  changed  in  funda- 
mental particulars  wholly  incompatible  with  the  idea  of 
creation  by  natural  law.  Fishes  do  not,  for  example, 
through  myriads  of  ages,  produce  their  own  kind  exclu- 
sively, and  then  instantaneously,  while  they  continue  to 
produce  their  kind  as  before,  also  begin  to  produce,  in  the 
completeness  and  perfection  of  their  organization,  mon- 
strous land  animals,  that  go  on  and  for  similar  periods 
produce  exclusively  their  own  kind,  and  then  suddenly  be- 
gin to  produce  mammals  of  various  species,  —  each  species 
distinct  and  separate  from  all  others,  and  in  the  perfection 
of  its  organization  from  its  origin,  —  while  one  of  these  spe- 
cies, the  monkey  tribe,  after  propagating  its  own  kind  ex- 
clusively for  similar  periods,  begins  on  a  sudden  to  pro- 
duce its  own  proper  offspring  as  before,  but  for  a  time 
also  to  produce  perfectly  organized  rational  human  beings, 
—  a  process  continued  for  a  little  period,  when  the  whole 
monkey  race  falls  back  under  its  first  immutable  law  of 
producing  exclusively  its  own  kind.  This  is  the  order  of 
nature,    on  the  assumption   of  creation   by   natural   law. 


TI1E    THEISTIC   HYPOTHESIS.  145 

There  were  no  gradual  changes  from  one  species  to  another. 
Every  thing,  on  the  other  'hand,  must  have  been,  by  sud- 
den leaps,  sudden  transformations  from  one  form  of  pro- 
duction to  others,  in  all  respects  fundamentally  different, 
and  this  under  the  same  circumstances.  Nature  remaining 
for  untold  ages,  to  say  the  least,  without  the  power  of  pro- 
ducing vital  organizations  of  any  kind,  by  sudden  throes, 
never  afterwards  repeated,  produces  infusoria  containing 
in  themselves  the  germs  or  principles  of  all  forms  and  spe- 
cies of  existence  which  subsequently  appear,  —  the  most 
wonderful  creative  act  conceivable.  These  infusoria,  after 
producing  for  untold  ages  nothing  but  their  own  kind,  be- 
gin to  mingle  with  their  own  proper  productions  those  of 
totally  distinct  and  higher  orders,  all  in  the  perfection  of 
organization  from  the  first.  So  of  these  last,  and  onward 
up  to  the  present.  Such  must  have  been  the  order  of  na- 
ture, if  creation  has  been  by  natural  law.  There  is  no 
escaping  this  conclusion.  Now,  if  we  can  know  anything 
of  nature,  she  does  not  thus,  per  saltern,  change  from  time 
to  time  her  own  laws. 

If  we,  on  the  other  hand,  suppose  that  the  order  of  crea- 
tion has  been  from  the  beginning  progressive,  indeed,  but 
by  successive  creative  fiats,  as  the  successive  states  of  na- 
ture demanded,  and  in  new  and  higher  forms  according  to 
an  original  and  wisely  projected  plan,  —  that  is,  that  the 
cause  of  the  order  in  nature  is  a  power  out  of  and  above 
nature,  — then  the  facts  presented  to  the  race,  and  developed 
by  the  researches  of  science,  all  take  form  in  accordance 
with  that  hypothesis,  and  we  have  a  series  with  no  links 
wanting,  and  whose  diverse  parts  are  separated  by  no  im- 
passable chasms.  Suppose  we  take  any  one  leading  species 
of  organized  existence,  the  human  race  for  example,  and 
13 


146  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

trace  it  back  to  its  origin.  From  the  beginning,  we  find 
that  organization,  physically  considered,  perfect  and  com- 
plete, wanting  nothing,  as  perfect  as  it  now  is,  the  original 
pair  presenting  the  perfect  type  of  all  their  offspring  to  the 
remotest  generations.  In  what  state  must  this  original 
pair  have  been  created  ?  They  were  not  developed  from 
lower  species,  that  is,  born  of  mere  monkeys.  That  theory 
must  now  be  dismissed  as  one  of  the  monstrosities  of 
"  science  falsely  so  called."  This  pair  must  have  been 
originated  by  a  direct,  immediate,  and  independent  crea- 
tive fiat  of  some  kind.  In  what  state  must  they  have 
been  originated,  the  idea  of  their  sustentation  by  miracle 
being  left  out  of  the  account  ?  They  could  not  have  been 
produced  in  a  mere  embryo  state,  and  developed  into 
manhood  by  natural  law.  This  is  self-evident.  Nature 
would  destroy  instead  of  developing  such  embryos  thus 
exposed.  The  same  holds  equally  true,  on  the  supposi- 
tion that  they  were  produced  in  a  state  of  infancy.  No 
species  is,  or  can  be,  more  absolutely  helpless  than  the 
human  kind  under  such  circumstances.  The  conclusion  is 
inevitable.  The  original  pair  must  have  been  brought  into 
being  in  a  state  of  maturity,  capable,  from  their  origin,  of 
self-preservation,  or  they  must  have  been  sustained  to 
manhood  by  miracle  ;  thus  demonstrating  the  error  of  the 
doctrine  of  natural  law.  The  same  remarks  are  equally  ap- 
plicable to  a  very  large  proportion  of  the  animal  creation 
around  us,  the  orders  of  mammals  almost,  if  not  quite, 
without  exception.  How  shall  we  account  for  such  crea- 
tions, on  the  hypothesis  of  natural  law  ?  If  we  know  or 
can  know  anything  of  nature,  this  we  know  with  absolute 
certainty,  that  she  does  nothing  per  saltern.  All  her  organi- 
zations are  gradual,  and  not  sudden,  instantaneous  forma- 


THE     Til  EI  STIC    HYPOTHESIS.  147 

tions.  She  never  does,  and  never  did,  by  sudden,  self- 
originated  throes  and  leaps,  produce  full-grown  elephants, 
or  full-grown  men.  Such  must  have  been  her  originations, 
if  creation  is  and  ever  has  been  by  natural  law.  This  doc- 
trine falls  to  pieces  upon  immovable  rocks  the  moment  it  is 
brought  to  bear  upon  undeniable  facts  pertaining  to  the 
origin  of  things. 

We  are  thus  furnished  with  our  minor  premise  of  the 
second  form  of  the  thcistic  sjdlogism,  as  presented  in  Chap- 
ter II.,  to  wit: 

The  supposition  that  the  order  of  events  in  nature  has, 
from  time  to  time,  been  changed,  and  that  parts  of  given 
series  are  arranged  in  forms  which  can,  by  no  possibility,  be 
accounted  for  by  a  reference  to  natural  law,  necessarily  im- 
ply that  the  ultimate  cause  of  the  facts  of  the  universe  is  a 
power  out  of  and  above,  and  no  inhering  law  of,  nature. 

Fundamental  facts  of  each  of  these  classes  do  exist  in 
nature. 

The  ultimate  cause  of  these  facts,  therefore,  is  a  cause 
out  of  and  above,  and  no  inhering  law  of,  nature. 

While  the  major  premise  of  this  syllogism  is  undeniably 
self-evident,  it  is  equally  undeniable  that  the  facts  adduced 
are  real,  and  do  fall  under  that  principle,  and  thus  affirm 
the  validity  of  the  minor  premise,  and  consequently  yield 
the  conclusion  as  a  truth  of  science.  We  have  now  said 
enough  to  indicate  the  general  character  and  bearing  of 
our  facts  thus  far  adduced,  and  shall  proceed  to  complete 
our  induction. 

Matter  and  Spirit  —  their  relations,  etc. 

V.  To  universal  mind,  two  orders  of  existence,  or  two 
distinct  and  opposite  substances,  stand  revealed  in  the  uni- 


148  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

verse,  to  wit,  matter  and  spirit.  The  conviction  of  the  actual 
existence  of  these  two  substances  in  the  universe,  and  that 
as  substances  they  are  not  the  same,  but  opposites,  in  their 
nature,  is  just  as  extensive  as  the  race  of  man..  No  mind 
does  or  can  exist  without  this  conviction.  In  certain  sys- 
tems of  philosophy  this  distinction  has  been  confounded 
and  denied.  No  professed  demonstrations  of  philosophy, 
however,  have  ever  been  able  to  shake  this  conviction  in 
the  general  intelligence,  and  no  philosopher  ever  convinced 
himself  that  mind  is  matter,  or  matter  spirit,  by  his  own 
reasonings.  In  this  connection,  we  deem  it  important  to 
make  merely  the  following  observations  upon  this  subject : 

1 .  The  universal  conviction  under  consideration  must  be 
held  as  absolutely  decisive  on  the  subject,  till  itsr  falseness 
has  been  absolutely  proved.  The  burden  of  proof  is  wholly 
with  the  objector. 

2.  Not  only  is  it  impossible  to  disprove  the  validity  of 
this  conviction,  but  equally  so  to  bring  any  form  or  degree 
of  valid  evidence  of  any  kind  against  it.  It  is  certainly  not 
intuitively  true  that  matter  is  spirit,  or  that  spirit  is  matter. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  an  absolute  intuition  of  the  univer- 
sal Intelligence  that  both  substances  exist  in  fact,  and  that 
one  of  them  is  not  the  other.  Equally  impossible  is  it  to 
invalidate  this  conviction  by  any  process  of  inductive  proof 
or  of  logical  deduction.  There  are  no  valid  principles,  that 
lie  back  of  any  of  our  intuitive  convictions,  from  which  any 
disproof  of,  or  evidence  against,  this  conviction  can  be  de- 
duced. Nor  are  there  any  facts  of  observation  which  throw 
a  shadow  of  doubt  over  its  validity. 

3.  No  form  or  degree  of  antecedent  probability  can  be 
adduced  against  the  validity  of  this  conviction.  This  we 
have  most  absolutely  proved  to  be  true  in  the  preceding  part 


.  TJIB     THEISTIC    HYPOTHESIS.  149 

of  this  treatise.  If  we  contemplate  either  of  these  sub- 
stances by  itself,  it  is  just  as  antecedently  probable  that  it 
does,  as  that  it  does  not,  exist ;  and  the  fact  that  one  of  them 
exists  presents  not  the  remotest  antecedent  probability 
against  the  supposition  that  the  other  exists.  It  is,  on  the 
other  hand,  just  as  antecedent^  probable  that  both  exist 
together,  as  that  either  exists  alone,  or  that  one  of  them 
exists  at  all. 

4.  While  this  conviction  presents  the  highest  proof  of  the 
real  existence  of  these  two  substances,  and  of  their  exist- 
ence as  distinct  and  opposite  entities,  we  have  in  it  also  the 
highest  antecedent  probability  of  its  validity.  It  is  unde- 
niably infinitely  more  probable  in  itself  that  realities  do, 
than  that  they  do  not,  accord  with  the  presentative  per- 
ceptions and  intuitive  convictions  of  the  universal  Intelli- 
gence. In  other  words,  it  is  infinitely  more  probable  that 
what  the  universal  Intelligence  has  absolutely  affirmed  to 
be  real,  is,  than  that  it  is  not,  real.  None  will  deny  the 
validity  of  this  principle. 

5.  We  must  deny  the  great  fundamental  principle  of  all 
science,  to  wit,  that  substances  are  as  their  phenomena,  and 
affirm  the  opposite  to  be  true,  before  mind  can  be  resolved 
into  the  developments  of  matter,  on  the  one  hand,  or  matter 
into  those  of  spirit,  on  the  other.  It  is  not  enough  to  say, 
that,  for  aught  we  know,  there  may  be  unknown  properties 
common  to  the  two  substances  which  will  identify  them,  in 
their  ultimate  essence.  Before  such  a  supposition  is  to  be 
admitted  at  all,  it  must  be  shown  that  the  existence  of  such 
properties  is  indicated  by  those  that  are  known.  This  is 
the  only  principle  on  which  we  are  at  liberty  to  reason  from 
the  known  to  the  unknown.  Besides,  we  cannot  but  know 
that  there  cannot  be  unknown  properties  in  an  extended 

13* 


150  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

and  solid  substance,  which  identify  it  ultimately  with  one 
utterly  void  of  all  these  qualities.  Thought,  feeling,  and 
voluntary  determination,  on  the  one  haucl,  and  solidity,  ex- 
tension, and  form,  on  the  other,  are  irreconcilable  contra- 
dictions, or  opposites,  and  cannot  inhere  in  the  same  sub- 
stance. Mind  and  matter,  the  universal  Intelligence  has 
fundamentally  separated  the  one  from  the  other,  and  phi- 
losophy cannot  join  them  together.  Mind,  therefore,  is,  and 
can  be,  no  mode  of  material  existence  or  development,  nor 
is  matter  any  form  of  spiritual  existence  or  manifestation. 
Thejr  are,  on  the  other  hand,  in  all  respects,  totally  distinct 
and  separate  orders  of  existence.  We  will  now  advance  to 
a  consideration  of  their  relations,  the  one  to  the  other. 

RELATIONS    OF   THESE    TWO    SUBSTANCES    TO    EACH    OTHER. 

To  appreciate  fully  the  bearing  of  the  great  central  facts 
now  to  be  brought  under  review,  we  must  bear  distinctly  in 
mind,  that,  whatever  we  may  conclude  in  regard  to  the  doc- 
trine of  original  creation  of  substance  from  non-being,  the 
time  was  when  neither  of  the  substances  under  considera- 
tion had  any  existence  in  their  present  forms  and  relations 
to  each  other.  The  time  was  when  mind,  finite  mind,  as 
exercising  the  functions  of  thought,  feeling,  and  voluntary 
determination,  and  matter  as  now  organized  and  acting, 
had  no  existence.  Matter,  for  example,  now  stands  related 
to  mind  as  an  object,  and  mind  to  matter  as  a  power  of 
knowledge.  Matter  sustains  to  mind  the  relation  of  a  cause 
of  certain  sensitive  states,  sensations ;  and  mind  to  matter, 
that  of  a  subject  of  such  states.  Matter  exists  as  the  sub- 
ject of  certain  changes  of  state  induced  by  the  action  of 
voluntary  determination  in  mind  ;  and  will  exists  in  mind  as 
the  cause  of  such  changes  of  state  in  matter.     Matter,  in 


THE    THEISTIC    HYPOTHESIS.  151 

all  its  organizations,  exists  exclusively  as  a  means,  and 
mind  as  the  end.  Matter,  too,  is  everywhere  organized  in 
fixed  correspondence  with  fundamental  ideas  of  pure  sci- 
ence pre-existing  in  mind.  Such,  in  brief,  are  the  relations 
noiv  existing  between  these  two  substances.  The  great  fact 
to  be  kept  distinctly  and  continuously  in  mind  is  this: 
These  relations  once  had  no  existence.  The  time  was 
when  mind  and  matter  both  had  no  being  in  their  present 
relations  to  each  other.  These  great  central  facts  of  the 
universe  once  had  no  existence,  but  are  themselves  facts  of 
recent  occurrence,  and  must  have  had  an  adequate  cause. 
Let  us,  for  a  few  moments  contemplate  some  of  these  facts. 

The  body  and  the  soul. 

1.  We  will,  in  the  first  place,  contemplate  the  relations 
existing  between  the  body  and  the  soul.  But  a  few  thou- 
sand years  since,  neither  of  these  objects,  as  now  constituted 
and  related  to  each  other,  had  an  existence.  If  matter  and 
mind  then  existed  at  all  as  substances,  they  existed  wholly 
independent  of  each  other.  Neither  owed  its  existence  to  the 
other,  and  the  states  of  neither,  as  far  as  we  have  any  evi- 
dence, were,  in  any  form,  determined  by  those  of  the  other. 
The  body  is  constituted  of  parts  immensely  numerous  and 
diversified,  and  capable  of  functions  endless  in  number  and 
diversity,  and  yet  so  blended  as  to  present  the  most  beau- 
tiful, majestic,  and  goodly  structure  which  the  mind  has 
ever  perceived  or  apprehended.  This  structure,  so  "  fear- 
fully and  wonderfully  made,"  exists  simply  and  exclusively 
as  a  special  means  to  one  end,  —  a  locomotive  habitation  and 
instrument  of  the  mind.  All  the  organs  and  functions  of 
the  former  are  in  fixed  and  absolute  correlation  to  the  pow- 
ers, susceptibilities,  and  wants  of  the  latter.     Here  is  a 


1T>2  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

substance  with  its  peculiar  and  special  powers  of  thought, 
feeling,  and  voluntary  determination.  And  here  is  a  struc- 
ture constituted  wholly  of  elements  of  a  totally  diverse,  dis- 
tinct, and  opposite  substance.  Yet  this  goodly  structure 
has,  in  all  its  endlessly  diversified  parts  and  functions,  an 
absolute  correlation  to  the  necessities  of  its  mysterious  oc- 
cupant. Now,  the  great  fact  here  presented,  the  fact  which 
has  a  fundamental  bearing  upon  our  present  inquiries,  is 
this  :  This  body,  with  all  its  functions  of  respiration,  nutri- 
tion, reproduction,  and  of  voluntarily  determined  locomo- 
tion, etc.,  is  a  structure  which  once  had  no  being,  and  was 
subsequently  produced.  There  was  a  time  when  the  various 
elements  which  constitute  its  diversified  parts  were,  for  the 
first  time,  blended,  and  when  the  parts  themselves  were  put 
together.  Whence  the  originating  cause  of  such  a  wonder- 
ful event?  The  mind  inhabiting  the  structure  did  not  surely 
originate  its  own  habitation.  Nor  is  this  organization  the 
propagated  effect  of  previously  existing  ones  of  a  different 
species.  The  dogma  of  transmutation  now  stands  among 
the  exploded  errors  of  the  past.  The  human  body,  as  origi- 
nally produced,  was  undeniably  the  result  of  some  direct 
and  immediately  originating  fiat  in  nature.  Was  that  fiat 
the  result  of  the  action  of  a  cause  inhering  in  nature  itself, 
or  of  a  cause  out  of  and  above  nature  ?  If  the  former,  why 
had  not  that  cause,  having,  as  we  must,  on  the  theory  of 
natural  law,  suppose,  existed  in  nature  from  eternit}^,  why 
had  it  not,  we  say,  acted  in  the  production  of  similar  or- 
ganizations before?  If  that  cause  existed  in  nature  then, 
it  exists  there  now.  Why  does  it  not  act  now  in  the  pro- 
duction of  similar  results  ?  What  known  fact,  natural  law, 
or  principle,  indicates  the  existence  in  nature  itself  of  an 
inhering  power  of  this  kind  ?    By  no  possibility  can  we  con- 


THE     TREISTIC    HYPOTHESIS.  153 

template  the  fact  of  the  original  organization  of  the  bod}', 
together  with  its  existence  as  a  habitation  of  a  rational 
spirit,  as  an  event  occurring  in  time,  —  and  that  by  a  direct 
and  immediate  originating  fiat,  and  not  as  the  propagated 
result  of  some  previously  existing  organization,  —  and  not 
aftirru,  that  this  event  is  the  result  of  the  action  of  no  in- 
hering law  of  nature,  but  of  a  cause  out  of  and  above  na- 
ture,—  as  the  body,  like  the  watch,  is  a  thing  wade,  — made 
and  adapted  for  specific,  intelligible  ends.  We  may  then 
reason  as  safely  from  the  character  of  the  thing  made  to 
that  of  the  maker,  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other. 

The  action  of  the  vital  principle  in  nature. 

2.  The  vital  principle,  as  it  exists  in  nature,  exists  in 
two  forms,  the  vegetable  and  animal,  and  its  action  in  the 
first  form  has  a  relation  of  fixed  subordination  to  its  action 
in  the  second.  The  animal  cannot  subsist  upon  the  mate- 
rial elements  in  their  unorganized  state.  Matter  must  be 
first  subjected  to  the  action  of  the  vital  principle  in  the 
vegetable  kingdom  before  it  can  sustain  the  action  of  the 
same  principle  in  the  animal  economy.  This,  to  say  the 
least,  is  the  general  law.  The  final  cause  of  the  action  of 
this  principle  in  both  kingdoms  alike  is  the  wants  of  mind 
in  man.  The  final  cause  of  the  action  of  this  principle  in 
the  vegetable  is  to  subordinate  the  elements  of  crude  mat- 
ter around  us  to  the  action  of  the  same  principle  in  the 
animal  kingdom  ;  and  the  final  cause  of  the  action  of  this 
principle  in  the  animal  economy  is,  we  repeat,  the  neces- 
sities of  rational  mind.  Now,  the  existence  of  this  principle 
in  nature,  together  with  its  results  in  the  production  of 
the  various  forms  and  species  of  vitalized  existence,  animal 
and  vegetable,  in  the  world  around  us,  as  well  as  the  sub- 


154  NATURAL    THEOLOGY, 

ordination  of  the  whole  to  the  end  referred  to,  are  all 
events  of  time,  —  events  for  which  we  are  to  find  an  ade- 
quate cause,  and  we  are  to  find  that  cause  in  nature,  or  out 
of  it.  If  it  exists  in  nature,  why  are  the  results  of  its  ac- 
tion a  series  of  events  having  a  beginning  in  time,  and  not 
a  series  coeval  with  that  in  which  said  cause  exists,  and 
whose  activity  it  controls;  that  is,  nature  herself  being 
uncreated,  coeval  with  past  duration  itself  ?  Such  ques- 
tions as  these,  —  questions  which  science  forces  upon  us,  — 
can  never,  by  any  possibility,  be  answered  on  the  hypothesis 
of  final  causation  by  natural  law. 

Relations  of  the  earth  itself  considered  as  an  organized  whole 
to  the  wants  of  mind. 

3.  If  we  turn  our  attention  from  particular  facts  to  a 
contemplation  of  the  globe  itself  which  we  inhabit,  and  con- 
sider it  as  it  is,  as  an  organized  whole,  we  shall  find  through- 
out the  same  fixed  law  of  subordination  to  one  end,  the 
wants  of  mind.  The  body  was  not  more  manifestly  con- 
structed for  one  exclusive  purpose,  —  a  habitation  of  the 
mind,  —  than  was  the  earth  itself  as  a  dwelling  for  the  hu- 
man race.  The  world,  as  an  organized  whole,  existed 
long  before  man.  Its  organization  was  not  only  begun, 
but  perfected,  before  man  had  a  being  upon  it.  Yet  the 
world  exists  but  for  man.  Its  entire  organization  through- 
out ;  its  form,  position  in  the  solar  system  ;  its  revolutions, 
diurnal  and  perennial ;  its  mineral  treasures,  vegetable  and 
animal  productions  ;  the  blending  of  its  diversified  elements  ; 
its  atmosphere,  its  oceans,  seas,  lakes,  rivers,  continents, 
mountain  ranges',  and  deserts  even  ;  have  one  exclusive  and 
specific  final  cause,  the  wants  of  man  as  a  physical  and 
mental  being.     The  wider  our  inductions,  and  the  more 


THE    THEISTIC   HYPOTHESIS.  155 

perfect  our  knowledge  of  man,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  the 
earth  as  an  organized  whole,  on  the  other,  the  more  abso- 
lute does  the  conviction  become  that  the  earth  exists  and 
was  constructed  as  a  means  to  one  end,  the  wants  of  the 
human  race. 

The  entire  universe  throughout  constructed  in  accordance 
with  ideas  and  principles  of  pure  science  pre-existing  in 
the  mind  itself. 

4.  The  universe,  as  we  have  before  said,  is  in  its  entire- 
ness,  an  absolute  unity,  an  organized  whole  complete  in  all 
its  parts.  When  we  contemplate  this  majestic  structure 
from  this  one  stand-point,  we  find  it  organized  throughout 
in  absolute  accordance  with  fundamental  ideas  and  princi- 
ples of  pure  science  as  they  exist  in  the  mind  itself.  The 
laws  and  principles  of  the  pure  mathematics,  for  example, 
are  undeniably  "  the  patterns  of  tilings  in  heaven,  and 
things  on  the  earth."  They  are,  in  fact,  the  laws  and  prin- 
ciples in  conformity  to  which  the  whole  universe,  in  all  its 
departments,  was  constructed.  To  this  statement,  there 
are  absolutely  no  exceptions.  Before  man  can  read  the 
book  of  nature  so  as  to  "  understand  what  he  reads,"  he 
must  first  graduate  in  the  pure  sciences  which  exist  for  the 
intelligence,  alone.  When  he  has  comprehended  the  for- 
mulas and  solved  the  great  problems  in  the  school  of  pure 
abstractions,  then  and  then  only,  can  he  interpret  nature 
without  him.  Then,  and  then  only,  for  example,  can  he 
explain  the  mechanism  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  the  nature 
of  their  orbits,  their  motions,  and  revolutions.  On  the 
supposition,  that  "the  builder  and  maker  of  all  things  "  is 
an  infinite  and  perfect  mathematician  and  architect,  and  has 
intentionally  constructed   the  entire   universe  throughout 


156  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

in  perfect  harmony  with  fundamental  ideas  and  principles 
of  pure  science,  as  they  exist  in  the  mind,  the  universe 
would,  in  all  respects,  be  just  what  it  now  is,  and  in  no  con- 
ceivable respects  otherwise. 

Not  only  is  it  true  that  the  universe  is  constructed  in 
absolute  conformity  to  ideas  and  principles  of  science,  but 
one  of  the  most  manifest  final  causes  of  this  arrangement 
is  the  scientific  education  of  the  human  race.  The  universe 
is  so  constructed  and  presented  to  the  human  intelligence 
as  to  awaken  thought  and  inquiry,  in  the  first  instance,  and 
as  to  then  lead  the  mind  back  into  the  school  of  pure  sci- 
ence, as  soon  as  it  fixes  its  attention  upon  any  of  the  lead- 
ing problems  presented  for  solution,  in  the  next.  Without 
a  knowledge  of  the  facts  of  nature  there  can  be  no  science, 
and  without  prior  discipline  in  the  school  of  pure  science, 
these  facts  remain  and  must  remain,  absolutely  inexpli- 
cable. Thus  nature  is  the  great  scientific  educator  of 
mind,  and  to  this  great  end  its  form  and  structure  through- 
out sustain  the  relation  of  an  iutelligibly  adapted  means. 
We  might  extend  these  illustrations,  and  show  that  there 
are  in  the  universe  throughout,  specific  adaptations  to  the 
education  of  each  specific  faculty  and  susceptibility  of  the 
human  mind.  The  fact  is  too  obvious  to  need  illustration, 
and  too  fundamental  in  its  bearing  upon  our  present  in- 
quiries, not  to  be  presented  as  one  of  the  constellation  of 
great  central  facts  of  the  universe.  Had  the  Author  of  na- 
ture an  absolute  knowledge  of  mind  as  it  is,  and  had  he  con- 
structed the  universe  with  a  specific  reference  to  the  devel- 
opment of  each  and  every  specific  faculty  and  susceptibility 
of  that  substance,  the  goodly  structure  of  said  universe 
would  be,  in  all  respects,  what  it  now  is.  The  fact  is  unde- 
niable, whatever  its  bearings  may  be. 


THE    THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS.  157 

General  bearing  of  these  great  central  facts. 

Such  is  a  very  concise  view  of  the  relations  of  these  two 
substances,  matter  and  rational  finite  spirit.  Let  us,  for  a 
few  moments,  contemplate  the  general  bearing  of  these 
great  central  facts  of  the  universe.  We  have  before  us  two 
substances,  in  all  respects  in  their  natures  totally  unlike 
and  opposite  to  each  other,  substances  which,  but  a  few 
ages  past,  had  no  existence  in  the  relations  which  they  now 
sustain  to  one  another.  Yet,  when  we  contemplate  these 
relations,  we  find  that  the  states  of  these  two  substances 
are  absolutely  correlative  to  each  other,  and  that  those  of 
the  former  are  all  predetermined  by  the  relation  of  specific 
subordination  to  the  laws,  susceptibilities,  and  wants  of 
the  latter.  The  grand  problem  now  before  us  is,  to  find 
an  ultimate  cause  intelligibly  adequate  and  adapted  to  the 
production  of  these  facts,  —  a  cause  necessarily  supposed 
by  the  facts  themselves. 

If  we  suppose  a  power  out  of  and  above  nature,  —  a  power 
which  had  an  absolute  and  perfect  knowledge  of  the  two 
substances,  and  intentionally  brought  them  into  their  pres- 
ent correlative  relations  to  each  other,  — we  have  a  full  and 
intelligibly  adequate  explanation  of  the  entire  mass  of  facts 
before  us.  If  we  reject  this  hypothesis,  and  refer  the  facts 
to  that  of  natural  law,  three  and  only  three  conceivable 
theories  present  themselves,  —  theories,  one  of  which,  to  the 
exclusion  of  all  others,  must  be  true.  1.  We  may  suppose 
this  cause  to  be  an  inhering  law  of  the  substance  of  finite 
mind,  a  law,  which  prior  to  all  present  relations  of  these  en- 
tities to  each  other,  first  determined  matter  to  take  form 
in  absolute  conformity  to  the  laws,  principles,  and  wants 
of  mind,  when  in  its  present  state  of  self-conscious  devel- 

14 


158  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

opment,  and  then  having  organized  its  existing  habitation, 
the  body,  it  located  itself  in  the  same  in  its  present  con- 
scious relations  to  the  universe.  2.  We  may  suppose,  on 
the  other  hand,  this  cause  to  be  an  inhering  law  of  matter,  a 
law  which  first  determined  this  substance  to  take  form  in  ab- 
solute correspondence  with  the  laws  of  mind  as  now  devel- 
oped, and  then  having  organized  for  it  its  present  habitation, 
the  body,  located  the  mind  in  the  same,  and  thus  brought  it 
into  its  present  conscious  relations  to  itself  and  the  uni- 
verse around  it.  3.  Or,  finally,  we  may  suppose  this  cause 
to  be  an  inhering  principle  or  law,  common  to  the  two  sub- 
stances,— a  law  first  of  all  organizing  matter  as  above  stated, 
and  then  bringing  mind  into  its  present  state  and  relations. 
Of  these  theories,  it  would  be  impossible  to  determine  which 
is  the  most  absurd. 

FACTS     OF     MIND,    OR     OF     AN     EXCLUSIVELY     MENTAL     CHAR- 
ACTER. 

VI.  We  now  advance  to  a  consideration  of  a  class  of 
facts  which  have  a  most  direct  and  special  bearing  upon  our 
present  inquiries,  those  furnished  by  rational  finite  mind  it- 
self. Mind,  —  it  should  be  kept  in  distinct  remembrance,  — 
mind,  in  its  present  state  of  self-conscious  development,  is 
undeniably  a  creation  of  quite  recent  origin  as  compared 
with  the  duration  of  even  the  external  material  creation. 
Long  after  the  material  universe  was  perfected  in  its  organi- 
zation, mind,  which  now  exists  in  this  world  as  the  sole  inter- 
preter of  nature,  and  perceives  in  her  wondrous  productions 
a  perfect  realization  of  its  own  internal  ideas  and  princi- 
ples of  pure  science,  and  contemplates  with  wonder  the 
pre-created  provisions  for  its  own  specific  necessities,  — 
mind,  as  a  free,  rational,  self-conscious  activity,  had  no  be- 


THE    THEISTIC   HYPOTHESIS.  159 

ing.  For  this  mysterious  existence  we  are  to  find  an  ade- 
quate cause.  To  proceed  intelligibly  in  our  inquiries,  we 
must  know  the  object  before  us  as  it  is.  The  following 
statements  will  lay  open  this  department  of  our  inquiries 
with  sufficient  distinctness  to  our  contemplation. 

Mind  constituted  with  three  distinct,  separate,  and  indepen- 
dently originated  faculties. 

1.  In  turning  our  thoughts  upon  our  own  minds,  we  are 
at  once  impressed  with  one  fundamental  fact,  a  threefold 
division  of  the  mental  powers,  to  wit,  the  Intellect,  Sensibil- 
ity, and  Will.  These  faculties  are  separated  from  each  other 
by  phenomena  perfectly  fundamental,  and  the  existence  of 
neither  in  the  same  subject  can  be  accounted  for  by  a  ref- 
erence to  either  or  both  of  the  others.  There  is,  in  these 
faculties,  an  adaptation  to  act  upon  and  influence  one  an- 
other, but  only  on  the  condition  of  their  having  a  prior  ex- 
istence and  constitution  already  established.  There  is  in 
neither  any  adaptation  whatever  to  produce,  that  is,  cause 
to  exist,  and  then  constitute  either  of  the  others.  Each 
faculty,  then,  has  an  origin  wholly  independent  of  every 
other.     This  is  undeniable. 

TJiese  faculties  correlatively  related  to  each  other. 

2.  While  each  of  these  faculties  has,  in  the  sense  explained, 
an  independent  origin  and  constitution,  they  are  so  consti- 
tuted that  the  activities  of  each  are  immutably  and  specifi- 
cally correlated  to  those  of  each  of  the  other.  The  action 
of  the  Intelligence,  for  example,  has  a  special  and  intelli- 
gibly specific  reference  to  that  of  the  Sensibility,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  of  the  Will,  on  the  other.     As  possessed  of  In- 


160  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

telligence,  the  mind  sustains  to  all  existences,  material  and 
mental,  the  relation  of  a  power,  while  they  sustain  to  it  that 
of  objects  of  knowledge.  When,  from  a  contemplation  of 
the  fixed  and  fundamental  laws  of  the  Intelligence,  we  turn 
to  those  of  the  Sensibility,  the  latter  appears  as  an  instru- 
ment scientifically  constituted  to  be  acted  upon  in  specific 
forms  by  the  truth,  as  apprehended  by  the  former.  Every 
fundamental  idea  developed  in  the  Intelligence  finds  its  spe- 
cific correlation  in  some  specific  but  independently  consti- 
tuted susceptibility  in  the  Sensibility.  Such  are  the  immu- 
table relations  of  these  two  independently  constituted  de- 
partments of  our  nature.  The  specific  functions  of  each  are 
indefinitely  numerous  and  diversified.  Yet  every  such 
function  is  the  specific  correlation  of  some  specific  and  in- 
dependently constituted  function  of  the  other. 

A  similar  correlation  obtains  between  the  functions  of 
these  two  faculties  and  those  of  the  Will,  the  executive  fac- 
ulty of  the  mind.  The  Intelligence,  for  example,  presents 
to  the  mind  the  endlessly  diversified  forms  of  good  and  evil 
which,  as  a  free  voluntary  activity,  the  mind  is  to  seek  and 
avoid,  while  to  every  such  form  there  is,  in  the  Sensibility, 
a  correlated  susceptibility,  whose  specific'  and  exclusive 
function  is  to  impel  the  Will  to  seek  the  good  and  avoid 
the  evil.  The  more  we  study  the  mind,  the  more  distinctly 
revealed  do  these  great  facts  become. 

There  is  one  department  of  our  mental  constitution,  how- 
ever, in  which  the  correlation  of  which  we  are  speaking  ap- 
pears, if  possible,  more  distinct  and  impressive  than  in  any 
other.  We  refer  to  the  department  of  our  moral  nature.  That 
function  of  the  intelligence  denominated  the  Conscience  has 
one  specific  and  exclusive  office,  to  wit,  to  reveal  to  the 
mind  what,  as  a  free  voluntary  activity,  it  ought  and  ought 


THE     TH EI  STIC    HYPOTHESIS.  1G1 

not  to  be  and  to  do,  and  to  assert  its  desert  of  good  or  ill, 
as  it  has  thus  become  or  done  the  one  or  the  other.  In  the 
Sensibility  we  find,  also,  a  specifically  correlated  function, 
whose  exclusive  office  is  to  impel  the  will  to  choose  the 
good  and  refuse  the  evil,  before  action,  and,  after  the  mind 
has  obeyed  or  disobeyed  the  behests  of  Conscience,  to  effect 
in  it  corresponding  retribution,  —  that  is,  to  render  it  happy 
or  miserable.  In  the  very  centre  of  our  mental  constitu- 
tion there  is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  moral  government  in  actual 
operation,  —  a  government  in  which  there  is  absolute  moral 
legislation,  moral  activity,  and  moral  retribution  according 
to  deeds,  and  all  this  on  account  of  the  correlated,  but  in- 
dependently constituted,  functions,  of  the  other  distinct  and 
separate  faculties  of  the  mind.  Free  will  is  the  only  power 
actual  or  conceivable  to  which  moral  ideas  are  in  any  form 
applicable.  The  specific  and  exclusive  function  of  the  Con- 
science is  to  reveal  those  ideas,  while  the  Sensibility  has 
specific  functions  exclusively  correlated  to  moral  ideas,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  to  moral  action  on  the  other.  Thus  mind 
stands  revealed  before  us, — mind,  an  absolute  unity  of  sub- 
stance, on  the  one  hand,  but  with  its  three  distinct,  separ- 
ate, and  independently  constituted,  but  absolutely  correlated 


Mind,  in  the  higher  and  spiritual  departments  of  its  nature 
exclusively  correlated  to  the  theistic  idea  of  Ultimate  Caus- 
ation. 

3.  Another  great  central  fact  of  universal  mind  is  this  : 
"W^hile  the  Intelligence  is  so  constituted  that  it  must  attain 
to  the  theistic  idea  of  ultimate  causation,  all  the  higher  de- 
partments of  that  nature,  the  moral  and  spiritual,  are  im- 
mutably and  exclusively  correlated  to  this  one  idea,  the 
14* 


1G2  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

idea  of  the  Unconditioned  Cause  as  a  self-conscious  person- 
ality.    In  the  depth  of  mind  there  is  a  profound  conscious- 
ness of  dependence,  for  the  supply  of  its  necessities,  upon 
a  power  out  of  itself.     The  great  sources  of  good  to  which 
its  nature  is  adapted,  are  all  out  of  itself.     Of  this  it  has, 
and  cannot  but  have,  a  deep   and  profound  consciousness. 
In  its  connection  with  nature,  it  instinctively  seeks  for  a 
power  out  of  nature  and  above  it,  —  a  power  by  whom  the 
elements  around  may  be  controlled,  in  accordance  with  the 
ever-varying  exigencies  of  its  own  existence.     In  the  hour 
of  pain  and  affliction,  in  the  midst  of  peril,  when  sudden 
danger  impends,  how  instinctively  does  the  voice  of  prayer 
ascend  for  deliverance,  and  ascend  to  a  power  out  of  and 
above  nature.     The  direction  of  the  needle  to  the  pole  is 
not  more  fixed  than  that  of  universal  mind  to  such  a  power 
under  such  circumstances.     Then,  when  encircled  with  the 
powers  and  movements  of  nature,  universal  mind  also  has 
a  consciousness  of  necessities  of  the  deepest  character, 
which  nothing  in  nature  has  any  adaptation  to  meet.    Every- 
thing around  it  is  mutable,  finite,  and  imperfect,  and  it  as- 
pires after  the  permanent,  the  immutable,  the  infinite,  and 
the  perfect.     Worship  and  prayer  also  are  universal  and 
immutable  instincts  of  mind.     Now,  all  these  instinctive 
and  immutable  tendencies  and  laws  of  universal  mind  are 
the  equally  changeless  correlatives  of  a  free,  self-conscious 
personality,  and  of  nothing  else.     We  may  admire  a  blind, 
necessary,  unconscious  principle,  but  we  never  do  nor  can 
worship  it.     A  personality  is  the  only  object  of  such  a  sen- 
timent.    We  dread  the  pestilence,  the  tempest,  and  the 
earthquake,  and  we  may  fear  to  violate  a  law  of  nature  ;  but 
we  never  pray  to  either.     A  personality  is  the  exclusive 
object  of  worship  and  prayer.     Take  from  God  the  attri- 


THE     THE  IS  TIC    HYPOTHESIS.  163 

butes  of  self-conscious  personality,  and  there  is  no  sphere 
whatever  for  the  action  of  the  religious  principle  in  man. 
That  principle  presents  a  universal  and  immutable  want  of 
sentient  existence,  with  no  corresponding  provisions  and 
fundamental  adaptations  on  the  part  of  such  existence,  with 
no  corresponding  spheres  of  activity.  This  fact  will  be  con- 
sidered at  length  in  another  connection.  All  that  we  now 
insist  upon  is  the  undeniable  fact  of  the  fundamental  and 
immutable  correlation  between  all  the  higher  intellectual 
and  spiritual  departments  of  our  nature  and  the  theistic 
idea  of  God. 

Another  remark,  which  we  deem  it  of  the  highest  impor- 
tance to  make,  in  this  connection  is  this  :  From  the  immu- 
table laws  of  his  moral  nature,  man  is  a  governmental  being. 
He  is  equally  adapted  not  only  to  the  exercise  of  authority 
over  individuals  dependent  on  him,  but  also  himself  to  be 
subject  to  similar  authority  so  far  forth  as  he  exists  in  the 
relation  of  dependence  upon  others.  Government  is  a  de- 
mand of  the  social  nature  of  man.  It  is  just  as  natural  for 
communities  to  organize  governments  for  the  protection  and 
promotion  of  their  mutual  rights  and  interests  as  it  is  for 
individuals  of  opposite  sexes  to  form  marriage  alliances. 
Subjection  to  authority,  in  the  relations  referred  to, — author- 
ity exercised  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  righte- 
ousness and  justice,  and  for  the  promotion  of  the  ends  of 
benevolence,  —  gives  to  every  department  of  our  moral  na- 
ture the  most  beautiful  and  perfect  forms  of  development. 
How  universally,  for  example,  do  the  exercise  of  parental 
authority  in  accordance  with  those  ends,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
cordial  subjection  to  it,  on  the  other,  blend  the  hearts  of 
the  parent  and  child  in  mutual  love  and  esteem,  and  at  the 
same  time  tend  to  beautify  and  dignify  the  character  of 


164  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

each  ;  while  relaxing  the  reins  of  authority,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  resistance  to  it,  on  the  other,  tend,  as  immutably, 
to  induce  mutual  hatred  and  disesteera,  and  to  deprave  and 
degrade  the  character  of  both  parties  in  common.  No  child 
can  be  effectually  prepared  for  the  exercise  of  the  functions 
of  a  freeman,  or  for  honorable  and  useful  activity  in  any 
important  sphere  of  life,  but  by  being  habituated  to  sub- 
jection to  proper  authority.  Above  all  is  this  true  in  the 
relations  of  universal  mind  to  the  Author  of  our  being.  The 
omnipresent  influence  of  the  idea  of  God  as  having  a  direct 
personal  concern  in  all  our  rights  and  interests,  and  as  ex- 
ercising a  moral  government  over  his  creatures,  commanding 
obedience  and  prohibiting  disobedience  to  the  law  of  duty, 
and  holding  before  the  mind  retributions  according  to  deeds, 
tends  to  beautify  character  by  developing  in  it  every  possi- 
ble virtue,  and  that  in  its  most  perfect  possible  forms ; 
while  the  mere  absence  of  this  idea,  or  action  in  opposition 
to  it,  tends,  in  the  highest  possible  degree,  to  deprave  the 
morals  and  degrade  character.  The  history  of  the  world 
presents  not  a  solitary  exception  to  these  statements. 

While  mind  universally  is  thus  adapted  to  subjection  to 
government,  the  immutable  demand  of  its  moral  nature  is 
a  great  central  power  of  universal  control,  a  moral  govern- 
ment under  whose  control  all  rights  and  interests  shall  be 
ultimately  adjusted  in  perfect  accordance  with  the  princi- 
ples of  immutable  justice,  truth,  and  rectitude.  When 
wrong  is  perpetrated,  how  instinctively  does  our  moral  na- 
ture cry  out  for  the  interposition  of  such  a  power  for  the 
adjustment  of  that  wrong.  Thus  it  is,  that  the  moral  na- 
ture of  universal  mind  points  to  the  throne  of  eternal  justice 
and  order,  and  to  a  personal  Deity  seated  upon  that  throne 
as  the  arbiter  of  universal  destiny.  The  reality  of  this  great 


THE     THE1STIC    HYPOTHESIS.  165 

central  fact  of  universal  mind  now  before  us  is  undeniable, 
and  is  another  revelation  of  the  immutable  correlation  be- 
tween the  moral  nature  of  universal  mind  and  the  divine 
idea  of  Theism. 

The  adaptation  of  universal  mind  to  be  influenced  by 
positive  commands  and  prohibitions  from  recognized  lawful 
authority  should  not  be  overlooked  in  this  connection.  We 
are  in  the  presence  of  the  idea  of  the  right  and  the  wrong. 
We  feel  an  internal  conviction,  that  we  ought  to  do  the  one 
and  avoid  the  other,  and  at  the  same  time  experience  a 
strong  internal  impulsion  to  act  accordingly.  The  presence 
of  an  individual  who  simply  seconds  the  voice  and  impul- 
sion of  conscience  by  advising  and  urging  us  to  act  accord- 
ing to  its  dictates,  adds  greatly  to  the  moral  influence  to 
which  we  were  previously  subject.  How  vastly,  how  immeas- 
urably, is  this  influence  increased  when  some  recognized 
lawful  authority  lays  a  positive  command  upon  us  to  do  the 
right  and  avoid  the  wrong  !  When  the  child,  for  example, 
receives  from  the  parent  a  positive  command  to  do  an  act 
which  it  perceives  to  be  right,  and  not  to  do  that  which  it 
perceives  to  be  wrong,  what  an  additional  weight  is  given  to 
the  behests  of  conscience  in  such  a  case  !  The  nature  of  the 
child  is  fundamentally  adapted  to  be  swayed  in  its  activity 
by  authority  thus  exercised.  On  the  same  principle  it  is 
that  universal  mind  is  immutably  constituted  to  receive  the 
highest  possible  influence  in  favor  of  the  right  and  against  the 
wrong,  by  the  consideration  that  it  is  positively  commanded, 
by  an  all-wise  personality,  who  presides,  in  absolute  wis- 
dom and  rectitude  over  the  destiny  of  the  moral  universe, 
to  do  the  right  and  avoid  the  wrong.  That  universal  mind 
is  fundamentally  constituted  to  be  controlled  by  such  an 


166  NATURAL    TLTEOLOGY. 

influence,  none  who  rightly  read  and  candidly  interpret  the 
facts  of  consciousness  will  deny. 

Then,  finally,  the  idea  of  God,  as  a  free,  self-conscious 
personality,  is  the  very  idea  which  the  universal  Intelligence, 
in  its  natural,  spontaneous  procedures  alwa}<  s  forms  of  the 
Unconditioned  Cause.  To  the  Intelligence  in  such  proce- 
dure God  is  not  a  principle,  an  unconscious  law  of  nature, 
nor  a  blind  instinct,  but  a  person,  a  free,  intelligent,  self-con- 
scious personality,  existing  above  and  independent  of  na- 
ture, and  presiding  in  wisdom  and  beneficence  over  it.  All 
such  facts  conduct  us  to  one  conclusion,  and  fundamentally 
contradict  all  others,  to  wit,  that  universal  mind  is  consti- 
tuted in  immutable  correlation  to  one  idea  of  God,  that  of  a 
free,  self-conscious  personality.  Whether  that  constitution 
is  in  harmony  with  the  real  or  the  unreal,  in  the  Uncondi- 
tioned Cause,  yet  remains  to  be  argued.  About  the  facts 
there  can  be  no  dispute  among  those  whose  object  is  truth. 

LAWS    OF    NATURE PHRASE    DEFINED. 

VII.  The  class  of  facts  to  which  we  would  next  direct 
attention  is  included  under  the  phrase,  Laws  of  Nature. 
This  phrase  is  used  in  senses  quite  diverse  and  distinct  the 
one  from  the  other.  As  distinguished  from  the  idea  repre- 
sented by  the  term  nature,  quality,  or  property  of  particu- 
lar substances,  this  phrase  represents  the  rule  in  conformity 
to  which  such  quality  produces  it  appropriate  effects.  Thus 
the  power  or  principle  of  attraction,  for  example,  inheres  in 
all  material  substances  as  a  property  or  quality,  or  as  be- 
longing to  the  nature,  of  said  substances.  The  rule  in  con- 
formity to  which  this  power  acts,  that  is,  the  general  fact, 
that  such  bodies  attract  each  other,  directly  as  their  matter, 
and  inversely  as  the   squares  of  their  mean  distances,  is 


THE     THEISTIC    HYPOTHESIS.  1G7 

called  the  law  of  attraction.  When,  also,  we  have  discov- 
ered the  conditions  under  which  a  certain  event  or  class  of 
events  always  occurs,  we  have  discovered  a  law  of  nature, 
and  the  phrase  under  consideration  often  represents  this  fact. 
Thus,  when  the  conditions  on  which  the  electric  fluid  will 
pass  along  the  telegraphic  wire  were  discovered,  a  Law  of 
nature  was  developed.  This  same  phrase,  we  remark,  in 
the  next  place,  is  employed  to  represent  the  mode  of  exist- 
ence pertaining  to  any  particular  substance.  Thus,  the 
fact,  that  every  body  at  rest,  or  in  motion,  will  ever  after 
continue  in  the  same  state,  unless  that  state  is  changed  by 
the  action  of  some  power  ab  extra,  is  called  a  law  of  matter, 
and  is  numbered  as  one  of  the  laws  of  nature.  The  phrase 
under  consideration  is  employed,  we  remark  in  the  next 
place,  to  designate  any  fixed  order  of  sequence  among  events 
in  nature  ;  as,  for  example,  the  law  of  reproduction  pertain- 
ing to  animals  and  plants.  We  notice  but  one  other  sense 
in  which  these  words  are  employed,  to  wit,  to  designate  a 
state  of  order,  especially  that  form  of  order  in  which  objects 
are  related  to  each  other  as  means  and  ends,  and  this,  as 
opposed  to  the  opposite  state,  a  state  of  disorder.  This  is 
the  peculiar  and  special  form  of  the  order  which  every- 
where obtains  throughout  the  wide  domain  of  nature.  All 
the  powers  of  nature  are  everywhere  arranged  in  accord- 
ance with  this  one  principle.  Everything  exists  and  acts 
as  a  means  or  an  end,  and  the  combined  results  of  the  en- 
tire activities  of  all  the  powers  of  nature  are  in  exclusive 
accordance  with  this  law. 

Laws  as  stated  in  their  positive  and  negative  forms. 

There  are  two  forms  in  which  a  law  of  nature  is  com- 
monly presented,  —  the  positive  and  negative.     In  the  first 


168  NATURAL   THEOLOGY. 

form,  we  state,  in  direct  and  affirmative  terms,  the  law  it- 
self. In  the  second  form,  we  state  what  is  necessarily  im- 
plied in  the  law,  to  wit,  that  facts  opposed  to  it  never  do 
and  never  can  occur  through  the  laws  of  nature.  Many  of 
the  laws  of  nature  are  stated  almost  exclusively  in  this  last- 
named  form,  and  as  thus  stated,  they  are  the  most  distinct, 
impressive,  and  easily  apprehended.  Thus,  the  universal 
fact,  principle,  or  law,  that  all  the  perfected  productions  of 
nature,  —  a  tree,  mature  plant,  or  animal,  for  example,  — are 
of  gradual  formation,  is  commonly  stated,  not  in  the  affirm- 
ative, but  negative  form,  to  wit,  "  nature  produces  nothing 
per  saltern"  that  is,  by  sudden  leaps  or  instantaneous  fiats. 
So  in  ruairy  other  instances. 

Laws  of  nature  classed  as  necessary  and  contingent. 

The  laws  of  nature,  in  whatever  form  stated,  may  be  di- 
vided into  two  distinct  and  opposite  classes,  which,  for  the 
sake  of  convenience,  we  will  denominate  necessary  and 
contingent.  Those  which  result  from  the  direct  and  imme- 
diate action  of  substances  in  all  circumstances  and  relations 
alike  are  called  the  necessary  laws  of  nature.  Thus  two 
bodies,  matter  remaining  what  it  is,  cannot  exist  at  all, 
without  attracting  each  other,  and  doing  this  in  accordance 
with  one  fixed  and  immutable  law.  This,  then,  is  a  neces- 
sary law  of  nature.  On  the  other  hand,  those  universal 
facts  in  nature,  which  result  from  the  combined  action  of 
the  powers  thereof,  in  the  relations  which  said  powers  or 
substances  now  sustain  to  each  other,  and  which  would  not 
occur,  were  these  substances  placed  in  different  relations  to 
one  another,  are  called  the  contingent  laws  of  nature. 
Motion,  for  example,  does  not,  like  attraction,  pertain  to 
matter  as  a  substance,  and  especially  motion  around  some 


THE    THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS.  169 

centre,  and  in  that  form  in  which  the  centripetal  and  cen- 
trifugal forces  are  equal.  The  laws  of  motion,  in  accordance 
with  which  all  the  heavenly  bodies  move,  are  pure  accidents 
of  matter,  as  far  as  its  nature  as  a  substance  is  concerned, 
and  not  the  necessary  results  of  its  qualities  as  matter. 
This  law,  therefore,  like  many  others,  and,  indeed,  most  of 
the  so-called  laws  of  nature,  must  be  ranked  as  a  contin- 
gent law  of  nature. 

Examples  of  the  laws  of  nature. 

It  may  be  important,  in  this  connection,  to  specify  as 
examples  a  few  of  the  universally  admitted  laws  of  nature. 
Among  these,  we  would  notice  the  following  :  — 

1.  The  universal  fact  that  the  powers  of  nature  are  so 
organized  and  relatively  adjusted,  that  the  entire  action  of 
these  powers  is,  as  we  have  above  stated,  in  absolute  ac- 
cordance with  the  principles  of  a  wisely  adjusted  and  in- 
telligible system  of  means  and  ends.  This  undeniably  is 
the  present  all-controlling  law  of  nature.  Nature  is 
throughout  a  systematic  unity,  or  an  organized  whole 
complete  in  all  its  parts.  In  its  system  of  organization, 
there  is  a  place  for  everything,  and  everything  is  in  its 
place.  The  law  of  unity,  that  which  determines  the  place 
of  every  power,  and  consequently  the  results  of  its  activity, 
is  the  principle  of  which  we  arc  speaking,  the  law  of  means 
and  ends.     Hence  we  notice,  in  the  next  place, 

2.  As  an  absolutely  universal  law  of  nature,  a  law  to 
which  there  are  absolutely  no  known  exceptions,  the  fact, 
that  for  every  fundamental  want  of  sentient  existence 
there  is  a  corresponding  provision,  and  for  every  funda- 
mental adaptation  of  such  existences,  a  corresponding 
sphere  of  activity  ;  in  other  words,  that  for  every  end  in  na- 

15 


170  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

ture  there  is  a  corresponding  means.  No  one  will  pre- 
tend that  there  is  known  to  man  a  solitary  exception  to  this 
law.  The  widest  inductions,  on  the  other  hand,  most 
clearly  evince  that  this  is  an  absolutely  universal  law  of 
nature. 

3.  The  law  of  production,  noticed  above,  next  claims  our 
attention,  to  wit,  that  nature  produces  nothing  per  saltern, 
"by  leaps,  or  by  fits  and  starts."  Nature  is  uniform  and 
gradual  in  all  her  operations.  All  her  productions  are  of 
slow  growth  and  result  from  comparatively  small  begin- 
nings. The  validity  of  this  law  is  evinced  by  all  the  facts 
of  nature  known  to  man.  The  conviction  of  its  absolute 
validity  is  also  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  idea  of  pro- 
duction by  inhering  law  controlled  in  its  activitj'  by  the 
principle  of  necessity.  Such  a  law  must  be  absolutely 
uniform  in  its  activity,  and  the  organizations  resulting 
from  it  must  be  of  gradual  formation.  Hence  the  principle 
above  stated  must  be  regarded  as  a  fixed  law  of  nature. 

4.  We  next  direct  attention  to  the  law  or  laws  of  vital 
organization  in  nature.  That  the  power  of  originating  such 
organizations,  animal  or  vegetable,  is  not  now  existing  and 
acting  in  nature,  no  one,  well  informed,  professes  to  be- 
lieve. Propagation,  in  which  each  species  of  animals  and 
plants  produces  its  kind,  is  the  present  exclusive  law  of 
vital  organization  in  nature.  If  the  principle  of  origina- 
tion, or  transmutation  of  species,  once  existed  and  acted  in 
nature,  it  does  not  exist  and  act  there  now.  This  is  unde- 
niable. 

5.  We  mention  but  one  other  principle,  which  is  very 
properly  denominated  a  law  of  nature.  We  refer  to  the 
law  of  relative  fitness,  which  pervades  universal  nature 
in  the  structure  of  animal  organizations.     No  part  or  or- 


THE    THE  IS  TIC   HYPOTHESIS.  171 

gan  of  such  structure  exists  for  itself  alone,  but  has  a  perfect 
aud  fixed  adaptation  to  every  other.  So  absolute  and  univer- 
sal is  this  law,  that  the  scientific  naturalist  is  able,  when 
shown  a  single  bone  of  an  animal  of  some  extinct  species, 
to  determine,  at  once,  the  class  to  wiiich  the  animal  be- 
longed, its  general  form  and  structure.  Here,  then,  we 
have  a  universal  and  immutable  law  of  nature.  We  might 
specify  other  laws.  These,  however,  are  sufficient  for  our 
present  purpose,  which  is  mainly  to  prepare  the  way  for 
the  following  remarks  of  a  general  character  upon  the  so- 
called  laws  of  nature.     On  this  subject  we  remark  : 

General  characteristics  of  the  laws  of  nature. 

1.  A  vast  majority  of  these  laws  are  not  only  contingent 
in  their  character,  but  once  actually  had  no  existence  in 
nature.  Whether  finite  substance,  material  and  mental,  is 
or  is  not  a  created  thing,  one  fact  is  undeniable,  and  is  as 
universally  admitted,  to  wit,  that  all  substances,  now  called 
nature,  once  existed,  if  they  then  existed  at  all,  in  a  state 
of  total  and  universal  unorganizatiou.  The  time  was,  for 
example,  when  the  planetary  system,  with  its  various  laws 
of  motion,  etc.,  had  no  existence.  The  earth,  as  a  globe 
and  planet,  once  had  no  being.  It  once  existed  as  a  globe 
and  planet  with  no  animal  or  vegetable  formations  upon 
its  surface,  with  no  vital  forms  or  principles  from  which 
such  organizations  now  result,  and  with  no  soil  or  provis- 
ions adapted  to  sustain  them,  if  they  did  exist.  The  laws 
of  order,  means  and  ends,  adaptation,  production,  relative 
fitness,  etc.,  consequently  once  had  no  existence  in  nature. 
They  are  themselves,  on  the  other  hand,  facts  having  their 


for.     Hence,  we  remark, 


172  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

2.  That  these  laws  are  not  themselves  ultimate  facts, 
and  are  not  themselves  the  ultimate  cause  or  causes  of  any 
facts  in  nature.  To  account,  therefore,  for  the  occurrence 
of  any  of  the  present  or  past  facts  of  nature,  or  for  the  ex- 
istence and  action  of  these  laws  in  nature,  we  must  look 
out  of  and  beyond  the  laws  themselves.  This  is  self-evi- 
dent. That  which  once  of  necessity  was  not,  and  at  a  def- 
inite period,  from  a  like  necessity,  began  to  be,  does  not, 
and  cannot,  of  course,  contain  in  itself  the  ultimate  reason 
of  its  non-being,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  its  subsequent 
existence  and  action,  on  the  other.  The  grand  problem 
before  us,  then,  is  this  :  to  find  an  ultimate  reason  or  cause 
which  shall  adequately  and  intelligibly  account  for  the  ex- 
istence and  action  of  these  laws  in  nature,  —  laws  in  con- 
formity to  which  she  herself  now  exclusively  exists  and 
acts.     This  leads  us  to  remark, 

3.  That  the  existence  and  action  of  these  laws,  in  the 
forms  in  which  they  really  appear,  cannot  be  accounted  for 
by  reference  to  any  higher  inhering  law,  actual  or  conceiv- 
able, existing  and  acting  potentially  in  nature  itself.  The 
necessary  laws  of  nature,  as  above  defined,  contain  no  ex- 
planation whatever  of  the  existence  and  action  of  the  con- 
tingent ones.  The  law  of  attraction,  for  example,  is  just 
as  consistent  with  the  existence  and  action  of  the  powers 
of  nature  in  a  state  of  disorder,  as  in  a  state  of  order,  and 
presents,  therefore,  the  explanation  of  no  fact  of  order  in 
the  universe.  So  of  all  other  laws  of  a  kindred  character. 
The  same  holds  equally  true  of  any  conceivable  or  imagin- 
able law  inhering  and  acting  potentially  in  nature  itself. 
If  the  present  laws  of  nature  owed  their  existence  and  ac- 
tion ultimately  to  any  law  thus  inhering  and  acting  in  na- 
ture, then,  by  no  possibility,  could  there  have  been  a  period 


TIIE    THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS.  173 

when  these  laws  did  not  act  in  and  control  nature  as  they 
now  do.  By  hypothesis,  the  exclusively  determining 
cause  existed  and  acted  potentially  in  nature  from  eter- 
nity. The  necessary  results  of  that  action,  the  existence 
and  action  of  nature  in  exclusive  accordance  with  present 
laws,  must  consequently  have  been  from  eternity.  Suppose, 
for  example,  —  what  the  present  hypothesis  necessarily  im- 
plies,— the  existence  in  nature  of  any  inhering  law  whatever, 
necessarily  determining  it  to  exist  and  act  in  a  state  of  or- 
der, as  opposed  to  that  of  disorder,  and  especially  in  a  state 
of  universal  organization  in  accordance  with  the  law  of 
means  and  ends  ;  then  undeniably  nature  could  never,  by 
any  possibility,  have  existed  in  any  other  state.  If  we  re- 
fer to  any  inhering  law  of  nature,  as  the  ultimate  cause  of 
the  facts  of  nature,  we  must  suppose  that  law  to  exist,  as 
the  exclusive,  all-determining  cause  in  nature,  from  eternity. 
If  this  law  is  a  necessitating  cause  of  order  in  any  form 
whatever,  then,  from  eternity,  nature  could,  by  no  possibil- 
ity, have  existed  in  any  other  form.  The  laws  of  nature, 
therefore,  would  have  existed  and  acted,  as  universally  de- 
termining principles,  from  eternity.  There  is  no  escaping 
this  conclusion.  These  laws,  however,  have  not  thus  ex- 
isted and  acted  in  nature.  They  can,  therefore,  be  ac- 
counted for  by  a  reference  to  no  law  or  principle  of  ulti- 
mate causation  inhering  and  acting  potentially  in  nature 
itself.  All  the  laws  and  facts  of  nature,  on  the  other  hand, 
lead  us  to  a  cause  not  only  out  of,  above,  and  beyond 
themselves,  but  out  of,  above,  and  beyond  nature  itself. 
Every  view  and  aspect  of  nature  conduct  us,  by  inevitable 
consequence,  to  this  one  conclusion. 


15* 


174  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

The  progress  of  creation  has  been  from  one  absolute  ultimate 
to  another  of  a  totally  opposite  character. 

VIII.  We  now,  in  the  last  place,  adduce  a  great  general 
central  fact,  which  really  comprehends  all  others  which  we 
have  considered,  and  to  which  very  special  attention  is  in- 
vited on  account  of  its  special  bearings  upon  our  present 
inquiries.  We  refer  to  the  fact  that  creation  has,  in  the 
sense  explained,  not  only  been  progressive,  but  has  pro- 
gressed from  one  absolute  ultimate  to  another  of  an  opposite 
character.  Chaos  and  order  are  two  ultimate  states,  and 
as  such,  each  is,  in  all  respects,  the  total  opposite  of  the 
other.  Neither  can  be  contemplated  as  the  antecedent  or 
cause  of  the  other.  Neither  has  any  intrinsic  or  extrinsic 
tendency  to  consummate  in  the  other.  Each,  on  the  other 
hand,  has  an  immutable  tendenc}'  to  self-perpetuation. 
Every  theory  of  the  universe  admits  and  affirms  the  fact, 
that  the  original  state  of  nature  was  chaos  absolutely  uni- 
versal ;  that,  in  this  state,  creation  commenced  and  pro- 
gressed onward  till  order  has  become  the  first  law  of  na- 
ture in  absolutely  all  departments  of  existence.  These  are 
the  facts  as  universally  admitted  and  affirmed  as  real  by 
all  the  deductions  of  science  bearing  upon  the  subject. 
How  shall  we  account  for  the  commencement  of  creation  in, 
and  its  progress  from,  one  of  these  absolutely  universal  ul- 
timates  to  the  other?  The  undeniable  fact  must  be  ac- 
counted for  by  a  reference  to  natural  law,  or  to  a  power  a b 
extra.  If  we  suppose  the  state  of  chaos  which  preceded 
creation  to  have  been  from  eternity,  then  chaos  was  unde- 
niably the  immutable  law  of  universal  nature,  and  order,  by 
natural  law,  must  have  been  to  eternity  an  absolute 
impossibility.     If  we  suppose  this  state  of  universal  chaos 


THE    THEISTIC   HYPOTHESIS.  175 

to  have  been  preceded  by  one  of  order,  the  change  from  the 
latter  to  the  former  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  reference  to 
natural  law,  there  being  no  conceivable  relation  of  antece- 
dence and  consequence  in  such  a  case, .but  rather  an  undeni- 
able and  irreconcilable  contradiction.  Further,  if  we  con- 
template this  absolutely  ultimate  and  universal  chaos,  the 
revealed  and  admitted  original  state  of  nature,  without  refer- 
ence to  the  question  of  the  prior  continuance  of  that  state, 
we  shall  then  find  it  equally  impossible  to  account  for  the 
commencement  and  actual  progress  of  creation,  by  any  ref- 
erence to  natural  law.  What  known,  indicated,  or  ration- 
ally conceivable  natural  property  of  crude  matter  in  a  state 
of  absolute  chaos  is  there,  to  indicate  in  it  the  power  of  uni- 
versal self-originated  order  ?  Especially,  what  is  there  in 
nature,  in  the  former  state,  adapted  to  induce  those  forms 
of  order  which  now  exist  in  the  universe  ?  Nothing  can  be 
more  contradictory  and  absurd  than  the  ideas  of  nature  in 
the  former  and  the  latter  state,  with  the  idea  that  the  lat- 
ter is  the  necessary  consequent  of  the  former.  No  ideas 
can  be  conceived  of  more  absolutely  incompatible.  Sup- 
pose, once  more,  that  it  is  suggested  that  there  may  be  in 
nature  two  distinct  and  opposite  principles,  —  a  tendency, 
first  of  all,  to  exist,  for  a  period,  in  a  state  of  universal 
order,  and  then  to  resolve  itself  into  universal  chaos,  from 
which  state  it  shall  spontaneously  emerge  again,  through 
successive  transformations,  into  a  state  of  universal  order ; 
and  so  on,  swinging  like  a  pendulum,  between  these  two 
opposite  and  contradictory  ultimates  from  eternity  to  eter- 
nity. Such  a  supposition  is  just  as  self-contradictory  and 
absurd  as  the  idea  that  a  body  in  motion  will,  from  its 
own  inhering  laws,  spontaneously  change  the  direction  of 
that  motion,  without  any  force  acting  upon  it  ab  extra.   Two 


176  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

ultimates  which  are  absolutely  contradictory  the  one  to  the 
other,  can,  by  no  possibility,  sustain  to  each  other  the  rela- 
tion of  necessary  antecedence  and  consequence.  No  propo- 
sition can  be  more  self-evident  that  this.  The  same  thing 
might,  at  the  same  time,  be  and  not  be,  if  such  a  proposi- 
tion can  be  true.  The  fact,  that  nature  has  existed  in  these 
two  ultimate  and  utterly  incompatible  states,  is  a  great  cen- 
tral fact  of  the  universe  which  cannot  be  denied,  and  is,  in 
reality,  universally  admitted.  An  impassable  gulf  lies  be- 
tween these  two  states,  —  a  gulf  which  can  never  be  bridged 
over  by  natural  law. 


SECTION   in. 

FACTS     APPLIED. 

We  here  conclude  our  induction  of  facts,  and  will  now 
proceed  to  deduce  from  them  the  conclusions  which  they 
yield  bearing  upon  our  present  inquiries.  The  realitj^  of 
the  facts,  we  may  safely  assume,  will  not  be  questioned  by 
any  honest  inquirer  after  truth,  and  hardly  by  even  dis- 
honest minds,  their  reality  being  so  obvious  and  so  univer- 
sally admitted.  The  object  of  the  induction  has  been  to 
furnish  the  minor  premise  for  the  theistic  syllogism  in  its 
entireness,  the  idea  of  the  infinity  and  perfection  of  God  ex- 
cepted. The  facts  are  admitted,  together  with  the  doctrine 
of  the  being  of  God  considered  simply  as  the  ultimate  de- 
termining Reason,  or  Unconditioned  Cause  of  these  facts  ; 
a  cause  possessing  the  attributes  of  eternity,  immviability , 
and  intelligible  adequacy  and  adaptation  to  produce  these 
facts  and  render  them  what  they  are.  The  specific  inquiry 
now  before  us  is  this :     What  are  the  attributes  necessarily 


THE     THEISTIC    HYPOTHESIS.  177 

supposed  as  existing  in  this  cause,  by  these  facts  ?  This 
cause,  we  must  also  bear  in  mind,  must  be  an  inhering  law 
of  nature  itself,  or  a  power  of  a  specific  character  existing 
out  of  and  above  nature,  and  exercising  an  absolute  control 
over  it.  Our  object  is,  not  only  to  determine  the"  location, 
but  character,  of  this  cause.  To  this  inquiry,  the  answer  to 
which,  so  far  as  the  location  of  the  cause  is  concerned,  has 
already  been  given,  we  now,  without  further  introduction, 
advance  ;  our  great  object  being  to  determine  upon  scien- 
tific principles  the  attributes  necessarily  implied  in  God, 
considered  as  the  Unconditioned  Cause,  and  implied  by  the 
facts  of  the  universe. 

CHARACTER  AND    ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD,  AS  THE  UNCONDITIONED 
CAUSE  OF  THE  FACTS  OF  THE  UNIVERSE. 

The  Unconditioned  Cause  not  a  fortuitous  concurrence  of  the 
substances  or  powers  of  nature. 

I.  In  answering  the  question  before  us,  we  remark,  in  the 
first  place,  that  the  Ultimate  Reason,  or  Unconditioned 
Cause,  after  which  we  are  inquiring,  is  not,  of  course,  a 
fortuitous  concurrence  of  the  substances  or  powers  of  nature. 
That  the  endlessly  diversified  powers  of  nature,  after  con- 
tinuing from  eternity  in  a  state  of  universal  disorder,  took 
their  present  form,  for  such  a  reason,  is  an  idea  so  mon- 
strously absurd  and  self-contradictory  that  no  philosopher 
or  thinking  mind  now  avows  the  theory.  La  Place  affirms 
that  the  probabilities  against  such  a  theory  are  as  infinity 
to  unity.  This  theory,  therefore,  we  need  not  dwell  upon, 
and  we  allude  to  it  only  as  an  hypothesis  long  since  ex- 
ploded.     The   Unconditioned   Cause  after  which  we  are 


178  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

inquiring  must  be  a  law  of  order  of  some  kind.     No  other 
supposition  is  admissible. 

This  cause  no  inhering  law  or  principle  of  matter. 

II.  This  cause,  we  remark  in  the  second  place,  is  no  in- 
hering law  or  'principle  acting  potentially  in  matter.  This 
theory  can  be  maintained  but  upon  one  of  two  hypotheses. 
We  may  resolve  all  existences  into  matter,  —  the  doctrine  of 
real  Materialism,  —  and  refer  the  entire  facts  of  the  universe, 
as  their  ultimate  cause,  to  the  inhering  principles  of  this 
one  substance.  Or  we  may  admit  the  validity  of  the  dis- 
tinction between  matter  and  spirit  as  separate  and  opposite 
substances,  and  explain  all  the  facts  of  both  these  sub- 
stances by  reference  to  laws  or  principles  inhering  and 
acting  potentially  in  the  former.  This  last-named  hypothe- 
sis, is,  if  possible,  even  more  monstrously  absurd  than  the 
theory  of  Fortuitous  Concurrence,  —  so  undeniably  absurd 
that  it  has  never,  to  our  knowledge,  been  proposed  as  even 
possibly  true.  No  one,  who  admits  the  real  existence  of 
matter  and  spirit  as  distinct  and  separate  substances,  ever 
thinks,  as  we  have  said  in  another  connection,  of  denying 
the  claims  of  Theism  in  their  entireness.  To  admit  this 
distinction,  and  then  explain  the  entire  facts  of  the  universe 
by  a  reference  to  any  supposed  law  or  principle  inhering  in 
the  former,  is  to  explain  the  existence  of  the  powers,  sus- 
ceptibilities, phenomena,  and  relations  of  the  highest  forms 
of  being,  by  a  reference  to  the  inhering  principles  of  the 
lowest  actual  or  conceivable ;  for  there  is  no  conceivable 
form  of  being  lower  than  that  of  crude  matter.  It  is  more 
than  this,  to  explain  the  entire  phenomena  and  relations  of 
two  distinct  and  opposite  substances,  one  of  which  exists 
and  acts  exclusively  as  a  means,  and  the  other  as  an  end, 


THE    THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS.  179 

by  reference  to  the  inhering  principles  of  the  former ;  than 
which  nothing  can  be  more  monstrously  absurd.  On  this 
hypothesis,  therefore,  nothing  further  need  be  said.  The 
only  real  question  to  be  argued  pertains  exclusively  to 
the  claims  of  Materialism  in  its  true  and  proper  sense.  The 
question,  in  this  form  also,  has,  in  fact,  been  settled  already. 
We  have  shown,  by  arguments  which  we  feel  quite  safe  in 
affirming  cannot  be  properly  ignored,  or  refuted  upon  scien- 
tific or  any  other  valid  grounds,  that  matter  and  spirit  do 
in  reality  exist  as  distinct,  separate,  and  opposite  sub- 
stances. As  the  proper  resolution  of  this  question  is  per- 
fectly fundamental  to  the  end  we  have  in  view  in  this  whole 
discussion,  we  shall  argue  the  matter  at  full  length,  not 
avoiding,  when  necessary  to  our  present  purpose,  a  repeti- 
tion of  some  things  already  presented.  On  this  subject, 
then,  we  invite  very  special  attention  to  the  following  con- 
siderations : 

Dogma  of  Materialism  not  only  void  of  proof  but  of  all 
evidence  in  its  favor. 

1.  The  dogma  of  Materialism  rests  throughout  upon  a 
mere  assumption,  not  only  void  of  all  proof,  but  of  all  forms 
or  degrees  of  evidence  in  its  favor.  That  matter  is  the 
only  substance  really  existing,  no  one  surely  attempts  to 
prove.  Nor,  by  any  possibility,  can  the  least  shadow  of 
evidence  be  adduced  in  favor  of  such  an  idea.  We  have 
just  as  much  reason  for  the  assumption  that  spirit  is  the 
only  really  existing  substance,  as  we  have  to  assume  that 
matter  is  ;  and  we  have,  as  we  have  elsewhere  shown,  abso- 
lutely no  evidence  whatever  for  either  dogma.  The  dogma  of 
Materialism,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  Idealism,  on  the  other, 
stand  upon  precisely  the  same  grounds,  in  the  one  respect 


ISO  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

now  under  consideration.  Neither  can,  by  any  possibility, 
be  proved  true,  nor  in  favor  of  either  can  the  least  shadow 
of  evidence  be  adduced.  The  admission  that  mind,  the 
knowing  subject,  exists,  is  no  proof,  or  evidence  even,  that 
matter,  the  object,  does  not  exist.  So,  the  admission  of 
the  reality  of  the  object  presents  no  form  or  degree  of  proof, 
or  evidence  even,  that  the  subject  is  not  a  reality  also. 

The  dogma  of  Materialism  has  no  antecedent  probability  in 
its  favor. 

2.  This  leads  us  to  remark,  in  the  second  place,  that  the 
dogma  of  Materialism  has  no  form  or  degree  of  antecedent 
probability  in  its  favor.  It  is  undeniably  just  as  antece- 
dently probable  that  spirit  exists  as  the  only  reality,  as 
that  matter  thus  exists,  and  it  is  just  as  probable  in  itself 
that  both  substances  are  real  existences,  as  the  idea  that 
either  does  or  does  not  exist  at  all,  or  that  one  or  the  other 
exists  alone.  The  absolute  validity  of  all  these  statements 
has  been  established  in  another  connection.  These  state- 
ments, too,  one  and  all  of  them,  are  so  self-evident,  that 
no  reflecting  mind  will  question  them  for  a  single  moment. 

The  highest  conceivable  degree  of  antecedent  probability  exists 
against  this  dogma. 

3.  While  no  form  or  degree  of  proof,  evidence,  or  ante- 
cedent probability  exists  in  favor  of  this  dogma,  the  highest 
conceivable  degree  of  antecedent  probability  exists  against 
it.  What  is  there,  in  our  fundamental  idea  of  crude  matter, 
that  renders,  in  the  remotest  degree,  probable,  the  supposi- 
tion of  the  existence  in  it  not  only  of  the  law  of  its  own  or- 
ganization according  to  the  principles  of  pure  science,  but 
also  the  power  to  exercise, when  self-developed,  the  high  func- 


THE    THEISriC    HYPOTHESIS.  181 

tions  of  thought,  feeling,  and,  above  all,  of  free  will?  No 
one  idea  can,  by  any  possibility,  stand  at  a  greater  remove 
from  another,  than  does  our  fundamental  conception  of 
rational  spirit  from  that  of  mere  matter ;  and,  hence,  no 
hypothesis  has,  or  can  have,  a  greater  antecedent  probabil- 
ity against  it,  than  the  dogma  that  the  fundamental  phe- 
nomena of  mind  are  the  result  and  manifestation  of  a  power 
inhering  in  matter.  Nothing  can  be  more  improbable  in 
itself  than  such  a  supposition. 

This  dogma  opposed  to  the  intuitive  convictions  of  the  race. 

4.  The  dogma  of  Materialism,  we  remark,  in  the  next 
place,  is  not  only,  as  a  doctrine  in  itself,  but  as  related  to 
the  idea  of  Ultimate  Causation,  opposed  to  the  intuitive 
convictions  of  the  race.  There  is  not  a  race  or  tribe  of  men 
on  earth,  be  they  ever  so  rude  or  barbarous,  that  has  not 
apprehended  the  distinction  between  matter  and  spirit,  and 
in  thought  fundamentally  separated  the  two  substances  the 
one  from  the  other.  Equally  universal  is  the  idea  and  con- 
viction that  the  ultimate  cause  of  the  facts  of  the  universe 
is  mind  and  not  matter.  On  no  subjects  are  the  convictions 
of  the  race  more  strictly  universal  and  absolute  than  on 
these  two.  The  race  universally  believe  in  the  real  exist- 
ence of  matter  and  spirit  both,  and  that,  as  distinct  and 
separate  substances,  on  the  one  hand,  and  in  God,  the  Un- 
conditioned Cause  of  all  things,  as  a  spirit  and  not  an  in- 
hering law  of  matter,  on  the  other.     This  is  undeniable. 

Tliis  dogma,  as  a  doctrine,  opposed  to  the  immutable  princi- 
ples and  necessary  deductions  of  science. 

5.  Our  next  position  is  this  :  Materialism  as  a  doctrine 
stands  fundamentally  opposed  to  the  immutable  principles 

1G 


182  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

and  necessary  deductions  of  science  pertaining  to  sub- 
stances. The  immutable  principles  of  science  relative  to 
substances  are  these :  Substances  are,  in  their  nature,  as 
their  essential  qualities.  Substances,  in  their  presentatively 
known  qualities  essentially  alike,  are  to  be  ranked  as  the 
same  in  kind  or  nature.  Those,  in  their  fundamental  quali- 
ties thus  known,  essentially  unlike,  are  to  be  ranked  as  dis- 
tinct, separate,  and  unlike  substances.  Now,  as  we  have 
shown  in  another  connection,  the  fundamental  qualities  of 
matter,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  spirit,  on  the  other,  are  to 
the  mind  the  objects  of  immediate  or  presentative  knowl- 
edge, and  the  essential  qualities  of  one  are  fundamentally 
unlike  those  of  the  other.  To  resolve  all  realities  into  mat- 
ter, on  the  one  hand,  or  into  spirit,  on  the  other,  or  to  deny 
the  real  existence  of  both  alike  as  distinct  and  separate, 
but  actually  existing  substances,  is  a  violation  of  the  im- 
mutable principles  and  deductions  of  science  in  regard  to 
this  subject.  Materialism  as  a  doctrine  of  existence  con- 
founds what  science  has  fundamentally  distinguished,  and 
thus  utterly  saps  the  foundation  of  all  scientific  procedures 
in  regard  to  substances.  This  dogma  must  be  false,  or  the 
sciences  of  nature,  mental  and  physical,  in  all  their  pro- 
cedures, without  exception,  are  running  upon  a  totally  false 
foundation  ;  for  the  principles  above  stated  constitute  their 
sole  basis,  —  principles  which  this  dogma  denies,  —  and  must 
itself  be  false,  unless  that  denial  is  valid.  If  substances, 
in  their  essential  presentatively  known  qualities  fundamen- 
tally unlike,  are  to  be  regarded  as  in  their  nature  correspond- 
ingly unlike  each  other,  then  Materialism  is  and  must  be 
false.  If  substances,  in  their  essential  qualities  thus  known, 
are  to  be  assumed  as  one  in  nature  and  kind,  then  we  have 
no  principles  whatever  by  which  we  can  reason  at  all  about 


THE    THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS.  183 

realities  within  and  around  us,  and  the  professed  sciences 
of  nature  are  throughout  a  lie,  and  nothing  else.  And 
what  reasons  can  Materialism  offer  us  for  this  sweeping 
assumption?  None  whatever.  Science  is  to  be  totally  ig- 
nored and  condemned  without  proof,  without  evidence,  with- 
out a  hearing  even,  and  that  in  opposition  to  the  intuitive 
convictions  of  the  race,  and  the  absolute  presentative  intui- 
tions of  the  Universal  Intelligence,  or  this  dogma  must  be 
set  aside  as  founclationless  and  false.  Any  person  that,  in 
the  face  of  such  undeniable  facts,  will  still  avow  himself  a 
materialist,  is  certainly  at  liberty  to  do  so.  All  that  is 
needful  for  the  cause  of  truth  is,  that  the  world  should 
distinctly  apprehend  the  character  of  the  assumption  upon 
which  his  whole  system  exclusively  rests,  —  an  assumption 
for  the  validity  of  which  no  form  or  degree  of  proof  or  evi- 
dence even,  can,  by  any  possibility,  be  offered,  and  which 
is  affirmed  absolutely  to  be  false  by  the  highest  possible 
proof,  the  direct,  and  immediate  presentative  intuitions  of 
the  Universal  Intelligence. 


In  accordance  with  this  dogma  it  is  impossible  to  account  for 
any  one  of  the  classes  of  facts  above  adduced. 

6.  We  now  advance  to  a  consideration  of  one  of  the  most 
fundamental  arguments  of  all  against  the  hypothesis  of  Ma- 
terialism. It  is  this  :  By  no  possibility  can  we  account  for 
any  one  of  the  classes  of  fundamental  facts  which  we  have 
adduced  in  Section  II.  of  this  chapter,  and  there  adduced  as 
the  basis  of  our  present  deductions.  Every  one  of  these 
classes  of  great  facts,  on  the  other  hand,  fundamentally  con- 
tradicts this  hypothesis.  This  we  have  already  shown  to 
be  true  undeniably  of  every  hypothesis  which  refers  the  facts 


184  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

of  the  universe,  as  their  ultimate  cause,  to  any  inhering  law 
of  nature  of  any  kind  whatever.  Above  all,  if  possible, 
then,  must  this  hold  true  of  any  Irypothesis  which  assumes 
that  this  law  inheres  exclusively  in  matter.  For  the  sake 
of  distinctness,  we  will  specify  a  few  of  these  classes  of 
facts : 

(1.)  We  remark,  then,  in  the  first  place,  that,  on  this  hy- 
pothesis, it  is  absolutely  impossible  to  account  for  the  unde- 
niable fact  that  creation  had  a  beginning  in  time.  Suppose, 
what  this  Irypothesis  fundamentally  implies,  that  an  all-con- 
trolling law  eternally  inhered  in  matter  necessarily  deter- 
mining it  to  exist  and  act  in  a  state  of  universal  scientific 
order  as  opposed  to  the  opposite  state,  and  that  this  law  is 
the  ultimate  Unconditioned  Cause  of  all  the  facts  of  the  uni- 
verse, mental  and  physical.  Then,  undeniably,  nature  could, 
by  no  possibility,  ever  have  existed  in  any  other  state.  It 
must,  from  eternity,  have  existed  in  a  state  of  scientific 
order,  according  to  the  immutable  principle  of  means  and 
ends,  and  could  never,  at  any  moment,  have  existed  in  any 
other  state.  But  nature,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  has  not  existed 
in  this  state  from  eternity.  The  order  which  is  now  its  first 
law,  and  which  pervades  nature  universally,  once  had  no 
existence  in  it,  but  is  itself  an  event  of  time,  and  there- 
fore to  be  accounted  for.  The  ultimate  cause  of  this  order, 
consequently,  is  and  can  be  no  inhering  law  or  principle  of 
matter. 

(2.)  We  next  allude  to  the  facts  of  immediate,  original 
creation,  animal  and  vegetable,  with  which  the  past  history 
of  the  universe  abounds.  It  is  an  immutable  and  universal 
law  of  nature,  that  in  the  same  circumstances  the  same 
results  arise,  and  none  others.  The  appearance  of  new  re- 
sults supposes  the  action  of  new  causes.   No  one  imagines, 


THE    THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS.  185 

that  while  nature  remains  as  now  constituted,  and  while  act- 
ing under  its  present  laws,  any  new  races  of  animals  or 
plants,  and  especially  of  the  former  class,  will  be  directly 
and  immediately  originated,  —  races  especially  like  the  lead- 
ing ones  that  do  exist,  —  the  human  race,  for  example.  If 
we  suppose  that,  at  the  moment  when  the  original  pair  which 
stands  at  the  head  of  the  race  was  originated,  nature  ex- 
isted throughout  in  a  state  similar,  or  even  analogous,  to 
the  present,  no  one  will  entertain  the  absurdity  that  that 
pair  was  immediately  originated  by  any  inhering  law  of 
nature.  What  were  the  real  facts  of  the  case?  Nature 
then  did  exist  throughout  in  a  state,  in  all  essential  particu- 
lars, the  same  as  the  present.  The  organization  of  the 
planetary  system  was  then  completed,  — the  earth  and  other 
planets  revolving  round  their  own  axes,  and  moving  round 
their  common  centres  as  now.  The  external  and  internal 
organization  of  the  earth  itself  was  also  complete.  The 
atmosphere,  the  ocean,  and  the  dry  land,  with  all  its  varied 
rock  and  other  formations,  with  their  varied  races  of  ani- 
mals and  vegetables  each  producing  immutably  its  kind  and 
that  only,  existed  as  they  now  do.  If  matter  does  not  now,  — 
and  no  one  imagines  that  it  does  or  can,  —  by  direct,  imme- 
diate, and  originating  acts,  create  human  beings,  all  the 
immutable  laws  and  principles  of  induction  require  us  to 
suppose  and  affirm  that  the  pair  referred  to  was  not  thus 
originated.  This  conclusion  is  not  a  truth  of  analogy,  bat 
of  induction.  The  supposition,  that  matter  now,  by  sud- 
den, spontaneous  throes,  does,  from  time  to  time,  first  elimi- 
nate from  the  atmosphere,  the  waters,  the  rocks,  and  vegeta- 
ble formations,  the  various  elements  which,  in  endlessly 
diversified  forms,  enter  into  the  composition  of  the  human 
body,  and  then  combine  them  into  completed  and  mature 
1G* 


186  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

human  organizations  male  and  female,  infusing  into  the 
same  the  vital  and  rational  principles,  and  then  sending 
them  abroad,  as  the  progenitors  of  new  races  of  human  be- 
ings, —  such  a  supposition,  we  say,  is  not  more  incredible  or 
more  absurd  in  itself,  or  more  contradictory  to  all  known 
facts,  than  is  the  supposition  that  the  two  progenitors  of 
our  race  were  thus  originated.  Such  a  supposition  is  un- 
deniably out  of  the  question.  No  man  can  possibly  put 
the  two  ideas  together, — that  of  two  animated  human  bodies, 
a  male  and  female,  in  the  full  perfection  and  maturity  of 
organization,  and  the  earth  in  the  state  in  which  it  actually 
was  at  the  time  when  the  pair  under  consideration  were  act- 
ually originated, — and  for  a  moment  suppose  these  creations 
were  the  spontaneously  originated  results  of  any  law  or 
power  inhering  in  matter.  But  two  suppositions  remain  as 
even  conceivably  true,  to  wit,  origination  by  transmutation 
from  pre-existing  species  of  animated  organizations,  or  by 
the  interposition  of  some  creative  power  out  of  and  above 
nature.  The  former  supposition  is  also  out  of  the  question. 
The  individual  that,  in  the  presence  of  all  the  present 
known  laws  and  facts  of  nature,  together  with  all  the  facts 
developed  by  the  science  of  geology,  will  still  maintain  that 
the  real  ancestors  of  our  race  were  baboons  or  monkeys,  or 
any  other  species  of  the  irrational  creation,  is,  in  no  proper 
sense,  slandered,  when  it  is  affirmed  that,  on  this  one  subject, 
he  exercises  a  form  and  degree  of  intellectual  acumen  hardly 
superior  to  that  possessed  by  our  reputed  progenitors. 
The  only  conclusion  which  the  facts  at  all  permit  is  this, 
that  humanity  owes  its  origin  to  the  immediate  creative  fiat 
of  some  originating  power  out  of  and  above  matter. 

(3.)  The  class  of  facts,  to  which  we  next  refer,  may  be 
denominated  the  properties  and  accidents  of  matter,  facts 


THE    THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS.  187 

which  are  to  be  carefully  distinguished  from  one  another. 
If  the  Unconditioned  Cause  of  the  facts  of  creation  is  to  be 
found  in  this  substance,  it  must,  of  course,  be  found  in  its 
properties,  and  not  in  its  accidents.  There  are  but  two 
properties  which  intrinsically  inhere  in  any  one  particle  of 
matter,  relatively  to  any  other  properties  to  which  we  need 
now  to  refer,  those  of  attraction  and  repulsion.  Motion  is 
not  an  inherent  property,  but  an  accident  of  this  substance. 
Now,  among  the  most  important  facts  of  the  universe,  as  far 
as  matter  itself  is  concerned,  must  be  reckoned  its  acci- 
dents,— accidents  which  have  no  necessary  connection  with, 
and  could  never  have  resulted  from,  its  inherent  properties. 
Yet  the  organization  of  the  universe  is  such  that  there  is  a 
perfect  balance  between  the  results  of  the  pure  accidents 
and  the  action  of  the  necessary  properties  of  matter.  We 
may  refer,  in  illustration  of  the  above  remark,  to  the  solar 
system.  There,  the  centrifugal  force,  which  is  a  pure  acci- 
dent both  in  its  degree  and  direction  as  far  as  matter  is 
concerned,  is  so  perfectly  balanced  by  the  centripetal,  which 
is  the  equally  pure  result  of  the  action  of  the  inherent  prop- 
erties of  the  same  substance,  that  the  entire  movements  of 
the  planets  about  the  sun  are  in  absolute  accordance  with 
the  principles  of  perfect  science.  Now,  this  motion  must 
have  been  eternal,  both  in  its  degree  and  direction,  and 
then  the  system  itself,  in  its  entire  organization,  the  earth 
with  all  its  inhabitants,  rational  and  irrational,  must  have 
been  from  eternity,  or  that  motion  must  have  been  com- 
municated by  a  power  out  of  matter.  But  this  organization 
is  not  from  eternity,  and,  therefore,  the  motion  cannot  be 
eternal  in  its  existence,  and  must  have  been  communicated 
by  some  power  out  of  matter.  From  no  law  or  property  of 
matter,  when  once  void  of  this  motion,  either  in  its  degree 


188  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

or  direction,  can  we  account  for  its  existence.  "  Give  me 
matter  and  motion,"  says  Descartes,  "  and  I  will  con- 
struct you  the  universe."  Motion  cannot  be  granted,  but 
through  a  power  out  of  matter,  excepting  as  an  accident 
eternally  pertaining  to  it ;  in  which  case,  the  facts  of  the 
universe,  as  we  have  seen,  could  not  be  what  they  now  are, 
events  of  time,  and  not  realities  existing  from  eternity.  The 
Unconditioned  cannot  be  found  in  matter,  unless  we  can  find 
properties  inhering  in  it,  from  which  all  the  facts  of  the 
universe  cannot  but  result.  Now,  the  accidents  of  matter, 
which  constitute  a  most  essential  part  of  these  facts,  have 
and  can  have  no  necessary  connection  with  such  properties, 
and  cannot  have  resulted  from  them,  nor  have  said  acci- 
dents, as  a  matter  of  fact,  existed  in  connection  with  that 
substance  from  eternity.  They  must,  therefore,  have  been 
communicated  by  a  power  out  of  matter,  and  exercising  a 
control  over  it,  a  control  absolute  in  itself  and  in  its  di- 
rection, in  full  accordance  with  the  principles  of  pure 
science. 

(4.)  When  we  lift  our  contemplation  from  the  earth  to 
the  heavens  above  us,  we  are  at  once  confronted  with  fun- 
damental facts  which  might  properly  be  ranked  as  acci- 
dents in  nature,  but  which  we  prefer  to  mention  by  them- 
selves ;  facts  which, as  we  have  shown,  can  never  be  explained 
on  the  hypothesis  that  the  planetary  system  owes  its  origin 
to  any  inhering  law  of  nature  of  any  kind,  much  less,  if  pos- 
sible, to  any  law  inhering  in  matter.  Aside  from  the  fact, 
that  this  system  once  did  not  exist,  and  then  took  form,  as 
an  event  of  time,  there  is  in  it,  as  we  have  seen,  a  calcula- 
ble uniformity  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  form  of  variety  on 
the  other,  which  can  never  be  explained  by  a  reference  to 
any  law  or  principle  inhering  in  matter.     The  same  identi- 


THE    THE  IS  TIC  HYPOTHESIS.  189 

cal  and  necessary  cause,  operating  in  the  same  circum- 
stances, can  by  no  possibility  produce  directly  opposite 
results  ;  the  motion  of  different  bodies  in  the  same  system 
in  opposite  directions  around  their  central  orbs,  for  ex- 
ample. Such  facts,  and  others  of  a  kindred  nature  which 
we  have  adduced,  could  not  result  from  any  inhering  law 
of  matter. 

(5.)  We  next  allude  to  the  facts  of  mind,  and,  in  this 
connection,  will  adduce  but  one,  the  existence  and  action 
of  Free  Will  in  nature.  If  matter  is  the  only  reality,  and 
its  inhering  laws  the  sole  cause  of  all  the  facts  of  the  uni- 
verse, then  undeniably  there  can  be  no  such  agency  as  Free 
Will,  and  no  such  events  as  free  acts,  in  nature.  The 
contrary  sentiment  no  one  professes  to  hold.  Now,  Free 
Will  is  a  real  power,  and  free  acts  real  events  in  nature. 
Of  this  we  are  just  as  absolutely  conscious  as  we  are  of  ex- 
isting and  acting  at  all.  There  is  a  power  existing  and 
acting  in  nature,  —  a  power  which  does  not  inhere  in  matter, 
and  whose  activity  is  not  determined  necessarily  by  any 
law  inhering  in  it.  Here,  as  in  other  respects,  the  argu- 
ment against  the  hypothesis  of  Materialism  has  demonstra- 
tive certainty.  The  phenomena  of  mind  universally,  and 
those  of  Free  Will  above  all,  are  absolutely  incompatible 
with,  and  contradictory  to,  this  hypothesis.  So  absolute 
is  the  proof  here  found,  that  such  authors  as  Sir  William 
Hamilton  suppose  that  here  is  to  be  found  the  main  and 
absolute  element  of  the  demonstration  of  the  being  of  God. 
Whether  this  is  true  or  not,  one  thing  is  certain,  that  here 
the  argument  does  assume  the  aspect  of  absolute  demon- 
stration. For  the  existence  and  action  of  this  one  power 
in  nature  cannot  be  denied  without  affirming  that  univer- 
sal consciousness  is  a  lie,  and  thus  sapping  the  foundation 


190  NATURAL   THEOLOGY. 

of  all  knowledge  on  all  subjects  alike  ;  and  can  be  accounted 
for  as  admitted  facts  by  reference  to  no  inhering  law  of  na- 
ture of  any  kind,  and  above  all  to  any  such  law  of  matter. 
This  is  undeniable. 

(6).  The  only  other  class  of  facts,  to  which  we  will  allude 
in  this  connection,  is  the  laws  of  nature  themselves.  These 
laws,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind,  —  the  majority  of  them,  to 
say  the  least,  —  once  had  no  existence  in  nature.  Their 
existence  and  operation  are  events  of  time.  How  shall  their 
introduction,  as  controlling  principles  in  nature,  be  ac- 
counted for?  Not,  as  we  have  shown,  by  any  mere  ulti- 
mate law  of  any  kind  inhering  in  nature  itself.  Airy  prin- 
ciples resulting,  by  necessaiy  consequence,  from  such  a  law, 
must,  like  their  cause,  be  from  eternity,  and  not  events  of 
time.  There  is  no  escaping  this  conclusion.  Now,  if  these 
laws,  as  facts  occurring  in  time,  could,  from  no  ultimate  in- 
hering law  of  nature  whatever,  be  introduced  as  controlling 
causes  into  nature,  much  less  could  such  results  arise  from 
any  law  inhering  in  matter.  Every  law  in  nature,  neces- 
sary ones  excepted,  —  that  is,  every  contingent  law  in  nature, 
—  is  demonstrative  proof  of  the  absolute  impossibility  of  the 
hypothesis  of  Materialism  being  true. 

Thus  we  might  go  over  every  class  of  facts  which  we 
have  adduced,  and  show,  absolutely,  that  not  one  of  them 
can  be  made  to  consist  with  this  hypothesis.  The  above 
cases  are  abundantly  sufficient  to  verify  this  statement,  and 
show  that  it  cannot  be  false.  We  are  now  prepared  for 
our  next  fundamental  argument  against  this  hypothesis  of 
Atheism, —  an  argument  to  which  very  special  attention  is 
invited. 


THE    TIIEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS.  191 


Much  less  can  all  these  classes  of  facts  taken  together  be  ac- 
counted for  by  this  hypothesis. 

7.  This  leads  us  to  notice  another  very  important  con- 
sideration bearing  upon  the  question  now  before  us.  While 
the  hypothesis  of  Materialism  falls  to  pieces  when  tried 
upon  any  one  of  the  classes  of  facts  taken  by  itself,  much 
more  must  it  be  true  of  it  when  confronted  by  all  these 
classes  taken  together.  We  have  before  us  an  hypothesis 
for  the  validity  of  which  there  is  and  must  be  the  total  ab- 
sence of  all  forms  and  degrees  of  proof  or  evidence  what- 
ever. We  have,  in  the  next  place,  a  large  number  of 
classes  of  fundamental  facts,  not  one  of  which  can,  by  any 
possibility,  be  reconciled  with  this  hypothesis,  and  while 
each  alike  absolutely  contradicts  it.  What,  then,  must  be 
our  conclusions  when  all  these  classes  together  are  arrayed 
against  this  hypothesis  ?  If  any  truth  of  natural  or  moral 
science  is  capable  of  demonstrative  certainty,  much  .more, 
if  possible,  must  this  be  the  case  of  the  proposition  that 
the  hypothesis  under  consideration  is  and  must  be  false. 
The  universe  itself,  with  all  its  fundamental  facts,  mental 
and  physical,  in  one  impenetrable  mass  confronts  this  hy- 
pothesis, and  with  demonstrative  evidence  affirms  its  utter 
invalidity. 

This  hypothesis  based  upon  the  assumption  that  the  great 
central  fact  of  the  universe  is  a  lie* 

8.  Our  next  general  consideration  bearing  upon  our 
present  inquiry  is  this  :  While  the  hypothesis  of  Material- 
ism is  professedly  based  upon  the  facts  of  the  universe,  and 
is  put  forward  as  the  only  one  which  really  and  truly  ex- 


192  NATURAL   THEOLOGY. 

plains  them  all,  it  is,  in  truth,  based  upon  the  assumption 
that  the  greatest  of  all  facts,  those  of  mind,  and  that  in  the 
highest  department  of  our  nature,  the  moral  and  spiritual,  is 
a  lie,  being  the  correlations  of  the  unreal  instead  of  the  real. 
It  is,  as  we  have  seen,  a  universal  and  immutable  law  of  na- 
ture, as  far  as  facts  are  or  can  be  known  to  man,  that  for  every 
fundamental  want  of  sentient  existence  there  is  a  correspond- 
ing provision,  and  for  every  fundamental  adaptation  a  corre- 
sponding sphere  of  action.  As  we  have  also  seen,  the  moral 
and  spiritual  departments  of  the  nature  of  universal  rational 
mind  are  immutably  correlated  to  one  exclusive  idea  of  ulti- 
mate causation,  that  of  a  free,  intelligent,  self-conscious  per- 
sonality, of  whom  humanity  is  the  miniature  image  and  like- 
ness. Now,  the  hypothesis  of  Materialism  is  based  upon  the 
assumption  that  this  law,  in  this  its  highest  possible  applica- 
tion, is  a  lie,  and  nothing  else,  and  cannot  be  true,  unless 
this  assumption  is  valid.  The  facts  of  mind,  whatever  may 
be  said  of  its  nature,  whether  it  is  assumed  to  be  material 
or  not,  are  undeniably  the  highest  facts  of  the  universe,  and 
the  laws  of  mind  are  the  highest  laws  of  the  universe. 
What  must  we  think  of  an  hypothesis  which  is  based  wholly 
upon  the  assumption  that  these  great  central  facts  and 
laws  are  the  correlatives  of  the  unreal  instead  of  the  real 
in  reference  to  the  Unconditioned  ?  If  the  great  law  of 
nature,  above  referred  to,  is  valid,  there  exists  for  mind  a 
personal  God.  Materialism,  instead  of  being  in  accordance 
with  the  laws  of  nature,  and  affirmed  as  true  by  the  same, 
cannot  itself  be  true,  unless  the  highest  of  all  these  laws 
affirm  most  absolutely,  as  the  great  reality,  an  infinite  un- 
truth. If  all  other  facts  should  fail  us,  —  and  none  of  them 
do,  —  mind  itself,  the  great  supreme  fact  of  nature,  would 
still  remain  an  absolute  demonstration  that  Materialism 


THE    THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS.  193 

and  all  other  antitheistic  hypotheses  are  and  must  be  false. 
Of  this,  more  hereafter. 

While  the  hypothesis  of  Materialism  does  not,  that  of  Theism 
does,  accord  with  all  the  facts  of  the  universe. 

9.  We  have  but  one  additional  consideration  to  present 
on  this  subject.  It  is  this :  While  the  hypothesis  of  Ma- 
terialism does  not  and  cannot  be  made  to  accord  with  any 
of  the  great  central  facts  of  the  universe,  that  of  Theism 
does,  in  reality,  accord  with  all  these  facts.  We  can  find  in 
matter  no  known  properties,  nor  can  we  conceive  of  any, 
which  are,  in  the  remotest  degree,  indicated  by  those  that 
are  known  ;  nor  can  we  find  an}^where  else  any  facts  of  any 
kind  to  indicate  that  in  it  is  to  be  found  the  Unconditioned 
Cause  of  the  facts  of  the  universe.  The  entire  facts  of  na- 
ture, on  the  other  hand,  as  we  have  seen,  array  themselves 
against  this  hypothesis,  and  deny  most  absolutely  all  its 
claims.  While  this  is  so,  there  is  another  hypothesis,  which 
we  are  hereafter  to  consider,  with  which  all  the  facts 
under  consideration  do  most  perfectly  harmonize.  We  re- 
fer, of  course,  to  the  doctrine  of  Theism,  the  idea  of  the 
Unconditioned  as  a  free,  intelligent,  self-conscious  person- 
ality. The  entire  universe  is,  in  all  respects,  what  it  would 
be,  if  creation  was  the  result  of  the  agency  of  such  a  cause  ; 
and  in  all  respects  what  it  could  not  be,  were  the  Uncon- 
ditioned an  inhering  law  of  matter.  Of  all  this,  however, 
we  are  to  speak  at  full  length  in  the  proper  connection. 
How  strange  it  is,  that  an  assumption  like  that  of  Materi- 
alism —  an  assumption  unsustained  by  any  kind  of  evidence 
whatever,  and  contradicted  by  all  the  leading  facts  of  the 
universe  —  should  ever  find  a  place  in  any  intelligent  mind, 
and  this  in  the  presence  of  another  hypothesis,  which  not 
17 


194  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

only  accords  with  and  adequately  explains  all  the  facts  of 
the  universe,  but,  as  we  shall  see  hereafter,  is  affirmed  as 
alone  valid  by  them  all.  With  these  suggestions,  we  for 
the  present  leave  this  department  of  our  subject  to  the 
reflection  of  the  thoughtful  reader. 

THE   UNCONDITIONED   NO   INHERING   LAW   OF   NATURE. 

III.  Our  next  general  position  is  this :  The  Uncondi- 
tioned Cause  of  the  facts  of  the  universe  is  and  can  be  no 
inhering  law  of  nature  of  any  kind,  the  term  nature  being  em- 
ployed to  represent  all  finite  realities,  mental  or  physical, 
whatever  they  may  be.  This  proposition  has  been  so  fully 
and  distinctly  argued  in  the  former  section  that  very  little 
need  be  added  in  this  connection.  In  reference  to  all  the 
classes  of  leading  facts  in  creation,  we  have  already  seen  that 
not  one  of  them  can  be  accounted  for  on  any  such  hypothe- 
sis. Much  less,  then,  could  all  these  classes  of  facts,  taken 
together,  be  thus  accounted  for.  If  we  deny  the  distinction 
between  matter  and  spirit,  and,  in  opposition  to  Material- 
ism, resolve  all  realities  into  the  latter  or  any  of  its  phe- 
nomena, we  are  at  once  confronted  by  the  absolute,  direct, 
and  immediate,  or  presentative  affirmations  of  our  own  and 
of  the  Universal  Intelligence.  We  have  just  as  much  reason 
to  assume  matter  to  be  the  only  reality  as  to  assume  the 
same  thing  of  spirit,  and  we  have  absolutely  no  reasons 
whatever  for  either  assumption.  One  form  of  being  is  just 
as  antecedently  probable  in  itself  as  the  other,  and  the  co- 
existence of  both  is  just  as  a  priori  probable  as  the  sole  ex- 
istence of  eitber.  This  we  have  already  seen.  While  no 
form  or  degree  of  evidence  does  or  can  exist  against  the  doc- 
trine that  both  substances  exist  as  distinct  and  opposite 
known  realities,  we  have  the  absolute  affirmations  of  the 


THE    THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS.  195 

Universal  Intelligence  that  this  is  the  case.  We  cannot  as- 
sume mind  to  be  the  only  reality,  without  affirming  the  In- 
telligence itself  to  be  a  lie,  and  that  for  no  reasons  whatever. 
If  we  admit,  on  the  other  hand,  the  distinctions  between  mat- 
ter and  spirit  to  be  real,  and  that  both  substances  do  exist 
as  known  realities,  we  shall  find  it  equally  impossible  to  ac- 
count for  the  facts  of  matter  by  a  reference  to  those  of  finite 
mind,  as  to  account  for  those  of  the  latter  by  a  reference  to 
those  of  the  former  ;  and  by  reference  to  any  inhering  law  of 
either  or  both  together,  to  be  absolutely  impossible  to  account 
for  all  the  facts  of  the  universe  taken  as  they  are.  All  the  spe- 
cific arguments,  we  need  only  add  in  this  connection,  which 
go  to  show  that  the  Unconditioned  is  not  any  inherent  law 
or  property  of  matter,  bear  with  equal  absoluteness  against 
the  Irypothesis  that  it  is  any  law  inhering  in  nature.  In 
the  one  case  as  well  as  in  the  other,  for  example,  creation 
could  not  have  had  a  beginning,  and  must  possess  an  abso- 
lute uniformity,  —  a  uniformity  contradicted  by  the  great 
central  facts  of  the  universe.  This  is  self-evident.  If  the 
Unconditioned  is  any  law  inhering  in  nature,  and  conse- 
quently acting  from  necessity,  as  the  conditions  of  its  ac- 
tivity must  have  been  fulfilled  from  eternity,  it  must  have 
acted  from  eternity.  Creation,  in  that  case,  could  have  had 
no  beginning,  but  must  have  been,  like  its  Unconditioned 
Cause,  eternal  in  its  existence.  There  is  no  escaping  this 
conclusion.  Nor  from  any  law  inhering  in  nature  can  we 
account  for  the  existence  of  the  power  of  free  determina- 
tion in  mind.  No  one  power  can  generate  another  with 
attributes  higher  than  its  own.  The  power  of  free  deter- 
mination, undeniably  existing  in  the  Conditioned,  renders 
absolutely  evident  the  reality  of  a  similar  power  in  the 


196  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

Unconditioned,  which,  therefore,  is  not  and  cannot  be  any 
power  or  law  inhering  in  nature. 

Whatever  our  theories  pertaining  to  the  facts  of  the  uni- 
verse may  be,  whether  we  assume  the  ground  of  Material- 
ism on  the  one  hand,  or  Idealism  on  the  other,  one  thing 
pertaining  to  these  facts  is,  we  remark  finally,  undeniable. 
The  developments  of  nature  are,  as  we  have  seen,  progres- 
sive from  the  less  to  the  more  perfect.  This  undeniable  fact 
—  a  fact  admitted  and  affirmed  in  all  theories  alike  —  sup- 
poses, of  necessity,  that  the  entire  series  of  developments, 
whatever  their  nature  may  be,  had  a  beginning  in  time. 
Now,  this  fact  is  absolutely  incompatible  with  the  supposi- 
tion that  the  Unconditioned  is  any  law  or  principle  inhering 
in  nature.  In  that  case,  the  series  would  and  could  have 
had  no  beginning.  The  cause  exists  immutably  the  same 
from  eternity,  with  all  the  conditions  of  its  activity  per- 
fectly and  absolutely  fulfilled  from  eternity.  Being  subject 
to  the  law  of  necessity,  it  must  have  acted  from  eternity. 
This  great  central  fact  of  creation  is  equally  fatal  to  the 
claims  of  Materialism  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  those  of 
Idealism  on  the  other.  We  may,  if  we  please,  professedly 
resolve  all  finite  realities  into  matter,  or  into  spirit,  or 
finally  into  pure  thought ;  still,  the  fact  of  progression  in 
the  developments  of  nature  remains,  and  also  its  immutable 
direction  from  the  less  to  the  more  perfect.  No  philoso- 
pher, whatever  his  ontological  views  may  be,  would  dare, 
in  the  presence  of  the  world,  to  confront  nature  with  a  de- 
nial of  these  facts.  Nor,  by  any  possibility,  can  he  avoid 
the  conclusion  necessarily  resulting  from  them,  to  wit,  that 
the  series  referred  to  had  a  beginning  in  time,  and  that, 
consequently,  the  Unconditioned  cannot  inhere  in  the  series 
itself,  as  a  necessary  law  or  principle  of  ultimate  causation, 


THE    THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS.  197 

the  immutable  characteristic  of  every  such  inhering  law, 
but  must  have  its  ultimate  dwelling-place  in  some  power  of 
nature. 

THE  UNCONDITIONED  NO  NECESSARY  CAUSE  OF  ANY  KIND. 

IV.  Our  next  position  is  this  :  The  Unconditioned  Cause 
of  the  present  order  of  things  is,  not  only  not  any  law  or 
power  inhering  in  nature,  but  no  necessary  cause  of  any 
kind.  A  necessary  cause  must  act  as  soon  as  the  conditions 
of  its  activity  are  fulfilled,  and  it  cannot  but  continue  to  act 
in  the  same  direction  until  a  power  out  of  itself  shall  neces- 
sitate a  change  in  the  direction  of  its  activity.  This  is  the 
fundamental  element  of  our  necessary  conception  of  a  cause 
acting  from  necessity.  If  the  originating  cause  of  which  we 
are  speaking  is  a  law  inhering  in  nature,  it  must,  as  we  have 
seen,  have  acted  from  eternity,  or  not  at  all,  as  no  change 
in  the  conditions  of  its  activity  could  have  occurred.  A 
law,  inhering  in  nature,  which  prevented  organization  from 
eternity  to  a  given  period,  must  have  prevented  the  same  to 
eternity,  unless  the  direction  of  the  action  of  that  law  was 
changed  by  a  power  out  of  nature. 

The  same  does  and  must  hold  equally  true  of  every  origi- 
nating Unconditioned  Cause  acting  under  the  law  of  neces- 
sity. The  conditions  of  its  activity  must  have  been  fulfilled 
from  eternity ;  else  its  activity  would  depend  upon  some- 
thing out  of  itself,  and  then  it  would  be  neither  in  itself 
immutable,  nor  really  and  truly  the  originating  cause.  If 
the  conditions  of  its  activity  were  fulfilled  from  eternity, 
then  it  could  not  but  have  acted  from  eternity,  or  not  at 
all,  and  creation  would  be  from  eternity,  and  not,  as  it  in 
fact  is,  in  time.  That  which  rendered  it  impossible  for  the 
originating  cause,  supposing  it  subject  to  the  law  of  neces- 
17* 


198  NATURAL    TL7E0L0GY. 

sity,  from  eternity  up  to  a  given  period,  to  create,  must 
have  rendered  it  equally  impossible  for  it  to  create  to  eter- 
nity. On  the  supposition  that  the  originating  cause  of  the 
present  order  of  things  is  a  necessary  cause,  by  no  possi- 
bility can  we  account  for  the  origin  of  this  order  of  things 
in  time.  It  makes  no  difference,  at  all,  whether  this  law 
is  inherent  in  nature,  or  in  any  power  whatever  out  of 
it.  If  that  cause,  being  in  itself  eternal  and  immutable, 
and  determined  in  its  activity  by  nothing  out  of  itself  (the 
necessary  condition  of  its  being  the  originating  and  Un- 
conditioned Cause),  —  if  that  cause  is  subject  to  the  law  of 
necessity,  it  must  have  created  from  eternity,  or  not  at 
all.  The  conditions  of  its  activit}-  must  have  been  fulfilled 
from  eternity,  else  that  which  fulfilled  these  conditions  and 
necessitated  action  would  itself  be  the  unconditioned  and 
originating  cause.  If  those  conditions  were  fulfilled  from 
eternity,  creation  could  not  but  have  been  from  eternity ; 
and  if  it  did  not  occur  from  eternity  up  to  any  given  period, 
it  never  could  have  occurred  at  all.  Creation  must  have 
been  from  eternity,  or  it  never  could  have  occurred  from  any 
form  of  necessary  causation.  There  is  no  possible  escape 
from  this  conclusion.  The  entire  known  facts  of  creation 
totally  falsif}'  the  central  facts  of  original  causation,  or  this 
conclusion  must  be  true.  The  above  remarks  are  perfectly 
applicable  to  the  Unconditioned  Cause,  whatever  attributes 
we  affirm  of  him,  and  yet  suppose  him  governed  by  the 
law  of  necessity.  All  these  attributes*  would  exist  in  such 
Cause  eternally  and  immutably  the  same.  Absolutely  the 
same  motives  would  be  before  the  divine  mind,  in  absolutely 
equal  force  at  one  moment  as  another,  as  each  moment  is 
in  itself  in  all  respects  precisely  like  every  other,  and  each 
equally  distant  from  the  eternity  past  and  the  eternity  to 


THE    THEISTIC   HYPOTHESIS. 


199 


come.  What  could  there  be  in  attributes  remaining  in  all 
respects  immutably  the  same,  and  eternally  acted  upon  by 
precisely  the  same  considerations  and  influences,  to  render 
it  impossible  for  God  to  put  forth  creative  power  from 
eternity  up  to  a  given  period,  and  then  to  render  it  impos- 
sible for  him  not  to  create  at  that  moment?  The  thing  is 
undeniably  just  as  impossible,  as  an  event  without  a  cause. 
Indeed,  it  would  be  nothing  else  than  this  very  thing,  a 
change  with  absolutely  nothing  to  occasion  it.  We  must 
take  the  ground  that  creation  is  a  fact  from  eternity,  and 
then  we  are  confronted  by  all  the  facts  of  the  universe  ;  or 
we  must  affirm  that  it  had  a  beginning  in  time,  and  then 
draw  the  inevitable  conclusion  that  it  is  and  can  be  the 
result  of  no  form  of  ultimate  necessary  causation.  We  are 
forced  to  assume  one  or  the  other  of  these  positions.  The 
first,  we  cannot  assume,  without  palpably  denying  all  the 
great  fundamental  facts  of  the  universe.  The  second, 
then,  we  must  assume,  as  necessarily  implied  in,  and  af- 
firmed by,  these  facts. 

THE    UNCONDITIONED    A    FREE    WILL. 

V.  Hence,  we  remark  directly  and  positively,  that  the 
Unconditioned  Cause  is  and  must  be  a  Free  Will,  in  oppo- 
sition to  all  other  forms  of  necessary  ultimate  causation. 
If  we  suppose  that  God,  as  such  cause,  is  a  free  and  not  a 
necessary  agent,  then  the  entire  facts  of  the  universe,  to- 
gether with  their  occurrence  in  time,  can  be  readily  ac- 
counted for,  and  they  cannot  be  accounted  for  on  any  other 
supposition.  If  he  is  a  free  and  not  a  necessary  agent, 
from  eternity  to  eternity,  he  might,  at  each  successive  mo- 
ment, create  or  not  create.  This  would  be  the  immutable 
law  of  his  existence  and  activity.     He  might  consequently 


200  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

commence  creation  in  time,  and  not  from  eternity  ;  and  cre- 
ation commencing  in  time,  and  advancing  onward  from  a 
period  unknown  to  us,  but  really  fixed  and  determinate  in 
itself,  becomes  a  conceivable,  and,  therefore,  a  possible 
fact.  On  no  other  condition,  we  repeat,  is  such  a  fact  con- 
ceivable or  possible.  The  fundamental  element  in  our  idea 
of  a  necessary  cause,  is  this  :  that  it  cannot  possibly  but 
act,  the  moment  the  conditions  of  its  activity  are  fulfilled. 
In  the  Unconditioned  Cause,  the  entire  conditions  of  its  put- 
ting forth  creative  energy  must  have  been  fulfilled  from  eter- 
nity, or  not  at  all.  The  essential  element  of  our  ideas  of  a 
free  cause,  on  the  other  hand,  is,  that  when  the  conditions  of 
its  activity  are  fulfilled,  it  may  or  may  not  act,  in  any  one 
given  direction.  As  with  the  Unconditioned  Cause,  the 
conditions  of  its  creative  activity  must  have  been  equally 
and  perfectly  fulfilled  at  each  successive  moment,  from 
eternity  up  to  any  given  period,  the  putting  forth  of  such 
power  at  any  one  given  moment  in  time,  and  not  from  eter- 
nity, is  conceivable  and  possible  upon  one  supposition  only, 
namely,  that  the  Unconditioned  is  a  Free  Will,  in  opposi- 
tion to  all  conceivable  or  possible  forms  of  ultimate  caus- 
ality acting  from  necessity.  This  conclusion  has  all  the 
force  of  absolute  demonstration,  and  can,  by  no  possibility, 
be  avoided,  but  by  the  assumption  that  creation  is  not  in 
time,  but  from  eternity ;  in  which  case,  we  are,  as  we  have 
said,  confronted  at  once  by  all  the  leading  fundamental 
facts  of  the  universe.  If  we  suppose  that  creative  power  is 
associated  in  the  Unconditioned  with  infinite  Intelligence, 
the  former  must  be  limited  in  its  activity  by  the  dictates  of 
the  latter.  As  each  moment  of  duration  is  in  itself  abso- 
lutely like  every  other,  and  absolutely  equidistant  from  the 
eternity  past,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  eternity  to  come, 


THE    THE  IS  TIC  HYPOTHESIS.  201 

on  the  other,  infinite  Intelligence  could  discover  no  reason 
why  any  one  moment  should  be  selected  for  the  commence- 
ment of  creation,  rather  than  any  other  ;  and  as  no  reasons 
could  present  themselves  to  the  divine  mind  for  beginning 
creation  at  any  one  moment,  which  were  not  equally  present 
at  every  other,  creation  must  have  been  commenced  from 
eternity,  as  by  no  possibility  could  it  have  been  commenced 
in  time.  But,  if  God  is  a  free  and  not  a  necessary  agent, 
then,  at  each  successive  moment,  such  beginning  might  or 
might  not  have  occurred,  and  consequently  its  occurrence 
in  time  is  conceivable  and  possible.  We  are  quite  certain 
that  this  conclusion  cannot  be  invalidated. 

Further,  just  such  a  power  does,  in  fact,  exist  in  the 
Conditioned,  as  one  of  the  great  central  facts  of  mind.  To 
suppose  that  the  same  power  does  not  reside  in  the  Uncon- 
ditioned, is  to  suppose  that  the  stream  rises  higher  than  the 
fountain,  that  the  Conditioned  is  more  perfect  than  the 
Unconditioned,  and  that  the  Finite  has  higher  attributes 
than  the  Infinite,  than  which  no  supposition  can  be  more 
absurd  and  self-contradictory.  The  Unconditioned,  then,  is 
and  must  be  a  Free  Will,  in  opposition  to  all  forms  of  ulti- 
mate causality  acting  from  necessity. 

The  argument  summarily  stated. 

The  argument  in  this  department  of  our  inquiries  may  be 
concisely  and  summarily  stated  in  the  following  form  : 

1.  The  Unconditioned  is  undeniably  a  cause  out  of  and 
above  nature. 

2.  No  power  conceivable  out  of  and  above  nature  is,  in 
any  form,  adapted  to  act  upon  and  control  its  activity,  but 
a  Will.  This  will  not  be  denied,  whatever  ideas  may  be 
entertained  about  the  nature  of  the  Will. 


202  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

3.  All  the  fundamental  facts  of  the  universe,  demand 
the  supposition  that  the  divine  will  is  not  a  power  of  neces- 
sitated but  free  determination.  A  necessitated  cause  may 
be  thus  defined.  The  antecedent  being  given,  but  one 
consequent  can,  by  any  possibility,  arise,  and  that  con- 
sequent must  arise.  With  the  Unconditioned,  at  each  mo- 
ment of  time,  from  eternity  to  the  period  when  creation 
began,  we  have  in  all  respects  the  same  identical  antece- 
dent. This  we  have  clearly  seen.  If,  then,  creation  did 
not  occur  at  any  one  moment,  its  occurrence  at  any  other, 
on  the  supposition  that  the  divine  will  is  governed  by  the 
law  of  necessity,  would  be  an  event  without  a  cause,  a  new 
and  different  consequent  in  connection  with  the  same  ante- 
cedent. A  free  cause,  on  the  other  hand,  may  be  thus  de- 
fined :  The  antecedent  being  given,  either  of  two  or  more 
consequents  may  arise.  Postulating  the  divine  will  as  a 
power  of  free  determination,  and  from  eternity  to  the  pe- 
riod when  creation  began  we  have  the  same  identical  ante- 
cedent with  the  possibility  of  the  occurrence  or  non-occur- 
rence of  creation  at  each  successive  moment.  Its  occur- 
rence, at  the  moment  when  it  did  occur,  is  a  possible  and, 
therefore,  a  conceivable  event.  On  no  other  hypothesis  is 
the  fact  of  creation,  as  an  event  happening  in  time,  a  pos- 
sible or  rationally  conceivable  event. 

4.  In  the  higher  forms  of  Conditioned  existence,  the  hu- 
man mind,  we  find  the  element  of  Free  Will  as  a  matter  of 
fact.  We  find  nature  within  and  around  us  also  consti- 
tuted in  fixed  correlation  to  this  one  power  in  man.  We 
must  suppose,  then,  that  this  same  power  of  free  determi- 
nation exists  in  the  Unconditioned,  or  assume,  and  that  in 
the  total  absence  of  all  evidence,  that  the  Conditioned  has 
higher  attributes  than  the  Unconditioned,  the  Finite  than 


THE    TUEISTIC   HYPOTHESIS.  203 

the  Infinite,  than  which  no  assumption  can  be  more  absurd. 
The  Unconditioned,  therefore,  is,  in  fact,  a  Free  Will,  and 
no  form  of  necessitated  causation. 

THE    UNCONDITIONED    A    SELF-CONSCIOUS    INTELLIGENCE. 

VI.  As  the  Unconditioned  Cause,  God  is,  we  remark,  in 
the  next  place,  a  self-conscious  intelligence.  The  great 
facts  of  the  universe  which  necessitate  such  a  conclusion, 
are,  among  others,  such  as  the  following:  1.  The  universe 
is,  in  its  entireness,  a  system  of  means  and  ends  ;  the  end, 
the  highest  good  of  mind,  being,  in  all  respects,  worthy  of 
the  election  of  even  Infinity  and  Perfection  ;  and  the  means, 
the  organized  universe,  being  most  wisely  and  intelligibly 
adapted  to  the  end.  2.  Creation  is  exclusively  one  great 
and  perfectly  systematized  whole,  constructed,  in  all  its 
parts  and  departments,  upon  principles  of  pure  science, 
in  perfect  conformity  to  fundamental  ideas  of  science 
pre-existing  in  the  Intelligence.  3.  This  vast  and  goodly 
structure,  also,  is  not  a  reality  existing  from  eternity,  but 
an  effect  originated  in  time.  4.  The  Unconditioned  Cause 
of  this  wronderful  system  is  nothing  else  than  a  Free  Will, 
in  opposition  to  all  forms  of  necessitated  Causality.  The 
necessary  deduction  from  these  facts  is,  that  this  cause  is, 
and  cannot  but  be,  associated  with  self-conscious  Intelli- 
gence in  the  same  subject.  The  action  of  Free  Will  im- 
plies election,  choice,  intention,  which  are  absolutely  im- 
possible in  the  absence  of  self-conscious  Intelligence  in  the 
same  subject,  —  self-conscious  Intelligence  presenting  ap- 
propriate objects  of  election,  choice,  intention.  Such  action 
is  utterly  inconceivable  on  any  other  supposition,  and 
when  the  results  of  such  action  are  all,  as  in  the  case  of 
creation  and  providence,  in  absolute  conformity  to  the  idea 


204  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

of  means  and  ends,  and  to  the  laws  and  principles  of  pure 
science,  as  developed  in  the  Intelligence,  the  necessary  de- 
duction from  such  facts  is,  that  the  Unconditioned  Cause  of 
such  results  is  and  must  be,  not  only  a  free  agent,  but  also 
a  self-conscious  Intelligence.  The  mind,  in  the  presence 
of  such  facts,  can  no  more  conceive  the  opposite  to  be  true, 
than  it  can  conceive  of  an  event  without  a  cause.  Every- 
thing in  creation  wears  the  exclusive  aspect  of  intelligent 
foresight,  and  corresponding  election  and  predetermination, 
— the  intentional  realization  of  an  absolutely  perfected  plan 
pre-existing  in  the  Intelligence.  The  necessary  logical  con- 
sequent of  such  facts  is  the  supposition  of  self-conscious 
Intelligence  in  the  Unconditioned  Cause  of  such  results. 
No  intuition  is  more  self-evident,  and  no  demonstration  is 
or  can  be  more  absolute  than  such  a  conclusion.  Postulate, 
as  we  have  seen  that  we  must  do,  the  Unconditioned  Cause 
as  a  Free  Will,  and  creation  itself  as  an  effect  originated  in 
time,  and  the  entire  facts  of  creation  as  being  throughout 
in  perfect  and  exclusive  accordance  with  the  most  perfect 
ideas  of  means  and  ends,  and  of  the  laws  and  principles  of 
pure  science  (and  these  facts  admit  of  no  other  supposi- 
tion, and  no  one  pretends  that  they  do),  and  we  can  no 
more  conceive  that  this  Unconditioned  Cause  is  not  a  self- 
conscious  Intelligence,  than  we  can  conceive  of  the  anni- 
hilation of  space,  or  that  the  whole  is  not  equal  to  all  of 
its  parts.  If  creation  was  not  an  effect  originated  in  time, 
if  the  Unconditioned  Cause,  consequently,  could  be  any- 
thing else  than  a  Free  Will,  then,  and  only  then,  could  we 
avoid  this  conclusion. 

All  the  facts  of  the  universe,  we  remark  finally,  accord 
with  one  supposition  only,  to  wit,  that  they  are  the  result 
of  free  choice,  guided  by  Intelligence  in  the  Unconditioned, 


THE    THE IS TIC  HYPOTHESIS.  205 

and  not  of  any  necessary  law  inhering  in  nature.  In  the 
flatter  case,  there  could  not  but  be,  throughout  the  wide 
domain  of  nature,  an  absolute  uniformity.  In  the  former, 
supposing  that  God  designed  to  manifest  his  own  agency 
in  his  works,  there  would  be  a  calculable  uniformity,  indi- 
cating the  control  of  Intelligence,  as  in  the  movements  of 
the  heavenly  bodies,  and  at  the  same  time  a  manifest  vari- 
ety, indicating  that  the  powers  of  nature  are  arranged  as 
they  are,  from  choice  and  not  from  necessity.  Now  this, 
as  we  have  seen,  is  the  precise  state  of  the  facts  throughout 
the  universe.  No  account  can  be  given  of  the  origin  of 
creation  at  the  particular  moment  when  it  did  occur,  but 
this :  God  willed  that  it  should  be  so,  and  not  otherwise. 
No  other  reason  can  be  assigned  why  the  event  occurred  at 
that  particular  moment,  and  not  at  some  prior  or  subsquent 
one,  each  point  of  duration  being  in  itself  absolutely  like 
every  other,  and  each  being  absolutely  equidistant  from  the 
eternity  past  and  the  eternity  to  come.  The  same  holds 
equally  true  of  the  time  in  which  each  species  of  animals 
and  plants  was  originated,  and  of  the  forms  of  organization 
which  they  put  on.  All  indicate  most  undeniably  the  inter- 
position of  Will,  guided  by  intelligence,  and  are  explicable 
on  no  other  supposition.  Not  one  of  them  can  be  accounted 
for  by  a  reference  to  any  known  law  of  nature,  or  by  any 
reasonably  conceivable  law  inhering  in  it.  We  have  already 
alluded  to  the  facts  of  astronomy  bearing  upon  this  suppo- 
sition. Why,  for  example,  is  the  density  of  Mercury  nearly 
twice  as  great  as  that  of  Venus  or  the  Earth,  —  which  are 
more  remote  from  the  Sun,  —  while  that  of  Uranus  is  nearly 
twice  as  great  as  that  of  Saturn,  which  is  nearer  the  Sun? 
Why  is  the  motion  of  the  satellites  of  Uranus  the  opposite 
of  that  of  all  the  other  planets  and  their  satellites  ;  and  why 
18 


206  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

have  the  satellites  of  that  one  planet  an  inc^nfuion  to  the 
ecliptic  so  diverse  from  that  of  all  the  others  ?  What  is  the 
cause  of  the  amazing  eccentricity  of  the  orbits  of  the  com- 
ets ?  Why  this  marked  variety,  and  yet,  in  the  midst  of  it 
all,  such  a  calculable  uniformity  ?  But  one  answer  can  be 
given  to  such  inquiries.  The  arrangements  of  creation  are 
the  result  of  a  fiat  of  Will  guided  by  Intelligence,  and  not 
of  any  law  inhering  in  nature.  In  the  latter  case,  no  such 
calculable  uniformity  on  the  one  hand,  and  striking  variety 
on  the  other,  could,  by  any  possibility,  arise.  All  would 
not  only  be  a  calculable,  but  an  absolute  uniformity.  On 
the  other  supposition,  we  might  suppose,  a  priori,  that  the 
facts  of  creation  would  be  just  as  they  are,  and  not  other- 
wise. Not  a  solitary  fact,  in  any  form  or  degree,  contra- 
dicts this  one  hypothesis,  while  the  whole  are  explicable  on 
no  other ;  but  all  alike  affirm  its  validity.  God,  then,  as 
the  Unconditioned  Cause,  is,  and  must  be,  a  free,  self-con- 
scious Intelligence.     Hence,  we  remark,  — 

SPIRITUALITY   AN    ATTRIBUTE    OF   THE    UNCONDITIONED. 

VII.  That  Spirituality  is  another  attribute  which  must 
be  affirmed  of  the  Unconditioned  Cause.  That  which  pe- 
culiarizes  spirit  from  matter,  and  distinguishes  rational 
mind  from  all  other  forms  of  existence,  is  Intelligence  and 
Free  Will.  As  possessed  of  these,  God  is  and  cannot  but 
be  a  spirit.  Such  are  the  necessary  deductions  of  science 
on  this  subject.  The  conclusion  is  absolute,  and  any  en- 
largement, for  the  purpose  of  adding  weight  to  it,  would  be 
wholly  superfluous.  The  existence  in  God  of  a  triunity  of 
mental  powers,  Intelligence,  Free  Will,  and  Sensibility, 
such  as  exists  in  man,  is  not  implied  in  the  above  argu- 
ment.    The  existence  of  the  latter  attribute,  however,  will 


THE    THEISTIC   HYPOTHESIS.  207 

be  denied  by  none  who  admit  that  of  the  two  former.  We 
must  admit  its  reality,  also,  or  affirm  that  mind  is  inten- 
tionally constituted  in  fixed  and  immutable  correlation  to 
the  unreal,  instead  of  the  real,  in  God  ;  for  one  of  the  change- 
less demands  of  universal  mind  is,  that  God  should  be  to  it 
an  object  of  sympathy,  which  he  cannot  be  while  he  is  con- 
templated as  void  of  desire  and  emotion,  that  is,  of  a  sensi- 
bility. God,  then,  is  and  must  be  a  spirit,  of  whom  man  is 
the  miniature  "  image  and  likeness  ;  "  a  spirit  possessed  of 
the  attributes  of  Intelligence,  Sensibility,  and  Will.  If  any- 
thing is  wanting  to  the  completeness  of  the  demonstration 
of  this  great  truth,  the  writer  has  not  been  able  to  perceive 
the  fact. 

THE  UNCONDITIONED  A  FREE,  SELF-CONSCIOUS  PERSONALITY. 

VIII.  As  the  Unconditioned  Cause,  God  is  a  free,  intelli- 
gent, self-conscious  Personality,  in  opposition  to  the  uncon- 
scious impersonality  of  Pantheism,  or  "the  regulative  Idea" 
of  Idealism.  Spirituality,  Intelligence,  and  Free  Will,  act- 
ing in  harmony  with  Intelligence,  are  the  necessary  elements 
of  self-conscious  Personality.  These  elements  being  given, 
such  Personality  cannot  but  be.  The  moment  we  conceive 
of  the  Unconditioned  Cause  as  a  Free  Will  acting  in  con- 
nection and  in  harmony  with  Intelligence,  instead  of  an 
unconscious  principle  acting  by  a  law  of  necessary  develop- 
ment, then  God  is  and  must  be  ever  present  to  our  minds 
as  an  all-wise,  self-conscious  Personality,  "  in  whose  image, 
and  after  whose  likeness  "  we  ourselves  were  created.  As 
we  have  seen,  Spirituality,  Intelligence,  and  Free  Will 
must  be  affirmed  of  God.  He  cannot  therefore  be  anything 
else  than  a  self-conscious  Personality.  On  the  other  hand, 
he  cannot  be  the  unconscious,  self-developing  imperson- 


208  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

ality  of  Pantheism,  nor  "the  regulative  Idea"  of  Ideal- 
ism, nor  the  "  Law  of  Thought"  of  Nihilism.  That  God  is 
such  a  Personality,  as  we  have  shown  that  he  cannot  but 
be,  may  be  further  argued  from  the  following  considera- 
tions : 

1.  This  is  the  central  element  of  the  idea  of  God  as  spon- 
taneously developed  in  the  Universal  Intelligence.  Wherever 
the  Intelligence  has  acted  uninfluenced  by  ideas  and  princi- 
ples of  "  science  falsely  so  called,"  God,  as  none  other  than 
a  self-conscious  Personality,  is  to  the  mind  an  omnipresent 
reality.  We  as  naturally  think  of  him  as  such  a  Person- 
ality, as  we  do  of  ourselves  as  such  personalities.  Now, 
ideas  of  God  which  stand  opposed  to  the  necessary,  sponta- 
neous intuitions  of  the  Universal  Intelligence,  as  those  of 
the  unconscious,  undeveloped,  self-developing  impersonality 
of  Pantheism,  and  "the  regulative  Idea"  of  Idealism  do, 
cannot  but  be  false.  Else  the  Universal  Intelligence  is 
itself  a  lie. 

2.  To  the  idea  of  God  as  such  a  Personality,  our  entire 
intellectual,  moral,  and  spiritual  nature  is,  as  we  have  al- 
ready seen,  in  fixed,  immutable,  and  exclusive  correlation. 
All  our  intellectual,  moral,  and  spiritual  ideas  and  principles 
pertaining  to  God,  centre  in  him,  as  a  being  to  whom  prayer 
"  in  time  of  need  "  is  to  be  addressed ;  as  a  source  of  con- 
solation in  affliction,  —  a  being  who  is  to  be  loved  and 
sought  unto  as  the  "  Father  of  our  spirits,"  to  be  feared, 
reverenced,  and  obeyed,  as  the  moral  governor  and  "judge 
of  all,"  and  to  be  worshipped  and  sought  unto,  as  the  pure 
embodiment  of  all  perfection.  Take  away  from  God  the 
element  of  self-conscious  Personality,  and  there  is  no  place 
for  the  action  of  any  of  these  principles  or  sentiments.  An 
undeveloped,  self-developing  Impersonality,  —  "a  regula- 


THE    THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS,  209 

tive  Idea,"  or  "  Law  of  Thought,"  —  can  no  more  be  to  the 
mind  a  proper  object  of  prayer,  or  religious  worship  of  any 
kind,  than  infinite  space  or  duration.  We  must  hold  the 
idea  of  God  as  a  self-conscious  Personality  to  be  valid,  or 
assume  that  the  entire  intellectual,  moral,  and  spiritual 
nature  of  universal  Humanity  is  the  immutable  correlative 
of  the  unreal,  instead  of  the  real :  an  assumption  of  all 
others  most  absurd  and  subversive  of  all  the  universally  ad- 
mitted principles  of  philosophy,  —  the  central  element  of  all 
of  which,  as  far  as  they  bear  upon  this  subject,  is,  that  mind, 
in  its  fundamental  laws,  tendencies,  and  adaptations,  is  the 
correlative  of  the  real,  and  not  of  the  unreal,  in  God. 

3.  The  undeniable  fact,  that  man  himself  is  such  a  Per- 
sonality is  demonstrative  proof  that  God,  "the  Father  of 
our  spirits,"  can  be  nothing  else  than  such  a  Personality 
himself.  If  man  is  conscious  of  anything  in  reference  to 
himself  he  is  of  this :  that  he  is  an  intelligent,  free,  self- 
conscious  Personality.  Now,  we  can  no  more  conceive  it 
possible  for  a  necessary  and  unconscious  Impersonality  to 
produce  an  intelligent,  free,  self-conscious  Personality,  than 
we  can  conceive  of  an  event  without  a  cause.  No  absurdity 
can  be  greater  than  the  idea  of  a  cause  producing  an  effect 
greater  than  itself,  and  which  it  has  no  intelligible  adapta- 
tion whatever  to  produce.  God,  then,  as  the  Unconditioned 
Cause,  is  not,  and  cannot  be,  the  unconscious,  undevel- 
oped, self-developing  Impersonality  of  Pantheism,  nor  the 
"  regulative  Idea  "  or  "  Law  of  Thought "  of  Idealism.  On 
the  other  hand,  he  is  and  must  be,  the  free,  intelligent, 
self-conscious,  all-perfect  Personality,  which  the  Universal 
Intelligence  has  affirmed  him  to  be. 
18* 


210  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 


THE  UNCONDITIONED  A  MORAL  AGENT. 

IX.  Moral  agency  is  another  attribute  which,  as  a  neces- 
sary consequence  of  the  principles  above  elucidated,  we 
must  affirm  of  God.  The  essential,  fundamental  elements 
of  moral  agency  are  Spirituality,  Intelligence,  Free  Will, 
and,  consequently,  self-conscious  Personality.  These  last 
cannot  possibly  exist  without  the  first.  God,  then,  as  the 
Unconditioned  Cause,  must  be  a  moral  agent.  Such  deduc- 
tion also  is  but  the  embodiment  of  the  spontaneous  intuition 
of  the  Universal  Intelligence  on  the  subject,  —  an  intuition 
expressed  by  the  ancient  patriarch  in  the  celebrated  pas- 
sage :  "  That  be  far  from  thee,  Lord,  that  the  righteous 
shall  be  as  the  wicked.  Shall  not  the  Judge  of  all  the  earth 
do  right? "  Then  how  infinite  the  absurdity  that  man,  him- 
self a  moral  agent,  should  be  the  creation  of  a  cause  wholly 
void  of  all  moral  ideas  and  sentiments  !  The  human  mind 
cannot  make  a  deeper  descent  in  the  abyss  of  absurdity 
than  in  entertaining  such  a  sentiment,  —  an  absurdity  as 
great  as  the  idea  that  the  Infinite  may  be  a  real  creation  of 
finite  causation.  Suppose  we  wholly  abstract  from  the  Un- 
conditioned Cause  all  the  elements  of  moral  agency.  How 
can  we  conceive  the  possibility  of  the  origination,  from  such 
a  form  of  causality,  of  a  free,  self-conscious  Personality, 
endowed  with  all  the  attributes  of  such  agency  ?  Must  man 
regard  himself  as  an  infinitely  higher  existence  than  the 
originator  of  his  being  and  immortal  powers  ? 

Such  would  be  the  teachings  of  all  who  would  deny  the 
attributes  of  moral  agency  to  God,  and  yet,  as  they  must 
do,  affirm  the  same  of  man,  these  being  infinitely  the  high- 
est attributes  of  which  the  mind  can  conceive.  How  can  a 
stream  rise  higher  than  its  source  ?     How  can  an  effect  em- 


THE    THE  IS  TIC   HYPOTHESIS.  211 

body  not  only  different,  but  infinitely  higher,  characteristics 
than  its  Unconditioned  Cause  ?  The  thing  is  inconceivable 
and  impossible.  In  the  consciousness  of  the  powers  and 
relations  of  moral  agency,  we  know  absolutely  that  the 
Author  of  our  being  cannot  be  destitute  of  moral  ideas  and 
attributes. 

THE  UNCONDITIONED  THE  MORAL  GOVERNOR  OF  THE  UNIVERSE. 

X.  As  the  Unconditioned  Cause,  God  exists  as  the  moral 
governor  of  the  moral  universe,  exercising  the  high  functions 
of  moral  administration  in  perfect  harmony  with  the  laws 
of  perfect  goodness  and  justice.  That  there  should  be  such 
a  great  central  power  of  universal  moral  administration  is, 
as  we  have  seen,  an  immutable  demand  of  the  moral  nature 
of  all  rational  moral  agents.  God  exists,  then,  as  such  a 
governor,  or  universal  mind,  in  the  highest  department  of 
its  being,  is  the  immutable  correlative  of  the  unreal  in  the 
Unconditioned  Cause,  and  that  intentionally  on  the  part  of 
the  Creator.  One  of  the  deepest  and  most  universal  wants 
of  mind  exists  also  without  a  corresponding  provision,  and 
one  of  its  highest  adaptations,  without  a  corresponding 
reality,  —  an  exception  to  a  principle  absolutely  universal 
throughout  the  domain  of  sentient  existence,  unless  it  be  in 
the  highest  of  all,  the  moral  and  spiritual  constitution  of 
mind.  How  absurd  and  unphilosophical  the  idea  of  such 
exception  here  ! 

If  we  cannot  reason  from  the  laws  and  demands  of  our 
moral  and  spiritual  nature  to  the  character  of  the  Uncondi- 
tioned Cause,  there  are  no  facts  of  the  universe  from  which 
we  can  safely  reason  upon  any  subject. 

That  the  character  of  the  government  which  God  exer- 
cises over  the  moral  universe  is  in  perfect  harmony  with  the 


212  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

principles  of  absolute  goodness  and  rectitude,  is  rendered 
demonstratively  evident  to  universal  mind,  from  what  is 
continually  passing  under  the  eye  of  consciousness  in  the 
depths  of  our  inner  being.  Here  a  moral  government  in 
perfect  harmony  with  such  principles  is  in  actual  uninter- 
rupted operation.  The  idea  of  right  and  wrong  is  to  the 
mind,  from  its  nature  and  laws,  an  omnipresent  reality, 
and  the  behests  of  the  conscience  in  favor  of  the  doing  of 
the  right,  and  avoiding  the  wrong,  are  always  absolute, 
admitting  of  no  exceptions,  and  of  no  excuse  for  non-com- 
pliance ;  and  no  one  does  or  can  perform  an  act  in  harmony 
with,  or  in  opposition  to,  that  law,  without  experiencing  in 
himself  corresponding  retributions.  The  moral  nature  of 
mind  is,  in  itself,  a  system  of  perfect  moral  government,  in 
actual  operation,  —  a  moral  government,  the  movements 
and  powers  of  which  fall  directly  and  continuously  under 
the  eye  of  consciousness,  and  always  reveal  to  the  mind 
the  absolute  rectitude  of  the  divine  administration.  What- 
ever apparent  disorders  ma}r  present  themselves  in  the 
world  without,  whatever  conclusion  they  might,  by  them- 
selves, force  upon  the  mind,  when  once  it  retires  within 
and  enters  into  converse  with  the  laws  and  principles  of  its 
own  moral  being,  it  ever  finds,  in  the  operations  of  those 
laws  and  principles,  a  perpetual  revelation  of  the  absolute 
moral  rectitude  of  God. 

SECTION  IV. 

GENERAL    SUGGESTIONS. 

A  few  suggestions  of  a  general  nature  will  close  this 
chapter,  —  remarks  designed  to  elucidate  still  farther  the 
great  subject  before  us. 


THE    TREISTIC    HYPOTHESIS.  213 

Bearing  of  the  different  sciences  upon  our  deductions. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  contemplate  the  true  bearing  of 
the  different  sciences,  pure  and  mixed,  upon  the  results  of 
our  previous  investigations.     There  are  two  distinct  points 
of  view  from  which  the  facts  of  the  universe,  material  and 
mental,   may  be  contemplated  and  are  contemplated,  by 
different  classes  of  mankind :  the  spontaneous,  and  intui- 
tive, —  the  common  sense,  if  the  expression  may  be  allowed, 
and  the  reflective,    or  the  scientific.     The  former  is  the 
stand-point  from  which  all  men,  at  the  first,  and  the  major- 
ity, for  the  most  part,  at  all  times,  contemplate  these  facts. 
The  latter  is  the  light  in  which  they  are  viewed  when  sys- 
tematically referred  to  those  fundamental  laws  and  princi- 
ples by  which  they  are  in  reality  controlled.    Now,  the  legiti- 
mate deductions  of  science  can  never  be  in  opposition  to 
the  necessary,  intuitive  convictions  of  the  Universal  Intelli- 
gence, in  view  of  the  facts  referred  to  ;  but  must,  as  far  as 
they  pertain  to  the  same  subjects,  embody  those  convictions 
in  a  general  and  universal  form.     In  the  presence  of  a  par- 
ticular  event,  all  mankind  affirm  a  cause  adequate  to  its 
production.     Science  embodies  this  conviction  in  a  reflec- 
tive and  universal  form,  to  wit,  every  event  must  have  a 
cause.     The  same  holds  true  in  all  other  instances.     Com- 
mon   sense,    the    spontaneous,    necessary,    and    universal 
convictions  of  the  race,  embody  those  fundamental  convic- 
tions which  science  develops  and  expresses  in  a  reflective 
and  universal  form.     The  true  deductions  of  the  latter  can 
never  contradict  the  former,  but  must  sustain  to  them  the 
fixed  relations  above  referred  to.     No  systems  of  philoso- 
phy, mental  or  physical,  no  deductions  of  science,  which 
contradict  these  convictions,  can  stand  the  test  of  time. 


214  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

On  the  other  hand,  all  the  principles  of  science,  and  conse- 
quently all  scientific  deductions,  resting,  as  they  do,  upon 
such  principles,  have  their  basis  in,  and  borrow  their  va- 
lidity from,  such  convictions.  If  the  intuitive  conviction, 
that  each  particular  event  has  a  cause,  is  not  valid,  then 
the  principle  and  all  the  deductions  based  upon  it,  that 
every  event  must  have  a  cause,  are  wholly  destitute  of  va- 
lidity.    The  same  holds  true  in  all  other  instances. 

Now,  the  Universal  Intelligence  has,  as  we  have  seen, 
in  the  presence  of  the  facts  of  the  universe,  spontaneously 
and  intuitively  affirmed  the  reality  of  the  being  and  perfec- 
tions of  God.  Assuming,  as  we  are  bound  to  do,  the  valid- 
ity of  this  conviction,  as  embod}Ting  the  necessary  intui- 
tions of  the  Universal  Intelligence,  it  will  follow,  as  an 
undeniable  consequence,  that  all  the  legitimate  deductions 
of  the  entire  circle  of  the  sciences,  as  far  as  the}T  bear  upon 
this  subject,  will  culminate  in  this  conviction,  and  reaffirm 
its  validity.  What  are  the  facts  of  the  case  ?  Do  the  re- 
sults of  science  affirm  the  validity  of  the  conviction  under 
consideration  ? 

One  thing  is  absolutely  certain,  and  that  is,  that  no 
principle,  or  legitimate  deduction  from  any  principle  of 
science,  affirms  anything  in  opposition  to  that  conviction. 
What  fact  or  principle  developed  in  the  science  of  matter  or 
of  mind  affirms  the  non-existence  of  God,  or  of  any  of 
his  essential  perfections  ?  We  may  take  the  entire  circle 
of  the  sciences,  we  may  ascend  to  the  utmost  heights,  and 
descend  to  the  profoundest  depths,  of  each  and  all  of  them, 
we  may  carefully  surve}7  all  their  principles,  facts,  and  log- 
ical deductions,  and  we  shall  find  absolutely  nothing  which 
even  looks  towards  the  proposition,  "There  is  no  God." 
Nature  has  no  language  to  utter  such  a  proposition. 


THE    THEISTIC   HYPOTHESIS.  215 

A  single  consideration  will  render  it  demonstrably  evi- 
dent that  all  the  legitimate  deductions  of  real  science  will, 
in  fact,  harmonize  with  this  conviction.  The  consideration 
is  this  :  This  conviction  and  the  deductions  of  science 
have,  for  their  basis,  the  same  essential  facts,  the  former 
resting  upon  the  facts  of  the  universe  as  presented  to  the 
Universal  Intelligence,  and  the  latter  resting  upon  a  wider 
induction  of  the  same  and  similar  facts,  —  facts  at  the  same 
time  more  fully  elucidated  and  systematically  arranged  and 
classified.  If  the  universal  and  necessary  conviction  in- 
duced by  the  one  is  the  affirmation  of  the  reality  of  the  di- 
vine existence  and  perfections,  much  more  will  the  legiti- 
mate deductions  of  the  other  affirm  the  same  great  truths. 
If  the  necessary  result  of  a  knowledge  of  the  end  answered 
by  the  mechanism  of  the  watch,  without  any  particular  ac- 
quaintance with  the  mechanism  itself,  is  the  affirmation 
that  it  had  an  intelligent  author,  much  more  would  a  mi- 
nute and  scientific  examination  of  that  mechanism  itself, 
together  with  a  full  knowledge  of  the  perfect  adaptation  of 
all  its  parts  to  produce  the  results  referred  to,  induce  and 
confirm  the  same  affirmation.  Such  are  the  relations  be- 
tween the  true  deductions  of  real  science,  and  the  primary 
necessary  affirmations  of  the  Universal  Intelligence  in  re- 
spect to  the  same  subjects.  They  can,  by  no  possibility, 
be  opposed  to  each  other,  but  must  perfectly  harmonize, 
especially  in  reference  to  the  existence  and  character  of 
the  Unconditioned  Cause  of  all  the  facts  of  the  universe. 
We  will  elucidate  and  confirm  this  principle  by  the  induc- 
tion of  a  few  examples. 

In  the  first  place,  when  mind  first  attains  to  a  conscious- 
ness of  its  own  existence  and  powers,  by  a  necessary  law 
of  the  Intelligence,  it  affirms  of  the  Author  of  its  being, as 


216  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

the  Unconditioned  Cause,  the  possession  of  Intelligence 
and  of  all  other  corresponding  perfections  which  render 
him  the  proper  object  of  the  supreme  love,  worship,  and 
service  of  his  rational  offspring.  What  are  the  teachings 
of  mental  science  on  the  same  subject?  Suppose  we  have 
attained  to  the  most  full  and  complete  scientific  develop- 
ment of  the  mental  powers  and  susceptibilities.  We  then 
raise  the  inquiry,  Whence  originated  this  mysterious  crea- 
tion? Who  was  its  Author,  and  what  is  his  character? 
Did  absolute  non-intelligence  originate  Intelligence  and 
so  wisely  adjust  all  its  laws?  Is  the  Author  of  mind  in 
which  are  so  mysteriously  and  harmoniously  blended, 
the  attributes  of  Intelligence,  Sensibility,  and  Will,  him- 
self wholly  destitute  of  these  perfections,  —  him'self  a 
blind,  undesigning,  unconscious  agency?  While  the  Uni- 
versal Intelligence,  in  its  primitive,  intuitive,  and  neces- 
sary activity,  affirms  the  being  and  perfections  of  God, 
science  affirms,  with  equal  absoluteness,  that  mind,  with  its 
high  endowments,  could  have  been  originated  from  no  other 
cause.  The  more  profound  our  knowledge  of  mind,  the 
more  wide  and  deep,  and  absolutely  impassable  does  the 
gulf  appear  between  an  apprehension  of  its  powers  and 
susceptibilities,  and  the  idea  that  they  owe  their  existence 
and  adaptations  to  a  cause  wholly  void  of  intelligence,  or 
any  of  its  essential  characteristics,  or  necessary  accompa- 
niments ;  that  the  "  Father  of  our  spirits  "  is  any  other  than 
God. 

Suppose  we  enter  into  the  most  profound  study  of  the 
moral  constitution  of  the  human  mind,  till  we  have  dis- 
tinctly apprehended  how  perfectly  adapted  that  constitu- 
tion is,  in  all  its  functions,  to  the  great  law  of  duty,  and 
what  a  perfectly  adjusted  system  of  moral  government  is 


THE     TH  EI  STIC    HYPOTHESIS.  217 

being  administered  in  the  action  of  the  laws  and  suscepti- 
bilities of  that  constitution  ;  suppose  that,  when  science  has 
shed  its  fullest  light  upon  this  department  of  our  being,  we 
then  put  the  question,  Is  the  author  of  this  constitution, 
and  the  establisher  and  upholder  of  this  system  of  moral 
government,  himself  utterly  destitute  of  all  moral  ideas 
and  sentiments?  A  sentiment  more  opposite  to  the  de- 
ductions of  true  science  never  "  danced  in  the  brain  of  a 
maniac,"  than  is  involved  in  an  affirmative  answer  to  this 
question. 

Again ;  if  there  is  a  principle  sustained  and  affirmed  by 
the  deductions  of  universal  science,  it  is  this :  the  absolute 
adaptations  of  different  departments  of  nature  to  each  other. 
No  sentient  existence,  for  example,  has  a  fundamental 
want,  to  which  there  is  not  a  corresponding  provision. 
Now,  there  is  no  principle  more  absolutely  universal  and 
fundamental,  in  the  human  mind,  than  that  of  religion. 
Religion  is  as  natural  to  man  as  food,  or  breath,  —  so  natu- 
ral, that  he  will  worship  "  beasts  and  birds,  and  creeping 
things,"  rather  than  have  no  religion  at  all.  What  is  the 
all  overshadowing  reality  to  which  this  department  of  our 
nature,  in  all  its  entireness,  vibrates,  as  its  fixed  and 
changeless  centre?  It  is  the  idea  of  a  personal  God. 
Without  this  idea,  and  in  the  absence  of  an  unshaken 
conviction  of  its  absolute  validity,  the  mainspring  of  the 
mind  is  broken ;  its  great  central  balance-wheel  is  gone. 
A  dark  void  is  also  left  in  the  soul  which  nothing  can  illu- 
mine or  fill.  Here,  then,  is  a  fundamental  adaptation  of 
universal  mind,  without  an  object,  the  great  necessity  of 
the  highest  department  of  creation,  without  a  correspond- 
ing provision,  if  there  is  no  God.  Here,  also,  is  the  only 
solitary  exception  to  a  principle  in  all  other  departments 

19 


218  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

of  the  universe  absolutely  universal.  The  voice  of  univer- 
sal nature  is  against  such  a  conclusion.  Science  draws 
down  upon  it  the  weight  of  the  entire  facts  of  the  universe. 
The  more  profoundly  we  study,  the  more  fully  we  develop, 
the  moral  and  spiritual  departments  of  our  nature,  the 
more  full  and  distinct  are  the  affirmations  of  all  our  deduc- 
tions in  favor  of  the  idea  of  God,  and  in  opposition  to  every 
other  assumption.  The  true  science  of  mind,  in  all  its 
departments,  converges  to  this  one  fixed  and  changeless 
centre. 

Let  us  now  contemplate  the  relations  of  mind  to  the  ex- 
ternal material  universe,  as  developed  by  scientific  obser- 
vation and  deduction,  and  let  us  contemplate  the  facts  pre- 
sented in  the  light  of  those  principles  which  lie  at  the  basis 
of  all  correct  procedures  of  true  science,  such,  for  ex- 
ample, as  the  following  :  A  means  supposes  an  end  ;  order 
which  once  did  not  exist  and  began  to  be,  supposes  an  in- 
telligent designing  cause  ;  and  the  all-pervading  influence 
of  law  supposes  a  lawgiver,  a  governor.  All  forms  of 
scientific  procedure,  all  legitimate  deductions  from  effects 
to  ultimate  principles  and  final  causes,  from  phenomena  to 
substance,  from  the  conditioned  to  the  character  of  the 
Unconditioned  and  Absolute,  have  and  must  have  their 
basis  in  the  above  principles  and  those  of  a  kindred  char- 
acter. Indeed,  in  the  absence  of  these  principles  there 
can  be  no  real  science  of  matter  or  of  mind.  Now,  what 
are  the  relations  of  mind  to  the  external  universe  ?  Noth- 
ing is  or  can  be  more  evident  than  this,  that  the  final  cause 
of  all  things  is  mind.  All  things  exist  in  fixed  and  exclu- 
sive adaptation  to  this  one  end,  the  wants  of  mind.  The 
more  profoundly  we  study  nature,  the  wider  and  more  uni- 
versal our  deductions,   the   more  distinct  does  this  great 


TFIE    THE  IS  TIC  HYPOTHESIS.  219 

fact  become.  The  physical  organization  with  which  mind 
is  connected,  and  the  encircling  universe  in  the  midst  of 
which  it  "  lives  and  moves  and  has  its  being,"  converge  to 
but  one  centre,  mind.  That  is  the  fixed  and  changeless 
law,  the  final  cause,  of  the  entire  activity  of  the  entire  pow- 
ers of  the  universe.  Such  are  the  ultimate  deductions  and 
laws  of  the  whole  circle  of  the  sciences  in  respect  to  the  uni- 
verse. What  is  the  language  of  these  deductions?  What 
do  they  affirm  of  the  character  of  the  Unconditioned  and 
Absolute  Cause,  —  the  cause  which  originated  mind  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  external  material  universe  on  the  other, 
and  then  brought  them  into  such  relations,  the  one  to  the 
other  ?  If  we  suppose  that  cause  to  be  possessed  of  Intel- 
ligence to  perceive  the  end,  and  the  means  requisite  to  its 
realization,  and  a  Will  to  harmonize  all  things  into  fixed 
adaptation  to  the  end,  the  great  problem  of  the  universe 
admits  of  a  ready  solution  ;  and  on  no  other  assumption  are 
the  facts  before  us  explainable  or  even  conceivable.  The 
mind  can  no  more  conceive  that  the  universe  of  matter  and 
mind  was  brought  into  such  fixed  and  changeless  relations 
to  each  other  by  a  cause  wholly  void  of  Intelligence  and 
Will,  than  it  can  conceive  of  the  annihilation  of  space,  or 
of  an  event  without  a  cause.  The  more  profound  our 
study  of  nature,  the  wider  and  more  universal  our  deduc- 
tions of  facts,  the  more  full  and  distinct  does  the  above  affir- 
mation become. 

Let  us  now  contemplate  the  relations  of  the  universe  to 
the  laws  and  principles  of  pure  science,  as  they  are  devel- 
oped by  science,  in  the  Intelligence.  The  pure  mathe- 
matics exist  only  in  and  for  the  Intelligence,  all  its 
principles  being  pure  ideas  of  Reason,  and  all  its  results 
pure   deductions   from    such   principles.     Now,    when    we 


220  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

have  fully  mastered  this  science  in  all  its  departments, 
what  are  our  relations  to  the  universe  around  us?  We 
have  simply  attained  to  that  knowledge  by  which  we  are 
prepared  to  read  the  book  of  nature  scientifically,  as  it  lies 
open  before  us.  We  have  attained  to  a  knowledge  of  those 
principles  and  formulas  by  which  alone  we  can  understand 
the  mechanism  and  solve  the  problems  of  the  universe. 
Pare  ideas  of  Reason,  what  are  they  but  "  the  patterns  of 
things  in  heaven,  and  of  thiugs  in  the  earth,  and  of  things 
under  the  earth  "  ?  How  wonderful,  for  example,  must  it 
appear  to  the  student,  when  he  has  fully  developed  the 
properties  and  laws  of  the  circle,  the  ellipse,  the  parabola, 
and  hyperbola,  etc.,  to  learn  that  by  them  alone  all  the 
movements  and  revolutions  of  every  planet,  and  of  every 
particle  of  matter  in  the  universe,  are  directed,  and  that  until 
he  has  attained  to  such  knowledge,  he  cannot  understand 
or  explain  any  of  these  great  facts  !  The  more  profoundly 
we  study  the  pure  sciences,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  mech- 
anism of  the  universe,  on  the  other,  the  more  distinctly 
does  the  universal  and  perfect  correspondence  of  the  one 
with  the  other  appear.  When  we  have  attained  to  this  high 
stand-point,  —  when  the  perfect  correspondence  between 
the  entire  mechanism  of  the  universe,  and  fundamental 
ideas  of  the  pure  intelligence,  lie  out  distinctly  before  our 
minds,  —  how  absolutely  absurd  and  inconceivable  does  the 
assumption  appear,  that  all  this  harmony  between  the  In- 
telligence and  the  universe  was  produced  by  a  cause  wholly 
void  of  all  ideas  !  In  the  presence  of  the  two  ideas,  the 
Intelligence  can,  by  no  possibilit3r,  make  but  one  affirma- 
tion in  respect  to  them,  to  wit,  their  absolute  incompati- 
bility. 

Equally  absolute  are  the  bearings  of  the  science  of  Geol- 


THE     THE  I  STIC    HYPOTHESIS.  221 

ogy  and  other  connected  sciences  upon  this  great  subject. 
The  following  may  be  enumerated  as  among  the  great  prin- 
ciples of  these  sciences,  bearing  fundamentally  upon  our 
present  inquiries.  (1.)  Nature  never  performs  anything 
per  saltern.  All  her  creations  are  very  gradually  produced. 
(2.)  Matter  in  a  state  of  total  unorganization  indicates  no 
power  whatever  to  originate  organizations,  animal  or  veg- 
etable, such  as  now  exist  on  earth.  (3.)  Matter  once  ex- 
isted in  this  precise  condition,  in  the  total  absence  of  vital 
organizations  of  every  kind,  as  well  as  of  the  embryo  prin- 
ciples from  which  such  organizations  result.  (4.)  Every 
species  of  vital  organization  had  an  organization  from  some 
creative  act,  and  that  independent  of  all  others.  (5.)  Ab- 
solutely no  indications  whatever  exist  of  the  remotest  ten- 
dency on  the  part  of  any  one  species  towards  a  transmuta- 
tion into  a  different  or  opposite  species.  (G.)  The  origi- 
nal pair,  from  which  every  species  of  animals  has  descended, 
must  have  been  created  in  such  a  state  of  maturity  as  to 
be  capable,  from  the  beginning  of  their  existence,  of  self- 
sustentation.  (7.)  Throughout  the  wide  domain  of  nature, 
there  is  the  total  absence  of  the  remotest  known  tendency 
towards  the  production  of  any  existing  forms  of  animal 
and  vegetable  organization,  but  through  one  inexclusive 
and  immutable  law,  that  of  propagation  and  reproduction. 
Admitting  these  facts  to  be  true,  the  conclusion  is  abso- 
lute, that  the  great  leading  races  of  animals,  and  species  of 
vegetables,  could  have  been  originated  from  no  power  or 
law  inhering  in  nature,  but  must  owTe  their  origin  to  some 
creative  power  out  of  nature.  No  one  will  pretend  to  ac- 
count for  such  facts  on  any  other  supposition.  Now,  the 
more  profound  our  researches,  and  the  more  widely  ex- 
tended our  deductions  in  this  department  of  science,  the 
10* 


222  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

more  manifest  does  the  reality  of  these  facts  become,  and 
more  absolute  the  conclusion  referred  to. 


A    NEW    ASPECT    OF    THIS    WHOLE    SUBJECT. 

An  entirely  new  aspect  of  this  whole  subject  has  recently 
been  presented  by  Prof.  Agassiz,  and,  for  its  presentation, 
the  scientific  public  will,  unquestionably,  to  the  end  of 
time,  regard  itself  as  very  highly  indebted  to  this  great 
thinker.  Palpable  facts  have  long  been  before  the  world, 
—  facts  indicating  most  clearly,  that  both  continents,  the 
Eastern  and  Western,  must  have  been,  by  some  general 
convulsion  of  nature,  completely  submerged  by  ice-floods 
from  the  direction  of  the  North  Pole,  and  that  this  general 
catastrophe  must  have  occurred  immediately  prior  to  the 
present  order  of  things.  These  facts  the  learned  professor 
has  carefully  investigated,  and  is  still  pushing  his  inqui- 
ries in  the  same  direction,  with  his  usual  diligence  and 
care.  The  deduction  yielded  by  the  facts  thus  far  devel- 
oped, —  a  deduction  which  further  investigations,  will,  no 
doubt,  confirm  so  as  to  exclude  doubt,  —  the  deduction 
yielded  by  the  facts  thus  far  developed,  we  say,  is  this  : 
A  general  state  of  coldness,  so  intense,  was  induced,  as 
of  necessity  to  put  "  an  end  to  all  living  beings  upon  the 
surface  of  the  globe."  This  ice-period  was  too  recent  to 
admit  of  the  origination  of  the  races  of  living  beings,  now 
covering  the  surface  of  the  earth,  by  transmutation  from 
preceding  ones,  and  leaves  us  with  but  one  remaining  hy- 
pothesis, the  creation  of  the  former  "  by  the  word  of 
God."     Well  may  the  learned  professor  say  :  — 

"  I  attach  great  importance,  in  a  philosophical  point 
of  view,  to  the  study  of  this  ice-period,  because,  if  it  can 


THE    THE  IS  TIC  HYPOTHESIS.  223 

be  demonstrated  that  such  was  once  the  condition  of  our 
earth,  it  will  follow  that  the  doctrine  of  the  transmutation 
of  the  species,  and  of  the  descent  of  the  animals  that  live 
now  from  those  of  past  days,  is  cut  at  the  root  by  this 
winter,  which  put  an  end  to  all  living  beings  upon  the  sur- 
face of  the  globe." 

We  hope  that  naturalists  of  the  Development  School 
will  suspend  their  conjectures  in  favor  of  their  theor}^, 
until  all  the  facts  of  the  period  under  consideration  have 
been  fully  developed,  and  their  bearings  as  fully  deter- 
mined. In  the  mean  time  religion  can  have  nothing  to  fear 
from  the  progress  of  true  science. 

The  bearings  of  the  science  of  Physiology  on  this  sub- 
ject should  not  be  overlooked  in  this  connection.  Matter 
and  spirit,  each  in  all  respects  diverse  from  and  opposite 
to  the  other,  and  each  having  an  existence  totally  indepen- 
dent of  the  other,  have  }Tet,  throughout  the  universe,  a  mys- 
terious connection  the  one  with  the  other ;  the  latter  every- 
where manifest  as  the  end  of  creation,  and  the  former 
organized  throughout  wholty  as  a  means  to  this  end.  Take 
the  human  body  as  an  illustration.  How  infinitely  compli- 
cated is  this  wonderful  specimen  of  divine  mechanism,  and 
yet  how  perfectly  adapted  is  every  part  to  every  other,  and 
the  whole  as  a  habitation  of  mind,  and  as  an  instrument 
for  the  accomplishment  of  its  endlessly  diversified  purposes  ! 
The  arm,  for  example,  may  properly  be  said  to  be  an  infi- 
nite machine,  being  capable  of  a  diversity  of  motions 
strictly  infinite.  With  it,  together  with  the  other  organs, 
how  absolutely  complete  is  the  human  form  !  Without  this 
organ,  or  with  it  in  any  other  locality,  how  incomplete  and 
defective  that  organization  would  be  !  If  it  is  possible  for 
Infinity  and  Perfection  to  manifest  itself  through  any  mate- 


224  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

rial  organization,  it  is  clone  through  this  one  organ  in  con- 
nection with  the  other  parts  of  the  system  of  organization 
with  which  it  is  connected. 

But  let  us  contemplate  especially  two  other  organs  of 
this  mysterious  mechanism,  the  eye  and  the  ear.  Those 
organs  have  but  one  exclusive  office,  to  enable  mind  to 
communicate  with  the  external  world.  Here  is  the  mate- 
rial creation,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Intelligence,  on  the 
other ;  and  here  are  two  organs  formed  for  no  other  pur- 
pose but  to  enable  the  latter  to  know  and  communicate 
with  the  former.  What  shall  we  think  of  the  assumption, 
that  the  Unconditioned,  who  created  the  Intelligence  and 
established  its  laws,  on  the  one  hand,  and  then  arranged 
the  external  universe  as  to  that  Intelligence  an  object 
of  knowledge,  on  the  other,  and  finally  constructed  these 
organs  for  no  other  purpose  but  to  enable  the  latter  to  know 
the  former,  —  what  must  we  think,  we  sa}^,  of  the  assump- 
tion, that  the  Power  who  accomplished  all  this  is  himself 
utterly  void  of  all  ideas,  of  all  knowledge?  u  He  that 
formed  the  eye,  shall  he  not  see?  He  that  planted  the 
ear  shall  he  not  hear?  He  that  teacheth  man  knowledge, 
shall  he  not  know  ?  "  He  surely  must  have  a  wonderful 
capacity  for  digesting  absurdities,  who  would  answer  these 
questions  in  the  negative.  Now,  the  more  profound  our 
study  of  these  organs,  —  the  more  perfect  our  acquaintance 
with  mind  on  the  one  hand,  and  with  the  adaptation  of  the 
body  as  a  habitation  of  spirit,  and  as  an  instrument  by  which 
mind  communicates  with  the  external  universe,  and  accom- 
plishes its  purposes,  by  means  of  the  powers  of  nature,  on 
the  other,  — the  more  clear  and  distinct  do  the  manifestations 
of  Divinity,  through  the  relations  of  this  science,  become. 
Scientifically  read,  all  its  teachings  speak  but  one  language 


THE    THEISTIC  HYPOTHESIS.  225 

exclusively,  the  affirmation  of  the  being  and  perfections 
of  God,  and  the  absolute  impossibility  of  accounting  for 
the  facts  presented  on  any  other  supposition. 

The  same  holds  equally  true,  if  we  descend  from  animal 
to  vegetable  physiology.  The  vegetable  is  the  grand  me- 
dium between  animal  organization  and  matter  in  a  state 
of  unorganization.  The  vital  principle  in  the  vegetable  has 
but  one  function,  and  thut  is  to  bring  unorganized  matter 
into  a  state  in  which  it  may  sustain  the  animal.  And 
how  perfectly  adapted  is  the  vegetable  kingdom  to  this  one 
end  !  The  wider  and  more  particular  our  inductions,  the 
more  manifest  does  the  perfection  of  these  adaptations  ap- 
pear. What  is  the  conclusion  towards  which  all  these  great 
facts  tend?  The  vital  principle  in  the  animal  economy 
acts  as  a  most  wisely  adapted  means  to  one  end,  the  exi- 
gencies of  mind  ;  and  the  same  principle  in  the  vegetable 
in  subordination  equally  perfect  to  the  animal.  Mind  is 
the  centre,  and  all  the  infinitely  complicated  machinery  of 
the  universe  moves  around  it,  in  the  relations  of  a  most  wise 
and  intelligent  adaptation.  Is  the  Author  of  mind  and  the 
Organizer  of  the  material  universe  in  such  intelligent  adap- 
tation to  the  end  to  which  the  action  of  all  its  powers  are 
subordinated,  totally  ignorant  of  both  alike,  and  equally 
of  the  relations  which  he  has  established  between  them? 
Impossible,  is  the  response  of  all  the  revelations  of  this  sci- 
ence. The  more  profound  our  study  of  the  science,  the 
more  deep  and  distinct  does  that  response  become. 

The  same  holds  equally  true  of  all  the  sciences  bearing 
directly  or  indirectly  upon  our  present  investigations.  The 
time  is  not  distant  when  the  entire  scientific  movement  of 
universal  mind  will  be  seen  to  culminate  in  the  affirmation 
of  one  great  central  truth,  the  being  and  perfections  of  God. 


226  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

There  is  an  absolute  unity  in  creation,  and  a  real  unity 
equally  absolute  in  the  sciences.  Scientific  research  and 
deduction  can  lead  in  but  one  direction  upon  this  subject. 

Reasons  for  the  apparent  opposition  between  some  of  the 
sciences  and  religion. 

AYe  are  now  prepared  to  state  the  reasons  for  the  appar- 
ent opposition  between  many  of  the  sciences  and  religion. 
Every  form  of  scepticism  has  professedly  based  itself  upon 
the  assumed  deductions  of  Science.  Religion,  it  is  af- 
firmed, teaches  one  thing,  and  Science  another,  and  the 
friends  of  Religion  have,  in  instances  not  a  few,  been  too 
ready  to  admit  the  reality  of  such  a  contradiction.  If  we 
admit  that  the  teachings  of  Religion  are  in  fact  opposed  to 
the  legitimate  deductions  of  true  Science,  then  we  grant  all 
that  the  opposers  of  the  former  can  desire,  to  wit,  that  they 
have  the  highest  possible  reasons  for  rejecting  Religion. 
But  why  this  apparent  contradiction  ?  The  following  im- 
portant reasons,  may,  among  others,  be  assigned  for  the 
fact: 

1.  In  the  first  place,  all  are  not  the  legitimate  deductions 
of  real  Science,  which  are  held  out  before  the  world  as  such. 
There  are  S}Tstems  of  "Science  falsely  so  called,"  and  it  is 
no  matter  of  wonder  that  such  systems  should  present  de- 
ductions hostile  to  Religion.  At  the  same  time,  theologi- 
ans have  erred  in  developing  the  system  of  truth  revealed 
in  the  volume  of  inspiration,  as  well  as  philosophers,  in 
their  attempted  solutions  of  the  problems  of  the  universe. 
Hence,  it  has  often  happened  that  false  systems  of  Religion 
assumed  as  true  have  been  arrayed  against  the  teachings 
of  true  Science,  on  the  one  hand,  and  systems  of  false  phi- 


THE     THEISTIC    HYPOTHESIS.  227 

losophy  have  been   arrayed  against  true  Religion,  on  the 
other. 

2.  Another  important  fact  deserves  very  special  notice 
here.  Most  of  the  sciences,  the  physical  and  mental  es- 
pecially, have,  when  in  their  infancy,  and  while  philoso- 
phers have  "  seen  men  as  trees  walking,"  —  in  other  words, 
have  seen  only  the  shadows  of  the  great  realities,  which 
the  sciences  in  their  maturity  never  fail  to  reveal,  —  we  say, 
most  of  the  sciences,  while  in  their  infancy,  have  appeared 
to  reveal  facts  and  principles  opposed  to  Religion,  while 
the  same  sciences,  when  they  have  advanced  towards  matu- 
rity of  development,  have  invariably  presented  themselves 
as  the  handmaids  of  Religion.  What  a  striking  illustration 
of  the  above  statement  do  the  recent  and  mature  revela- 
tions of  Geology  present !  Everywhere  amid  those  revela- 
tions u  the  footprints  of  the  Creator"  are  most  distinctly 
visible.  There  is  not  a  solitary  Science  that  has  attained 
to  anything  like  maturity,  —  a  science  whose  early  deduc- 
tions were  arrayed  against  Religion,  —  that  is  an  exception 
to  the  above  remark. 

3.  Wherever  there  has  been  an  apparent  conflict  between 
Science  and  Religion,  the  real  issue  has  invariably  been 
between  the  original  intuitions  of  the  Universal  Intelli- 
gence and  the  mere  assumptions  of  philosophers,  and  not 
between  true  Science  and  real  Religion.  Wherever,  philos- 
ophers, for  example,  have  assumed  that  our  knowledge  of 
nature  has  only  a  relative  validity,  and  have,  therefore,  re- 
pudiated the  claims  of  Religion,  no  real  issue  has  been 
raised  between  Science  and  Religion,  but  between  these 
philosophers  and  the  Universal  Intelligence.  They,  in 
truth,  impeach,  not  Religion,  but  the  Intelligence  itself, 
and   before   they   are  heard   at  all  against  Religion,  they 


223  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

should  be  called  upon  to  settle  finally  the  issue  which  they 
themselves  have  raised  with  said  Intelligence.  In  the 
sphere  of  true  Science  there  are  no  assumptions.  Intui- 
tions, on  the  other  hand,  lie  at  the  basis  of  all  deductions, 
and  all  real  intuitions  are  held  in  equal  respect,  and  oc- 
cupy their  appropriate  positions,  as  the  foundations  and 
starting-points  of  scientific  deduction  in  all  its  forms.  In 
no  systems  of  Science,  in  which  real  intuitions  have  their 
proper  place  and  authority,  has  there  ever  been  found 
even  an  apparent  conflict  between  Science  and  Religion. 
In  systems,  on  the  other  hand,  in  which  assumptions  oc- 
cupy the  place  of  principles,  there  and  only  there  the  con- 
flict under  consideration  obtains.  Religion,  in  fact,  is  the 
great  central  rock  of  eternal  truth.  Every  system  of  phi- 
losophy that  shall  fall  upon  this  rock  will  be  broken,  and 
upon  whatever  systems  it  shall  fall,  it  will  grind  them  to 
powder.  The  reason  is  obvious.  Every  S3~stem  that  wars 
upon  Religion,  wars,  and  that  for  the  same  reason,  upon 
the  Intelligence  itself. 

4.  Before  philosophers  of  any  school  are  permitted  to 
set  forth  their  own  conflict  with  the  original  and  necessary 
intuitions  of  the  Universal  Intelligence,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  with  Theism,  on  the  other,  as  a  conflict  between  true 
Science  and  real  Religion,  they  should  be  compelled  to  agree 
among  themselves  in  regard  to  some  principles  of  truth,  and 
then  to  show  wherein  said  principles  conflict  with  the  teach- 
ings of  Religion.  This  they  have  never  yet  done.  There 
has  never  yet  been  set  forth  against  Religion,  by  airy  one 
school  in  philosophy,  a  single  principle,  the  validity  of 
which  has  not  been  absolutely  denied  by  every  other  anti- 
theistic  school  that  can  be  named.  Outside  of  the  sphere 
of  real  religious  thought  we  meet  with  nothing  but  an  ab- 


THE    THE  I  STIC  HYPOTHESIS.  229 

solute  chaos  of  warring  systems,  principles,  and  opinions. 
All  here  is  "a  land  of  darkness,  as  darkness  itself,  with- 
out form  or  order,  where  the  light  is  as  darkness."  When 
philosophers  shall  unitedly  set  forth  some  form  of  real  in- 
tuition as  demonstrated  truth,  and  show  wherein  said  truth 
irreconcilably  conflicts  with  Religion,  then,  and  not  till 
then,  will  they  make  manifest  a  real  issue  between  Science 
and  Religion.  This,  however,  they  have  never  yet  accom- 
plished, and  we  are  quite  sure  they  never  will  accomplish. 

METHOD     BY    WHICH     THE    IDEA     OF     GOD     IS     DEVELOPED     IN 
THE    SCRIPTURES. 

We  will  suppose  the  Scriptures  to  have  fallen  into  the 
hands  of  an  individual  of  common  intelligence,  and  that, 
with  no  knowledge  of  their  claims  to  inspiration,  he  has 
read  understanding^  such  passages  as  the  following :  "  In 
the  beginning,  God  created  the  heavens  and  the  earth  ;  " 
"  And  thou,  Lord,  in  the  beginning,  hast  laid  the  founda- 
tions of  the  earth,  and  the  heavens  are  the  work  of  thy 
hands."  Whatever  the  general  impressions  of  this  individ- 
ual may  be  in  regard  to  the  whole  book,  he  will  necessa- 
rily and  intuitively  recognize  these  declarations  as  abso- 
lutely true.  The  reason  is  this :  These  passages,  in  the 
first  place,  assert  a  fact  distinctly  recognized  by  the  race 
as  true,  to  wit,  creation  as  an  event  of  time,  —  the  fact 
that  the  worlds  had  a  beginning.  They  then  affirm  a  deduc- 
tion, as  intuitively  and  necessarily  implied  by  this  fact,  to 
wit,  that  the  ultimate  cause  of  creation  is  a  power  out  of 
and  above  nature,  that  is,  God  ;  in  other  words,  that  "  the 
worlds  were  made  by  the  word  of  God."  No  one  can  avoid 
the  conclusion,  that  creation  had  a  beginning,  or  that  it  is 
an  event  of  time,  and  no  one  can  reflect  upon  this  fact, 
20 


230  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

■which  he  must  believe  or  stultify  himself,  and  not  intui- 
tively affirm  the  author,  or  ultimate  cause,  of  creation,  to 
be  a  personal  God. 

FUNDAMENTAL    DEFECT    IN   THE    THEISTIC    ARGUMENT,    AS 
DEVELOPED    BY   PALEY   AND    OTHEPtS. 

The  fundamental  defect  in  the  theistic  argument,  as  pre- 
sented by  Pale}T,  and  others  of  the  same  school,  now  be- 
comes perfectly  obvious.  They  argue  to  a  personal  God, 
from  mere  facts  of  order,  or  marks  of  design,  irrespective, 
wholly,  of  the  facts  of  creation  as  an  event  of  time.  This 
defect  Dr.  Chalmers  alludes  to  in  his  Natural  Theology. 
Before  we  can  affirm,  he  tells  us,  the  existence  of  a  maker, 
we  must  show  that  something  has  been  made.  Before  we 
can  affirm  that  "  the  worlds  were  formed  by  the  word  of 
God,"  we  must  show  that  they,  too,  are  things  "  that  were 
made."  Take  Paley's  argument  as  illustrated  by  the  case 
of  the  watch.  Let  us  suppose  that  watches  have  ever  been 
produced  one  from  another,  with  no  indications  of  an  exter- 
nal agency,  and  that  wre  have  no  evidence  whatever  that 
the  line  of  succession  has  any  beginning.  Then,  undeniably, 
watches  are  not  to  be  reckoned  among  things  made,  and 
present  no  evidence  of  the  existence  of  a  watch-maker.  So 
of  the  reality  of  a  world-maker,  if  we  leave  out  of  view  the 
great  central  fact  of  creation  as  an  event  of  time.  Recog- 
nizing the  undeniable  fact,  however,  that  creation  had  a  be- 
ginning, then,  and  that  with  infinite  reason,  and  from  abso- 
lute proof,  "  through  faith  we  understand  that  the  worlds 
were  formed  by  the  word  of  God,  so  that  things  which  are 
seen  were  not  made  of  [developed  from]  things  which  do 
appear." 


GOD    THE   INFINITE   AND   PERFECT.  231 


CHAPTER  IV. 

GOD  THE  INFINITE  AND  PERFECT. 

We  are  now  at  liberty,  in  view  of  the  results  to  which  we 
arrived  in  the  preceding  chapter,  to  assume,  as  the  basis  of 
our  present  investigations,  the  reality  of  the  divine  exist- 
ence, as  possessed  of  the  attributes  of  Creative  Power ,  Eter- 
nity, Immutability,  Free  Will,  Intelligence,  and  Moral  Perfec- 
tion. The  universe,  material  and  mental,  stands  before  us 
as  the  result  of  the  agency  of  such  a  being.  In  what  light 
shall  we  revere  and  worship  the  Author  of  our  existence  ? 
Shall  we  regard  him  as  finite  and  imperfect  like  ourselves, 
or  as  really  and  truly  Infinite  and  Perfect?  In  which  of 
these  relations  does  creation  reveal  him?  For  this  great 
inquiry  we  have  been  fully  prepared  through  the  train  of 
thought  thus  far  pursued.  That  God  is  possessed  of  the 
attributes  of  Infinity  and  Perfection  is,  in  fact,  a  truth  af- 
firmed as  such  by  the  Universal  Intelligence.  This  is  evi- 
dent from  a  single  consideration.  No  individual,  without 
conscious  guilt,  can  attribute  to  the  Most  High  any  known 
and  acknowledged  imperfection.  Men  may,  without  con- 
scious guilt,  attribute  real  imperfections  to  him,  not  know- 
ing and  acknowledging  them  to  be  such.  Whatever,  on  the 
other  hand,  they  conceive  and  admit  to  be  necessarily  in- 
volved in  the  idea  of  Infinity  and  Perfection,  the}'  feel  them- 
selves under  the  most  sacred  obligations  to  attribute  to 
God.     Nor  has  there  ever  been  a  time,  since  the  idea  of 


232  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

God  first  appeared  upon  the  theatre  of  consciousness,  that 
we  did  not  regard  him  as  Infinite  and  Perfect,  and  should 
not  have  felt  ourselves  involved  in  infinite  guilt  in  attribut- 
ing an}'  acknowledged  imperfection  to  him.  The  doctrine 
of  God,  as  possessed  of  such  perfections,  is  not  only  a  uni- 
versal, but  a  first  truth  of  the  Intelligence,  —  a  first  truth  in 
the  same  sense  that  the  idea  of  God  is. 

Now,  as  God,  in  his  relations  as  Creator  and  Governor  of 
the  universe,  stands  revealed  to  the  Universal  Intelligence 
as  Infinite  and  Perfect,  there  must  be  somewhere  in  the  uni- 
verse some  great  facts  revealed  to  the  Intelligence,  —  facts 
which  lie  at  the  basis  of  this  conviction  and  affirm  its  valid- 
ity. We  must  admit  this,  or  convict  the  Intelligence  itself 
of  fundamental  error,  and  then  the  validity  of  all  principles 
and  logical  deductions  fails  entirely.  If  we  convict  the  Uni- 
versal Intelligence  of  fundamental  error,  the  validity  of  all 
its  affirmations,  primary  and  deductive,  must  be  denied. 

Creation,  then,  does  in  fact  reveal  God  as  Infinite  and 
Perfect.  But  where,  and  from  whence,  and  in  what  form,  is 
this  revelation  made  ?  In  what  department  of  the  divine 
works  do  we  find  the  basis  and  source  of  the  conviction  that 
God  is  clothed  with  the  perfections  under  consideration  ? 
Not  surely  in  the  mere  extent  of  creation.  The  vastness  of 
the  divine  works  reveals  their  Author  as  possessed  of  very 
great,  and  to  us  incomprehensible  power,  but  not  as  pos- 
sessed of  absolute  infinity.  If  the  creation  of  one  single 
world  does  not  reveal  the  Creator  as  Infinite,  that  of  any 
number  short  of  infinite  cannot  do  it ! 

Where,  then,  shall  we  find  the  basis  of  the  conviction 
which  realty  and  truly  exists  in  all  minds,  that  God  is  both 
Infinite  and  Perfect?  Not,  primarily  nor  chiefly,  in  the 
revelations  of  matter,  but  mainly  of  that  which  is  "  made 


GOD    THE  INFINITE   AND   PERFECT.  233 

in  the  image  and  likeness"  of  the  Infinite,  amid  the  laws 
and  susceptibilities  of  mind  itself.  If  God,  as  we  have  seen 
that  he  has  done,  has  pencilled  out  his  own  Infinity  and  Per- 
fection anywhere  in  creation,  it  is,  we  may  very  safely  con- 
clude a  priori,  in  that  in  which  the  Infinite  is  imaged  forth 
in  the  finite.  Infinity  and  Perfection  are  affirmed  of  God 
exclusively  as  a  spirit,  —  a  free,  intelligent,  self-conscious 
personality.  Now,  matter,  in  its  nature  finite  and  limited, 
and  in  all  its  essential  characteristics  the  opposite  of  spirit,  is 
unadapted  to  reveal  these  attributes  in  their  absoluteness  in 
its  Author.  Mind,  in  its  laws,  adaptations,  and  susceptibili- 
ties, must  reveal  them,  if  they  are  revealed  at  all  in  creation. 
That  God  might  endow  mind,  made  as  it  is  "  in  his  own 
image  and  after  his  own  likeness,"  with  such  powers,  laws, 
and  susceptibilities,  that  it  should  be  to  itself  a  perpetual 
revelation  of  the  Infinity  and  Perfection  of  its  Author,  ap- 
pears to  us  to  be  self-evident.  Let  us  turn  our  thoughts  in 
this  direction  and  see  if  we  cannot  find  here  the  clear  pen- 
cillings  of  the  divine  Infinity  and  Perfection.  In  conducting 
the  argument  on  this  head,  the  following  principles  are 
postulated  as  self-evident,  or  as  necessarily  involved  in 
what  has  already  been  proved  as  true  in  respect  to  the  char- 
acter of  God : 

1.  Mind,  in  all  its  original  powers,  laws,  adaptations,  mid 
susceptibilities,  is,  in  all  respects,  just  what  its  divine  Au- 
thor intended  that  it  should  be. 

2.  Whatever  indications  we  find  in  mind  of  the  character 
of  its  Author,  God  intended  them  as  such. 

3..  These  indications,  whatever  they  may  be,  accord  with 
the  real,  and  not  with  the  unreal,  in  God.     In  other  words, 
mind,  in  its  original  and  immutable  powers,  laws,  adapta- 
20* 


234  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

tions,  and  susceptibilities,  is  correlative  of  the  real  and  not 
the  unreal  attributes  of  its  Author. 

Should  any  one  deny  any  of  these  principles,  the  last 
especially,  he  would  be  at  once  confronted  by  the  deduc- 
tions reached  in  the  last  chapter,  and  also  by  the  great 
basis  principle  of  all  science  pertaining  to  sentient  exist- 
ence, to  wit,  that  for  every  original  want  of  such  exist- 
ence, there  is  a  corresponding  provision,  and  for  every 
fundamental  adaptation  a  corresponding  reality,  or  sphere 
of  activity.  Let  the  antitheist,  if  he  chooses,  assume  that 
mind,  in  its  fundamental  adaptations  and  necessities,  is  an 
exception  to  this  otherwise  absolutely  universal  principle. 
The  world,  in  that  case,  will  no  longer  look  to  him  as  an 
oracle  of  reason  or  common  sense.  The  way  is  now  pre- 
pared to  consider  the  great  facts  of  creation  —  of  mind 
especially  —  bearing  upon  the  question  before  us. 

If  we  should  raise  the  inquiry  pertaining  to  the  origin  of 
the  idea  of  God  as  Infinite  and  Perfect,  an  answer  may  very 
readily  be  obtained.  Mind  is  so  constituted  that,  in  the 
presence  of  the  finite  and  imperfect,  it  necessarily  conceives 
of  the  Infinite  and  Perfect.  The  terms  finite  and  imperfect, 
and  Infinite  and  Perfect,  are  correlative  terms,  and  the  ideas 
which  they  represent  are  correlative  ideas.  The  one  cannot 
be  in  the  mind  without  the  other.  In  conceiving  of  itself 
as  a  spirit  finite  and  imperfect,  the  mind  necessarily  con- 
ceives of  a  personality  endowed  with  absolute  Infinity  and 
Perfection.  Hence  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  God  as  such  a 
being.  The  idea  cannot  but  be  in  the  mind,  because  that 
of  the  finite  and  imperfect  is  and  must  be  there. 

If  we  should  ask  after  the  source  of  the  conviction,  which 
really  exists  in  all  minds,  that  God  is  possessed  of  such 
perfections,  it  is  undoubtedly  to  be  found  in  the  deep  con- 


GOD    THE  INFINITE   AND   PERFECT.  235 

sciousness  that  the  mind  cannot  but  have  that  its  own  men- 
tal nature  is  constituted  in  fixed  and  immutable  harmony 
with  that  idea,  and  in  opposition  to  all  other  ideas  of  the 
Unconditioned  Cause.  Throughout  creation  there  is  visi- 
ble everywhere  the  perfect  adaptation  of  one  thing  to  an- 
other. Wherever  there  is  a  want  there  is  a  corresponding 
provision,  and  wherever  there  is  an  adaptation  there  is  a 
corresponding  reality.  Mind  has  an  intuitive  conviction 
that  its  own  immortal  nature  cannot  be  an  exception  to  this 
universal  law.  Now,  in  the  presence  of  the  idea  of  God  as 
Infinite  and  Perfect,  mind  has  the  intuitive  consciousness 
that  its  entire  mental  and  moral  nature  is  constituted  in 
immutable  correlation  to  that  idea.  Action  in  harmony 
with  that  idea  is  action  in  conscious  harmony  with  its  own 
nature.  Action  in  any  other  direction,  or  the  entertaining 
of  any  other  ideas  of  God,  is  an  equally  undeniably  conscious 
violation  of  the  laws  of  that  nature.  In  the  presence  of  this 
idea,  then,  from  which  it  cannot  escape  if  it  would,  mind  is 
and  must  be  to  itself  a  perpetual  revelation  of  the  Infinity 
and  Perfection  of  its  Author.  But  more  of  this  as  we  pro- 
ceed to  a  more  distinct  and  formal  development  of  the  basis 
of  the  conviction  under  consideration. 

1.  In  whatever  direction  we  turn  our  investigations,  one 
thing  is  quite  evident,  and  that  is,  that  neither  in  the  uni- 
verse of  matter  or  mind  do  we  find  anything  to  limit  the 
Perfections  of  God.  If  the  external  creation  does  not  affirm 
absolutely  his  Infinity  and  Perfection,  neither  does  it  affirm 
finiteness  of  him.  Nor  in  the  revelations  of  mind  do  we 
find  the  least  indication  of  limitation  in  any  attributes  of 
the  Author  of  our  being.  Nor  can  any  such  indications  be 
found  in  any  of  the  forms  in  which  this  idea  appears  in  the 
human  mind.     In  other  words,  there  is  and  can  be  no  dpri- 


236  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

on,  or  a  posteriori  evidence  against  the  doctrine  of  the  In- 
finity and  Perfection  of  God.  If  he  is  finite  and  imper- 
fect, no  evidence  of  the  fact  can  be  adduced  from  any 
source  whatever. 

2.  Nor  is  there  any  form  or  degree  of  antecedent  proba- 
bility against  this  doctrine.  If  God  exists  at  all,  —  and  he 
does  exist,  —  no  reasons  whatever  can  be  assigned  why  he 
should  not  exist  as  the  alone  Infinite  and  Perfect.  As  the 
Unconditioned  Cause,  no  reasons  can  be  assigned  why  he 
should  not  as  well  possess  power  adequate  to  all  possible 
results,  as  to  any  whatever.  He  that  exists  from  ever- 
lasting to  everlasting  the  same,  why  should  he  not  em- 
body in  himself  all  possible  and  conceivable  perfections, 
and  that  in  an  infinite  degree?  No  fact  in  the  universe  of 
matter  or  mind,  and  no  element  in  the  idea  of  God  as  the 
Unconditioned  Cause,  or  in  any  form  in  which  this  idea  ex- 
ists in  the  mind,  presents  the  least  shadow  of  probability 
even,  against  the  doctrine  under  consideration. 

3.  While  there  is,  in  fact,  no  antecedent  probability 
whatever  against  the  validity  of  the  idea  of  God  as  the 
alone  Infinite  and  Perfect,  there  is  a  form  of  antecedent 
probability  in  its  favor,  and  that  of  an  important  and  posi- 
tive nature.  The  validity  of  the  idea  of  God,  as  the  Uncon- 
ditioned and  Absolute  Cause,  has  already  been  established, 
and  its  validity  none  will  question.  Now,  as  Cousin  has 
well  observed,  no  other  conception  so  fully  and  adequately 
represents  our  necessary  idea  of  such  a  cause  as  that  of  In- 
finity and  Perfection.  In  the  undeniable  absence  of  all 
evidence  of  every  kind  to  the  contrary,  this  one  great  cen- 
tral fact  binds  us  absolutely  to  believe  in,  and  worship  as 
real,  a  Personal  God,  Infinite  and  Perfect. 

4.  While  creation  presents  no  indications  whatever  of 


GOD    THE   INFINITE   AND   PERFECT.  237 

finiteness  and  imperfection  in  God,  there  is  one  general 
view  of  the  universe  which  tends  to  impress  upon  the  mind, 
and  that  very  deeply,  the  opposite  sentiment.  The  uni- 
verse is,  to  our  comprehension,  of  vast  and  boundless  ex- 
tent, and  infinitely  complicated  in  its  structure,  move- 
ments, and  operations.  Every  particle  of  matter  influences 
and  is  influenced  by  every  other,  however  remote  their  dis- 
tances from  each  other  may  be.  The  entire  movements  of 
creation,  from  the  motion  of  the  planets  in  their  spheres,  to 
that  of  the  least  mote  that  flits  in  the  sunbeam,  —  all  the  pro- 
ductions of  nature,  animal,  vegetable,  and  mineral,  —  are  the 
result  of  the  combined  action  and  reaction  of  the  entire 
individual  particles  of  which  the  great  whole  is  composed. 
Yet  such  is  the  perfect  balance  of  the  powers  of  nature, 
that  the  result  is  absolute  harmony  throughout.  Every- 
thing is  in  its  place,  and  everything  in  its  season,  and  all 
things  work  together  for  one  great  end,  the  wants  of  mind. 
Now,  there  are  the  clearest  indications  possible,  through  the 
material  creation,  of  infallible  wisdom  and  guidance,  on 
the  part  of  the  great  First  Cause,  and  the  existence  of  these 
attributes  necessarily  implies  absolute  Infinity  and  Perfec- 
tion in  God.  The  more  the  mind  reflects  upon  the  subject, 
the  more  deep  will  the  impression  become,  and  the  validity 
of  the  argument  thus  deduced  cannot  be  shaken. 

5.  "While  there  is  also  this  total  absence  of  all  evidence 
that  God  is  not  Infinite  and  Perfect,  there  is,  in  the  depths 
of  our  own  mental  being,  a  law  or  principle  which  presents 
a  solemn  protest  against  our  affirming  any  form  of  imper- 
fection of  him,  without  proof  the  most  absolute.  We  are 
conscious  of  doing  no  violence  to  any  law  or  principle  of 
our  nature,  when  we  affirm  absolute  Infinity  and  Perfection 
of  God.     On  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  but  be  conscious 


238  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

of  doing  such  violence,  when  we,  for  a  moment,  entertain 
the  sentiment  that  he  is  anything  else  than  Infinite  and 
Perfect.  Now,  this  feeling  or  sentiment  lying  in  the  depths 
of  universal  mind  was  not  placed  there  by  the  Creator, 
without  design  ;  and  what  could  that  design  have  been,  if 
not  as  an  indication  of  the  real  character  of  God  ?  Any 
other  supposition  is  an  impeachment  of  his  integrity.  God, 
then,  is  endowed  with  the  attributes  of  Infinity  and  Perfec- 
tion. If  God  is  finite  and  imperfect,  he  should  have  so 
constituted  finite  minds,  that  an  affirmation  of  his  finiteness 
and  imperfection  would  be  no  violence  to  the  nature  of 
such  minds.  The  fact  that  he  has  so  constituted  them  is 
a  most  absolute  affirmation,  on  his  part,  of  his  own  Infinity 
and  Perfection. 

6.  We  would  now  invite  very  special  attention  to  a  great 
fact,  to  which  we  have  alluded  before,  and  which  has  a  fun- 
damental bearing  upon  our  present  inquiries.  As  the  pow- 
ers and  susceptibilities  of  the  mind  lie  out  under  the  eye 
of  consciousness,  it  stands  revealed  to  the  general  Intelli- 
gence as  adapted  to  a  state  of  endless  progression, — progres- 
sion in  knowledge  and  capacities  for  virtue  and  happiness. 
The  more  profoundly  we  study  these  laws  and  susceptibili- 
ties, the  more  distinctly  revealed  do  the  adaptations  of 
mind  to  such  a  state  appear.  It  is  no  valid  objection  to 
the  above  statement,  that,  in  the  progress  of  life,  the  men- 
tal powers  advance  to  a  certain  degree  of  development, 
and  then  appear  to  retrograde.  Such  effects  are  attendant 
upon  the  peculiarities  of  our  own  present  condition. 
Certain  conditions  are  requisite  to  mental  progress,  and 
mind  can  progress  only  while  the  conditions  of  its  devel- 
opment are  fulfilled.  The  original  adaptation  of  mind  to  a 
state  of  endless  progression,  however,  is  manifest  from  the 


GOD    THE   INFINITE   AND    PERFECT.  239 

nature  of  its  fundamental  ideas,  and  of  its  powers  and  sus- 
ceptibilities. There  can  be  no  limit  to  the  progress  of 
mind  when  the  necessary  conditions  of  mental  growth  and 
development  are  fulfilled.  Two  great  truths  stand  re- 
vealed in  the  fact  before  us.  The  first  is  the  immortality 
of  mind  and  its  endless  development  during  the  progress 
of  that  immortality.  It  is  an  intuition  of  the  Universal 
Intelligence,  that  every  creature  is  created  for  a  certain 
destiny,  and  that  that  destiny  is  as  the  original  powers  of 
the  subject.  In  the  adaptation  of  mind  to  a  state  of  end- 
less progression,  its  immortal  existence  in  such  a  state  is 
most  clearly  revealed. 

In  the  same  great  fact  the  absolute  Infinity  and  Perfec- 
tion of  God  are  revealed  with  equal  distinctness.  Here,  in 
the  most  distinct  and  impressive  form  in  which  the  thing  is 
possible,  the  Infinite  is  embodied  in  the  Finite.  Here,  in 
characters  which  no  honest  inquirer  after  tLe  universal  truth 
can  fail  to  read  and  understand,  God  Las  pencilled  out, 
upon  the  works  of  his  hand,  his  own  Infinity  and  Perfection. 
Mind,  in  its  own  nature  finite,  is  adapted  and  destined  to 
a  state  of  endless  expansion,  —  an  expansion,  in  the  prog- 
ress of  which  it  will  and  must  outgrow  all  that  is  finite. 
Nothing  but  the  Infinite  and  Perfect  can,  by  any  possibil- 
ity, meet  the  endlessly  growing  necessities  of  such  a  being. 
God,  then,  is  Infinite  and  Perfect,  or  he  is  wholly  unable  to 
fill  out  capacities  for  good  which  he  has  himself  created. 
The  conception  itself  of  such  a  state,  and  the  generation 
of  powers  destined  and  adapted  to  it,  argue,  most  undeni- 
ably, Infinity  and  Perfection  in  the  Author  of  our  being. 
Such  must  be  his  character,  else  he  has  generated  capaci- 
ties for  real  good  which  nothing  finite,  not  even  himself, 
can  fill.     There  must  be   an  infinite  blank  in  creation,  if 


240  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

God  is  not  Infinite  and  Perfect.  Who  would,  for  a  mo- 
ment, entertain  the  sentiment,  that  mind,  in  its  endless 
progression  towards  Infinity  and  Perfection,  is  advancing 
towards  the  unreal,  and  is  drawn  in  that  direction  by  ideas 
of  the  unreal  instead  of  the  real  ? 

Let  us  again  turn  this  thought  over  for  a  few  moments. 
Suppose  that  it  were  the  design  of  God,  through  some 
finite  creation,  to  reveal  his  own  Infinity  and  Perfection, 
and  to  embody,  in  the  thing  created,  that  by  which  these 
attributes  of  the  Creator  should  be  revealed  and  affirmed. 
How  can  this  be  done,  unless  by  creating,  in  the  finite  and 
imperfect,  capacities  for  an  endless  approach  toward  Infin- 
ity and  Perfection  ?  If  such  a  fact  does  not  reveal  these 
perfections  in  God,  nothing  can.  Mind,  then,  as  "  the 
image  and  likeness  "  of  its  Author,  is  and  must  be,  to  it- 
self, a  perpetual  revelation  of  God's  Infinity  and  Perfec- 
tion. 

7.  To  this  one  idea  of  God,  and  to  that  only,  the  entire 
nature  of  universal  mind  is  fundamentally  adapted.  To  it 
all  its  powers  and  susceptibilities  exist  in  fixed  and  abso- 
lute correlation.  If  there  is  anything  to  which  reason  and 
science  impart  their  absolute  .sanction,  if  there  is  any- 
thing that  universal  observation  and  induction  affirm,  it  is, 
as  we  have  before  said,  the  validity  of  the  principles,  that 
for  every  universal  want  of  sentient  existence  there  is  a 
corresponding  provision,  and  for  every  fundamental  adap- 
tation, a  corresponding  reality.  The  direction  of  the 
needle  indicates  the  existence  and  action  of  a  cause  at- 
tracting it  thither.  Nature  never  vibrates  to  the  unreal, 
but  ever  to  the  real.  When  we  find  an  agency  adapted  to 
a  certain  sphere  of  activity,  we  know  that  there  is  a  cor- 
responding sphere  for  the  action  of  those  powers.     When 


GOD    THE   INFINITE   AND   PERFECT.  241 

we  find  a  susceptibility  to  a  certain  form  of  good,  we  know 
that  there  exists  the  corresponding  provision.  If  this  one 
principle  should  fail  us,  universal  nature  is  a  lie,  and  there 
is  no  faith  to  be  reposed  in  her  relations,  —  this  one  ex- 
cepted, that  she  is  never  to  be  trusted.  Now,  universal 
mind  is  fundamentally  constituted  in  fixed  and  changeless 
harmony  with  one  idea  of  God  and  of  that  only,  —  of  God  as 
a  self-conscious  personality,  possessed  of  all  possible  per- 
fections, and  each  infinite  in  its  nature ;  in  other  words, 
as  the  Infinite  and  Perfect. 

This  great  fact  of  universal  mind  demands  a  somewhat 
extended  elucidation.  Mind,  we  would  remark  in  the 
first  place,  is  not  only  constituted  for  a  state  of  endless 
growth  and  expansion,  but  this  form  of  development  is  an 
immutable  demand  of  its  nature.  Were  it  once  brought 
into  a  state  of  hopeless  stagnation  and  non-growth,  it 
would,  from  necessity,  be  immeasurably  wretched.  Now, 
the  growth  of  mind  must  depend  upon  the  range  and  com- 
pass of  its  ideas  of  realities  within  and  around  it.  It  can 
never,  by  airy  possibility,  expand  beyond  the  circle  of  such 
ideas.  Take  from  mind  the  idea  and  conviction  of  the  re- 
ality of  a  self-conscious  personality,  endowed  with  Infinity 
and  Perfection,  and  thus,  by  a  necessary  consequence,  limit 
the  range  of  its  powers  to  the  finite  and  imperfect,  and  ere 
long  there  is  an  inevitable  termination  of  mental  growth 
and  expansion.  Mind  must,  in  that  case,  cease  to  be,  or 
ever  after  remain  in  endless  stagnation  and  wretchedness. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  its  immortality  is  to  be  spent  in  the 
conscious  presence  of  Infinity  and  Perfection,  then  this 
great  demand  of  its  immortal  nature  will  be  eternally  met. 
That  God  should  be  both  Infinite  and  Perfect,  then,  is  an 
immutable  demand  of  man's  immortal  nature.  God  is  both 
21 


242  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

Infinite  and  Perfect,  or  he  has  created  universal  mind  in 
fixed  adaptations  not  only  to  immortality,  but  also  to  an 
immortality  the  most  glorious  and  blessed  conceivable,  and 
this  with  the  design  of  finally  extinguishing  the  light  of 
the  soul  in  the  abyss  of  annihilation,  or  necessitating  it  to 
spend  that  immortality  in  a  state  of  hopeless  wretchedness. 
Mind  was  not  only  constituted  for  immortal  growth  and 
expansion,  and  such  development  is  not  only  a  changeless 
demand  of  its  nature,  but  there  is  an  all-overshadowing  reali- 
ty, the  Infinite  and  Perfect,  upon  the  idea  of  which,  our  im- 
mortal powers  may  eternally  expand  in  beauty  and  perfec- 
tion, and  under  the  influence  of  which  this  great  demand 
of  our  being  may  be  forever  met,  in  a  state  of  consequent 
ceaseless  blessedness ;  and  this  great  fact  of  universal 
mind  is,  in  itself,  the  highest  demonstration  of  the  exist- 
ence of  this  reality. 

The  history  of  universal  mind,  in  all  ages,  is  but  an  un- 
varying commentary  upon,  and  an  affirmation  of,  the  truth 
of  the  above  statements.  Under  a  denial  of  the  being  and 
perfections  of  God,  mind  has  ever  put  on  a  blind,  bewil- 
dered and  lawless  form  of  activity,  in  which  the  harmonious 
growth  and  development  of  its  powers  have  become  an 
utter  impossibility.  Under  any  other  idea  of  him,  than  as 
Infinite  and  Perfect,  it  has  ever  been  subject  to  a  process  of 
intellectual  and  moral  deterioration  and  degradation.  Un- 
der the  influence  of  this  one  idea  of  God,  and  just  in  pro- 
portion to  its  emancipation  from  all  other  forms  of  that 
idea,  has  the  development  of  mind  been  uninterruptedly 
and  harmoniously  progressive.  The  history  of  mind,  from 
the  beginning  of  time  to  the  present  hour,  presents  us  with 
not  a  solitary  exception  to  the  above  statement.  God  is, 
then,  both  Infinite  and  Perfect,  or  the  idea  of  the  unreal 


GOD    THE    INFINITE    AND    PERFECT.  243 

and  immutable  faith  in  the  objective  validity  of  that  idea, 
is  the  irreversible  condition  of  continued  mental  growth 
and  blessedness. 

Mind,  also,  must  ever  have  its  dwelling-place  in  the 
presence  of  the  idea  and  conviction  of  its  own  immortalit}T. 
Let  this  idea  and  conviction  be  attended  with  an  implicit 
faith  in  the  being  and  absolute  Infinity  and  Perfection  of 
God,  and  the  vista  of  the  eternal  future  is  one  of  unmingled 
light  and  blessedness.  Connect  this  idea  and  conviction 
with  those  of  the  finiteness  and  imperfection  of  God,  and 
an  impenetrable  gloom  envelops  the  entire  vision  of  the 
soul's  immortality.  Mind  cannot  but  be  conscious  that 
its  endlessly  growing  necessities  in  the  former  case  may 
be,  and  in  the  latter  cannot  be,  met.  Hence,  it  holds  true, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  that  the  idea  of  immortality  has  ever 
been  to  the  mind  one  of  gloom  and  darkness,  under  any 
other  idea  of  God  than  that  of  his  Infinity  and  Perfection. 
Is  an  immovable  faith  in  the  unreal,  the  irreversible  con- 
dition of  mental  blessedness,  and  that  from  the  changeless 
laws  of  mind  ?  It  is  so,  or  God  is  possessed  of  the  attri- 
butes of  Infinity  and  Perfection. 

There  is,  also,  in  the  depths  of  mind,  an  unchangeable 
demand  for  the  continued  contemplation  of  one  all-over- 
shadowing reality,  endowed  with  the  attributes  of  Infinity 
and  Perfection,  and  an  adaptation  equally  fundamental 
to  the  relations  of  affectionate  intercommunion  with 
such  a  being.  The  individual  who  entertains  the  senti- 
ment that  there  is  no  God,  finds,  from  the  fixed  and  immu- 
table laws  of  his  mental  constitution,  a  painful  vacancy  in 
his  mind,  which  nothing  finite  or  imperfect  can  fill.  He  is, 
and  cannot  but  be,  mentally  wretched,  without,  perhaps, 
knowing  the  cause.     Similar  experience  is  the  immediate 


244  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

and  necessary  result  of  entertaining  any  idea  of  God  which 
does  not  involve  the  elements  of  Infinity  and  Perfection. 
The  mere  contemplation  of  a  being  embodying  such  per- 
fections, on  the  other  hand,  is,  of  itself,  a  well-spring  of  life 
in  the  mind.  In  the  conviction  that  it  is  the  object  of  the 
approbation  and  favor  of  such  a  being,  its  blessedness  is 
complete.  Under  the  opposite  conviction,  it  is,  from  the 
necessity  of  its  nature,  encompassed  with  the  gloom  of 
the  eternal  sepulchre.  Cicero  affirms  that  he  always  ex- 
perienced a  sentiment  of  dissatisfaction  with  the  highest 
productions  of  himself  and  all  other  men,  and  assigns  this 
as  the  reason,  that  his  mind  was  ever  aspiring  after  some- 
thing Infinite.  Here  he  has  fixed  upon  a  changeless  law 
of  universal  mind,  the  natural  and  necessary  tendency  of 
the  aspirations  of  whose  nature  is,  above  all  that  is  finite, 
toward  the  Infinite  and  Perfect,  as  its  fixed,  final,  and 
changeless  centre.  Are  all  these  immutable  attractions 
towards  the  unreal?  Let  antitheism  base  itself  upon 
such  an  assumption,  if  it  chooses.  Universal  mind,  in  the 
fundamental  department  of  its  nature,  is  the  immutable 
correlative  of  the  unreal,  or  God  is  both  Infinite  and  Per- 
fect. 

Worship  is  another  universal  and  changeless  tendenc}^ 
of  mind.  It  must  have  some  object  of  worship,  some  ob- 
ject in  which  its  supreme  regard  may  centre.  No  prin- 
ciple of  our  nature  is  stronger  or  more  universal  in  its 
action  than  this.  Now,  mind  is  so  constituted  that  if  any- 
thing finite  becomes  to  it  such  an  object,  mental  degrada- 
tion is  the  necessary  result,  —  a  statement  verified  by  the 
unvarying  experience  of  the  race.  With  no  object  of  wor- 
ship, it  becomes  dark  and  desolate,  a  lawless  meteor,  to 
which   is  "  reserved  the   blackness  of  darkness  forever." 


GOD    TIIE   INFINITE   AND    PERFECT.  245 

In  an  unwavering  faith  and  a  devout  worship  of  God  as 
Infinite  and  Perfect,  this  fundamental  demand  of  its  nature 
is  not  only  fully  met,  but  mind  puts  on  its  most  beautiful 
and  perfect  forms  of  development.  Such,  then,  is  the  char- 
acter of  God ;  or  universal  mind,  in  its  strongest  and  high- 
est attractions,  is  drawn  towards  the  unreal  instead  of  the 
real ;  than  which  no  supposition  is  more  unreasonable. 

The  well-being  of  mind  is  conditioned  upon  its  moral 
states  more  than  upon  all  other  causes  combined.  This 
statement  no  one  will  deny.  Now,  when  mind  divorces  it- 
self from  a  belief  in  God  and  allegiance  to  his  throne,  or 
worships  him  in  any  other  form  than  as  the  Infinite  and 
Perfect,  it  becomes  subject  to  an  undivided  and  degrading 
selfishness,  the  slave  of  its  own  lower  propensities.  The 
history  of  the  race  presents  us  with  not  a  solitary  exception 
1o  this  statement.  Without  God,  or  under  the  influence  of 
any  idea  of  him  but  one,  mind,  from  the  immutable  laws 
of  its  moral  nature,  loses  its  moral  balance  ;  its  action  con- 
sequently becomes  disordered,  and  its  susceptibilities  the 
prey  of  dark  and  desolating  influences.  It  is  only  in  the 
conscious  presence  of  the  Infinite  and  Perfect,  and  when  all 
its  powers  are  balanced  hy  an  unwavering  faith  in  God  as 
possessed  of  such  perfections,  that  mind  does  or  can  attain 
to  the  mastery  of  its  own  spirit  and  to  the  consequent  frui- 
tion of  that  form  of  blessedness  to  which  all  the  higher  de- 
partments of  its  nature  are  adapted.  Such  is  the  nature  of 
mind,  —  the  immutable  law  of  its  entire  moral  activit}^. 
Can  we  suppose  that  the  only  real  regulative  principle  of 
moral  action  in  universal  mind  is  faith  in  the  unreal  ?  This 
must  be  true,  we  answer  again,  or  God  is  both  Infinite  and 
Perfect. 

Let  us  contemplate  still  further  this  important  depart- 
21* 


246  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

ment  of  our  subject.  Mind  is  so  constituted  that  it  must 
apprehend  the  idea  of  God  as  Infinite  and  Perfect,  whether 
it  believes  in  his  existence  or  not.  Now,  in  the  presence 
of  the  idea  of  such  a  being,  it  cannot  but  apprehend  also  an 
idea  of  what  such  a  being  —  supposing  him  to  exist  —  would 
require,  in  every  condition  in  life,  that  we  should  be  and  do. 
No  idea  conceivable  is  so  well  adapted  to  awaken  in  us  cor- 
rect apprehensions  of  what  we  ought  to  be  and  to  do.  As  a 
regulative  idea  of  moral  judgment,  none  other  does  or  can 
compare  with  that  of  God  as  the  Infinite  and  Perfect.  This 
is  undeniable.  Suppose  that  the  mind  apprehends  this  idea, 
which  it  must  have,  as  representing  an  actually  existing 
personality  of  corresponding  perfections.  It,  then,  as  it 
apprehends  the  right  and  the  wrong,  must  conceive  of 
itself  as  actually  required  by  such  a  being,  —  a  being  upon 
whom  it  apprehends  its  entire  interests  here  and  hereafter 
as  hanging  in  absolute  dependence,  —  to  do  the  right  and 
avoid  the  wrong.  Then  it  finds  itself  under  influences,  of 
all  others  actual  or  conceivable,  best  adapted  to  induce 
absolute  rectitude  of  character  and  conduct.  The  moral 
nature  of  mind,  then,  is  fundamentally  adapted  to  action 
under  the  influence  of  this  one  idea  of  God,  and  a  corre- 
sponding belief  in  his  actual  existence,  and  is,  also,  as  fun- 
damentally unadapted  to  act  under  any  opposite  ideas  and 
convictions.  Either  the  moral  nature  of  mind  is  a  lie,  there- 
fore, or  God  exists  as  the  alone  Infinite  and  Perfect.  There 
is  no  escaping  this  conclusion.  If  God  does  not  exist  as 
such  a  being,  then  the  immutable  condition  of  the  highest 
possible  form  of  moral  beauty  and  perfection  possible  to 
finite  rational  beings  is  an  immutable  faith  in  the  unreal  and 
the  untrue,  than  which  no  absurdity  can  be  greater. 


GOD    THE   INFINITE    A  XT)    PERFECT.  247 

We  remark,  again,  that  all  the  moral  ideas  and  principles  of 
mind  clearly  indicate  that  it  was  created  and  fundamentally 
adapted  to  exist  and  act  as  the  subject  of  a  system  of  moral 
government.  All  the  natural  and  moral  tendencies  of  our 
nature  render  us  governmental  beings.  When  men  are 
brought  into  social  relations  to  each  other,  it  is  as  natural 
for  them  to  organize  sj^stems  of  civil,  domestic,  and  moral 
administration,  to  which  each  and  all  are  alike  subject,  as 
it  is  to  seek  any  other  good  whatever.  Government  estab- 
lished supposes  an  administrator,  and  moral  government 
a  moral  administrator.  All  the  moral  ideas  and  principles 
of  our  nature  are  correlative  to  one  idea,  to  wit,  that  of  an 
ultimate  system  of  absolutely  perfect  moral  administration  ; 
a  system  in  which  all  the  moral  disorders  now  existing  will 
be  fully  corrected  and  redressed,  in  which  virtue  and  vice 
will  each  receive  its  appropriate  rewards,  and  the  reign  of 
perfect  justice  and  eternal  truth  be  rendered  forever  trium- 
phant over  all  opposition. 

Such  is  the  system  of  moral  administration  demanded  by 
the  moral  nature  of  all  rational  existences,  and  nothing  but 
Infinity  and  Perfection  in  the  administrator  can  possibly 
realize  such  a  system.  Now,  unless  there  is  in  the  moral 
nature  of  universal  mind  a  fundamental  adaptation  to  the 
unreal,  and  to  that  only,  a  S3^stem  of  perfect  moral  admin- 
istration does  in  fact  exist,  —  a  system  administered  by  a 
moral  governor  Infinite  and  Perfect  in  all  his  attributes. 

There  is  one  other  view  of  the  present  subject,  —  the  de- 
mands of  mind,  —  which  should  not  be  overlooked  in  this 
connection.  Mind  is  constituted  with  a  deep  and  profound 
consciousness  of  dependence,  for  the  supply  of  its  great 
and  endlessly  growing  necessities,  upon  a  power  out  of  and 


248  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

above  itself.  Its  nature  immutably  demands  some  power 
higher  than  itself  to  lean  and  rest  upon.  This  no  one  will 
deny.  Now,  this  sentiment  of  want  and  dependence  can  be 
met  and  satisfied  by  nothing  short  of  absolute  all-sufficiency 
in  the  object  of  the  mind's  trust  aud  confidence.  Hence,  in 
the  midst  of  the  mutable  and  transitory,  it  naturally  seeks 
the  immutable  and  permanent,  and  the  sentiment  under  con- 
sideration never  is  and  never  can  be  fully  met  and  satisfied 
till  the  mind  finds  itself  leaning  upon  a  trust  in  the  Infi- 
nite and  Perfect.  Immutable  necessities  exist  without  cor- 
respondiug  provisions,  and  immutable  adaptations  without 
the  correlated  objects,  or  God  is  both  Infinite  and  Per- 
fect. 

8.  The  argument  above  adduced  will  be  seen  to  possess 
the  highest  possible  force,  when  viewed  in  relation  to  a  fun- 
damental law  of  the  Intelligence,  —  a  law  to  which  we  have 
before  alluded.  To  the  Intelligence,  the  terms  finite  aud 
infinite,  imperfect  and  perfect,  are  correlative  terms,  and 
the  ideas  designated  by  them  correlative  ideas.  The  idea 
of  the  finite  and  imperfect  cannot  be  in  the  mind  without 
that  of  the  Infinite  and  Perfect.  We  cannot  conceive  of  a 
being  of  finite  and  consequently  imperfect  capacities,  with- 
out, at  the  same  time,  having  the  idea  of  God  as  the  Infinite 
and  Perfect.  While  this  is  the  fixed  law  of  the  Intelligence, 
that  in  the  presence  of  the  finite  and  imperfect  it  shall  con- 
ceive of  the  Infinite  and  Perfect,  we  find  that  all  the  higher 
spiritual  and  moral  departments  of  our  nature  exist  in  im- 
mutable correlation  to  two  fundamental  ideas,  —  that  of  a 
universe  material  and  mental,  —  a  universe  finite  and  im- 
perfect, on  the  one  hand,  and  such  a  universe  hanging  in 
dependence  upon  and  presided  over  by  a  being  Infinite  and 
Perfect,  on  the  other.     The  universe  we  necessarily  appre- 


GOD    THE   INFINITE   AND   PERFECT.  249 

bend  as  thus  finite  and  imperfect,  and  we  cannot  but  know 
that,  if  its  interests  are  under  the  control  of  Infinity  and 
Perfection,  then  they  are  eternally  safe,  and  that  they  can 
be  safe  on  no  other  condition.  Now,  from  the  laws  of  our 
mental,  moral,  and  spiritual  constitution,  we  can  be  really 
and  truly  happy,  —  we  can  possess  in  ourselves,  and  rela- 
tively to  ourselves  and  the  universe,  a  deep  and  permanent 
sense  of  security  such  as  our  nature  immutably  demands, 
but  under  the  conviction  that,  while  such  is  the  universe  in 
fact,  such  also  is  its  God.  This  fact  cannot  be  denied. 
God,  then,  is  both  Infinite  and  Perfect,  or  he  has  intention- 
ally created  universal  mind  so  that  its  highest  well-being  is 
irreversibly  conditioned  on  its  disbelief  in  the  real  and  the 
true,  and  an  immutable  faith  in  the  unreal  and  untrue.  No 
demonstration  is  or  can  be  more  absolute  than  this. 

There  is  a  perfect  analogy  between  the  argument  as  above 
conducted  and  the  entire  procedure  of  the  Intelligence  in 
the  natural  sciences.  The  direction  of  the  needle  to  the 
pole,  for  example,  indicates  the  existence  of  a  reality  ade- 
quate and  adapted  to  draw  it  in  that  direction.  Nature  has 
no  attraction  towards  the  unreal.  This  is  a  universal  and 
necessary  intuition.  Now,  mind  is  so  constituted,  that,  in 
the  presence  of  the  finite  and  imperfect,  it  necessarily  ap- 
prehends the  Infinite  and  Perfect.  Everything  finite,  also, 
has  in  it  the  element  of  imperfection ;  and  mind,  from  its 
immutable  constitution  and  laws,  is  impressed  with  the  sen- 
timent of  want  and  dissatisfaction  in  the  presence  of  the 
imperfect,  and  impelled  to  seek  for  the  perfect,  —  in  other 
words,  the  Infinite,  — which  alone  does  and  can  embrace  the 
perfect  in  its  absoluteness.  The  fixed  and  immutable  ten- 
dency, therefore,  of  universal  mind  is,  from  nature,  finite 
and  imperfect,  to  something  out  of  and  above  nature,  the 


250  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

Infinite  and  Perfect.  This  is  the  fixed  and  changeless  cen- 
tre towards  which  its  immortal  powers  perpetually  and  im- 
mutably tend.  Is  that  tendency  towards  the  unreal  ?  Anti- 
theism  answers,  Yes.  The  response  of  universal  nature 
is,  No.  Otherwise  the  entire  procedure  of  universal  sci- 
ence has  its  basis  in  fundamental  error. 

9.  One  other  great  fact  bearing  upon  our  present  investi- 
gations claims  our  special  attention  in  this  connection.  We 
refer  to  the  different  effects  which  universal  mind  of  neces- 
sity experiences  in  acting  in  harmony  with  the  idea  of  God 
as  Infinite  and  Perfect,  on  the  one  hand,  and  in  harmony 
with  the  opposite  idea,  on  the  other.  When  our  activity  is 
in  the  direction  of  the  real  and  in  harmony  with  its  charac- 
ter, we  are  conscious  of  acting  in  harmony  with  the  funda- 
mental laws  and  adaptations  of  our  own  being.  When  we 
act  in  the  opposite  direction,  we  cannot  but  be  conscious  of 
a  violation  of  these  laws  and  adaptations.  In  the  former 
case,  mind  is  conscious  that  it  has  found  its  appropriate 
sphere  of  action.  In  the  latter,  it  cannot  but  feel  that  it  is 
out  of  its  place.  There  are  no  exceptions  to  these  state- 
ments, and  can  be  none.  Now,  when  mind  acts  in  harmony 
with  the  idea  of  God  as  Infinite  and  Perfect,  we  cannot  be 
more  distinctly  conscious  that  we  exist  at  all,  than  we  are 
that  all  our  activity  is  in  full  and  perfect  harmony  with  all 
the  fundamental  laws  and  adaptations  of  our  entire  mental 
being,  our  own  nature  giving  its  most  absolute  testimony 
to  the  reality  of  the  object  towards  which  our  activity  is 
directed.  Precisely  opposite  results  do,  and  cannot,  from 
the  changeless  laws  of  our  mental  constitution,  but  attend 
all  forms  of  activity  in  a  different  or  opposite  direction  rela- 
tive to  the  idea  of  God.   All  such  forms  of  action  are  a  war 


GOD    THE    INFINITE    AND    PERFECT,  251 

upon  nature,  — a  violent  reversal  of  all  the  laws  and  adapta- 
tions of  our  immortal  being. 

Here  is  a  form  of  evidence,  of  the  highest  validity,  of  the 
being  and  perfections  of  God,  of  which  no  one  can  be  desti- 
tute without  infinite  guilt.  No  one  will  affirm  that  the  uni- 
verse of  matter  and  mind  presents  no  evidence  of  this  great 
truth.  On  the  other  hand,  he  cannot  but  be  aware  that 
there  is  absolutely  no  evidence  of  an  opposite  nature.  What 
excuse  can  we  have,  then,  for  not  acting  in  the  line  of  such 
evidence,  whether  we  may  regard  it  as  demonstrative  or 
not,  when  such  an  infinite  reality  draws  us  in  that  direc- 
tion, and  such  infinite  interests  may,  to  say  the  least,  be 
involved  in  such  action,  and  when  we  thus  act,  the  evidence 
that  we  are  acting  in  the  direction  of  the  real,  perpetually 
accumulates  upon  us  (such  being  the  harmony  of  our  activ- 
ity with  the  laws  and  adaptations  of  our  entire  mental  na- 
ture) till  conviction  becomes  absolute,  and  doubt  an  impos- 
sibility? Let  us  only  follow  the  necessary  instincts  and 
convictions  of  our  minds,  and  begin  to  worship,  to  pray, 
and  to  obey  the  behests  of  our  own  consciences,  as  our  own 
nature  prompts  us  to  do,  as  the  direct  commands  of  the  Infi- 
nite and  Perfect,  and  we  have  a  perpetually  growing  intuition 
of  the  reality  of  the  being  of  God,  which  is  as  the  "  shining 
light,"  continually  dawning  on  to  the  ''perfect  day." 

•THE    AUGUMENT    SUMMARILY    STATED. 

The  following  is  a  summary  statement  of  the  argument 
for  the  Infinity  and  Perfection  of  God  presented  in  this 
chapter : 

1.  God,  as  shown  in  the  preceding  chapter,  does  exist  as 
a  free,  intelligent,  self-conscious  Personality  of  absolute 
moral  rectitude  and  excellence. 


252  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

2.  The  necessary  deduction  from  this  fact  is,  that  as  the 
universe,  material  and  mental,  is  what  it  is,  from  choice 
and  design  on  the  part  of  God,  it  is  not  in  any  department, 
much  less  in  that  of  mind,  correlated  to  the  unreal  in  God. 
Not  to  suppose  this  would  be  a  contradiction  of  his  moral 
rectitude. 

3.  In  no  department  of  nature,  mental  or  physical,  does 
the  least  form  or  degree  of  evidence  exist  of  finiteness  or 
imperfection  in  God,  nor  is  there  any  antecedent  probabil- 
ity in  favor  of  such  a  supposition. 

4.  While  the  material  creation  does  not  and  cannot  pre- 
sent absolute  proof  of  God's  Infinity,  it  does  present  all 
possible  indications  of  an  infallible  wisdom  which  implies 
such  Perfection  in  God. 

5.  Infinity  and  Perfection  are  involved  in  our  necessary 
conception  of  God  as  the  Unconditioned  Cause :  at  least 
no  other  idea  so  truly  and  adequately  represents  the  essen- 
tial elements  of  our  necessary  conceptions  of  such  a  cause. 

6.  In  constituting  mind  with  capacities  for  the  endless 
progression  of  all  its  faculties,  God  has  pencilled  out  in  the 
finite  the  most  absolute  indications  of  his  own  Infinity  and 
Perfection. 

7.  While  mind  is  so  constituted  that  it  must  have  the 
idea  of  God  as  a  self-conscious  Personality  absolutely  Infi- 
nite and  Perfect,  all  the  higher  departments  of  its  nature 
are  immutably  correlated  to  this  one  idea  of  him,  and  that 
exclusively.  Mind,  then,  was  intentionally  constituted  as 
the  immutable  correlation  of  the  unreal  and  untrue,  or  God 
is  both  Infinite  and  Perfect.  Such  is  and  must  be  the  attri- 
butes of  God,  or  nature,  in  its  highest  developments,  the 
laws  of  mind,  and  God,  too,  are  a  lie. 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT.  253 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  DISJUNCTIVE  ARGUMENT ;  OR,  REALISM  AS  OP- 
POSED TO  MATERIALISM,   ON   THE  ONE  HAND, 
AND  IDEALISM,   ON  THE  OTHER. 

There  is  a  certain  fixed  relation  between  a  man's  sys- 
tem of  philosophy  and  that  of  his  theology,  —  the  essential 
characteristics  of  the  former  always  determining  those 
of  the  latter.  Antitheism,  in  all  the  multiplied  phases 
which  it  has  assumed,  has  always  taken  its  peculiar  forms 
from,  and  found  its  basis  in,  corresponding  S3rstems  of  phi- 
losophy. The  same  remarks  holds  also  of  Theism.  The 
individual  that  believes  in  a  God,  holds  a  system  of  philos- 
ophy that  conducts  him  to  such  belief.  His  theology  may 
modify  his  philosophy.  It  will  remain  equally  true,  how- 
ever, that  his  philosophy  will  act  or  react  upon  his  theol- 
ogy, and,  in  many  important  particulars,  determine  its  es- 
sential characteristics.  From  the  laws  of  our  mental  con- 
stitution, it  cannot  be  otherwise.  God,  in  the  establish- 
ment of  that  constitution,  has  joined  these  two  departments 
of  human  research  together,  and  man,  if  he  would,  cannot 
put  them  asunder.  If  an  individual  discards  philosophy 
altogether,  he  does  so,  because  he  holds  a  system  of  philos- 
ophy which  requires  him  to  do  it.  The  best  antidote  to 
false  systems  of  theology  is  the  rectification  of  those  of  the 
philosophy  on  which  the  former  are  based.  The  Antithe- 
ism of  the  present  age  is  somewhat  peculiar  in  its  charac- 
22 


254  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

teristics,  for  the  reason  that  it  has  its  sources  in  systems 
of  philosophy  of  corresponding  peculiarities.  We  propose, 
in  the  present  chapter,  an  examination  of  such  systems  as 
contrasted  with  what  we  regard  as  philosophy  not  "  falsely 
so  called."  All  such  systems,  whether  true  or  false,  bor- 
row their  fundamental  characteristics  from  certain  ideas 
entertained  of  the  universe,  material  and  mental,  and  con- 
sequently divide  themselves  into  two  classes,  to  wit,  those 
which  affirm  said  universe,  in  its  fundamental  characteris- 
tics, as  apprehended  by  the  Intelligence,  to  be  real,  and 
those  which  affirm  it  to  be,  in  whole  or  in  part,  unreal. 

"  We  have,  therefore,  intended  to  say,"  says  Kant,  in 
giving  the  results  of  his  philosophy,  "  that  all  our  in- 
tuition is  nothing  but  the  representation  of  phenomena ; 
that  the  things  which  we  invisage  "  [perceive  and  form  no- 
tions and  judgments  of]  "  are  not  that  in  themselves  for 
which  we  take  them ;  neither  are  their  relationships  in 
themselves  so  constituted  as  they  appear  to  us,  and  that  if 
we  do  away  with  the  subjective  quality  of  our  sense  in  gen- 
eral, every  quality,  all  relationships  of  objects  in  space  and 
time,  nay,  even  space  and  time,  would  disappear,  and  can- 
not exist  as  phenomena  in  themselves,  but  only  in  us.  .  .  . 
It  remains  wholly  unknown  to  us  what  may  be  the  nature  of 
the  objects  in  themselves,  separate  from  all  the  receptivity 
of  our  sensibility.  We  know  nothing  but  our  manner  of 
perceiving  them,  which  is  peculiar  to  us,  and  which  need 
not  belong  to  every  being,  although  to  every  man.  With 
this  we  have  only  to  do."  Here  is  very  clearly  laid  down 
the  line  of  demarcation  between  the  various  possible  sys- 
tems of  philosophy,  to  wit,  those  that  maintain  that  the 
objects  of  our  intuitions,  ideas,  notions,  and  judgments 
are,  and  those  which  maintain  that  they  are  not,  in  their 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT.  255 

essential  characteristics  and  relationships,  "  that  for  which 
we  take  them."  We  purpose  to  consider  the  various  sys- 
tems which  lie  on  each  side  of  this  line,  in  their  order. 


SECTION  I. 

PRELIMINARY    TOPICS. 

Before  proceeding  to  these  important  inquiries,  two  top- 
ics, of  fundamental  importance  to  a  right  understanding  of 
this  whole  subject,  require  special  elucidation,  to  wit,  the 
number  of  possible  hypotheses  which  present  themselves  for 
our  consideration,  and  the  tests  by  which  we  may  distin- 
guish the  true  from  the  false.  To  these  questions,  atten- 
tion will  now  be  directed. 

POSSIBLE  OR    SUPPOSABLE    HYPOTHESES. 

We  will  commence  with  a  statement  of  the  only  possible 
hypotheses  which  present  themselves  for  our  consideration, 
—  hypotheses,  all  of  which  have  their  bases  in  distinct  and 
opposite  theories  of  knowledge.  As  preparatory  to  a 
statement  of  these  hypotheses,  we  would  invite  special  at- 
tention to  the  following  principles  which  have  a  funda- 
mental bearing  upon  our  inquiries,  and  which  will  be  ad- 
mitted by  every  reflecting  mind  to  be  self-evidently  true  : 

Primary  principles  bearing  upon  our  present  inquiries. 

1.  Existence,  in  all  its  forms,  actual  and  conceivable,  is, 
as  shown  in  the  Introduction,  a  mystery.  A  priori,  we 
can  determine  absolutely  nothing  in  respect  to  the  ques- 
tion, what  forms  of  existence,  the  conception  of  which  is 
not  self-contradictory,  do  and  do  not  exist.     There  is  no 


256  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

form  or  degree  of  antecedent  probability  for  or  against  the 
idea  that  matter  or  spirit,  as  apprehended  by  our  Intelli- 
gence, does  or  does  not  exist ;  and  there  is  just  as  much  a. 
priori  probability  in  favor  of  the  hypothesis  that  both  ex- 
ist together,  as  that  either  exists  alone,  or  that  neither 
exists  at  all.  So  there  is  no  antecedent  or  a  priori  prob- 
ability for  or  against  the  Irypothesis,  that  matter,  finite 
spirit,  and  God,  as  apprehended  by  the  general  Intelligence, 
do  all  actually  exist.     Consequently, 

2.  Whatever  is  actually  manifested  as  existing  must  be 
admitted  as  real,  the  question  of  its  existence  being  abso- 
lutely settled  by  the  fact  of  its  manifestation. 

3.  When  any  reality  is  manifested  as  existing,  its  actual 
existence  is  not  only  to  be  admitted,  but  also  that  of  all 
other  realities  necessarily  implied  by  such  fact.  If,  for 
example,  we  admit  the  actual  existence  of  matter  (body), 
we  must  also  admit  the  objective  reality  of  space,  because, 
the  latter  not  existing,  the  former  could,  by  no  possibility, 
exist.     So  in  all  other  like  cases. 

4.  The  condition  of  the  possibility  of  knowledge  is  the  ex- 
istence of  a  subject  sustaining  to  actual  existences  the 
relation  of  a  power,  and  they  to  it  that  of  objects  of  real 
knowledge,  and  these  in  such  relations  to  each  other  that 
actual  knowledge  arises  in  consequence  of  this  correlation. 

5.  The  sphere  of  the  conceivably  knowable  is  all  realities 
as  they  are,  with  all  their  properties,  laws,  and  relations ; 
that  of  the  actually  knowable,  in  any  given  case,  depends 
upon  the  extent  in  which  the  conditions  of  knowledge  are 
or  ma}^  be  fulfilled  between  any  given  power  of  knowledge 
and  its  correlated  objects. 

6.  We  can  no  more  determine,  a  priori,  whether  a  power 
of  knowledge  does  or  does  not  exist,  or  what  is  its  sphere, 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT.  257 

than  we  thus  determine  what  realities  do  or  not  exist.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  existence  of  a  power  of  knowledge  can, 
by  no  possibility,  be  manifested  but  by  its  conscious  exer- 
cise in  a  given  subject,  or  by  its  manifestation  as  exercised 
by  some  other  subject,  and  the  great  question  in  philosophy, 
to  wit,  What  can  I  know?  can  be  answered  but  through 
these  two,  namely,  What  do  I  in  fact  know  ?  and  What  is 
implied  in  such  knowledge  ? 

7.  There  are  but  three  conceivable  forms  in  which  any 
reality  can  be  known  to  us :  prese?itatively,  that  is,  by  di- 
rect and  immediate  perception  or  intutition  ;  •  representa- 
tively, that  is,  as  an  unknown  cause  of  some  conscious 
mental  state ;  and  impliedly,  that  is,  as  necessarily  sup- 
posed as  the  condition  of  the  existence,  or  as  the  logical 
consequent  of  that  which  is  known  to  exist. 

8.  In  determining  our  theory  of  existence,  that  is,  in  de- 
termining what  realities  do  exist,  we  are  to  admit  nothing  as 
real  which  is  not  manifested  as  such  in  one  or  the  other  of 
the  forms  named,  and  we  are  to  hold,  as  actual,  all  forms  of 
being  thus  manifested,  and  as  manifested.*  As  all  of  the 
principles  above  named  are  too  self-evident  to  admit  of 
their  being  doubted  or  denied,  we  proceed,  at  once,  to  give 
a  statement  of  the  only  conceivable  or  possible  systems  of 
Ontology,  or  hypotheses  which  claim  our  attention  in  the 
present  chapter. 

The  only  conceivable  systems  of  Ontology. 

In  determining  what  realities  do  exist,  and  that  from  what 
have  been  known  in  one  or  the  other,  or  all  of  the  forms 

*  See  all  these  principles  stated  and  elucidated  in  "  The  Science  of  Logic," 
pp.  381-386. 

22* 


258  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

named,  as  actually  existing,  the  following  hypotheses  pre- 
sent themselves,  namely :  — 

1.  Realism.  We  may  suppose  that  the  knowing  faculty 
has  a  direct  and  immediate  or  presentative  knowledge  of  the 
existence  and.  essential  qualities  of  matter,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  of  mind  or  spirit  (finite  spirit  as  distinct 
from  matter),  on  the  other.  We  then  affirm  as  realities 
actually  known,  matter  and  finite  spirit  both,  and  hold  as 
real  all  existences  and  relations  of  existence  necessarily 
implied  by  the  existence  and  relations  of  these  two  substances. 
This  gives  us  the  system,  or  hypothesis,  of  Realism.  Accord- 
ing to  its  fundamental  teachings  and  deductions,  the  uni- 
verse, material  and  mental,  as  given  in  the  Intelligence,  is 
"  that  in  itself  for  which  we  take  it ; "  and  God,  the  Infinite 
and  Perfect,  as  the  Unconditioned  Cause  of  the  facts  of  this 
actually  existing  and  really  known  universe,  exists,  also, 
as  a  real  and  actualty  known  personality. 

2.  Materialism.  We  may  assume,  in  the  next  place,  that 
the  knowing  faculty  has  a  real  or  presentative  knowledge 
of  matter  only,  the  object,  while  the  subject,  what  we  call 
spirit,  is  wholly  unknown.  We,  then,  resolve  all  real  ex- 
istences into  matter,  and  assume  that  what  is  called  spirit, 
as  distinct  from  matter,  is  nothing,  after  all,  but  matter 
in  a  certain  state  of  development.  This  is  Materialism, 
and  the  necessary  logical  consequence  of  the  hypothesis  is 
a  denial  of  the  being  of  God,  or  the  dogma  of  Atheism. 

3.  Ideal  Dualism.  We  may,  in  the  next  place,  while  we 
admit  the  reality  of  a  subject  and  object  in  knowledge,  as- 
sume that  we  have  no  real  or  presentative  knowledge  of 
either ;  that  all  knowledge  is  exclusively  phenomenal,  and 
never  real ;  and  that,  consequently,  both  the  subject  and 
object,  as  they  exist  in  themselves,  are  wholly  unknown 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT.  259 

and  unknowable  to  us.  The  universe  of  matter  and  spirit, 
which  we  apprehend  as  real,  is  not  that  in  reality  u  for 
which  we  take  it."  It  has,  on  the  other  hand,  only  an  ideal 
existence,  and  God  is  nothing  but  the  ideal  cause  of  that 
which,  in  reality,  has  no  substantial  being.  This  is  the 
system  of  Ideal  Dualism. 

4.  Subjective  Idealism.  While  we  assume  that  all 
knowledge  is  phenomenal,  we  may  deny  the  reality  of  the 
external  unknown  cause,  or  object,  and  assume  the  un- 
known subject  to  be  both  subject  and  cause  of  all  phenom- 
ena. The  subject,  the  I,  would,  consequently,  be  the  only 
real  existence.  The  universe  which  Ave  apprehend  as  real, 
would,  as  in  the  hypothesis  of  Ideal  Dualism,  have  no  real, 
but  only  an  ideal  existence,  and  God,  as  before,  would  be 
only  the  ideal  author  and  cause  of  that  which  exists  only 
in  idea.     This  is  the  system  of  Subjective  Idealism. 

5.  Objective  Idealism.  While  we  adopt  the  assumption, 
that  all  knowledge  is  phenomenal  and  not  real,  we  may 
deiry  the  reality  of  the  subject,  and  assume  that  the  object 
is  the  only  reality,  and  that  all  phenomena,  even  the  I  it- 
self, are  only  developments  and  forms  of  manifestation  of 
this  one  alone  real  substance,  —  a  substance  commonly  de- 
nominated the  Infinite  and  the  Absolute,  or  God.  This  object, 
God,  and  this  alone,  has  real  being.  All  else  is  phenome- 
nal only.  According  to  the  logical  consequences  of  this 
hypothesis,  God  and  nature  are  not  distinct,  but  one  and 
the  same  existence,  —  the  term  nature  representing  the  idea 
of  God  in  a  state  of  development.  God,  as  distinct  from 
nature,  and  the  author  of  it,  that  is,  —  the  God  of  Realism, 
—  has  no  existence.  This  hypothesis,  which  is  properly 
called  Objective  Idealism,  has  been  denominated,  inasmuch 


2 GO  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

as  it  identifies  nature  and  all  realities  with  God,  the  sys- 
tem of  Universal  Identity,  or  Pantheism. 

6.  Pure  Idealism.  While  we  assume  that  all  knowledge 
is  exclusively  phenomenal,  we  may,  we  remark  in  the  last 
place,  deny  the  reality  of  both  the  subject  and  object  as 
real  existences,  and  assume  that  there  is  an  absolute  iden- 
tity of  being  and  knowing.  Knowing,  thought  itself,  ac- 
cording to  this  hypothesis,  is  the  only  and  exclusive  real- 
ity, and  God  is  only  an  inhering  law  of  thought.  This  is 
the  sj^stem  of  Absolute  Identity,  or  Pure  Idealism. 

Each  of  the  above-named  hypotheses  takes,  and  that  of 
necessity,  its  peculiar  and  special  form  from  the  peculiar 
and  special  theory  of  knowledge  which  lies  at  its  basis.  As 
these  are  the  onty  possible  theories  of  knowledge,  so  the 
above  are  the  only  possible  systems  of  Ontology.  As  they 
are  contradictory  theories  and  really  include  all  possible 
hypotheses  relatively  to  being,  or  in  respect  to  the  ques- 
tion, What  realities  do  and  do  not  exist?  one  of  these 
hypotheses  must  be  true,  and  all  the  others  false.  If  Real- 
ism is  valid,  all  the  others  are  false,  and  Theism  is  true. 
If  any  one  of  the  others  is  true,  Realism,  and  with  it  The- 
ism, must  be  false.  We  are,  therefore,  now  in  the  presence 
of  the  disjunctive  argument  for  the  being  of  God,  and  the 
argument  may  take  either  of  two  directions,  or  both  to- 
gether. We  may,  in  the  first  place,  prove  Realism  true, 
and  then  immediately  infer  that  all  the  other  hypotheses 
must  be  false.  Or,  we  may  prove  all  these  hypotheses 
false,  and  hence  infer  the  validity  of  that  of  Realism,  and, 
as  a  necessary  consequence,  the  truth  of  Theism.  Or,  fi- 
nally, we  may  prove  Realism  true,  and,  by  an  independent 
train  of  argument,  prove  each  of  these  hypotheses  to  be 
false,  and  then,  for  these  double  and  demonstrably  valid 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT.  2G1 

reasons,  infer  the  truth  of  Theism.  We  propose,  in  the 
following  investigations,  to  accomplish  all  these  objects. 
We  shall  then  have  the  strongest  possible  argument  for  the 
truth  of  Theism,  inasmuch  as  we  shall  have  demonstrated 
the  fact  that  it  cannot  be  false,  and  must  be  true. 

Tests  to  be  allied,  in  determining  which  of  these  hypotheses 
is  valid. 

We  now  advance  to  a  consideration  of  the  fundamental 
criteria,  or  tests,  by  which  we  may  determine  which  of  these 
theories  is  true,  and  which  is  false.  Among  such  criteria, 
we  adduce  the  following  :  — 

1.  The  true  theory  will  take  into  account  all  the  facts  of 
Consciousness,  with  all  their  essential  characteristics,  just 
as  they  are,  supposing  nothing  which  does  not  exist,  and 
omitting  nothing  which  does  exist. 

2.  The  principles  of  this  theory  will  readily  account  for 
all  these  facts,  with  all  their  characteristics,  and  that  with- 
out exception. 

3.  The  principles  of  this  theory  will  be  necessarily 
implied  by  these  phenomena,  and  all  its  deductions  will 
be  necessary  logical  consequents  of  these  principles  and 
phenomena,  so  that  it  will  be  manifest,  not  only  that  this 
system  must  be  true,  but  that  all  contradictory  ones  must 
be  false. 

Every  theory  possessing  these  characteristics,  it  will 
readily  be  seen,  cannot  be  feilse,  and  every  one  wanting  or 
contradicting  them,  cannot  be  true.  Suppose,  for  example, 
a  theory  is  constructed  which  accords  only  with  a  part  of 
the  real  facts  of  Consciousness.  That  one  circumstance  is 
an  absolute  demonstration  of  the  fact,  that  such  theory  is 


262  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

founded   in  error ;  for,  if  it  were  true,  it  would  not  only 
accord  with,  but  be  demanded  by,  the  facts  referred  to. 


SECTION  II. 

THE    TRUE    HYPOTHESIS,    OR   REALISM. 

We  now  return  to  an  investigation  of  the  theories  under 
consideration.  All  systems  which  come  under  the  first 
class,  however  diverse  they  may  be  in  their  details,  with 
which  we  now  have  nothing  to  do,  will  possess  the  follow- 
ing characteristics : 

General  characteristics  of  this  hypothesis. 

1.  Knowledge  implies  two  things,  —  an  object  to  be 
known,  and  a  subject  capable  of  knowing.  Between  the 
nature  of  the  subject  and  object  such  a  correlation  exists 
that  when  the  appropriate  conditions  are  fulfilled,  knowl- 
edge arises  as  the  necessary  result  of  this  correlation. 

2.  Between  mind  and  realities  within  and  around  it  this 
correlation  exists.  It  is  relatively  to  them  a  power,  and 
they  are  relatively  to  it  objects  of  real  knowledge.  Matter, 
Spirit,  Time,  and  Space,  for  example,  are  to  mind  such 
objects,  and  it  is  to  them  such  a  power.  When  the  appro- 
priate conditions  are  fulfilled,  mind  attains  to  a  knowledge 
of  their  essential  characteristics,  for  the  reason  that  they 
are  to  it  objects,  and  it  is  to  them  a  power  of  knowledge. 

3.  As  a  power  of  knowledge,  the  action  of  the  Intelli- 
gence will  be  as  the  fundamental  characteristics  and  rela- 
tions of  the  objects  of  knowledge.  Mind,  for  example, 
knows  matter  as  a  substance  having  extension,  form,  and 
solidity  ;  spirit  as  endowed  with   the  functions  of  thought, 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT.  263 

feeling,  and  will,  and  space  and  time  as  the  places  of  sub- 
stances and  events,  for  the  reason  that  such  are  their  essen- 
tial characteristics,  the  knowing  faculty  being  so  constituted 
that  Its  activity  is  in  harmony  with  the  objects  of  knowl- 
edge and  is  determined  by  such  objects. 

According  to  this  theory,  "  the  things  which  we  invisage 
are  that  in  themselves  for  which  we  take  them,"  and  "their 
relationships  are  so  constituted  as  they  appear  to  us."  All 
"  our  intuition  is"  not  "  nothing  but  the  representation  of 
phenomena,"  but  that  of  real  qualities  of  objects  which 
have,  not  an  ideal,  but  a  real  existence.  "  Every  quality," 
"  all  relationship  of  objects  in  space  and  time,"  and  space 
and  time  themselves,  would  remain  what  our  Intelligence 
now  affirms  them  to  be,  whatever  changes  should  take  place 
in  the  "  subjective  quality  of  our  senses,"  or  if  the  Intelli- 
gence itself  be  done  away  with.  Matter  and  spirit,  in  their 
essential  characteristics,  as  apprehended  by  the  Intelli- 
gence, are  realities  in  themselves.  The  universe,  material 
and  mental,  and  God  as  the  author  of  each,  are  realities 
also. 

Mind  knows  not  only  its  own  manner  of  perceiving  ob- 
jects, but  the  objects  themselves,  and  "  has  to  do "  with 
each  alike,  because  each  alike  is  real.  According  to  this 
theory,  mind  is  not  in  the  midst  of  a  universe  of  fictions  of 
its  own  creation,  but  of  realities,  —  realities  finite  and  infi- 
nite, —  realities  which  it  knows  because  they  are  objects, — • 
and  it  is  a  faculty  of  knowledge,  and  to  which  it  sustains 
relations  infinitely  solemn  and  momentous.  That  this  is 
the  true  and  only  true  theory,  we  argue  from  the  following 
considerations : 


264  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 


VALIDITY    OF   THIS   THEORY    ESTABLISHED. 

Cannot  be  disproved. 

1.  By  no  possibility  can  this  hypothesis  be  shown  to  be 
false,  and  any  one  of  an  opposite  character  true.  It  cannot, 
in  the  first  place,  be  proven  that  the  realities,  matter  and 
spirit,  which  it  affirms  to  be  real,  do  not,  in  fact,  exist,  and 
exist  as  apprehended  by  the  general  Intelligence.  The 
proposition  that  matter,  for  example,  as  a  solid  and  ex- 
tended substance,  really  exists,  is  not  self-contradictory  nor 
opposed  to  any  necessary  intuitive  or  deductive  truth.  The 
same  holds  equally  true  of  the  proposition,  mind,  as  endowed 
with  the  faculties  of  thought,  feeling,  and  voluntary  deter- 
mination, exists.  Nor  is  the  idea  of  the  actual  coexistence 
of  these  two  substances,  in  any  form  or  degree,  self-contra- 
dictory, or  opposed  to  any  of  the  necessary  intuitions  or 
deductions  of  the  Intelligence. 

Equally  incapable  of  disproof  is  the  hypothesis  that  the 
mind  is,  relatively  to  these  substances,  a  poiver,  while  they 
sustain  to  it  the  relation  of  objects,  of  real  knowledge.  That 
such  a  power  may  not  exist,  and  that  the  mind  does  not 
exist,  in  fact,  as  such  a  power,  are  alike,  and  undeniably, 
incapable  of  proof. 

The  very  attempt  to  disprove  this  trypothesis  involves 
the  most  palpable  contradiction  and  absurdity  conceivable. 
Suppose  an  individual  should  undertake  to  prove  that  "the 
things  which  we  invisage  are  not  that  in  themselves  for 
which  we  take  them."  Howr  could  he  do  it  ?  He  has  in  the 
wdiole  procedure  to  employ  the  very  faculty  which  he  affirms 
to  "take  things"  and  their  "relationships  for  that  in 
themselves  "  which  they  are  not.     Then,  by  the  fundamen- 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT.  265 

tal  demands  of  his  theory,  we  are  bound  to  say,  that  his 
arguments  and  their  relationships  and  bearings  are  not  that 
in  themselves  for  which  he  takes  them.  Nor  is  his  theory  of 
knowledge  that  in  itself  for  which  he  takes  it.  No  theory 
of  knowledge  the  opposite  of  that  under  consideration  can 
be  devised  which  does  not  render  real  knowledge  on  all 
subjects  alike  impossible,  and  the  supposition  of  its  reality 
or  possibility  an  absurdity.  According  to  the  fundamental 
assumptions  of  all  such  theories,  the  very  first  step  which  the 
Intelligence  takes  —  the  step  which  constitutes  the  exclu- 
sive basis  of  all  its  subsequent  procedures  —  is  a  lie,  and 
nothing  else.  How,  then,  can  anything  be  really  proved  or 
disproved  by  such  a  power  or  agent  as  that  ? 

Nor,  permit  us  to  remark,  in  the  last  place  in  this  con- 
nection, can  the  fundamental  assumption  on  which  all  theo- 
ries opposed  to  Realism  rest,  be  shown  to  be  valid,  to  wit, 
that  our  knowledge  of  matter  on  the  one  hand,  or  of  spirit 
on  the  other,  or  of  both  alike,  is  not  direct,  immediate,  or 
presentative,  but  indirect  and  mediate,  that  is,  representa- 
tive or  phenomenal  exclusive^.  The  only  standard  or  test 
of  judgment  in  this  case  is  Consciousness,  and  its  testimony 
is  absolute  against  this  assumption,  and  in  favor  of  that  of 
Realism.  All  this  is  undeniable.  The  validity  of  the  theory 
under  consideration,  therefore,  can,  by  no  possibility,  be 
disproved. 

A  common  absurdity  of  philosophers  relatively  to  perception. 

It  is  surprising  the  contradictions  and  absurdities  into 
which  philosophers  often  fall,  in  reasoning  upon  external 
perception.  From  the  physiological  conditions  of  percep- 
tion they  often  attempt  to  show  what  perception  itself  must 
be,  and  to  prove  that  our  knowledge  of  matter  is  not  pre- 
23 


266 


NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 


sentative,  but  representative.  Now,  if  our  knowledge  of 
matter  is  exclusively  representative  or  phenomenal,  such 
also  must  be  our  knowledge  of  the  conditions  of  perception. 
The  conditions  of  vision,  for  example,  are  the  production 
of  an  image  of  the  object  upon  the  retina  by  means  of  rays 
of  light  proceeding  from  said  object.  The  inference  is 
drawn,  from  hence,  that  in  vision  the  image  and  not  the  ob- 
ject is  the  thing  really  perceived.  But  how  do  we,  how 
can  we,  know  that  the  retina  itself,  the  image  upon  it,  or  the 
rays  of  light  proceeding  from  the  object  to  form  the  image,  are 
real  ?  By  external  vision  exclusively.  This  is  undeniable. 
The  explanation  of  vision  assumes  what  that  explanation 
denies,  to  wit,  that  in  vision  the  object  and  not  the  image  is 
the  thing  really  perceived.  So  the  attempt  to  show,  as  is 
often  done,  what  perception  is,  by  referring  to  the  physio- 
logical conditions  of  perception,  assumes  what  was  intended 
to  be  disproved  by  the  reference,  to  wit,  that  our  knowl- 
edge of  matter,  so  far  forth  as  physiology  is  concerned,  is 
not  phenomenal,  but  real.  It  should  ever  be  borne  in  mind 
i  hat  by  reference  to  the  conditions  of  perception  we  can 
determine  nothing  whatever  relatively  to  the  nature  of  per- 
ception, —  a  question  which  can  be  correctly  resolved  but  by 
an  appeal  to  Consciousness.  Perception  is  exclusively  an 
\  ntellectual  state,  of  the  nature  of  which  Consciousness  only 
i  akes  cognizance.  Whether  perception  is,  in  any  case,  or 
n  all  cases,  really  and  truly  presentative,  or  in  all  instances 
exclusively  representative,  can  be  determined  but  by  an 
.ppeal  to  this  one  tribunal. 

No  antecedent  probability  against  this  theory. 

2.  Our  next  position  is  this  :  that  no  form  or  degree  of 
a  ntecedent  probability  exists  against  the  hypothesis  of  Real- 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT.  267 

ism.  Every  hypothesis,  actual  or  conceivable,  assumes  and 
affirms  that  something  exists,  and  exists  as  an  actually  and 
truly  known  reality.  If  we  assume,  for  example,  that  there 
is  an  absolute  identity  between  being  and  knowing,  we  even 
then  admit  and  affirm  knowing  to  be  real,  and  really  known 
as  such.  We  admit,  also,  that  knowing  exists  both  as  a 
power  and  object  of  real  knowledge  ;  for  we  affirm  that  know- 
ing is  known.  Something  then  exists  as  an  object  of  real 
knowledge,  and  this  is  and  must  be  admitted  and  affirmed 
by  every  hypothesis  whatever.  Now,  if  we  must  suppose 
something  to  exist,  and  to  exist  as  a  truly  known  reality, 
then  it  is  undeniable  that  no  form  or  degree  of  antecedent 
probability  does  or  can  exist  against  the  hypothesis  that 
matter  and  spirit  do  in  fact  exist  as  such  realities.  No 
antecedent  probability  can  be  shown  to  lie  against  the  hy- 
pothesis of  Realism,  which  does  not,  in  fact,  lie  in  all  its 
force  against  every  other  that  can  be  named  or  conceived  of. 
In  other  words,  no  form  or  degree  of  antecedent  probability 
does  or  can  exist  against  this  lrypothesis.  This  leads  us  to 
remark : 

This  hypothesis  involved  in  no  difficulties  not  common  to  all 

others. 

3.  That  the  hypothesis  of  Realism  is  involved  in  no  diffi- 
culties which  are  not  common  to  all  others,  and  rests  upon 
the  very  principle,  as  far  as  the  mode  of  knowledge  is  con- 
cerned, upon  which  in  the  last  analysis  all  others  must  rest. 
If  Intelligence  be  given  as  in  its  nature  a  faculty,  and  reali- 
ties as  in  their  nature  objects  of  real  knowledge,  all  difficul- 
ties, as  far  as  the  facts  of  knowledge  are  concerned,  disap- 
pear, and  that  totally.  The  reason  for  knowledge  is,  that  the 
Intelligence  is  a  faculty,  and  realities  within  and  around  it 


2G8  NATURAL   THEOLOGY. 

are  objects  of  real  knowledge.  Now  the  same  reason  pre- 
cisely must  be  assigned,  if  we  assume  that  such  a  relation- 
ship does  not  exist  between  the  Intelligence  and  realities. 
Why  is  it  that  they  are  not  to  it  objects,  and  it  to  them  a 
faculty  of  real  knowledge?  The  answer,  and  the  only  an- 
swer that  in  the  last  analysis  can  be  given,  is,  that  such  is 
the  nature  of  mind,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  realities,  on  the 
other.  Why  is  it  that  the  Intelligence  takes  things  and 
their  relationships  to  be  that  in  themselves  which  they  are 
not  ?  The  answer  is,  such  is  the  nature  of  the  Intelligence 
as  a  faculty,  and  of  realities  as  objects  of  real  knowledge. 
Why  is  it  that  the  Intelligence,  in  the  first  instance,  invis- 
ages  things  and  their  relationships  as  possessed  of  given 
real  characteristics,  and  then  the  same  Intelligence  affirms 
the  same  things  to  be  not  that  in  themselves  which  it 
had  previously  invisaged  them  to  be?  But  one  answer  can 
be  given,  to  wit,  that  such  is  the  nature  of  the  Intelligence 
as  an  invisaging  faculty.  If  we  assume,  we  remark  finally, 
an  absolute  identity  between  being  and  knowing,  and  ask 
the  reason,  as  we  must  do,  why  knowing  really  and  truly 
exists  both  as  the  subject  and  object  of  real  knowledge ; 
the  same  answer  as  before,  and  that  only,  presents  itself,  to 
wit,  such  is  the  nature  of  knowing  that  it  is  and  must  be 
both  a  subject  and  object  of  real  knowledge.  As  this  is  the 
reason  which  in  the  last  analysis  must  be  given  for  all  the 
procedures  of  the  Intelligence,  whatever  their  nature  may 
be,  it  is  surely  infinitely  more  reasonable  to  stop  just  where 
the  Universal  Intelligence  in  fact  does  stop,  to  wit,  with  the 
principle  that  mind  is  a  faculty,  and  realities  around  it  are 
objects  of  real  knowledge.  We  are  then  involved  in  no 
difficulties  not  common,  and  escape  those  which  are  per- 
fectly fatal,  to  all  others. 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT.  269 

The  validity  of  Realism  affirmed  absolutely  by  the  intuitive 
convictions  of  the  race. 

4.  This  leads  us  to  remark,  in  the  next  place,  that  while 
the  validity  of  Realism  can  by  no  possibility  be  disproved, 
while  no  form  or  degree  of  antecedent  probability  exists 
against  it,  and  while  it  is  encumbered  with  no  difficulties 
whatever  not  common  to  every  other  hypothesis,  it,  and  it 
alone,  accords  with  the  intuitions  and  necessary  convictions 
of  the  Universal  Intelligence  on  the  subject.  All  men  do 
and  must  believe,  whatever  their  speculative  theories  may 
be,  that  they  have  an  actual  presentative  knowledge,  not 
only  of  their  manner  of  perceiving,  but  also  and  equally  of 
the  objects  of  perception  themselves.  To  this  statement 
there  is  absolutely  no  exception.  Either  the  Universal  In- 
telligence is  a  lie,  or  this  is  the  true  theory  of  knowledge. 

Every  one  has  an  absolute  consciousness  of  the  validity  of  this 
hypothesis. 

5.  Our  next  argument  is  this  :  Every  individual  has  an 
absolute  consciousness  of  the  truth  of  this  hypothesis.  If 
we  have,  or  can  have,  such  a  consciousness  of  any  mental 
state  whatever,  we  have  such  a  consciousness  of  a  direct 
and  immediate,  or  presentative,  knowledge  of  the  existence 
and  essential  qualities  of  matter,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of 
spirit,  on  the  other.  This  no  one  will  deny.  We  have, 
then,  the  highest  evidence  we  possibly  can  have  of  the  exis- 
tence and  character  of  any  reality  whatever,  —  that  "the 
things  we  in  visage"  are  "that  in  themselves  for  which  we 
take  them."  And  why  should  we  question  the  validity  of 
our  knowledge  in  either  case  ?  For  no  valid  reason  what- 
ever ;  not  even  on  the  ground  of  an  antecedent  probability 

23* 


270  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

in  any  form  or  degree.  The  hypothesis  of  Realism  can  bo 
denied  but  upon  one  condition  exclusively  :  a  fundamental 
impeachment  of  the  validity  of  the  faculty  of  knowledge  on 
all  subjects  whatever,  and  all  this  for  no  assignable  rea- 
sons which  have  even  the  appearance  of  validity; 

All  the  activities  of  universal  humanity,  and  all  scientific 
procedures  have  their  basis  in  the  assumed  validity  of  this 
hypothesis. 

6.  All  the  activities  of  universal  humanity,  and  the  entire 
procedure  of  the  Intelligence  in  all  the  sciences  mental 
and  physical,  we  remark  in  the  next  place,  have  their  actual 
basis  in  the  assumption  of  the  truth  of  the  theory  of  knowl- 
edge under  consideration,  and  are  the  heights  of  absurdity 
on  any  other  assumption.  The  science  of  mind  is  based 
throughout  upon  the  assumption  that  the  phenomena  of 
spirit  as  given  in  Consciousness  —  phenomena  which  lie  at 
the  basis  of  that  science  —  are  to  the  Intelligence  real  ob- 
jects, and  it  is  to  them  a  real  power  of  knowledge.  The 
science  of  Natural  Philosophy  and  Astronomy,  and  all  the 
natural  sciences,  proceed  entirely  upon  the  assumption  that 
a  relation  precisely  similar  exists  between  the  Intelligence, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  qualities  of  external  material  sub- 
stances, on  the  other.  The  same  is  true  of  the  Mathematics 
and  all  the  activities  of  humanity.  All  have  their  basis  in 
one  assumption  exclusively,  to  wit,  that  mind,  as  a  faculty 
of  knowledge,  knows  things  and  their  relationships  as  they 
are,  and  are  the  perfection  of  absurdity  on  any  other  suppo- 
sition. How  infinitely  absurd  was  it  in  Kant,  for  example, 
to  spend  his  life  in  writing  books  to  convince  the  world 
that  "  things  which  we  invisage  are  not  that  in  themselves 
for  which  we  take  them,"  when,  according  to  his  theoiy, 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT.  271 

there  was  no  such  world  as  he  was  writing  to,  such  as  he 
took  them  to  be,  —  there  were  no  real  beings  to  be  con- 
vinced,—  no  real  beings  holding  any  theory  at  all, — nor 
was  his  own  theory  that  in  itself  for  which  he  took  it !  So 
of  all  the  activities  of  humanitj',  whatever  their  objects  or 
directions.  , 

Objections  urged  against  the  validity  of  this  hypothesis  most 
puerile  and  absurd,  namely,  "the  antitheses  of  science  falsely 
so  called" 

7.  The  only  objections  which  have  ever  been  urged  against 
the  validity  of  this  Irypothesis,  or  against  that  of  our  knowl- 
edge of  matter  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  spirit  on  the  other, 
claim  a  moment's  attention  in  this  connection.  On  exami- 
nation, said  objections  will  be  found  to  be,  without  excep- 
tion, most  puerile  and  absurd,  —  mere  philosophical  puzzles, 
as  we  have  before  called  them,  —  mere  puzzles  utterly  un- 
worthy the  dignity  of  science.  They  are  all  in  common 
based  upon  certain  affirmed  contradictions  involved,  we  are 
told,  in  all  our  ideas  of  matter,  spirit,  time,  space,  and  God. 
From  these  contradictions  we  are  also  assured  that  our 
knowledge  of  such  realities  can  have  no  real  validity. 
"  Vain  wisdom  all,  and  false  philosophy."  In  the  Logic,  we 
have  laid  down  the  following,  as  an  immutable  principle  of 
science,  and  which  we  here  repeat  as  a  self-evident  truth 
that  none  will  deny,  to  wit,  that  an  objection,  or  argument, 
which  lies,  in  all  its  force,  against  a  known  truth,  can  have  real 
validity  against  no  proposition  whatever.  Now,  the  identical 
contradictions  which  antitheists  professedly  find  in  our  ideas 
of  the  realities  named  above  we  will  show  to  be  involved,  in 
all  their  force,  in  ideas  absolutely  known  to  be  valid.  By 
the   same  arguments,  for   example,  by  which   Kant   pro- 


272  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

fessedly  draws  from  our  ideas  of  the  world  the  contradictory 
demonstrations,  that  it  is  both  temporary  and  eternal  in  its 
duration,  and  finite  and  infinite  in  its  dimensions,  we  will 
demonstrate  the  same  contradictions  to  be  involved  in  our 
idea  of  any  globe,  real  or  ideal,  one  inch  in  diameter.  The 
same  identical  contradictions  which  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer 
professedly  finds  in  our  ideas  of  matter,  or  body,  we  will 
demonstrate  to  be  involved  just  as  fully  in  our  conception 
of  a  straight  or  crooked  line  one  inch  long.  To  verify  this 
statement,  we  will  give  an  extract  from  the  author  last 
named,  —  an  extract  which  embraces  his  entire  argument,  — 
to  prove  the  utter  invalidity  of  our  ideas  of  matter.  Wher- 
ever the  term  matter,  or  body,  exists  in  the  copy,  we  will 
substitute  the  words,  "  a  line  one  inch  long,"  inserting  in 
brackets  the  word  which  stands  in  the  original.  "  Were  it 
not  for  the  necessities  of  the  argument,  it  would  be  inex- 
cusable to  occupy  the  reader's  attention  with  the  thread- 
bare, and  yet  undecided,  controvers}7  respecting  the  divisi- 
bility of  a  line  one  inch  long  [matter].  A  line  one  inch 
long  [matter]  is  either  infinitely  divisible  or  it  is  not :  no 
third  possibility  can  be  named.  Which  of  the  alternatives 
shall  we  accept  ?  If  we  say  that  a  line  one  inch  long  [mat- 
ter] is  infinitely  divisible,  we  commit  ourselves  to  a  suppo- 
sition not  realizable  in  thought.  We  can  bisect  and  re-bisect 
a  line  one  inch  long  [body],  and  continually  repeating  the 
act,  until  we  reduce  its  parts  to  a  size  no  longer  physically 
divisible,  may  then  mentally  continue  the  process  without 
limit.  To  do  this,  however,  is  not  really  to  conceive  the 
infinite  divisibility  of  a  line  one  inch  long  [matter],  but  to 
form  a  symbolic  conception  incapable  of  expansion  into  a 
real  one,  and  not  admitting  of  other  verification.  Really 
to  conceive  the  infinite  divisibility  of  a  line  one  inch  long 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT.  273 

[matter],  is  mentally  to  follow  out  the  divisions  to  infinity, 
and  to  do  this  would  require  infinite  time.     On  the  other 
hand,  to  assert  that  a  line  one  inch  long  [matter]  is  not  infi- 
nitely divisible,  is  to  assert  that  it  is  reducible  to  parts 
which  no  conceivable  power  can  divide ;  and  this  verbal 
supposition  can  no  more  be  represented  in  thought  than  the 
other."   Who,  in  view  of  such  nonsensical  quibbling  as  this, 
would  assert  the  absolute  invalidity  of  our  idea  of  a  line 
one  inch  long,  and  consequently  of  eve^  line  straight  or 
crooked  ?    Yet  the  reasoning  of  this  author,  as  the  reader 
cannot  fail  to  perceive,  is  just  as  conclusive  against  the 
validity  of  our  ideas  of  all  lines  in  empty  space,  and  in  the 
world  around  us,  as  it  is  against  the  validity  of  our  concep- 
tion of  matter,  or  of  any  other  reality.    So,  as  we  have  said, 
in  the  reasonings,  or  rather  philosophical  quibblings,  of  Kant, 
to  prove  from  our  ideas  of  matter  that  the  world  is  both  tem- 
porary and  eternal  in  duration,  and  finite  and  infinite  in  ex- 
tent, we  may  substitute  for  the  term  world  a  material  or  im- 
material globe  one  inch  in  diameter,  and  his  arguments  in 
that  case  will  have  the  same  identical  force  that  they  now 
possess.  Now,  reasonings  which  lie  in  all  their  force  against 
known  truths  can  have  validity  nowhere.     Yet  these  philo- 
sophic puzzles  contain  the  only  objections  which  ever  have 
been,  or  can  be,  brought  against  the  hypothesis  of  Realism  ; 
in  other  words,  against  the  validity  of  our  ideas  of  matter, 
spirit,  time,  space,  cause,  substance,  immortality,  and  God. 
We  should  justly  involve  ourselves  in  the  charge  of  abso- 
lute mental  inanity,  if,  for  such  reasonings,  we  should  sur- 
render our  faith  in  these  eternal  verities. 

Take  another  view  of  this  subject.  Space  and  time,  as 
demonstrated  by  Mr.  Spencer  against  Kant,  are  realities  in 
themselves,  and  not  mere  subjective  laws  of  thought.     Nor 


274  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

are  they,  what  Mr.  Spencer  affirms  them  to  be,  unknown 
and  unknowable  realities.  On  the  other  hand,  both  are  dis- 
tinctly represented  in  human  thought,  with  these  necessary 
and  immutable  characteristics,  that  it  is  absolutely  impossi- 
ble for  us  even  to  conceive  of  their  non-reality,  or  that  as 
realities  they  are  in  any  respects  different  from  what  we 
conceive  them  to  be.  Our  knowledge  of  space  and  time, 
therefore,  is  absolutely  valid  for  the  reality  and  character 
of  their  objects.  To  affirm  the  opposite,  is,  in  reality,  to 
affirm  that  absolute  knowledge  is  not  knowledge  at  all. 
Now  all  the  difficulties  and  contradictions  which  Mr.  Spen- 
cer professedly  finds  in  our  conception  of  matter,  he  also 
affirms  to  exist  in  our  ideas  of  space  and  time.  These 
difficulties  and  affirmed  contradictions,  undeniably,  do  not 
invalidate  our  knowledge  of  these  infinite  and  eternal  veri- 
ties, and,  therefore,  are  utterly  void  of  force  against  the 
validity  of  our  knowledge  of  matter,  or  of  any  other  sub- 
stance. This  is  undeniable.  These  antitheses  of  "  science 
falsely  so  called  "  have  been  the  bane  of  philosophy  in  all 
ages.  Under  the  appellation  of  "  antinomies  of  pure  Rea- 
son," they  were  introduced,  as  a  deadly  disease,  into  the 
vital  centres  of  philosophic  thought  in  Germany,  where 
they  induced  the  death  of  philosophy  itself.  Recently, 
they  have  assumed,  in  the  philosophic  thinking  of  such 
authors  as  Man  sell  and  Spencer,  the  form  of  a  chronic 
diarrhoea,  attended  with  all  their  former  fatal  symptoms. 

In  the  Intellectual  Philosophy,  as  stated  in  the  Introduc- 
tion, we  have  fully  explained  the  sophistry  which  charac- 
terizes these  antinomies.  But,  suppose  that  they  are,  in 
fact,  inexplicable.  For  such  reasons  as  this,  shall  we  deny 
the  validity  of  absolute  knowledge?  Is  not  existence  itself 
an  inexplicable  mystery?     Shall  we,  for  this  reason,  deny 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT.  275 

the  existence  of  all  realities?  Suppose,  that  what  we  know 
to  be  real  involves  questions  which  we  cannot  answer,  and 
difficulties  which  we  cannot  explain,  —  which  shall  control 
our  faith,  the  known,  or  the  inexplicable?  We  must  bear 
in  mind  that  the  idea  of  existence,  whether  of  the  known  or 
unknown,  involves  all  the  difficulties  and  apparent  contra- 
dictions which  these  authors  professedly  find  in  our  ideas 
of  the  realities  under  consideration.  The  unknown,  say 
these  authors,  has  real  being.  Now,  in  all  their  reasonings 
to  prove  that  our  ideas  of  matter,  spirit,  space,  time,  sub- 
stance, and  God,  involve  the  elements  of  contradiction,  and 
are,  therefore,  void  of  validity,  we  may,  whenever  either  of 
these  terms  are  employed,  substitute  the  term  existence,  or 
the  words,  unknowable  and  unknown  entity,  and  the  reason- 
ing will  have  the  same  identical  force  as  before  ;  a  fact 
rendering  it  undeniable  that  such  reasonings  have  no  valid- 
ity whatever  in  respect  to  any  forms  of  thought  of  any  kind. 
If  these  seeming  contradictions  have  the  force  claimed  for 
them,  —  if  nothing  is  to  be  admitted  as  real  the  conception 
of  which  involves  said  contradictions,  —  then,  to  be  logically 
consistent,  we  must  be  absolute  nihilists  ;  for  we  can  affirm 
nothing  whatever,  whether  known  or  unknown,  to  be  real, 
without  involving  ourselves  in  all  these  affirmed  contradic- 
tions in  all  their  force.  But  something  is  real.  This  is 
undeniable.  These  affirmed  contradictions,  therefore,  are 
utterly  void  of  force  against  the  validity  of  any  of  our 
ideas  of  any  objects  whatever.  There  is  no  escaping  this 
conclusion.  The  hypothesis  of  Realism,  consequently,  stands 
revealed  before  us  as  resting  upon  no  other  basis  than  the 
rock  of  truth  itself.  This  subject  will  be  fully  elucidated 
in  the  next  chapter. 


276  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

SECTION  II. 

MATERIALISM. 

We  will  now  pass  over  to  the  other  side  of  the  gulf  whieh 
separates  the  hypothesis  which  we  have  considered  from  all 
others  of  an  antitheistic  character,  and  will  commence  with 
that  which  stands  first  in  order,  to  wit,  Materialism,  which 
affirms  the  validity  of  human  knowledge  as  far  as  matter, 
and  denies  its  validity  as  far  as  spirit,  is  concerned.  In  its 
fundamental  assumptions  and  deductions,  this  hypothesis  is 
a  system  of  absolute  atheism.  If  matter  is,  in  fact,  the  only 
reality,  the  inhering  laws  of  this  one  substance  must  be  the 
real  ultimate  cause  of  all  the  facts  of  the  universe,  and  there 
can  be  no  God  aside  from  these  laws.  If  matter  is  the  only 
reality,  it  must  have  existed  from  eternity  with  all  its  pres- 
ent qualities,  attributes,  properties,  and  laws,  absolutely 
the  same  as  at  the  present  moment.  It  must,  from  eternity, 
have  contained  within  itself,  and  that  without  change  or 
modification  to  eternity,  the  Unconditioned  Cause  of  all  its 
tendencies,  dispositions,  arrangements,  and  operations. 
Such  is  the  materialistic  hypothesis. 

POSITIONS,  ONE    OR    THE    OTHER    OF  WHICH   THE    MATERIALIST 
MUST    ASSUME. 

In  his  attempts  to  prove  the  validity  of  his  hypothesis, 
the  materialist  must  assume  one  or  the  other  of  these  two 
positions,  to  wit,  that  our  knowledge  of  matter  is  direct 
and  immediate,  or  presentative  ;  or,  that  it  is  indirect  and 
mediate,  or  representative.  Let  us,  for  a  few  moments, 
contemplate  the  subject  from  each  of  these  two  distinct  and 
opposite  points  of  view. 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT.  277 

First  position  —  that  our  knowledge  of  matter  is  presentative. 

The  materialist,  we  will  suppose,  in  the  first  place,  affirms 
our  knowledge  of  the  primary  qualities  of  matter,  such,  for 
example,  as  real  solidity,  extension,  and  form,  to  be,  in  fact, 
direct  and  immediate,  or  presentative,  and,  therefore,  valid 
for  the  reality  and  essential  characteristics  of  its  object. 
Matter,  as  possessed  of  the  qualities  above  named,  he  af- 
firms, has,  consequently,  not  an  ideal  or  possible,  but  a  real 
existence.  So  far,  the  position  of  the  materialist  is  abso- 
lutely impregnable.  This  form  of  knowledge  in  respect  to 
this  substance,  does,  in  fact,  exist,  and  its  absolute  validity 
for  the  reality  and  character  of  its  object  cannot  be  denied, 
without  an  absolute  denial  of  the  validity  of  knowledge  in 
all  its  forms,  actual  and  conceivable.  The  materialist,  we 
repeat,  is  right,  in  affirming  real  existence  of  matter  as  ap- 
prehended by  the  general  Intelligence.  But  what  must  we 
think  of  the  assumption  based  upon  this  fact,  to  wit,  that 
matter  is  the  only  substance  that  has  being  ?  The  fact  pre- 
sented yields  no  such  deduction  as  that.  The  propositions, 
mind  exists,  and  matter  exists,  are  in  no  sense  or  form  con- 
tradictory or  incompatible  propositions.  The  admitted  ex- 
istence of  one  of  these  substances  does  not  in  the  remotest 
degree  render  the  existence  of  the  other  even  improbable. 
All  this  is  undeniable. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  have  absolute  knowledge  of  both 
of  these  substances  as  really  existing  entities.  In  external 
perception  we  have  a  direct  and  immediate  knowledge  of 
matter,  as  possessed  of  the  qualities  of  real  extension  and 
form  ;  and  in  internal  perception  we  have  a  consciousness 
equally  absolute,  of  mind  as  endowed  with  the  attributes 
of  Intelligence,  Sensibility,  and  Will.  In  the  unveiled 
24 


278  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

presence  of  the  attributes  and  relations  of  these  knowable 
and  known  entities,  we  have  a  knowledge  equally  absolute 
of  the  being  and  perfections  of  a  personal  God.  Contem- 
plated from  this  one,  the  true,  stand-point,  Materialism  has 
not  only  no  form  or  degree  of  positive  proof,  evidence,  or 
antecedent  probability,  in  its  favor,  but  also  stands  revealed 
as  demonstrably  false. 

Second  position,  to  wit,  that  our  knowledge  of  matter  is  indi- 
rect and  mediate. 

We  will  now  suppose  the  materialist  to  shift  his  ground, 
and,  assuming  the  truth  of  the  sensational  theory  of  external 
perception,  to  affirm  that  our  knowledge  of  matter  is  wholly 
indirect  and  mediate,  and,  as  a  consequence,  that  it  has 
only  a  relative  validity.  According  to  this  hypothesis,  the 
substance  called  matter,  if  it  exists  at  all,  has  being  merely 
and  exclusively  as  an  unknown  and  unknowable  entity.  On 
what  grounds,  then,  can  the  materialist  assume  or  affirm 
this  unknown  and  unknowable  something  to  be  the  only 
reality  ?  How  can  he  prove,  for  example,  from  his  present 
stand-point,  that  what  we  call  matter  and  spirit  do,  or  do 
not,  exist  as  distinct  and  separate  entities,  or  that  they 
have,  or  have  not,  a  real  community  of  properties  and  at- 
tributes ?  Of  the  nature  and  relations  of  any  substance  of 
which  we  have  no  positive  knowledge,  we  can  legitimately 
make  no  positive  affirmations  of  any  kind.  When  the  mate- 
rialist, therefore,  affirms  that  our  knowledge  of  matter  is 
wholly  indirect  and  mediate,  and  that,  as  a  consequence,  it 
has  no  validity  for  the  reality  and  character  of  its  object, 
and  then  assumes  for  this  unknown  and  unknowable  some- 
thing an  exclusive  existence,  he  simply  convicts  himself  of 
the  grossest  conceivable  absurdity  and  self-contradiction. 


TFIE    DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT.  279 

The  doctrine  of  Materialism,  therefore,  viewed  from  the  first 
position,  —  the  only  true  stand-point,  —  is,  past  contradic- 
tion, demonstrably  false.  Viewed  from  the  second,  the  only 
remaining  position,  it  stands  revealed  as  one  of  the  most 
palpable  and  gross  absurdities  that  was  ever  intruded  into 
the  sphere  of  science. 

SECTION  III. 

IDEALISM. 
GENERAL    REMARKS    UPON    IDEALISM    IN    ITS    VARIOUS  FORMS. 

In  passing  from  Materialism  to  Idealism,  four  distinct, 
and  in  some  respects  opposite,  sytems,  as  we  have  shown, 
present  themselves,  all  alike  having  their  basis  in  the  com- 
mon assumption,  that  neither  the  objects  nor  the  relation- 
ships of  objects  which  we  conceive  of  as  existing  in  time 
and  space,  nor  time  and  space  themselves,  are  "  that  in 
themselves  for  wThich  we  take  them."  According  to  all 
these  systems,  mind  is  not,  as  a  faculty  of  knowledge, 
placed  in  the  midst  of  realities  material  and  mental,  finite 
and  infinite,  where  it  attains  to  actual  knowledge  of  such 
realities,  and  makes  this  attainment  because  it  is,  relatively 
to  them,  a  facultj',  and  they,  relatively  to  it,  are  objects  of 
knowledge.  The  universe  which  we  contemplate,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  in  reality  a  fiction  of  the  mind's  own  creation, 
—  a  fiction  rendered  to  the  mind  a  reality,  and  just  such  a 
reality,  by  reason  and  virtue  of  the  mind's  internal  laws 
and  susceptibilities.  "  Up  to  this  time,"  says  Kant,  "  it 
has  been  received  that  all  our  cognition  must  regulate  itself 
according  to  the  objects,  jet  all  attempts  to  make  out  some- 
thing a  priori  by  means  of  conceptions  respecting  such, 
whereby  our  cognition   would   be  extended,  have  proved 


280  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

under  this  supposition  abortive.  Let  it  be  once,  therefore, 
tried,  whether  we  do  not  succeed  better  in  the  problems  of 
metaphysics,  when  we  admit  that  the  objects  must  regulate 
themselves  according  to  our  cognition,  —  which  thus  ac- 
cords already  better  with  the  desired  possibility  of  their 
cognition  a  priori,  which  is  to  decide  something  with  respect 
to  objects  before  they  are  given  to  us.  The  circumstances 
in  this  case  are  precisely  the  same  as  with  the  first  thoughts 
of  Copernicus,  who,  since  he  did  not  make  any  way  in  the 
explanation  of  the  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies  when  he 
supposed  the  whole  firmament  turned  round  the  spectator, 
sought  whether  it  might  not  answer  better  if  he  left  the 
spectator  himself  to  turn,  and  the  stars,  on  the  contrary,  at 
rest.  Now,  in  metaphysics,  as  to  what  concerns  the  intui- 
tion of  objects,  we  may  try  in  the  same  way.  If  the  intuition 
must  regulate  itself  according  to  the  property  of  the  objects, 
I  do  not  see  how  one  can  know  anything  with  regard  to  it 
a  priori;  but  if  the  object  regulates  itself  (as  object  of  the 
senses) ,  according  to  the  property  of  our  faculty  of  intuition, 
I  can  very  well  represent  to  myself  this  possibility.  But, 
since  I  cannnot  remain  stationary  with  these  intuitions  if 
they  are  to  become  cognitions,  but  must  refer  them,  as 
representations,  to  something  as  object,  and  determine  this 
object  by  means  of  them,  I  can  admit  that  the  conceptions, 
whereby  I  bring  about  this  determination,  either  regulate 
themselves  according  to  the  object,  —  and  then  I  am  again  in 
the  same  difficulty  respecting  the  mode,  —  as  I  can,  a  priori, 
thereof  know  anything ;  or  I  admit  that  the  objects,  or 
what  is  the  same  thing,  experience,  in  which  alone  (as  given 
objects)  they  are  known,  regulates  itself  according  to  these 
conceptions,  and  I  thus  see  immediately  an  easy  escape,  be- 
cause experience  itself  is  a  mode  of  cognition  which  requires 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT.  281 

Understanding,  the  rule  of  which  I  must  suppose  in  myself, 
before  objects  }ret  are  given  me,  —  consequently  a  priori, 
which  rule  is  expressed  in  cognitions  a  priori,  and  accord- 
ing to  which  cognitions,  therefore,  all  objects  of  experience 
must  necessarily  regulate  themselves,  and  coincide  there- 
with. As  to  what  concerns  objects,  so  far  as  they  can  be 
thought  by  means  of  reason  merely,  and,  indeed,  necessa- 
rily, but  which  (so  at  least  reason  thinks  them)  cannot  be 
given  at  all  in  experience,  the  attempts  to  think  them  (for 
still  they  must  let  themselves  be  thought)  will  hereafter 
furnish  an  excellent  touchstone  of  that  which  we  admit  as 
the  changed  method  of  the  mode  of  thinking,  namely,  that 
we  only  know  that  a  priori  of  things  which  we  place  in  them 
ourselves." 

"  We  have  sufficiently  shown,"  he  says,  again,  "  in  the 
transcendental  ^Esthetic,  that  all  which  is  perceived  in 
space  or  time,  consequently  all  objects  of  an  experience  pos- 
sible to  us,  are  nothing  but  phenomena,  that  is,  mere  per- 
ceptions, which,  so  far  as  they  are  represented  as  extended 
beings,  or  series  of  changes,  have  no  existence  founded  in 
itself,  independent  of  our  thoughts." 

"Thus  the  objects  of  experience  are  never  given  in 
themselves,  but  only  in  experience,  and  do  not  at  all  exist 
out  of  the  same." 

According  to  the  teachings  of  these  systems,  as  stated  in 
the  above  extracts,  perceptions  and  the  objects  of  percep- 
tion are  one  and  identical.  "  All  objects  of  experience 
possible  to  us  are  nothing  but  phenomena,  that  is,  mere 
perceptions."  So  also  space  and  time  are  not  realities  in 
themselves  of  which  we  have  ideas,  but  the  ideas  and  their 
objects  also,  time  and  space,  are  the  same.  "  Space  repre- 
sents no  property  of  things  themselves,  nor  does  it  represent 
24* 


282  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

them  in  their  relationships  to  each  other."  Again  :  "  Space 
is  nothing  else  but  the  form  of  all  phenomena  of  the  exter- 
nal senses,  that  is,  the  subjective  condition  of  sensibilit}?-, 
under  which  alone  external  intuition  is  possible." 

Again  :  "  Time  is  nothing  but  the  form  of  the  internal 
sense,  that  is,  of  the  intuition  of  ourselves  and  of  our  inter- 
nal state."  "  The  representation  of  time  is  itself  intuition." 
"  If  we  make  abstraction  of  our  manner  of  invisaging  our- 
selves intern alty,  and  by  means  of  this  intuition  [time]  of 
embracing  also  all  external  intuitions  in  the  representative 
faculty,  and,  consequently,  if  we  take  the  objects  as  they 
may  be  in  themselves,  time  is  thus  nothing." 

As  the  necessary  consequence  of  the  principles  above 
elucidated,  there  are  according  to  these  systems,  we  remark 
finally,  in  realit}^,  no  such  thing  as  bodies  possessing  form 
and  extension  existing  actually  in  space,  nor  successive 
events  occurring  in  time.  "  We  can  only,  from  the  point  of 
view  as  men,  speak  of  space,  extended  beings,"  etc.  "  On 
the  contrary,  the  transcendental  conception  of  phenomena 
in  space,  is  a  critical  reminding  that  nothing  generally 
which  is  perceived  in  space  is  a  thing  in  itself,  —  that  space 
is  not  a  form  of  things  which  perhaps  was  proper  to  them 
in  themselves  ;  but  that  objects  in  themselves  are  not  at  all 
known  to  us,  and  that  what  we  term  external  objects  are 
nothing  else  but  mere  representations  of  our  sensibility." 
Again  :  "  Time  is  certainly  something  real,  that  is  to  say, 
it  is  the  real  form  of  the  internal  intuition.  It  has,  there- 
fore, subjective  reality  in  regard  to  internal  experience  ;  that 
is,  I  have  really  the  representation  of  time,  and  of  my 
determinations  in  it.  It  is,  therefore,  not  to  be  looked  at 
really  as  object,  but  as  the  mode  of  representing  myself  as 
object.     But  if  I  myself  could  invisage  myself,  or  if  any 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE    AUGUMEKT.  283 

other  being  could  invisage  me,  without  this  condition  of 
sensibility,  the  self-same  determinations  which  we  represent 
to  ourselves  as  changes  would  then  afford  us  a  cognition, 
in  which  the  representation  of  time,  and,  consequently,  also 
of  change,  would  not  at  all  occur."  If  time  and  space  are 
not  realities  in  themselves,  then  there  can,  by  no  possibilit}^ 
be  real  events  succeeding  each  other  in  time,  nor  real  objects 
existing  in  space.  Whatever  else  is  real,  there  can  be  no 
such  realities  as  these.  Such  are  the  fundamental  principles 
of  Idealism,  in  all  the  different  forms  and  phases  which  it 
assumes.  Knowledge  is  wholly  confined  to  the  experience 
of  the  subject,  and  pertains  to  nothing  real  exterior  to  it. 
The  only  faculty  of  perception  possessed  by  the  mind  is 
Consciousness,  which  has  two  functions,  the  exterior  and 
interior.  The  only  objects  of  perception  are  nothing  but 
different  mental  states.  What  we  regard  as  the  perception 
of  an  object  external  to  the  mind  is  nothing  but  a  state  of 
sensibility  seen  by  the  Consciousness  in  its  exterior  func- 
tion, and,  consequently,  postulated  as  the  quality  of  an 
object  exterior  to  the  mind.  A  state  of  the  sensibility  per- 
ceived by  Consciousness  in  its  exterior  function,  and,  con- 
sequently, postulated  as  a  quality  of  an  external  object, 
gives  us  such  object.  A  mental  operation  seen  by  Con- 
sciousness in  its  interior  function,  and,  consequently,  postu- 
lated as  the  quality  of  the  perceiving  subject,  gives  the 
subject.  Thus  arises  the  apprehension  of  the  universe  of 
matter  and  spirit,  neither  of  which,  however,  being  in  them- 
selves, or  their  relationships,  "  that  for  which  we  take 
them." 

I  said,  that  in  passing  from  Materialism  to  Idealism, 
four  distinct,  and,  in  some  respects,  opposite  sj^stems,  pre- 
sent themselves.     Each  of  these  systems  has  its  basis  in, 


284  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

and  takes  form  from,  peculiar  ideas  of  Ontology,  or  ideas 
of  realities  as  they  exist  in  themselves. 

1.  The  first  assumes  that  there  are  two  unknown  and  un- 
knowable realities  immediately  concerned  in  all  intellectual 
operations ;  realities  called  noumena,  to  wit,  the  subject 
which  invisages,  and  the  object  which  in  some  unknown  and 
unknowable  manner  effects  the  sensibility  of  the  invisaging 
subject,  and  thus  calls  into  exercise  its  intellectual  activi- 
ties.    This  is  the  ideal  Dualism  of  Kant. 

2.  The  system  next  in  order  takes  away  the  object  en- 
tirely, and  assumes  the  finite  invisaging  subject  to  be  the 
only  thing  real,  resolving  the  universe  and  God  into  this 
subject.  We  thus  attain  to  the  subjective  Idealism  of 
Fichte. 

3.  The  third  system  takes  away  wholly  the  finite  subject 
and  object  alike,  and  assumes  the  Infinite  and  Absolute  as 
the  only  realit}',  and  resolves  the  universe,  material  and 
mental,  into  the  diverse  forms  in  which  the  Infinite  and  Ab- 
solute develops  itself.  Here  we  meet  with  the  ideal  Pan- 
theism of  Schelling. 

4.  The  fourth  and  last  system  takes  away  all  such  sub- 
stances, subjective  and  objective,  finite  and  infinite,  alike, 
and  resolves  all  realities  into  pure  thought,  —  thought  with- 
out a  real  subject  or  object  either.  Idealism  here  attains 
its  consummation  in  the  Nihilism  of  Hegel.  Nor  can  Ideal- 
ism, without  the  most  palpable  self-contradiction,  stop  short 
of  this  consummation,  resting  as  it  does  and  must  upon  the 
assumption,  that  ideas  of  Reason,  such  as  those  of  Space, 
Time,  Substance,  and  Cause,  are  not  valid  for  things  in 
themselves.  The  theory  of  Kant  assumes  and  is  based 
upon  the  assumption  of  the  reality  of  two  substances,  the 
subject  and  object,  —  substances  sustaining  the  relation  of 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT.  285 

dependence  the  one  upon  the  other  ;  in  other  words,  of  cause 
and  effect.  Now,  if  these  ideas  of  Reason  are  valid  for 
things  in  themselves,  why  should  not  all  others  be  ?  No 
possible  reason  can  be  assigned  why  they  should  not,  and 
thus  we  should  have  a  real  and  not  an  ideal  universe.  In- 
deed, if,  as  the  system  of  Kant  assumes,  the  ideas  of  cause 
and  effect  are  valid  for  things  in  themselves,  then  the  idea 
of  Time  must  be  ;  for  cause  and  effect  suppose  succession 
as  real,  which  is  impossible,  excepting  on  the  condition  of 
the  non-ideality,  but  objective  reality  of  Time.  Fichte  and 
Schelling  attempted  to  escape  this  difficulty,  so  absolutely 
fatal  to  Idealism,  whatever  form  it  may  assume,  by  taking 
away  the  object  and  cause,  and  assuming.the  subject  to  be 
the  only  reality.  But  each  of  their  systems  was  found  still 
to  rest  upon  the  very  principle  which  both  alike  denied  as 
fatal  to  their  own  claims  to  all  validity,  to  wit,  the  idea  of 
substance  and  attribute.  In  admitting  the  subject,  whether 
assumed  as  finite  or  infinite,  to  be  something  real,  together 
with  thought  as  phenomenon  of  that  subject,  they  admitted 
the  validity  of  the  idea  of  substance  for  things  in  them- 
selves. If  the  validity  of  this  idea  of  Reason  be  admitted, 
why  not  that  of  all  others,  and  thus  conduct  us  wholly  out 
of  the  sphere  of  Idealism  into  that  of  Realism  ?  Hegel,  to 
escape  this  fatal  contradiction,  took  a  leap  into  pure  Ideal- 
ism, denying  the  reality  of  all  substances,  material  and 
mental,  finite  and  infinite,  alike,  assuming  that  thought  it- 
self is  the  only  thing  real,  and  resolving  the  universe,  mate- 
rial and  mental,  and  God,  as  apprehended  by  the  Intelli- 
gence, into  pure  ideas  or  laws  of  thought.  But  in  this  cold 
region  of  absolute  nonentity  the  system  of  Hegel  even,  the 
last  and  final  consummation  of  Idealism,  is  found  impaled 
upon  the  very  rock  on  which  all  prior  systems  of  the  same 


286  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

class  had  split,  to  wit,  the  assumption  of  one  or  more  ideas 
of  Reason  as  valid  for  things  in  themselves.  In  deducing 
one  form  of  thought  from  another,  the  real  relation  of  cause 
.and  effect,  antecedence  .and  consequence,  is  admitted  and 
affirmed.  When  one  thing  arises  from  another  in  the  order 
of  necessary  succession,  whatever  the  things  in  themselves 
may  be,  they  do  and  must  sustain  to  each  other  the  relation 
of  real  cause  and  effect,  chronological  antecedence  and  con- 
sequence. In  admitting  the  reality  of  such  succession,  as 
the  system  of  Hegel  does,  and  as  all  others  must,  we  admit 
and  affirm  the  ideas  of  cause  and  effect  and  also  of  time  as 
valid  for  things  in  themselves,  and  thus  open  the  way  for 
the  system  of  universal  Realism,  as  the  system  demanded 
and  affirmed  by  Philosophy  itself. 

Having  thus  demonstrated  that  Idealism,  whatever  form 
it  may  assume,  involves  the  most  palpable  and  fatal  self- 
contradictions,  we  might  dismiss  the  subject  here,  as  no 
S37stem  involving  such  contradictions  can  be  true.  As  mod- 
ern Antitheism,  however,  bases  itself  exclusively  upon  the 
principles  which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  this  system,  in 
some  or  in  all  its  varied  forms,  we  shall,  for  the  interests 
of  truth,  enter  into  a  more  full  discussion  of  the  subject. 
As  Idealism,  in  all  its  forms,  rests  upon  common  princi- 
ples, and  as  the  same  observations  are  equally  applicable 
to  all  its  forms,  and  as  said  forms  must  fall  with  the  sys- 
tem itself,  we  shall  discuss  said  system  without  reference  to 
its  specific  developments.  In  accomplishing  our  object,  we 
shall,  as  occasion  requires,  repeat  some  of  the  statements 
which  have  just  been  made  in  the  preliminary  exposition. 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   AEGU3IENT.  287 

THE    COMMON    BASIS    ON   WHICH   THIS    HYPOTHESIS   IN  ALL    ITS 
FORMS   RESTS. 

The  common  basis  on  which  Idealism  in  all  its  forms 
rests,  is  this  :  We  have  valid  knowledge  of  mental  states 
only ;  all  our  knowledge  of  realities,  as  they  exist  in  them- 
selves, being  exclusively  relative,  and  consequently  utterly 
void  of  objective  validity.  "  We  have  therefore  intended  to 
say,"  says  Kant,  —  a  statement  accepted  by  all  schools  of 
Idealism  as  lying  at  the  basis  of  the  system  in  all  its  forms, 
—  "  that  all  our  intuition  is  nothing  but  the  representation  of 
phenomena, — that  the  things  which  we  invisage  [perceive, 
and  form  conceptions  and  judgments  of]  are  not  that  in 
themselves  for  which  we  take  them  ;  neither  are  their  rela- 
tionships so  constituted  as  they  appear  to  us  ;  and  that  if 
we  do  away  with  our  subject,  or  even  only  the  subjective 
quality  of  our  senses  in  general,  every  quality,  all  relation- 
ships of  objects  in  space  and  time,  nay,  even  space  and  time 
themselves,  would  disappear,  and  cannot  exist  as  phenom- 
ena in  themselves,  but  only  in  us.  It  remains  utterly  un- 
known to  us  what  may  be  the  nature  of  the  objects  in  them- 
selves, separate  from  all  the  receptivity  of  our  sensibility. 
We  know  nothing  but  our  manner  of  perceiving  them,  which 
is  peculiar  to  us  and  which  need  not  belong  to  every  being, 
although  to  every  man.  With  this  we  have  only  to  do." 
The  above  extract  all  Idealists  of  all  schools,  as  we  have 
said,  will  accept  as  announcing  the  common  basis  of  all 
their  systems.  All  these  systems,  therefore,  stand  commit- 
ted, and  that  absolutely,  to  the  following  dogmas  :  1 .  Of 
mental  states  we  do  have  a  valid  knowledge.  2.  Of  all 
realities,  aside  from  said  states,  our  ignorance  is  absolute. 
3.  Space  and  time  exist,  not  as  realities  in  themselves,  but 


288  NATURAL   THEOLOGY. 

only  in  the  mind,  as  mere  subjective  laws  of  thought.  Such 
are  the  real  characteristics  of  this  system  in  all  its  varied 
forms  and  developments.  While  the  principles  of  the  sys- 
tem do  not  permit  us  to  make  any  positive  affirmations  in 
regard  to  real  existences  of  any  kind,  the  following  nega- 
tive affirmations  are  demanded  by  said  principles  relatively 
to  all  such  objects. 

NEGATIVE  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  ALL   REALITIES  ACCORDING   TO 
THE    ESSENTIAL    PRINCIPLES    OP    IDEALISM. 

1.  According  to  the  immutable  principles  of  this  sj^stem 
in  all  its  forms,  there  can,  by  no  possibility,  be  any  sub- 
stances having  real  extension  or  form.  Body  implies  space, 
—  space,  not  as  a  subjective  law  of  thought,  but  as  repre- 
sented in  our  ideas  of  this  reality.  If  space,  as  this  system 
affirms,  is  a  mere  law  of  thought,  and  no  reality  in  itself, 
as  represented  in  our  Intelligence,  then,  undeniably,  noth- 
ing having  real  extension  or  form  can  have  being.  Nor  is  it 
possible  for  us,  according  to  the  immutable  principles  of 
this  s3Tstem,  to  conceive  of  the  possibility  of  any  real  sub- 
stance of  any  kind  as  existing,  it  being  impossible  to  con- 
ceive of  substance  of  any  kind  as  a  real  existence,  and  that 
substance  not  have  a  positive  location  somewhere  in  space. 

2.  Nor  can  there  be,  according  to  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  this  system  in  any  of  its  forms,  any  real  succes- 
sive events,  or  any  existences  having  real  successive  expe- 
riences of  any  kind.  Succession  implies  time,  —  time,  not 
as  a  law  of  thought,  but  as  a  reality  in  itself.  Time  is  the 
place  of  events,  just  as  space  is  the  place  of  substances,  — 
a  reality  in  itself  in  accordance  with  our  mode  of  conceiv- 
ing the  same.     If  time,  as  these  systems  unitedly  affirm,  is 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT.  289 

no  such  reality  in  itself,  then  there  can  be  no  real  succes- 
sion of  any  kind.     This  is  undeniable. 

3.  For  the  reasons  above  assigned,  there  can,  in  no  form 
of  existence,  be  any  real  development  through  inhering  law, 
airy  kind  of  voluntary  activity,  nor  any  real  progression  in 
any  direction  whatever.  Development  and  progression 
both  in  common  undeniably  imply  succession,  and  succes- 
sion as  undeniably  implies  time,  —  time,  not  as  a  mere  law 
of  thought,  but  as  a  reality  in  itself,  the  reality  represented 
in  our  necessary  idea  of  time. 

Such  are  the  fundamental  principles  and  necessary  con- 
sequences of  Idealism  in  all  its  forms,  —  consequences  which 
demonstrably  verify  it  as  a  system  of  total  error.  If  any- 
thing is  real,  and  is  the  subject  of  absolute  knowledge  as 
such,  succession,  and  with  it  time,  is  real.  Yet  both  suc- 
cession and  time  are  absolute  impossibilities  according  to 
the  immutable  principles  of  this  system.  The  same  remarks 
are  equally  applicable  to  space.  It  is  absolutely  impossible 
for  us  to  conceive  that  space,  as  represented  in  human 
thought,  does  not  exist.  In  other  words,  we  have  absolute 
knowledge  of  it  as  such  a  realit}\  This  is  admitted  by 
Idealists  of  all  schools.  "We  can  never  make  to  ourselves," 
says  Kant,  "a  representation  of  this,  —  that  there  is  no 
space,  — although  we  may  very  readily  think  that  no  objects 
therein  are  to  be  met  with."  "  Take  away,"  he  says  again, 
"  from  our  experience  conceptions  of  a  body,  gradually, 
everything  which  is  empirical  therein,  color,  hardness,  soft- 
ness, weight,  impenetrability,  still  the  space  remains  which 
it  (the  body)  that  has  now  disappeared,  occupied,  and  this 
(space)  you  cannot  leave  out."  Yet  this  known  reality, 
which,  as  Kant  and  all  other  Idealists  affirm,  the  Intelli- 
gence "  cannot  leave  out,"  their  system  in  all  its  forms  does 
25 


290  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

"  leave  out  "  and  reduces  from  a  known  external  reality  in- 
finite in  itself,  to  a  mere  unknown  internal  law  of  thought. 
Such  a  system  must  be  utter  error  and  nothing  else. 

Idealism  throughout  fundamentally  violates  its  own  essential 
principles. 

Idealism,  we  remark  in  the  next  place,  in  all  its  forms  and 
developments,  exists  in  utter  violation  of  its  own  avowed 
and  fundamental  principles.  It  affirms,  as  the  fixed  basis 
of  all  its  procedures,  our  absolute  ignorance  of  all  realities 
of  every  kind  as  they  exist  in  themselves.  It  then,  with  the 
most  imperious  assurance,  propounds  its  own  exclusive 
theory  of  existence,  telling  us  what  realities  do  and  do  not 
exist,  and  what  are  their  nature,  principles,  and  laws,  and 
modes  of  being  and  development.  "  What  can  we  reason 
but  from  what  we  know  ?  "  Idealism  lays  down  as  the  exclu- 
sive basis  of  positive  systems  of  Ontology,  absolute  igno- 
rance of  existence  in  all  its  forms.  "  Objects  in  themselves," 
says  Kant,  "are  not  at  all  known  to  us."  " It  remains 
wholly  unknown  to  us,"  he  says  again,  "  what  may  be  the 
nature  of  objects  in  themselves."  "We  know  nothing  but 
our  manner  of  perceiving  them."  "  The  reality  existing 
behind  all  appearances  is,"  says  Mr.  Hubert  Spencer, 
"  and  ever  must  be,  unknown."  Such  are  the  united  teach- 
ings of  all  Idealists  and  sceptics  of  all  schools.  Where  is  the 
place,  then,  for  systems  of  Ontology,  for  dogmatic  theories 
of  existence,  or  for  a  philosophy  of  being  and  its  laws? 
What  must  be  the  character  of  such  systems  ?  The  high- 
est claim  that  they  can  present  to  our  regard  is  that  of 
well-developed  systems  of  guessing.  To  baptize  such  sys- 
tems with  the  name  of  science  is  one  of  the  greatest  ab- 
surdities conceivable. 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT.  291 

All  the  fundamental  principles  of  Idealism,  mere  assumptions. 

All  the  avowed  principles  of  Idealism  in  all  its  forms,  we 
remark  in  the  next  place,  are,  without  exception,  mere  as- 
sumptions,  utterly  void  of  all  intuitive  or  deductive  claims 
to  validity.  We  refer  to  such  dogmas  as  the  following : 
That  there  is  but  one  substance,  and  but  one  principle  of 
all  things ;  that,  in  all  forms  of  valid  knowledge,  there 
must  be  "a  sinthesis  of  being  and  knowing  in  the  I,"  or 
"  an  absolute  identity  of  being  and  knowing."  Take  away 
these  asserted  principles,  and  Idealism  in  all  its  forms  falls 
to  pieces  at  once,  and  utterly  vanishes  into  naught.  Yet 
all  these  avowed  principles  of  science  have  been  demon- 
strated in  the  introduction  to  be  nothing  but  mere  assump- 
tions, not,  in  any  sense,  of  self-evident  validity,  nor  capable 
of  proof,  and  not  having  the  least  degree  of  antecedent 
probability  in  their  favor.  Theories  and  systems  resting 
upon  such  assumptions  —  and  Idealism  rests  upon  none 
but  such  —  can  have  no  higher  merits  than  mere  well-con- 
structed logical  fictions.  A  rigid  scientific  scrutiny  can 
award  no  other  claim  to  this  system  in  any  form  which  it 
has  ever  assumed. 

Idealism  has  no  valid  claims  against  any  system  to  which  it 
stands  opposed. 

Idealism  in  all  its  forms,  we  remark  in  the  next  place, 
while  it  proudly  arrogates  to  itself  the  high  and  exclusive 
merit  of  scientific  development  throughout,  can  offer  no 
valid  or  scientific  reasons  whatever  in  favor  of  its  own 
claims,  or  against  those  of  other  and  opposite  systems. 
Idealism,  for  example,  claims  for  spirit  or  its  operations  an 
exclusive  existence ;  while  Materialism  puts  forward  the 


292  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

same  exclusive  claims  in  respect  to  matter.  Between  these 
two  conflicting  and  opposite  systems  the  evidence  is  abso- 
lute^ balanced.  Not  a  shadow  of  proof,  valid  evidence,  or 
even  antecedent  probability,  can,  by  any  possibility,  be  ad- 
duced in  favor  of  either  as  against  the  other.  Both  in 
common  rest  exclusively  upon  mere  unauthorized  and  reck- 
less assumptions  and  nothing  else,  —  assumptions  whose 
merit  is,  in  all  respects,  equal,  for  the  reason  that  neither 
class  has  any  merits  at  all,  the  demerit  of  occupying  false 
positions  in  so-called  systems  of  science  excepted.  The 
varied  forms  which  Idealism  itself  has  assumed  are  special 
and  peculiar,  each  standing  in  direct  and  open  antagonism 
against  every  other.  Ideal  Dualism,  Subjective  Idealism, 
Pantheism,  and  Pure  Idealism,  or  Nihilism,  all  rest,  as  we 
have  said,  on  common  assumptions.  Yet  each  stands  alone, 
and  neither  has  any  fellowship  with  either  of  the  others.  But 
the  advocates  of  neither  can  offer  any  valid  reasons  whatever 
for  holding  their  own  theory  and  rejecting  either  of  the  oth- 
ers. All  alike  affirm  absolute  ignorance  of  all  realities  as  they 
exist  in  themselves.  How,  then,  can  they  prove  their  own 
hypothesis  true,  or  that  of  either  of  their  opponents  to  be 
false?  Of  mere  conjectures  in  respect  to  that  of  which  noth- 
ing is  confessedly  known,  how  can  one  claim  validity  over 
the  other? 

Idealism  self-contradictory. 

Idealism  throughout,  we  remark  in  the  next  place,  is 
characterized  by  interminable  self-contradictions  and  ab- 
surdities. It  professes,  for  example,  an  absolute  scientific 
insight  into  that  which  it  affirms  to  be  utterly  unknowable 
and  unknown.  It  affirms  all  our  intuitions,  conceptions, 
and  ideas,  empirical  and,  a  priori,  contingent  and  necessary, 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT.  293 

to  be  utterly  void  of  validity  for  realities  as  they  exist  in 
themselves  ;  and,  then  on  the  exclusive  authority  of  assumed 
a  priori  ideas  and  principles,  constructs  its  systems  of  On- 
tology, and  theories  of  existence  and  its  laws.  It  utterly 
repudiates  all  original  and  necessary  intuitions  and  princi- 
ples of  science  as  utterly  "invalid  for  things  in  them- 
selves ;  "  and  then,  upon  the  exclusive  authority  of  mere 
assumptions,  for  the  validity  of  which  no  reasons  whatever 
can  be  presented,  proudly  dogmatizes  in  regard  to  the  nature 
and  laws  of  time,  space,  substance,  cause,  the  universe 
material  and  mental,  God,  duty,  and  immortality,  —  all  exist- 
ences, indeed,  and  forms  of  existence,  finite  and  infinite. 
It  affirms  the  validity  of  our  knowledge  of  mind  or  its  oper- 
ations, on  the  ground  that  such  knowledge  is  direct  and 
immediate,  or  presentative,  and  then  rejects  as  utterly  in- 
valid the  same  identical  form  of  knowledge  in  respect  to 
external  material  substances.  It  affirms  the  non-being:  of 
realities,  —  time  and  space,  —  of  which  it  is  absolutely  im- 
possible, as  Idealists  themselves  confess,  for  the  Intelligence 
even  to  conceive  as  not  being,  and  as  not  being  what  they 
are  represented  in  human  thought  to  be  ;  and  then  affirms 
as  real,  forms  of  existence  which  it  is  utterly  impossible  for 
the  Intelligence  to  conceive  as  actual ;  as,  for  example,  phe- 
nomena without  substance,  thought  without  a  thinker,  as 
affirmed  by  pure  Idealism,  and  real  existences  which  have 
being  nowhere  and  in  no  time,  as  affirmed  by  Idealism  in 
all  its  forms.  These  must  suffice  as  examples  of  contra- 
dictions and  absurdities  fundamentally  involved  in  this 
sj'stem  in  all  its  forms. 

The  method  of  Idealism  utterly  false  and  deceptive. 

Cousin  has  well  observed,  that  "  as  is  the  method  of  a 
25* 


204  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

philosopher,  such  will  be  the  destiny  of  his  philosophy." 
A  system  of  philosophy  developed  in  accordance  with  the 
principles  of  a  method  fundamentally  false  and  deceptive, 
cannot  fail  to  lead  the  teacher  and  the  pupil  both  widely 
astray  from  the  track  of  truth.  True  science  is  the  philoso- 
phy of  the  know  able  and  the  known.  Of  the  unknowable 
and  the  unknown  it  has  nothing  whatever  to  do,  but  to  as- 
sert its  absolute  ignorance  of  the  same,  and  to  explain  the 
reason  and  grounds  of  that  ignorance.  In  imparting  to 
real  knowledge  a  s}Tstematic  development,  true  science,  first 
of  all,  determines  the  valid  tests,  or  criteria,  by  which  real 
knowledge  —  knowledge  which  has  actual  validity  for  the 
reality  and  character  of  its  objects  —  maybe  distinguished 
from  cognitions  which  have  no  such  validity.  It  then  de- 
termines its  theory  and  facts  of  real  existence  by  a  rigid 
application  of  said  criteria,  admitting  nothing  to  be  real 
not  thus  determined  as  such,  and  omitting  nothing  thus  af- 
firmed. Finall}^,  in  the  light  of  fundamental  principles 
whose  validity  cannot  be  questioned,  the  facts  of  existence 
thus  given  are  elucidated,  and  their  characteristics,  laws, 
and  causes  proximate  and  ultimate,  determined.  By  such 
a  method  we  attain  to  a  knowledge  of  truth  itself.  Now,  the 
entire  method  of  Idealism,  in  all  its  forms,  utterly  violates 
all  the  principles  and  procedures  of  true  science.  The  lat- 
ter, as  we  have  said,  gives  us,  exclusively,  the  philosophy 
of  the  knowable  and  the  known.  The  former,  by  profes- 
sion, is  as  exclusively  the  philosophy  of  the  unknowable 
and  unknown.  The  Idealist,  when  he  "begins  to  philoso- 
phize," in  the  language  of  one  of  its  great  expounders 
before  quoted,  "  puts  himself  into  a  state  of  not  knowing," 
"  assuming  that  all  his  previous  knowledge  is  uncertain," 
and  "compelling  himself  to  treat  that  knowledge  as  nothing 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT.  295 

but  a  prejudice."  Disregarding  all  proper  psychological 
investigations  as  unworthy  the  dignity  of  science,  assum- 
ing all  existing  forms  of  knowledge  to  be  nothing  but  ap- 
pearances, and  finally  asserting  that  all  realities  lying  behind 
and  beyond  said  appearances  are  absolutely  unknown  and 
unknowable  entities,  he  launches  forth  into  the  '*  palpable 
obscure"  of  infinite  ignorance,  and  then  upon  mere  assump- 
tions, such  as  these,  —  that  there  is  in  reality  "  but  one 
substance,  and  one  principle  of  all  things,"  and  that  in  all 
forms  of  valid  knowledge  "  there  is  an  absolute  synthesis 
of  being  and  knowing  in  the  I,"  or  ''an  absolute  identity 
of  being  and  knowing,"  —  upon  mere  assumptions  such  as 
these,  we  say,  he  constructs  his  system  of  Ontology,  — his 
absolute  theory  of  all  real  existences  and  their  laws  and 
forms  of  development.  We  have  stated  the  method  of  Ideal- 
ism in  our  own  language,  but  in  strict  conformity  to  the 
expositions  of  its  own  advocates.  What  can  rationally 
be  expected  from  such  a  method  of  philosophizing  ?  Noth- 
ing, of  course,  but  systems  of  all  of  which  that  may  be  truly 
said,  which  a  distinguished  author  did  affirm  of  that  of  He- 
gel, to  wit:  "  Hegel's  philosophy  is  nothing  in  itself;  nor 
was  its  author  in  himself,  but  beside  himself."  Standing  in 
these  regions  of  the  deep  profound  of  the  unknowable  and 
unknown ;  closing  their  eyes  and  their  faith  to  all  which 
the  Universal  Intelligence  has  given  as  visible  and  real, 
and  assuming  that  even  necessary  ideas  represent  no  reali- 
ties as  they  are  in  themselves ;  what  did  these  great  and 
world-renowned  thinkers  discover  and  reveal  in  respect  to 
the  high  sphere  of  the  science  of  Ontology,  or  the  doctrine  of 
Universal  Being,  its  facts  and  laws  ?  Hegel,  for  example, 
discovered  by  direct  and  immediate  intuition,  —  intuition 
as  clear  as  midnight,  and  as  valid  as  the  contradictions  of 


296  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

u  Chaos  and  Old  Night,"  —  that  pure  thought  is  the  only 
and  exclusive  reality,  —  thought  without  subject  or  object ; 
that  matter  and  spirit,  the  finite  and  infinite,  time  and 
space,  are  nothing  but  pure  thought  in  its  various  forms 
and  developments  ;  and  that  God,  the  Infinite  and  the  Ab- 
solute, is  the  one  thought  which  comprehends  and  deter- 
mines all  others.  He  thus,  in  the  language  of  the  author 
above  referred  to,  gave  us  "  a  God  without  holiness,  a  Christ 
without  free  love,  a  Holy  Ghost  without  illumination,  a 
gospel  without  faith,  an  apostasy  without  sin,  wickedness 
without  conscious  guilt,  an  atonement  without  remission  of 
sin,  a  death  without  an  offering,  a  religious  assembly  with- 
out divine  worship,  a  release  without  imputation,  justice 
without  a  judge,  grace  without  redemption,  dogmatical 
theology  without  a  revelation,  a  this  side  without  a  that 
side, immortality  without  existence,  a  Christian  religion  with- 
out Christianity,  and  in  general  a  religion  without  religion." 
By  means  of  an  assumed  faculty  of  direct  and  absolute 
intuition,  —  a  faculty  vouchsafed  (as  a  punishment,  it  must 
be)  to  philosophers,  and  withheld  (in  mercy,  we  judge)  from 
the  rest  of  mankind,  —  Schelling  saw  that  being  and  knowing 
are  one  and  identical ;  that,  consequently,  but  one  substance 
and  principle  of  all  things  has  being  ;  that,  in  this  one  inde- 
finable something  called  the  Infinite  and  the  Absolute,  two 
opposite  forces,  each  infinite  and  indestructible,  exist  and 
act,  the  one  tending  to  expand  infinitely,  and  the  other 
seeking  to  know  itself  in  this  infinity  ;  that  creation,  which 
is  God  in  a  state  of  development,  —  creation  wTith  all  its 
finite  individualities,  —  is  the  exclusive  result  of  the  action 
and  reaction  of  these  two  forces  interpenetrating  each  other 
in  this  single  substance  ;  and,  that,  while  the  Infinite  and 
Absolute  is  perpetually  seeking  to  know  itself,  the  highest 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT.  297 

form  of  knowledge  to  which  it  ever  does  or  can  attain  is 
realized  in  the  consciousness  of  man.  We  give  but  an  epit- 
ome of  the  forms  of  intuitive  knowledge  to  which  our  seer 
attained  relatively  to  the  unknowable  and  unknown,  —  an 
epitome  sufficient,  however,  to  characterize  the  system  of 
being  and  of  life  which  he  constructed  in  that  "  land  of 
darkness  as  darkness  itself."  While  we  hold  ourselves 
responsible  for  giving  that  system  as  it  is,  we  do  not  vouch 
for  all  the  elements  which  he  has  put  into  it,  —  the  idea,  for 
example,  of  Infinity  seeking  to  expand  itself,  and  also  of 
seeking,  from  eternity,  for  self-knowledge,  without  attain- 
ing to  any  higher  forms  of  thought  than  have  yet  had  being 
in  the  human  mind.  As  man  is  the  highest  form  of  devel- 
opment to  which  the  Infinite  and  Absolute  has  yet  attained, 
God,  as  manifested  in  man,  should  be  to  us  the  exclusive 
object  of  religious  homage  and  worship  ;  and  the  two  young 
disciples  of  this  philosophy,  who  had  graduated  with  high 
honors  from  one  of  our  eastern  colleges,  were  right  and 
self-consistent  in  the  reverential  worship  they  habitually 
paid  to  each  other  when  they  met,  each  addressing  the  other 
in  such  language  as  this  :  "  Good  morning,  God  !  "  "  How 
do  }'OU  do,  Jehovah?"  We  relate  facts  of  actual  occur- 
rence. It  is  due  to  these  youth  to  add,  that  they  recovered 
at  length  their  common-sense,  through  the  ridicule  to  which 
they  were  subject  even  from  the  boys  in  the  streets. 

Fichte,  on  the  other  hand,  through  the  same  insight,  per- 
ceived with  equal  distinctness  that  mind  —  finite  spirit — is 
the  sole  and  exclusive  existence ;  that  creation  in  all  its 
developments  is  nothing  but  the  different  forms  in  which 
the  I  sees  itself  in  its  varied  processes  of  self-develop- 
ment ;  that  time,  space,  God,  duty,  and  immortality,  are 
nothing  but  regulative  ideas  through  which  the  I  gives  shape 


298  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

and  exteriority  to  its  own  subjective  states,  and  that  God, 
instead  of  being  the  creator  of  finite  mind,  is  himself,  as  "  a 
regulative  idea,"  created  by  finite  mind.  Hence,  the  great 
expounders  of  the  system  of  Subjective  Idealism,  in  the  Ger- 
man universities,  were  accustomed  to  address  their  pupils 
in  language  like  the  following:  "  To-morrow,  gentlemen,  I 
will  generate  God." 

Kant,  "  the  venerable  sage  of  Konigsberg,"  we  remark 
once  more,  and  with  the  same  identical  form  of  insight  em- 
ployed by  the  great  seers  above  named,  perceived  and  af- 
firmed, not  the  exclusive  existence  of  one  substance,  and 
one  principle  of  all  things,  but  the  actual  being  of  two, 
and  but  two,  unknown  and  unknowable  entities,  —  entities 
existing  nowhere  and  acting  in  no  time  ;  and  that  creation 
is  the  sole  result  of  the  action  and  reaction  of  these  two 
substances  the  one  upon  the  other.  Space,  time,  and  God 
have  place  in  this  system,  not  as  realities  in  themselves, 
but  as  mere  "  regulative  ideas." 

Now,  all  these  contradictions  and  absurdities  are  the 
natural  results  of  the  false  methods  of  philosophizing  which 
characterize  Idealism  in  all  its  forms. 

Idealism,  in  all  its  forms,  a  system  of  partialism. 

Every  form  and  system  of  Idealism  is  professedly  based, 
and  that  wholly,  upon  facts  of  Consciousness  ;  yet  it  ex- 
plains, and  that  wrongly,  only  a  part  of  them,  and  in  its 
fundamental  principles  and  deductions  palpably  contra- 
dicts all  the  rest.  In  their  entire  explications  they  all 
rest  upon  a  basis  which,  of  necessity,  wholly  excludes  the 
phenomena  of  the  Will ;  while  others  as  necessarily  ex- 
clude those  of  the  Sensibility,  and  all  unitedly,  as  we  have 
seen,  wrongly  explain  all  the  essential  facts  of  Intelligence. 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT.  299 

At  the  best,  Idealism  is,  throughout,  a  system  of  partialism, 
and  a  very  poor  one  at  that. 

Idealism  confounds  truth  with  error. 

Another  universal  characteristic  of  Idealism  is  this :  It 
absolutely  confounds  truth  with  error,  and  leaves  us  with 
no  tests  whatever  by  which  the  one  can  be  distinguished 
from  the  other.  One  fact  of  consciousness  is  just  as  real 
in  itself  as  another,  and  if  none  of  "  the  things  which  we 
envisage  are  that  in  themselves  or  in  their  relationships 
for  which  we  take  them,"  then  facts  of  Consciousness,  as 
facts,  are  to  us  the  only  truths  we  do  or  can  know,  and  as 
one  such  fact  is  just  as  real  as  another,  one  is  just  as  true 
as  another.  One  system  of  philosophy,  inasmuch  as  all 
alike  are  real  facts  of  consciousness,  —  that  is,  as  systems 
have  really  been  thought  out,  —  is  just  as  true  as  another. 
Our  sleeping  dreams  are  just  as  true  as  our  waking  ones, 
and  the  wild  fancies  of  the  maniac  as  the  most  sane  deduc- 
tions of  the  mathematician  or  philosopher.  This  is  pre- 
cisely where  the  system  of  Kant  leaves  us,  and  it  cannot, 
by  any  possibility,  do  anything  better  for  us.  Remarks 
precisely  similar  are  equally  applicable  to  all  the  other 
forms  of  Idealism.  If  "  the  me  "  is  the  only  reality,  one 
of  its  developments  is  just  as  real,  and  consequently  just  as 
true,  as  another.  The  philosophy  of  Fichte,  Locke,  Candi- 
lac,  and  the  Christian  system  of  Reid,  are  all  and  equally 
products  of  "  the  me,"  and,  therefore,  all  are  equally  true, 
and  that  with  no  intermixture  of  error  whatever.  If  the 
Infinite  and  Absolute,  or  thought  itself,  is  the  only  thing 
real,  and  all  things  are  only  necessary  development  of  the 
same,  one  is  just  as  necessary  as  another  and  just  as  real, 
and,  therefore,  just  as  true.     Error,  according  to  all  forms 


300  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

of  Idealism  alike,  has  no  place  in  the  universe.  One  act, 
according  to  its  fundamental  principles,  is  just  as  right, 
and  one  form  of  thought  just  as  true,  as  another.  The 
individual  that  holds  that  the  same  thing  at  the  same  time 
can  be  and  not  be,  holds  a  proposition  as  really  true  as  he 
that  holds  the  opposite  axiom.  The  writer  of  this  work, 
when  a  child,  stoutly  and  sincerely  maintained  for  a  long 
time,  in  opposition  to  all  his  brothers  and  sisters  (the 
first  discussion  he  ever  held  in  his  life),  that  two  and  two 
make  three.  His  argument  was  this  :  that  as  two  is  but 
one  more  than  one,  twice  two  can  be  but  one  more  than 
twice  one.  Now,  we  may  safely  challenge  any  Idealist  on 
earth  to  show,  from  the  fundamental  principles  of  his  sys- 
tem, that  the  proposition  which  the  writer  then  maintained 
is  not  just  as  true  and  as  valid  for  things  in  themselves,  as 
the  one  which  he  now  maintains,  to  wit,  that  two  and  two 
make  four.  The  former,  according  to  the  fundamental 
teachings  of  Idealism,  was  as  much  a  reality  in  itself  as 
the  latter,  and  just  as  real  and  necessary  a  development  of 
"  the  me  "  or  of  the  Infinite  and  Absolute.  Such  is  Ideal- 
ism. True  philosophy,  if  it  accomplishes  anything,  lays 
broad  and  deep,  and  makes  eternally  visible,  the  distinc- 
tions between  the  real  and  unreal,  the  true  and  the  false. 
The  s}Tstem  which  not  only  fails  to  do  this,  but  which,  as 
Idealism  undeniably  does,  totally  confounds  such  distinc- 
tions, must  be  a  s}Tstem  of  unmingled  error. 

Idealism  utterly  subversive  of  morality  and  religion. 

We  have  already  indicated  the  bearings  of  Idealism  upon 
religion,  We  may  well  be  permitted  to  allude  to  this  sub- 
ject again,  referring  now  to  its  bearings  upon  morality  as 
well  as  religion.     Every  such  system,   as  we  have  seen, 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT.  301 

either  gives  us  no  God  at  all,  or  gives  one  who  cannot  be 
to  us  an  object  of  religious  worship  in  anjr  proper  sense  of 
the  term.     To  the  God  which  it  gives  us,   prayer  is  an 
absurdity,  and   so  of  all  other  acts  of  religious  homage. 
All  such  systems  also  give  deductions  utterly  subversive  of 
all  forms  of  morality,  domestic,  civil,  social,  and  religious. 
If  the  universe  is  not  a  real,  but  only  an  ideal  existence,  the 
same  must  be  held  as  true  of  all  the  individualities  of  which 
that  universe  is  constituted,  with  all  their  apprehended  rela- 
tions to  us.     The  family,  the  community,  and  the  state  are 
nothing  in  themselves.     They  are  splendid  creations  of  our 
own  minds,  and  nothing  else.     The  child  begets  the  father, 
instead  of  the  father  the  child,  and  the  thing  begotten  is  in 
reality,  excepting  as  an  idea,  an  absolute  nonentity.     The 
individual  generates  the  community,  and  the  subject  the 
state,  and  the  thing  generated  is  a  mere  ideal  unsubstantiality. 
Now,  if  the  Idealist  would  only  be  self-consistent,  he  would 
be  as  reckless  of  all  the  claims  of  domestic,  social,  and  civil 
virtue,  as  he  is  of  those  of  religion.     The  moment  the  world, 
with  all  its  inhabitants,  ceases  to  have  to  us  any  real  or 
external  existence  out  of  ourselves,  that  moment  all  real 
moral  ties,  domestic,  social,  and  civil,  between  us  and  the 
world,  are  forever  sundered.     The  reader  is  doubtless  fa- 
miliar with  the  account  of  optical  illusions  which  some- 
times occur  in  connection  with  certain  diseases,  —  illusions 
by  which  the  room  of  the  patient  appears  to  be  filled  with 
men  and  women.     Suppose  that  while  the  patient  knows 
perfectly  that  such  spectral  illusions  are  nothing  else  but 
such,  he  should  find  that  their  conduct  and  states  depended 
on  his  volitions ;  that,  by  his  willing  it,  they  would  appar- 
ently revel  in  bliss,  writhe  in  agony,  manifest  the  tenderest 
afiectioi/s,  indulge  in  the  most  ferocious   and  brutal  pas- 
26 


302  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

sions,  lovingly  caress,  or  madly  bite  and  devour  one  an. 
other.  Suppose  the  patient  now  makes  his  room  a  thea- 
tre for  the  enactment  of  such  scenes  as  may  afford  him  the 
greatest  interest  or  gratification.  Whom  has  he  wronged? 
Which  of  those  forms  of  illusion  can  charge  him  with 
wrong?  What  substantial  moral  ties  bind  him  to  those 
real  and  so  regarded  unsubstantialities  ?  Now,  this  is  the 
spectacle  of  the  universe,  according  to  the  deductions  of 
Idealism  :  a  man  seems  to  be  a  child  and  brother,  in  one 
circle,  and  a  husband  and  a  parent  in  another.  Now,  if 
these  circles  and  those  within  them  are  realities,  capable 
of  receiving  good  or  ill  at  his  hands,  then  the  claims  of  mo- 
rality in  respect  to  them  are  also  a  substantiality.  But  if 
there  are  no  such  beings  present ;  if,  as  Idealism  affirms,  the 
circles  and  the  objects  in  them  which  he  has  envisaged  are 
not  that  in  themselves  nor  in  their  relationships  for  which 
he  has  taken  them  ;  if,  indeed,  as  the  system  further  teaches, 
they  are  nothing  in  themselves  ;  then,  what  laws  of  filial, 
fraternal,  conjugal,  or  parental  morality  rest  upon  him  rel- 
atively to  those  images  of  his  own  creation  ?  A  man  must 
know  himself  a  real  child  of  real  parents,  before  he  can 
recognize  himself  as  really  reached  by  the  precept,  "  Honor 
thy  father  and  thy  mother."  However  long  a  known  and 
recognized  unsubstantiality  may  nestle  in  a  man's  bosom, 
and  by  whatever  titles  it  may  be  called,  it  can  lay  no  real 
claim  upon  him,  or  with  justice  cry  out  against  any  vio- 
lence which  he  may  perpetrate  upon  it.  A  man  must  be 
convicted  of  standing  upon  real  flesh  and  bones,  before  he 
can  be  reached  by  the  precept,  "  Take  thy  foot  from  thy 
brother's  neck."  A  man  must  be  convicted  of  holding  real- 
ities in  chains,  before  he  can  be  bound  by  the  requirement, 
u  Sunder  the  bonds  of  oppression  and  let  the  oppressed  go 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT.  303 

free."  There  are  no  wrongs  to  be  redressed,  no  broken 
hearts  to  be  bound  up,  no  prodigals  to  be  reclaimed,  no 
guilt  that  can  be  incurred,  no  crimes  that  can  be  perpe- 
trated, and  nothing  in  "  man's  inhumanity  to  man,  making 
countless  thousands  mourns,"  if  Idealism  is  true.  It  must 
be  a  somewhat  painful  process  for  a  man  to  get  out  of  his 
head,  or  to  get  beside  himself.  So  the  Infinite  and  Abso- 
lute, in  its  attempts  to  attain  to  self-knowledge  and  self- 
development,  ma}r  find  it  somewhat  difficult  to  get  out 
of  itself  into  the  finite,  and  a  still  greater  difficulty  in 
"  its  regress  back  into  itself;  and  thus,  in  these  painful 
processes,  may  produce  finite  generations,"  sustaining,  as  a 
necessary  consequence,  not  the  happiest  apparent  relations 
to  each  other,  while  no  real  harm  is  done  on  the  part  of  one 
to  the  other.  But  this  is  no  concern  of  the  generations 
themselves,  but  wholly  that  of  the  Absolute  that  produced 
them.  Well  may  the  German  youth  boast,  that  being  de- 
livered by  their  philosophy  from  all  sense  of  moral  obliga- 
tion, and  from  all  fear  of  consequences  hereafter,  "  nothing 
remains  but  to  live  a  merry  life."  Such  is  Idealism,  giving 
in  all  its  principles  and  deductions  "the  lie  direct"  to 
every  moral  and  religious  sentiment  in  man. 

Idealism  void  of  all  utility. 

The  absolute  practical  inutility  of  Idealism  is  another  of 
its  essential  characteristics,  —  a  characteristic  perfectly 
fatal  to  all  its  claims  to  validity.  The  natural  and  philo- 
sophical, the  practical  and  theoretical  procedures  of  the  In- 
telligence should  not  be  in  essentially  different,  and  above 
all  in  opposite  and  contradictory,  directions.  Theory,  on 
the  other  hand,  should  give  laws  to  practical  life,  and 
should  impart  to  its  procedures  the  most  perfect  forms  and 


304  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

directions.  But  there  is  not  a  single  principle  or  deduc- 
tion of  Idealism  that  can  be  of  the  least  use  in  any  of  the 
sciences,  pure  or  mixed,  or  in  any  of  the  concerns  of  prac- 
tical life.  A  certain  Idealist  having  completed  his  system, 
remarked  that  it  had  in  it  absolutely  nothing  possessing 
any  form  or  degree  of  utility,  or  tending  in  any  manner  in 
that  direction.  And  here,  he  remarked,  were  to  be  found 
its  high  claims  to  regard.  Here  was  truth,  disconnected 
from  all  considerations  but  the  idea  itself.  Truth  could 
now  be  embraced  from  pure  disinterestedness, — from  no 
other  motives  than  the  simple  love  of  truth  itself.  There 
is  not  a  solitary  form  of  Idealism  that  can  rest  upon  any 
higher  claims  as  far  as  its  principles  and  logical  deductions 
are  concerned.  Idealists  may  have  said,  as  they  really 
have  clone,  many  useful  things.  Such  utterances,  however, 
are  not  in  consequence  of  their  systems,  but  in  spite  of 
them.  In  the  S3Tstems  themselves  there  is  absolutety  noth- 
ing looking  at  all  in  the  direction  of  any  form  of  utility 
whatever. 

Idealism  limits  mind. 

There  is,  we  remark  again,  in  all  the  forms  of  Idealism 
alike,  a  fundamental  tendency  to  limit  mind,  and  prevent  its 
permanent  growth  and  expansion.  This  statement  has  been 
fully  verified  by  undeniable  facts  of  history.  In  India,  for 
example,  all  the  forms  which  Idealism  has  ever  assumed, 
from  Kant  down  to  Hegel,  exist  in  a  state  of  development 
which,  in  almost  no  respect,  modern  philosophy  has  im- 
proved. There,  its  influence  has  been  fully  tested  by  an 
experience  of  ages  in  continuance  ;  and  what  has  been  the 
result?  When  the  system  first  opened  upon  the  Hindoo 
mind,  it,  as  did  the  German  mind  in  similar  circumstances, 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT.  305 

received  a  wonderful  expansion.     Civilization,  almost-  at 
once,  sprang  into  being  under  the  plastic  influence  shed 
down  upon  humanity.     The  ultimate  and  no  distant  result, 
however,  was  a  permanent  and  immovable  mental  stagna- 
tion from  which  there  is  no  possible  recoveiy,  onty  by  the 
actual  emancipation  of  the  mind  from  the  influences  by 
which  its  powers  are  paralyzed.     From  the  nature  of  the 
case,  from  the  necessary  intrinsic  tendencies  of  the  system, 
it  cannot,  in  any  case,  be  otherwise.     The  reason  is  obvi- 
ous.     All  proper  conceptions  of  God,  Immortality,   and 
Retribution,  under  the  influence  of  which  alone  the  mental 
powers  can  permanently  expand,  are  either  totally  obliter- 
ated in  these  systems,  or  else  so  utterly  degraded  that, 
under  their  influence,  mind  cannot  but  receive  corresponding 
degradation.     When   God,  for  example,  is,  in  our  concep- 
tions, degraded  from  a  self-conscious  Personality,  clothed 
with  absolute  Infinity  and  Perfection,  to  a  mere  idea  of 
Reason,  Law  of  Thought,  or  to  an  unconscious,  undeveloped 
Impersonality,  which  can  attain  to  the  exercise  of  conscious 
intelligence  only  in  the  Consciousness  of  man,  the  mind 
experiences  of  necessity  in  itself,  in  thus  "  changing  the 
glory  of  the  incorruptible  God   into  an  image  made  like 
unto  corruptible  man,"  the  consequences  of  its  own  folly, 
by  being  held  down  in  'a  state  of  mental  and  moral  degra- 
dation.    Then,  in  the  development  of  this  system,  mind  is 
carried  round  in  a  perpetual  circle,  where  nothing  elevat- 
ing or  expanding  presents  itself,  and  where  the  endless  re- 
currence of  precisely  the  same  forms  of  thought  produces 
ultimately  a  state   of  immovable   ennui   and   stagnation. 
When   you   have   once    travelled   the  ground   with   Kant, 
Fichte,  Schelling,  or  Hegel,  Idealism  can  do  no  more  for 
mental  development,  but  just  to  repeat  over  and  over  again, 
2G* 


306  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

in  endless  cj^cles,  the  same  changeless  successions  of  utterly 
barren  ideas.  Such  are  the  intrinsic  tendencies  of  the  sys- 
tem itself.  Germany  has  experienced  the  expanding  power 
of  Idealism  in  its  early  developments,  and  she  is  beginning  to 
feel  the  deadening  reaction.  Her  lecture-rooms  of  philoso- 
phy are  not  now  filled  with  eager  listeners,  as  they  once 
were,  nor  is  philosophy  the  theme  of  the  public  mind  there, 
as  it  once  was.  Everywhere  the  intense  interest  with 
which  philosophy  once  electrified  the  public  mind  is  dying 
out,  and  a  deadening  influence  has  taken  the  place  of  that 
interest,  —  an  influence  pressing  as  an  incubus  upon  the 
Intelligence  and  heart,  and  preventing  mental  progress  in 
any  direction.  No  other  results  can  follow  under  the  in- 
fluence of  Idealism. 

Idealism  fails  to  meet  the  scientific  wants  of  mind. 

We  remark,  finally,  that  Idealism  utterly  fails,  and  from 
its  own  nature  and  the  immutable  laws  of  mind,  must 
utterly  fail,  to  meet  the  philosophic  wants  not  only  of  the 
public  mind  generally,  but  equally  those  of  the  philosophic 
mind.  The  philosophic  idea  realized  is  one  of  the  great 
wants  of  humanity,  and  it  is  the  special  want  of  philosophic 
minds.  This  want,  whenever  it  exists,  is  correlative  to 
truth,  and  nothing  but  a  true  system  of  philosophy  can 
meet  that  want.  Present  to  the  mind  any  false  system, 
however  self-consistent  and  perfect  in  its  developments, 
and  however  well  sustained  by  apparent  evidence,  and  the 
mind,  after  revolving  around  it  for  a  period,  begins  to  ex- 
perience a  kind  of  heart-sickness  which  necessarily  results 
from  "  hope  deferred,"  and  disappointed  expectation. 
The  mind  may  continue  to  revolve  about  the  system,  under 
the  assumption  that  it  is  true,  and  under  the  conviction 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT.  307 

that  truth  must  be  useful  to  man.  Yet,  in  the  centre  of 
the  soul  there  will  be  a  continued  voice  of  remonstrance, 
an  inward  protest  against  the  claims  of  the  system.  This 
is  not  3^our  resting-place.  This  is  not  the  temple  of  truth  ; 
for  here  the  genial  warmth  and  vivifying  radiance  which 
truth  radiates  upon  all  who  find  her,  is  not  experienced. 
Now,  this  is  peculiarly  true  of  Idealism,  in  all  its  forms. 
The  palpable  contradictions  which  it  presents  between  the 
natural  and  philosophical  procedures  of  the  Intelligence, 
the  mind,  by  an  intuitive  and  necessary  conviction,  knows 
cannot  be  true,  and  hence  it  must  ever  experience  a  restless 
dissatisfaction  under  the  pressure  of  any  system  of  philoso- 
phy which  involves  them.  While  those  contradictions  and 
antagonisms  remain,  the  mind  cannot  but  know  in  itself 
that  the  great  problem  of  philosophy  -  yet  remains  to  be 
solved. 

The  ideas  of  God,  Liberty,  and  Immortality,  presented 
in  these  systems,  also  are,  in  all  respects,  the  reverse  of 
those  to  which  the  moral  and  spiritual  departments  of  uni- 
versal mind  are  unchangeably  correlative,  and  thus  a  pain- 
ful void  is  left  unfilled  in  the  very  centre  of  our  inner  be- 
ing. Then,  finally,  these  systems,  while  they  promise  to 
explain  all  the  facts  of  Consciousness,  as  they  are,  neces- 
sarily omit,  and  in  their  developments  palpably  contra- 
dict, an  essential  part  of  them,  —  a  part  just  as  real  and 
as  fundamental  as  those  which  are  professedly  explained. 
Thus,  such  systems  equally  fail  to  meet  the  philosophic 
wants  of  common  and  of  philosophic  minds.  What  univer- 
sal mind  demands  is  a  philosophy  which  shall  omit  none 
of  the  real  facts  of  Consciousness  which  do  exist,  and  sup- 
pose none  which  do  not  exist ;  which  shall  explain  them  all 
alike,  and   not,  .in  the  explanation,  transform  them  into 


308  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

something  which  they  are  not,  — a  philosophy  all  of  whose 
principles  shall  be  the  necessary  logical  antecedents  of 
these  facts,  and  whose  conclusions  shall  all  alike  be  the 
necessary  deductions  of  these  principles  and  facts,  and  thus 
leave  the  mind  explained  to  itself  as  it  is,  and  not  as  it  is 
not.  Now,  this  is  just  what  Idealism  necessarily  fails  to 
accomplish.  There  is  not  a  single  fact  of  Consciousness 
of  which  it  gives  a  satisfactory  explanation.  Take  the 
phenomena  of  external  perception  as  an  illustration.  In 
the  consciousness  of  perception,  the  mind  affirms  to  itself,  I 
perceive  an  external  object  having  real  extension  and  deter- 
minate form.  Such  is  the  perception  as  given  in  Conscious- 
ness. How  does  the  Idealist  explain  the  fact  ?  He  tells 
us  there  is  no  such  object  as  we  have  supposed,  —  no  ob- 
ject whatever  external  to  the  mind, — that  a  "trick  has 
been  played  upon  Reason,"  "  a  natural,  unavoidable  illu- 
sion," in  which  a  mere  subjective  phenomenon  has  been  pos- 
tulated as  the  quality  of  an  external  object.  This  is  his 
explanation  of  this  great  fact.  Now,  the  philosopher 
that  will  give,  in  the  name  of  philosophy,  such  an  expla- 
nation of  such  a  fact,  will  be  internally  felt  by  the  common 
and  philosophic  mind  alike  to  be  himself  a  philosophic 
mountebank,  intentionally  or  unintentionally  attempting  to 
play  tricks  upon  the  public  mind.  Idealism  can  never 
stand  the  test  of  time,  for  the  undeniable  reason  that  it 
fundamentally  fails  to  meet  the  deep  philosophic  wants  of 
humanity. 

Bearing  of  the  discussion  upon  the  Theistic  problem. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  "state  the  bearing  of  the  investi- 
gations brought  to  close  in  the  present  chapter,  upon  the 
theistic  problem  which  we  are  investigating.     In  the  pre- 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT.  309 

ceding  chapters  the  argument  was  direct.  In  this  it  is 
indirect,  but  nevertheless  of  fundamental  importance.  The 
argument,  in  its  disjunctive  form,  as  now  developed,  stands 
thus :  If  neither  the  hypothesis  of  Materialism,  nor  that 
of  Idealism,  in  any  of  its  forms,  can  be  true,  then  Realism, 
and  consequently  Theism,  must  be  true.  Neither  Materi- 
alism nor  Idealism,  in  any  of  its  forms,  can  be  true.  Real- 
ism, and  consequently  Theism,  must,  therefore,  be  true. 
The  argument  is  left  for  the  candid  consideration  of  the 
reader. 


310  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE      DISJUNCTIVE     ARGUMENT      COMPLETED,    OR 
REALISM  AS  CONTRASTED  WITH  THE  SCEP- 
TICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The  disjunctive  argument  in  favor  of  the  claims  of  The- 
ism would  be  left  in  a  somewhat  obscure  and  incomplete 
state,  if  one  more  topic  bearing  upon  the  question  before 
us  did  not  receive  a  special  consideration.  We  refer  to 
the  Sceptical  Philosophy ;  and  if  we  did  not  contrast  its 
claims  with  those  of  Realism,  we  should  fail,  in  the  present 
form  of  the  argument,  of  a  complete  vindication  of  the 
claims  of  Theism. 

THE    SCEPTICAL    PHILOSOPHY   DEFINED. 

All  the  systems  whose  claims  were  examined  in  the  last 
chapter  fall  really  and  truly  under  the  category  of  Posi- 
tivism. Each  one  is  based  upon  the  assumption,  that  the 
facts  of  the  universe  as  given,  in  the  Intelligence,  are  not 
either  unindicative  or  sceptical,  but  indicative  or  dogmati- 
cal, in  their  bearing  upon  the  great  question  of  Ultimate 
Causation,  and  that,  when  scientifically  interpreted,  they 
affirm  the  validity  of  this  one  theory  and  deny  that  of  all  oth- 
ers. This  is  what  Realism,  Materialism,  and  Idealism  in 
its  various  forms,  aflirm  each  system  for  itself.  The 
Sceptical  Philosophy  affirms  that  the  facts  of  the  universe, 


TLTE    DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  311 

as  thus  given,  are  neither  wbolty  unindicative,  nor  strictly 
indicative  or  dogmatic,  in  their  bearing  upon  this  question. 
On  the  other  hand,  thejr  are  of  such  a  nature  as  necessarily 
to  suggest  the  different  theories  above  named  as  each  pos- 
sibly true,  without  presenting  any  scientific  grounds  what- 
ever for  determining  which,  in  distinction  from  the  oth- 
ers, is  true.  As  these  are  the  only  systems  conceivable  or 
possible,  and  as  each  stands  to  each  and  all  the  others  in 
the  relation  of  contradiction,  one  of  them,  to  the  exclusion 
of  each  and  all  the  others,  must  be  true,  and  they 
false.  But  when  we  raise  the  inquiry  which  system  is 
true,  and  which  false,  facts,  it  is  affirmed,  present  us 
with  no  scientific  basis  whatever  for  the  determination  of 
such  a  question.  On  the  other  hand,  these  facts,  in  their 
entireness,  sustain  the  relation  of  absolute  and  equal  com- 
patibility with  each  and  all  these  systems  alike.  They  pre- 
sent no  clue  whatever  for  the  determination  of  the  question 
which  of  these  systems  is  the  valid  one.  Hence,  Scepti- 
cism affirms  of  each  system  alike,  this  system  may  be 
true,  and  it  may  not  be  true,  and  there  is  no  possibility  of 
determining  whether  it  is,  or  is  not  true.  Either  hypothe- 
sis  we  choose  may  be  assumed  as  the  ground  of  explaining 
the  facts  of  the  universe.  One  class  may  be  explained  by 
one  theory,  and  another  by  another  ;  and  at  different  times, 
as  occasion,  convenience,  or  pleasure  demands,  different  lry- 
potheses  may  be  assumed  as  the  ground  of  the  explanation 
of  the  same  facts  or  classes  of  facts.  We  err  only  when 
we  dogmatize,  —  that  is,  put  forward  any  given  hypothesis 
as  exclusively  true,  aud  require  others  thus  to  receive  it. 
The  logical  consequence  of  the  sceptical  hypothesis  is  free 
thinking,  and  this  is  what  its  advocates  claim  for  it  as  the 
glory  of  the  system.     Thought,  it  is  affirmed,  is  unbound. 


312  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

Of  all  conceivable  theories  of  existence,  and  especially  of 
ultimate  causation,  it  is  free  to  select  the  most  perfect  to 
thought,  and  forever  to  luxuriate  amid  the  endless  forms 
of  beauty  and  perfection  which  its  own  continually  expand- 
ing powers  shall  image  forth.  We  may  be  permitted  to 
allude,  in  this  connection,  to  one  fundamental  want  of  uni- 
versal mind,  —  a  want  which  Scepticism  totally  fails  to 
meet.  Amid  the  endlessly  diversified  forms  of  beauty  and 
perfection  which  mind  images  forth  to  itself,  it  desires  im- 
mutably to  be  able  to  say  to  itself,  This  is  true  ;  and  to  be 
able,  amid  these  forms  of  thinking,  to  distinguish  the  true 
from  the  false.  This  liberty  Scepticism  denies  absolutely 
to  universal  mind,  and  that  on  all  subjects  alike.  It  de- 
nies to  us  totally  the  consolation  of  thinking  that  on  any 
subject  whatever  we  have  found  the  pearl  of  great  price,  — 
the  truth.  It  holds  out  to  us  the  high  promise  of  liberty  in 
its  most  absolute  and  perfect  forms,  and  then  denies  to  us, 
with  equal  absoluteness,  the  privilege  of  thinking  we  know 
what  we  are,  where  we  are,  what  we  ought  to  be  or  to  do, 
or  whither  we  are  bound. 

Religious  bearings  of  Scepticism. 

It  will  readily  be  perceived,  on  a  moment's  reflection, 
that  Scepticism,  in  its  fundamental  principles  and  deduc- 
tions, their  validity  being  granted,  is  utterly  subversive  of 
all  the  claims  of  religion,  natural  and  revealed.  Scientific 
knowledge  is  the  highest  and  most  authoritative  form  of 
knowledge  of  which  we  can  form  a  conception.  Science  is 
not  opposed  to  intuition,  but  includes  as  principles  all  valid 
intuitions  of  every  kind.  Nor  is  science  opposed  to  reve- 
lation, supposing  the  fact  of  a  revelation  to  be  established 
by  valid  evidence.     Science,  on  the  other  hand,  takes  into 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT   COMPLETED,  313 

account  all  valid  principles  and  facts  given  in  the  Intelli- 
gence, and  as  thus  given.  Let  us  suppose,  what  Scepti- 
cism affirms  to  be  true,  that  all  valid  principles  and  facts 
given  in  the  Intelligence,  when  scientifically  classified  and 
elucidated,  lead  to  the  absolute  deduction,  that  Theism  has 
no  higher  claims  to  validity  than  either  of  the  other  hypoth- 
eses to  which  it  stands  opposed.  What  basis  exists  for  the 
positive  institutions,  commands,  and  prohibitions  of  relig- 
ion ?  What  authenticated  revelation  can  come  to  us  from 
a  Being  whose  existence  even  is  revealed  to  us  by  no  valid 
evidence  whatever?  If  God  exists,  the  fact  that  he  has 
left  us  without  any  valid  evidence  of  his  being  or  perfec- 
tions is  the  highest  indication  that  he  could,  by  any  possi- 
bilit}r,  give  us,  that  it  is  his  will  not  to  be  to  us  an  object 
of  fear,  love,  or  worship.  Of  distinct  and  opposite  hypoth- 
eses, each  of  which  is  sustained  by  precisely  the  same  evi- 
dence, no  obligations  do,  or  can,  bind  us  to  hold  and  treat 
one  as  true  and  the  other  as  false.  All  this  is  undeniable. 
If  the  sceptical  hypothesis  is  true,  religion  is  not  only  not 
reason,  but  opposed  to  reason.  What  obligations,  we  re- 
peat, do  or  can  rest  upon  us  to  treat  and  worship  as  a  real 
existence  a  Being  whose  existence  has  been  revealed  to  us 
by  no  valid  evidence  ?  The  Scriptures  expressly  base  the 
claims  of  Theism  upon  the  fact  that  the  being  and  perfec- 
tions of  God  are  "  clearly  seen,  being  understood  by  the 
things  that  are  made ; "  and  the  necessary  intuitions  and 
deductions  of  universal  mind  land  us  in  the  conclusion, 
that  on  no  other  conditions  can  we  be  bound  to  worship 
or  serve  God,  as  the  Creator  and  Governor  of  all. 

It  is  a  very  singular  fact  that  not  a  few  advocates  of 
Theism,  who  stand  before  the  world  as  Christian  theologi- 
ans,  admit,  with  Coleridge,   that   upon  strictly   scientific 

27 


314  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

ground,  we  have  no  valid  proof  of  the  being  of  God,  and 
they  suppose  that,  in  granting  such  a  conclusion,  the  high- 
est vantage  ground  is  gained  for  the  system  they  advocate. 
Science,  they  say,  leaves  the  question  wholly  undecided. 
We  are,  therefore,  at  liberty  to  follow  our  intuitive  convic- 
tions and  higher  instincts  upon  the  subject.  No  conflict, 
it  is  further  said,  can  exist  between  science  and  religion, 
for  the  reason  that  where  the  former  leaves  the  subject,  and 
admits  its  own  utter  want  of  light  and  authority,  the  latter 
takes  it  up,  and  leads  us  onward  by  its  own  authoritative 
teachings  and  mandates.  The  conflict  referred  to,  it  should 
be  borne  in  mind,  is  not  thus  avoided.  According  to  the 
hypothesis,  religion  makes  positive  affirmations  just  where 
science  affirms  absolutely  that  there  are  no  grounds  for 
such  affirmations.  Science  and  religion,  then,  are  irrecon- 
cilable antagonisms.  We  may  ask  further,  in  this  connection, 
the  important  question,  What  is  really  and  truly  meant, 
when  it  is  affirmed  that,  upon  strictly  scientific  grounds, 
we  have  no  valid  proof  of  the  being  of  God  ?  It  is  this  : 
When  all  the  facts  of  the  universe,  —  facts  of  matter  and 
spirit,  all  our  intuitive  convictions  and  higher  instincts  in- 
cluded, —  are  scientifically  examined,  classified  and  eluci- 
dated, they  leave  us  wholly  without  any  valid  proof  of 
the  being  and  perfections  of  God.  On  the  other  hand, 
they  leave  the  Theistic  hypothesis  without  any  higher 
claims  to  validity  than  is  possessed  by  either  of  the  hy- 
potheses to  which  it  stands  opposed.  To  admit,  then,  that 
upon  scientific  grounds  we  have  no  valid  proof  of  the  The- 
istic hypothesis,  is  to  admit  and  affirm,  that  in  acting  as 
religious,  we  act  as  unreasonable,  beings.  There  is  no 
escaping  this  conclusion. 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  315 

THE    ASSUMPTION    UPON   WHICH    THE    SCEPTICAL    PHILOSOPHY 
IS    BASED. 

When  we  inquire  for  the  foundation  of  the  sceptical  phi- 
losophy, we  shall  find  that  it  rests  as  its  exclusive  basis 
upon  a  certain  assumption  which  has  entered  as  a  common 
principle  into  most  of  the  systems  of  mental  science  which 
have  obtained  currency  among  mental  philosophers  in  an- 
cient and  modern  times.  The  assumption  is  this  :  Our 
knowledge  of  the  universe,  material  and  mental, —  that  knowl- 
edge from  which  all  our  conclusions  relatively  to  ultimate 
causation  must  be  deduced,  is  wholly  and  exclusively  phe- 
nomenal and  not  real,  mediate  and  not  immediate,  relative 
or  representative  and  not  preventative.  All  our  inquiries, 
says  the  sceptic,  in  regard  to  ultimate  causation,  relate 
exclusively  to  questions  pertaining  to  real  being  or  exist- 
ence, and  not  to  mere  phenomena.  We  assume  that  there 
is  a  real  universe  which  we  call  nature,  and  a  real  ultimate 
cause  of  the  real  facts  of  the  nature  which  is  real.  If  we 
know  nature  as  it  is,  we  may,  through  the  real  facts  of  a  real 
universe,  find  out  the  real  ultimate  cause  of  these  facts.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  we  do  not  and  cannot  know  nature  itself, 
we  cannot  know  the  real  ultimate  cause  of  the  actual  facts 
of  nature.  This  is  undeniable.  Now,  Scepticism  affirms 
that  these  are  the  precise  relations  which  we  do  in  fact  sus- 
tain to  nature,  according  to  the  fundamental  principles  of 
every  system  of  philosophy,  which  teaches  that  our  knowl- 
edge of  nature  is  exclusively  phenomenal  and  not  real. 
From  such  knowledge  we  cannot,  without  a  violation  of  all 
the  laws  and  principles  of  true  science,  reason  at  all  to  the 
real  ultimate  cause  of  the  real  facts  of  nature.  If  between 
us  and  all  realities  of  eveiy  kind,  —  realities  subjective  and 


316  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

objective,  —  there  spreads  out  the  veil  of  the  exclusively  phe- 
nomenal, that  is,  mere  appearances  in  which  no  realities  as 
they  are  appear ;  if  it  is  absolutely  impossible  for  us  to 
pierce  this  veil  and  find  out  what  realities  lie  behind  it ;  then 
it  is  the  height  of  presumption  in  us  to  attempt  to  deter- 
mine what  realities  do  and  do  not  exist,  and  what  is  the 
ultimate  cause  of  the  present  facts  of  said  realities.  Such 
are  the  deductions  of  Scepticism,  and  how  we  can,  without 
a  most  palpable  violation  of  all  the  laws  and  principles  of 
true  science,  avoid  these  deductions,  we  confess  ourselves 
wholly  unable  to  determine.  We  freely  confess  that  we 
would  just  as  soon  attempt  to  point  out  a  fallacy  in  that 
scientific  process  by  which  we  are  conducted  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  square  of  the  hypothenuse  of  a  right-angled 
triangle  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  squares  of  its  two  sides, 
as  to  point  out  the  want  of  connection  between  the  theory 
of  knowledge  under  consideration  and  the  inference  which 
Scepticism  deduces  from  that  theory.  The  connection  be- 
tween the  premises  and  conclusion  is  no  more  necessary  and 
absolute  in  one  case  than  it  is  in  the  other. 

FUNDAMENTAL    CHARACTERISTICS    OF   THE    SCEPTICAL    PHILOS- 
OPHY. 

The  validity  of  all  the  above  statements  will  be  fully 
evinced  by  a  critical  examination  of  the  fundamental  char- 
acteristics of  the  philosophy  from  whose  principles  the  scep- 
tical conclusions  are  deduced.  We  shall  present  the  char- 
acteristics of  this  philosophy  as  they  are  exhibited  by  its 
great  German  expounder,  Kant,  and  its  hardly  less  able 
American  expositor,  Prof.  Hickok.  According  to  the  ex- 
press and  fundamental  teachings  of  each  of  these  philoso- 
phers, the  mind,  in  no  intellectual  act  of  any  kind,  has  any 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  317 

direct  and  immediate  perception  of  any  external  object  what- 
ever. The  object,  if  it  exists  at  all,  by  acting  on  our  sen- 
sitivity, induces  a  certain  mental  state  called  sensation.  In 
the  act  of  perception  the  object  is  not  perceived  at  all.  Noth- 
ing whatever  is  perceived  but  the  sensation,  which  is  exclu- 
sively a  mental  state,  a  feeling  of  the  mind  itself.  The 
sensation,  when  first  induced,  is  wholly  formless  and  indis- 
tinct. As  thought  is  directed  to  it,  however,  in  the  act  of 
observation  and  attention,  it  takes  on  a  definite  appearance, 
appearing  to  the  mind  as  an  object  external  to  it,  and  as 
such  object  having  extension  and  form.  How  is  this  sensa- 
tion—  this  formless  and  undefined  feeling  of  the  mind,  a 
feeling  wholty  subjective,  and  as  such  utterly  void  of  all  ex- 
teriority, extension,  and  form  —  made  to  appear  to  the  mind 
as  an  object  wholly  exterior,  and  as  such  having  definite 
extension  and  form  ?  The  reason  assigned  is  this  :  On  oc- 
casion of  the  origination  of  the  sensation  in  the  mind  the 
ideas  of  substance,  space,  and  time  are  developed  in  the 
Intelligence.  When  the  sensation  appears,  some  substance 
external  to  the  mind  is  supposed  to  be  the  cause  of  the  sen- 
sation, and  the  various  elements  given  in  the  sensation  are, 
by  an  intellectual  operation,  connected  with  said  substance 
as  qualities  of  the  same.  Thus  the  object  is  perceived  as  an 
object  external  to  the  mind  and  having  an  existence  inde- 
pendent of  it.  Through  the  ideas  of  space  and  time,  pre- 
existing in  the  Intelligence,  this  object  is  made  to  appear 
to  the  mind,  that  is,  is  perceived  by  it,  as  having  real  ex- 
tension and  form.  In  all  these  operations,  however,  the 
mind  perceives  no  external  object  whatever.  It  has  actual ly 
perceived  nothing  but  a  purely  and  exclusively  mental  state, 
—  a  mere  sensation,  a  subjective  feeling,  —  utterly  void  of 
all  exteriority,  extension,  and  form.    It  is  thus  that  we  come 


olS  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

to  an  apprehension  of  our  own  physical  organizations  and 
of  the  external  universe  around  us. 

The  above  statements  verified. 

Such  is  a  brief  statement  of  the  philosophy  under  con- 
sideration. That  we  have  correctly  interpreted  this  philoso- 
phy we  will  now  proceed  to  show  by  citations  from  the 
authors  above  named.  Sensation  is  thus  defined  by  Prof. 
Ilickok  :  "  The  action  of  the  outer  world  upon  the  living 
organ  may  be  known  as  an  impression,  and  such  impression 
met  by  the  reaction  of  the  living  organ  constitutes  what  we 
now  term  a  sensation."  Again  :  "  The  impression  upon  the 
organ  of  sense  may  be  termed  a  feeling ;  but,  inasmuch  as 
it  is  antecedent  to  all  consciousness  of  it,  such  feeling  can 
be  blind  only  and  operate  solely  as  instinct."  The  author 
distinguishes  this  blind,  unconscious  feeling  from  those 
feelings  which  come  after  it,  and  "  hy  occasion  of  it  through 
a  perception."  The  former  exclusively  he  denominates  sen- 
sation. The  latter,  he  says,  "  is  properly  an  emotion." 
Hence  he  concludes  :  "  Sensation  is  never  to  be  taken  as 
feeling  except  in  a  blind  and  unconscious  state."  Here  we 
have  it  distinctly  stated  that  sensation  is  exclusively  a  sub- 
jective state,  —  a  state  of  the  sensibility,  a  feeling  of  the 
mind,  —  and  that,  prior  to  its  recognition  in  consciousness, 
it  is  wholly  formless  and  indistinct.  In  this  state  our  au- 
thor affirms,  "  It  is  not  matter  ;  it  is  not  object ;  it  is  not 
anything  3'et  perceived  ;  it  is  solely  a  content  in  the  organ, 
out  of  which  a  perceived  phenomenon  is  to  be  elaborated  by 
a  farther  mental  operation."  Here  we  have  the  germ  and 
substance  of  our  author's  theoiy  of  external  perception. 
The  "  content"  of  such  perception  —  that  is, the  thing  really 
perceived  as  an  object — is  the  sensation  itself  and  nothing 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  319 

else.  To  show  this  we  must  now  recur  to  the  article  on 
Sense,  the  faculty  of  external  perception.  This  function 
of  the  Intelligence  our  author  defines  as  "  the  faculty  for 
attaining  cognitions  through  sensation."  "  In  it  [sensation] 
we  have  a  content  that  is,  as  yet,  wholly  undiscriminated 
and  undefined.  It  is  in  the  living  organ  only,  and  not  yet 
in  the  consciousness  as  any  known  object.  In  order  that  it 
[the  sensation]  may  be  so  known,  an  intellectual  operation 
is  necessary,  by  which  this  content  in  blind  feeling  shall  be 
completely  set  in  clear  consciousness. 

"Two  things  are  to  be  effected.  The  intellectual  agency 
must  first  determine  what  the  content  is,  as  distinguished 
from  all  others  that  have  been  or  may  be  given ;  and,  sec- 
ondly, this  agency  must  determine  its  limits  in  all  the  ways 
in  which  limitation  can  be  referred  to  it,  and  in  this  how 
much  the  content.  The  first  operation  may  be  known  as 
Observation,  and  the  second  as  Attention.  We  will  give 
each  of  these  more  particularly. 

"  Observation.  Sensation  merely  gives  a  content  in  the 
organ  for  a  perception,  but  it  does  nothing  towards  making 
that  content  to  appear  in  consciousness  as  a  distinct  object. 
It  is  occasion  for  the  self-active  mind  to  pass  into  an  intel- 
lectual state,  and  by  a  pure  intellectual  process  to  distin- 
guish the  sensation.  The  purely  distinguishing  act  is  what 
is  meant  by  observation.  It  avails  to  give  the  content  in 
sensation  as  a  distinct  object." 

Here  we  are  expressly  taught  that  the  entire  content  of 
the  object  perceived,  that  is,  all  that  is  embraced  in  percep- 
tion, is  the  sensation.  Observation  pertains  to  no  object 
external  to  the  mind,  but  simply  makes  the  content  given 
in  sensation,  that  is,  the  sensation  itself,  "  appear  in  con- 
sciousness as  a  distinct  object."     Our  author  then  goes  on 


320  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

to  show  that  attention  as  well  as  observation  is  completely 
exhausted  upon  the  sensation,  and  pertains  not  at  all  to  any 
external  object.  In  the  latter  the  sensation  is  given  as  "  a 
distinct,"  and  in  the  former,  "  a  definite,"  object.  "  When 
a  sensation,"  he  says,  "  has  been  distinguished  in  kind  and 
variety  by  an  observing  act,  there  is  given  in  this  a  distinct, 
but  not  yet  a  definite,  object  to  the  consciousness.  We  need, 
farther,  a  purely  intellectual  agency  which  shall  completely 
define  the  quality  within  its  own  limits.  When  we  have 
distinct  quality,  we  need  also  to  go  farther  to  complete  the 
perception  and  .attain  a  definite  quality.  This  is  effected 
in  the  attention." 

Wrhat  our  author  means  by  the  term  quality  is  now  very 
evident.  It  is  nothing  but  sensation  distinctly  perceived  in 
consciousness  as  an  object,  through  observation  and  atten- 
tion. "As  thus  brought  into  distinct  appearance,"  he  says, 
"it  [the  sensation]  becomes  properly  a  phenomenon,  and 
what  was  before  undistinguished  content  in  sensation  now 
becomes  a  quality,  discriminated  from  all  others  and  known 
in  its  own  peculiarity." 

The  result  of  such  an  exposition  of  perception  is  perfectly 
obvious.  Perception  pertains  exclusively  to  the  sensation, 
and  not  at  all  to  the  external  object  supposed  to  be  the 
cause  of  this  feeling,  if  indeed  such  object  does  exist.  That 
which  is  to  the  mind  such  object  is  nothing  whatever  but  a 
mental  state,  a  feeling  of  the  mind  itself,  a  sensation  made 
such  object  by  an  "  intellectual  process  of  bringing  out  the 
sensation  to  a  clear  perception."  Such  are  the  express 
teachings  of  our  author  upon  the  subject.  "  The  fact  of 
sensation  is  given  as  primitive  ;  the  intellectual  operations, 
distinguishing  in  observation  and  defining  in  attention, 
bring  the  content  in  sensation  distinctly  and  definitely  into 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  321 

consciousness.  A  complete  object  is  thus  before  the  mind, 
and  we  are  said  to  apprehend  it  in  thus  getting  it  within 
the  mind's  grasp,  out  of  its  former  darkness.  In  its  [the 
sensation's]  appearance  in  the  light  of  consciousness  it  is 
known  as  phenomenon ;  and,  inasmuch  as  it  has  been  taken 
through  the  medium  of  sensible  organs,  it  is  termed  percep- 
tion. As  the  impression  on  the  organ  has  been  made  by 
an  existence  from  without  [supposed  to  have  been  thus 
made,  as  the  author  subsequently  teaches],  the  phenomenon 
[the  sensation  made  an  object  by  the  intellectual  opera- 
tion referred  to]  is  ascribed  to  outer  nature  as  some  quality 
of  an  external  world,  and  perceived  through  an  external 
sense."  Again,  our  author  says,  in  summing  up  the  results 
of  the  previous  analysis  :  "  It  follows,  that  what  has  been 
given  in  the  sense  [external  perception]  is  not  the  thing 
itself.  That  outer  thing  has  in  some  way  affected  the  organ 
and  induced  sensation,  and  this  sensation  it  is  which  the 
intellect  distinguishes  and  defines."  Nothing  can  be  more 
explicit,  and  at  the  same  time  confirmatory  of  our  previous 
exposition  of  the  principles  of  this  philosophy,  than  the 
above  statements. 

One  inquiry  remains,  which  is  this  :  How  is  it  that  through 
sensations  thus  converted  into  appearances  of  objects  exter- 
nal to  the  mind,  we  come  to  apprehend  the  universe  in 
which  we  conceive  ourselves  as  having  our  being?  This  pro- 
cess is  given  by  our  author  in  the  chapter  on  The  Under- 
standing.     "  The  Understanding,"  he  says,  "  is  that  intel- 
lectual faculty  by  which  the  single  and  fleeting  phenomena 
of  sense    are   known   as   qualities  inhering  in  permanen 
things,  and  all  things  as  cohering  to  form  the  universe.' 
As  perception  is  wholly  exhausted  upon  sensation,  and  thi 
content  furnished  by  the  same,  so  the  action  of  the  Under- 


322  NATURAL    THEOLOGY, 

standing  is  as  exclusively,  in  the  formation  of  world-con- 
ceptions, confined  to  and  exhausted  upon  the  material  fur- 
nished by  perception.  "  When  distinct  and  definite  phe- 
nomena," he  sa}^s,  "  are  perceived  in  sense,  they  are  not 
allowed  to  remain  single  and  separate  in  the  mind  just  as 
the  sense  has  taken  them.  A  further  operation  succeeds  ; 
and  a  ground  is  thought  in  which  they  inhere  ;  and  the  single 
qualities  become  thus  known  as  the  connected  qualities  of 
a  common  substance.  The  redness,  the  fragrance,  the 
smoothness,  etc.,  which  have  been  separately  attained  by 
different  senses,  are  successively  thought  into  one  thing, 
and  the  mind  forms  the  several  judgments  that  the  rose  is 
red,  and  is  fragrant,  and  is  smooth,  etc.  And  so,  also,  with 
the  distinct  and  definite  inner  phenomena.  The  thought, 
emotion,  volition,  etc.,  are  successively  connected  in  their 
common  source  as  the  exercises  of  the  one  and  the  same 
agent ;  and  thus  the  successive  judgments  are  formed,  that 
the  mind  thinks  and  feels  and  wills.  A  common  subject  is 
thought  for  the  qualities,  and  a  common  source  for  the 
changes,  and  they  become  thus  connected  as  substances 
and  qualities,  cause  and  events.  And,  still  farther,  the  dif- 
ferent substances  are  also  thought  as  standing  in  commun- 
ion together,  and  reciprocally  influencing  each  other ;  and 
causes  and  events  are  thought  as  produced  the  one  from 
the  other,  and  thus  in  dependence  ;  and  in  this  way  the  co- 
hering things  and  the  adhering  changes  are  all  connected 
together  in  one  nature,  and  judged  so  to  inhere  with  each 
other  through  space  and  time  that  they  all  together  make 
the  universe."  The  substances  themselves  in  which  phe- 
nomena, external  and  internal,  are  thought  as  inhering,  are 
not  objects  of  perception  at  all.     The  mind  itself  originates 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  323 

the  idea  of  substance,  and  then  connects  with  the  same  the 
phenomena  it  has  perceived. 

"  The  genesis  of  the  understanding-conception,"  our 
author  goes  on  to  say,  "  as  notion  —  may  be  apprehended 
as  follows  :  Some  external  thing  is  supposed  to  have  occa- 
sioned the  impression  made  upon  the  organ  which  induced 
the  sensation,  and  then  this  sensation,  and  not  the  thing 
which  made  the  impression,  is  taken  up  b}^  an  intellectual 
operation  which  distinguishes  and  defines  it,  and  thereby 
makes  it  appear  complete  in  the  consciousness  ;  and  thus 
the  phenomenon  is  solely  the  mode  in  which  the  external 
thing  has  revealed  itself  in  the  sense.  This  external  thing, 
thus  making  itself  to  be  known  in  the  sense  only  by  its 
phenomenal  qualities,  is  thought  to  be  the  ground  of  these 
qualities." 

The  above  extracts  abundantly  verify  our  entire  state- 
ments in  regard  to  the  system  of  philosophy  under  consid- 
eration. The  external  world,  if  it  exist  at  all,  is  to  the 
mind  no  object  of  direct  and  immediate  knowledge.  All 
that  we  perceive,  when  we  suppose  ourselves  to  perceive  ob- 
jects external  to  the  mind,  is  nothing  but  our  own  mental 
states,  —  our  sensations  rendered  to  the  mind,  —  such  objects 
by  laws  inhering  in  the  intelligence  itself.  In  a  subsequent 
chapter  on  Reason,  our  author  endeavors  to  show  that  this 
faculty,  through  the  fundamental  ideas  and  principles 
which  it  originates,  —  ideas  such  as  substance,  space,  time, 
cause,  etc.,  —  first  of  all  determines  the  character  of  our 
perceptions,  and  then  of  all  our  conceptions,  judgments, 
and  reasonings.  A  sensation  appears  or  is  induced  in  the 
mind.  The  idea  of  substance  "supposed"  to  pertain  to  a 
something  out  of  the  mind,  —  a  something  which  caused  the 
sensation, —  makes  this  sensation  appear  to  \X\q  mind  as  the 


324  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

quality  of  such  object.  The  sensation,  as  such  external  ob- 
ject, appears  to  possess  extension  and  form.  It  is  made 
thus  to  appear  through  the  ideas  of  time  and  space.  "  Space 
and  time,"  says  Kant,  "  are  the  pure  forms  of  them  "  [ex- 
ternal perceptions],  "sensation  in  general  the  matter." 
So  says  Prof.  Hickok,  in  his  Rational  Psychology.  So  of 
all  our  mental  operations  in  regard  to  external  nature.  All 
such  operations  are  exhausted  upon  the  crude  material  of 
sensation,  and  determined  in  all  their  forms  and  character- 
istics by  ideas  of  Reason  pre-existing  in  the  Intelligence. 
We  shall  have  occasion  to  refer  to  this  fact  again  in  another 
connection. 

Principle  common  to  all  forms  of  the  sensational  theory. 

Such  is  this  S}Tstem  of  philosoplry.  In  its  fundamental 
principles  and  deductions  all  must  agree  who  hold  that  all 
all  our  knowledge  of  external  nature  is  exclusively  through 
the  medium  of  sensation.  There  is  one  principle  strictly 
common  to  all  such  theories,  whatever  their  specific  forms 
may  be,  —  a  principle  to  which  very  special  attention  is  now 
invited.  It  is  this  :  Our  sensations  as  they  are,  being  given, 
together  with  the  mind,  constituted  as  it  now  is,  and  the  same 
universe  that  we  now  seem  to  perceive,  ivoidd  be  present  to  us 
in  all  respects  as  it  now  is,  and  that  whether  any  external  ob- 
jects whatever  do  or  do  not  exist.  The  universe  which  we 
actually  perceive,  and  which  is  the  only  real  universe  to  us, 
is  wholly  the  creation  of  the  mind  itself,  —  a  universe  brought 
into  its  present  form  by  the  mind  itself  through  its  own  in- 
hering ideas  and  laws  working  upon  the  crude  material  of 
sensation,  and  nothing  else.  This,  to  us  the  onty  real  uni- 
verse, has  nothing  of  real  substance  in  it,  —  nothing  more 
real  or  substantial  than  our  own  fleeting  and  crude  sensa- 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  325 

tions.     This  is  the  principle  strictly  common  to  the  sensa- 
tional theory  in  all  the  forms  which  it  does  or  can  assume. 

NECESSARY   CONSEQUENCES    OF   THIS    SYSTEM. 

We  now  invite  very  special  attention  to  a  consideration 
of  some  of  the  necessary  consequences  of  the  fundamental 
principles  of  this  philosophy.  We  do  not  affirm  that  all  the 
advocates  of  this  philosophy  actually  hold  all  these  deduc- 
tions as  true,  or  admit  all  these  consequences  as  real.  What 
we  do  affirm  is  this :  that  they  must,  to  be  logically  con- 
sistent, hold  all  these  consequences  in  their  entireness. 
Among  these  consequences  we  notice  the  following : 

The  external  universe,  which  we  contemplate  as  real,  has  no 
existence  out  of  our  own  minds. 

The  first  that  we  notice  is  this  :  The  external  universe  — 
that  universe  which  is  alone  real  to  us  —  has,  in  fact,  no  ex- 
istence whatever,  out  of  the  mind  itself.  Where  the  content, 
the  real  substance  of  a  thing  is,  there,  and  only  there,  we 
find  the  thing  itself.  Now  what,  according  to  the  funda- 
mental teachings  and  principles  of  this  philosophy,  is  the 
exclusive  content,  or  substance,  of  this  whole  world  of  per- 
ception ?  It  is  sensation  and  nothing  else.  Not  a  solitary 
element, "  from  the  heavens  above,  or  the  earth  beneath,  or 
the  waters  under  the  earth,"  if  indeed  such  realities  do  ex- 
ist, enters  into  the  composition  of  this  universe.  All  here  is 
sensation  transformed,  and  nothing  else.  Sensation,  we 
must  remember,  has  no  existence  out  of  the  mind,  but  is 
exclusively  a  feeling  of  the  mind  itself.  Where,  then,  must 
be  the  exclusive  dwelling-place  of  this  whole  universe  of 
perception  ?  It  has  no  being,  no  dwelling-place,  out  of  the 
mind  itself.     There  is  no  escaping  this  conclusion ;  and 

28 


32G  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

this  necessary  deduction  is  avowed  and  gloried  in  by  the 
leading  advocates  of  the  sj-stem.  Such  men  we  refer  to, 
as  Coleridge,  and  the  entire  school  of  the  strictly  German 
philosophy. 

Th  is  universe  has  no  existence  at  all,  excepting  when  we 
in  the  very  act  of  perception. 


are 


Another  deduction,  equallv  necessary  and  unavoidable,  is 
this  :  The  universe  of  perception,  the  only  external  uni- 
verse which  has  reality  to  us,  has  no  existence,  in  smy  form, 
excepting  when  we  are  in  the  act  of  perceiving  it.  Take 
away  the  content,  the  substance  of  a  thing,  and  you  take 
away  the  thing  itself.  The  exclusive  content,  or  substance, 
of  the  universe  of  external  perception,  we  repeat,  is,  ac- 
cording to  this  philosoplry,  sensation,  and  nothing  else. 
When  we  suppose  ourselves  to  be  looking  at  the  sun  and 
stars  of  heaven,  or  at  "the  great  globe  itself;"  when  we 
suppose  ourselves  "  beholding  with  open  face  "  the  father 
that  begot,  the  mother  that  bore  and  nursed  us,  the  wife 
that  lies  upon  our  bosom,  and  those  children  standing 
around  as  the  pledges  of  our  mutual  love, — wTe  are,  in  fact, 
perceiving  no  external  existences  whatever.  We  are  siru- 
ps perceiving  and  observing  certain  feelings,  sensations, 
of  our  own  minds.  And  when  these  sensations  and  the  con- 
sequent perceptions  disappear,  as  they  often  do,  what  be- 
comes then  of  this  world,  this  universe  of  perception  ?  The 
very  content  or  substance  of  it  has  gone  into  utter  annihi- 
lation. It  has  no  existence  whatever.  This  is  an  immuta- 
bly necessary  deduction  from  the  fundamental  principles  of 
this  philosophy. 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT  COMPLETED.  327 

"TAe  things  which  we  invisage  are  not  that  in  themselves  for 
which  we  take  them" 

Another  necessary  consequence  of  this  philosoplry  is  this, 
—  a  consequence  which  we  will  give  in  the  language  of  its 
great  expounder,  Kant :  "  We  have,  therefore,  intended 
to  say  that  all  our  intuition  is  nothing  but  the  representa- 
tion of  phenomenon, — that  the  things  which  we  invisage 
[perceive  and  think  of  as  real  external  existences]  are  not 
that  in  themselves  for  which  we  take  them  ;  neither  are 
their  relationships  in  themselves  so  constituted  as  they  ap- 
pear to  us."  Grant  the  validity  of  the  fundamental  princi- 
ples of  this  philosophy,  and  there  is  no  escaping  this  con- 
clusion. The  world  of  perception,  as  perceived  and  taken 
by  us,  has  an  existence  out  of  and  independent  of  ourselves. 
The  world  of  perception,  according  to  the  fundamental 
teachings  of  this  philosophy,  has  no  existence  whatever,  out 
of  or  independent  of  ourselves.  In  the  world  of  perception, 
as  we  take  them,  and  as  objects  appear  to  us,  objects  are 
related  to  each  other  as  having  real  and  relative  extension 
and  form,  as  mutually  affecting  each  other,  —  as  suns  and 
planets,  as  parent  and  child,  husband  and  wife,  etc.  In 
the  world  of  perception,  according  to  this  philosophy,  no 
such  objects  do  exist,  and  no  such  relationships  of  objects. 
-Nothing  whatever  is  perceived  out  of  the  mind,  and  nothing 
within  but  mere  subjective  feelings,  —  sensations  which  do 
and  can  possess  no  such  properties,  and  sustain  no  such 
relations  to  each  other  as  these  above  named.  This  is  un- 
deniable. Whatever  ma}7  exist  beyond  the  world  of  percep- 
tion, the  things  invisaged  within  it  are  not  and  cannot  be, 
if  this  philosophy  is  true,  "  that  in  themselves  for  which  we 


328  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

take  them,  neither  are  their  relationships  in  themselves  so 
constituted  as  they  appear  unto  us." 

The  universe  of  perception  the  exclusive  product  of  the  mind, 
itself  from  the  materials  furnished,  to  wit,  sensations. 

We  now  invite  special  attention  to  another  necessary  de- 
duction from  the  fundamental  principles  of  this  philosophy. 
It  is  this  :  The  universe  of  perception,  that  alone  which  is 
real  to  us,  as  an  external  universe,  is  the  exclusive  crea- 
tion of  the  mind  itself  from  the  materials  furnished,  to 
wit,  sensation,  and  owes  its  existence  to  no  cause  whatever, 
out  of  and  above  the  mind  itself.  Some  power  may  have 
created  mind  and  determined  its  laws.  Not  so  with  the 
world  of  perception.  It  had  no  existence  prior  to  our  own 
minds,  and  was  never  previously  fitted  up  for  our  place  of 
abode  by  a  divine  and  beneficent  cause.  This  universe 
the  mind  created  by  and  for  itself.  This  universe  owes  its 
being  and  characteristics  to  no  power  out  of,  or  above,  or 
other  than  the  mind  which  perceives  it.  This  is  an  immu- 
tably necessary  deduction  from  the  fundamental  principles 
of  this  philosophy. 

It  is  absolutely  impossible  for  us  to  determine  what  realities, 
proximate  or  ultimate,  finite  or  infinite,  do  or  do  not  exist. 

Another  consequence  equally  necessary,  which  arises 
from  the  fundamental  principles  and  deductions  of  this 
philosophy,  is  this :  From  sensation  itself,  and  from  no 
facts  of  perception,  external  or  internal,  can  we  determine 
what  realities,  proximate  or  ultimate,  finite  or  infinite,  do 
or  do  not  exist.  This  will  be  rendered  demonstrably  evi- 
dent from  the  following  considerations  : 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT   COMrLETED.  329 

1.  It  is  absolutely  impossible  for  us,  according  to  the 
fundamental  principles  and  deductions  of  this  philosoplry, 
to  determine  what  sensation  itself  is.  This  is  admitted  of 
such  mental  states  prior  to  observation  and  attention. 
Sensation,  in  this  state,  lies  back  of,  and  out  of,  the  sphere 
of  consciousness.  Of  its  nature,  therefore,  we  can  know 
absolutely  nothing.  As  soon  as  it  comes  within  the  sphere 
of  consciousness,  through  observation  and  attention,  it  ap- 
pears to  the  mind,  in  consciousness,  in  all  respects,  the 
opposite  of  what  really  and  truly  it  is  in  itself.  It  now  ap- 
pears as  the  actual  quality  of  an  object  having  real  exteri- 
ority, extension,  and  form  ;  while,  in  fact,  it  is  nothing  but 
an  exclusively  mental  feeling,  utterly  void  of  all  such  char- 
acteristics. It  is  absolutel}T  evident,  therefore,  that  we  can, 
by  no  possibility,  determine,  if  this  philosophy  is  true, 
what  sensation  really  and  truly  is, — sensation,  either  in 
its  original  state,  or  subsequent  to  its  development  in  con- 
sciousness. For  aught  that  we  do  or  can  know,  what  is 
called  sensation  may  be  no  feeling  at  all  of  any  kind,  but 
pure  thought  according  to  the  teachings  of  Pure  Idealism. 
Now,  while  it  is  thus  self-evident  that,  according  to  the  ex- 
press teachings  of  this  philosoplry ,  we  can,  by  no  possibil- 
ity, know  what  sensation  is,  it  is  equally  evident  that, 
through  this  unknown  and  unknowable  something,  we  can- 
not determine  what  other  realities  do,  or  do  not  exist. 
The  real  can  never  be  found  through  the  unknown.  This 
we  hold  to  be  self-evident. 

2.  Equally  impossible  is  it,  according  to  the  fundamental 
principles  and  deductions  of  this  philosophy,  to  find  any 
such  reality,  through  any  of  the  facts  of  perception,  external 
or  internal.  Throughout  the  wide  domain  of  perception, 
in  all  its  forms  alike,  we  are  in  a  universe  of  mere  appear- 

28* 


030  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

ances,  —  appearances  in  and  through  which  no  realities,  as 
they  are,  appear.  "  The  things  which  we  envisage  are  not 
that  in  themselves  for  which  we  take  them ;  neither  are 
their  relationships  so  constituted  as  they  appear  to  us." 
This  is  fundamental  in  this  philosophy.  How  can  we,  by 
means  of  such  appearances  as  these,  determine  what  reali- 
ties proximate  or  ultimate,  finite  or  infinite,  do  or  do  not 
exist?  The  thing  is  impossible,  and  the  attempt  an  ab- 
surdity. 

3.  Nor  do  our  prospects  brighten  at  all  when  we  turn  from 
sensation  and  the  facts  of  perception,  to  Reason,  the  organ 
of  the  supersensuous,  and  attempt  to  determine,  through 
that,  what  realities  do  and  do  not  exist.  Prof.  Hickok  ap- 
pears to  be  distinctly  aware  that,  according  to  the  funda- 
mental principles  and  deductions  of  his  philosophy,  we 
can  never  find  the  Unconditioned — that  is,  God  —  through 
the  facts  of  nature,  or  the  Conditioned.  "  The  Reason,"  he 
says,  "  by  its  insight  into  nature,  determines  for  nature  an 
absolute  Author  and  Finisher.  There  is  no  attempt  to  at- 
tain the  Absolute  from  the  conditioned  processes  of  logical 
thought  (that  is,  through  any  scientific  deductions  from 
the  known  facts  of  nature)  ;  but,  inasmuch  as  human  reason 
knows  itself,  and  is  thus  a  law  to  itself,  so  it  knows  that 
the  Absolute  Spirit  must  have  within  himself  his  own  rule 
and  stand  forever  absolved  from  all  rule  and  authority 
imposed  upon  him  by  another."  We  are,  then,  to  find  the 
God  of  nature,  not  through  nature,  or  "  the  things  that  are 
made,"  but  through  the  intuitions  of  Reason.  Now,  before 
we  take  this  higher  faculty,  as  it  is  called,  as  our  guide, 
we  should,  as  prudent  disciples  of  nature  and  of  truth,  in- 
quire carefully  into  the  trustworthiness  of  this  new  teacher 
who  is  to  be  placed  over  us  as  our  all-authoritative  guide. 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.         331 

What,  then,  is  Reason,  as  the  organ  and  source  of  ultimate 
truth,  according  to  the  fundamental  representations  of  this 
philosophy  upon  the  subject  ?  We  answer,  that  Reason  it- 
self, as  set  forth  in  this  philosoplry,  is  "  a  liar  from  the 
beginning,"  and  nothing  else.  "  The  Reason,"  says  Prof. 
Hickok,  "  modifies  Sense  [external  perception],  and  the 
Understanding  "  [all  our  conceptions  and  judgments  in  re- 
gard to  the  objects  of  perception,  etc.].  In  what  form  does 
Reason,  according  to  this  philosophy,  modify  these  phe- 
nomena? In  the  first  instance,  it  makes  a  mere  and  exclu- 
sive subjective  or  mental  feeling,  a  sensation,  appear  as 
the  quality  of  an  object  wholly  external  to  the  mind,  and 
makes  this  feeling,  which  is  undeniably  in  itself  void  of  all 
form  and  extension,  appear  as  the  quality  of  an  external 
object  having  both  extension  and  form  as  its  primary  quali- 
ties. This  same  Reason,  then,  determines  the  Understand- 
ing to  form  conceptions  of  objects  whose  sole  content  is 
sensation,  as  objects  wholly  exterior  to  the  mind  and  hav- 
ing an  existence  independent  of  it,  when,  in  reality,  they 
have  no  such  form  of  existence  whatever,  and  are  not  that  in 
themselves  or  their  relationships  for  which  we  take  them. 
Throughout  the  whole  domain  of  Sense  and  Understanding. 
— that  is,  the  whole  universe  of  perception,  —  Reason,  as  set 
forth  in  this  philosophy,  is  wholly  a  false  light  and  nothing 
else.  Now,  suppose  that  in  reference  to  the  great  facts  of 
ultimate  causation,  this  same  Reason  professes  to  find  "  a 
supernatural  in  nature,"  and  to  define  for  us  the  character 
of  the  Great  Supreme.  If  she  has  demonstrated  herself  a 
false  light,  an  ignis  fatuus,  as  she  has  done,  according  to 
the  express  teachings  of  this  philosophy  throughout  the  entire 
domain  of  the  world  of  perception,  —  that  is,  of  Sense  and 
Understanding,  what  infinite  folly  and  presumption  would 


332 


NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 


it  be  for  us  to  take  her  as  our  sole  guide  through  "  the 
palpable  obscure  "  which  lies  beyond  the  sphere  of  the  per- 
ceptive faculties  !  In  more  than  one  respect,  Reason  stands 
revealed  before  us,  in  the  light  of  the  teachings  of  this  phi- 
losophy, as  fundamentally  fallacious.  It  would  be  unrea- 
sonable in  us,  then,  —  yes,  more,  infinitely  absurd  and  pre- 
sumptuous,—  we  repeat,  not  to  hold  her  as  a  false  light 
everywhere.  This  is  Reason,  as  set  forth  in  this  philoso- 
phy, and  we  challenge  the  world  to  show,  that  we  have  not 
correctty  expounded  the  necessary  deductions  from  the  fun- 
damental teachings  and  principles  of  this  philosophy  upon 
the  subject. 

According  to  the  fundamental  principles  and  deductions  of 
this  philosophy,  an  authenticated  revelation  from  God,  if 
ive  suppose  him  to  exist,  is  an  absolute  impossibility. 

That  this  philosophy  is  utterly  subversive  of  Natural 
Religion,  there  can  be  no  rational  doubt  whatever.  The 
same  holds  equally  true  of  Revealed  Religion.  "  Science," 
sa3's  Prof.  Lewis,  one  of  the  leading  advocates  of  this  philos- 
ophy, "  has  indeed  enlarged  our  field  of  thought,  and  for  this 
we  will  be  thankful  to  God  and  to  scientific  men.  But  what  is 
it,  after  all,  that  she  has  given  us,  or  can  give  us,  but  a  knowl- 
edge of  phenomena,  —  appearances  ?  What  are  her  boasted 
laws,  but  generalizations  of  such  phenomena,  ever  resolv- 
ing themselves  into  some  one  great  fact  that  seems  to  be  an 
original  energy,  while  evermore  the  application  of  a  stronger 
lens  to  our  analytical  telescope  resolves  such  seeming  pri- 
mal force  into  an  appearance  or  manifestation  of  some- 
thing still  more  remote,  which  in  this  way,  and  in  this  way 
alone,  reveals  its  presence  to  our  senses?  Thus  the  course 
of  human  science  has  ever  been  the  substitution  of  one  set 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT  COMPLETED.  ooo 

of  conceptions  for  another."  This  is  science,  according  to 
the  immutable  principles  and  deductions  of  this  philosophy. 
Now,  let  us  suppose  that  a  new  class  of  facts,  —  facts 
called  miracles,  —  present  themselves  as  authenticating  a 
revelation  from  God.  What  have  we  here,  according  to 
this  philosophy  ?  Appearances  in  which  nothing  real  ap- 
pears, as  before.  "  The  application  of  a  stronger  lens  to 
our  analytical  telescope "  may  resolve  these  new  appear- 
ances into  others  more  general  and  comprehensive,  and 
so  on  forever,  without  our  arriving  at  any  possible  proof  of 
a  revelation  from  the  Infinite.  That  which  may  result 
from  the  inhering  laws  of  nature  can  be  no  proof  of  the 
presence  and  action  of  a  power  above  nature.  This  is  self- 
evident.  As,  according  to  this  philosophy,  we  know  and 
can  know  nothing  of  nature  as  it  is,  we,  of  course,  must  be 
equally  ignorant  of  the  real  laws  of  nature,  — laws  which 
determine  the  appearances  by  which  we  are  deluded.  How, 
then,  do  we,  how  can  we  know,  but  that  all  the  so-called 
miracles  of  Scripture  are  the  result  of  a  law  inhering  in 
nature  itself,  —  a  law  necessitating  such  occurrences  from 
time  to  time,  and  that  in  the  very  circumstances  and  forms 
in  which  they  do  appear  ?  Miracles,  prophetic  and  other- 
wise, may  be  but  the  necessary  forms  in  which  phenomena, 
appearances,  in  which  nothing  whatever  of  a  supernatural 
character  appears,  or  is,  present  themselves  to  our  minds. 
How,  upon  any  scientific  or  rational  grounds,  can  such  ap- 
pearances be  adduced  as  authenticating  a  revelation  from 
God?  We  have  been  utterly  misled  in  reference  to  the 
whole  world  of  perception.  So  this  philosophy  teaches. 
How,  then,  we  ask  again,  can  any  appearances  in  such  a 
world  authenticate  a  divine  revelation  ?  The  thing  is  im- 
possible.    A  philosophy  which  denies,  and  in  its  funda- 


334  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

mental  principles  necessarily  implies,  the  absolute  impossi- 
bility of  real  science  in  respect  to  nature,  must,  to  be  logi- 
cally consistent,  affirm  the  absolute  impossibility  of  an 
authenticated  revelation  through  any  appearances  in  the 
world  of  perception.  This  philosophy,  then,  is  just  as  utterly 
subversive  of  Revealed  as  it  is  of  Natural  Religion.  Not  a 
few  of  the  advocates  of  this  philosophy  are  accustomed, 
like  Prof.  Lewis,  to  deny  science  for  the  purpose  of  exalt- 
ing revelation.  The  very  principles  on  which  they  do  the 
former,  however,  renders  the  authentication  of  the  latter  an 
utter  impossibility. 

This  philosophy  equally  subversive  of  all   the  principles  of 
common  morality. 

We  deduce  but  one  additional  consequence  from  the  fun- 
damental principles  and  deductions  of  this  philosophy. 
We  have  shown  that,  in  its  fundamental  principles  and 
necessary  deductions  from  such  principles,  it  is  utterly  sub- 
versive of  Natural  and  Revealed  Religion  both.  We  now 
affii'm  it  to  be  equally  subversive  of  all  the  principles  of 
common  morality.  All  such  principles  are  based  upon  the 
assumption  —  and  have  and  can  have  no  real  validity  but 
upon  the  assumption  — that  "  the  things  which  we  envis- 
age are  that  in  themselves  for  which  we  take  them,"  and 
that  u  their  relationships  are  so  constituted  as  they  appear 
to  us."  All  the  duties  imposed  upon  us  in  the  domestic, 
social,  civil,  and  religious  relations  in  life  have  their  exclu- 
sive basis  in  the  assumption  that  real  individuals  truly 
exist  in  the  world  of  perception  around  us,  —  individuals 
sustaining  to  each  other  the  actual  relations  of  parent  a"nd 
child,  husband  and  wife,  brother  and  sister,  members  of  the 
community,  the  state,  and  the  church,  etc.     Take  awaj-  the 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  o  jQ 

idea  that  such  individuals  really  and  truly  exist,  and  that 
their  relations  are  so  constituted  as  they  appear  to  us, 
and  then  all  these  principles  cease,  and  must  cease,  to  bind 
us.  If  the  words,  father  and  mother,  husband  and  wife, 
parent  and  child,  citizens  of  the  state,  etc.,  represent  noth- 
ing but  "  baseless  fabrics  of  a  vision,"  appearances,  whose 
sole  content  is  sensation,  each  individual,  if  individuals  do 
exist,  is  utterly  absolved  from  all  obligation  to  any  exist- 
ence or  form  of  existence  but  himself.  There  is  no  escap- 
ing this  conclusion.  Now,  this  philosophy  teaches,  and 
its  fundamental  principles  allow  no  other  deductions,  that 
all  this  is  true  of  all  existences  and  relations  of  existence 
in  the  world  of  perception,  the  only  world  that  is  immedi- 
ately known  to  us.  "  The  things  which  we  envisage  are  not 
that  in  themselves  for  which  we  take  them,  neither  are  their 
relationships  so  constituted  as  they  appear  to  us."  Where 
is  the  place  for  the  principles  of  common  morality  in  such 
a  world  as  that?  They  have,  and  can  have,  no  place  in  it 
whatever.  All  the  principles  of  common  morality  imply 
that  this  philosophy,  in  all  its  fundamental  principles  and 
deductions,  is  false,  and  utterly  so,  and  are  themselves  so 
many  absolute  falsehoods,  if  that  philosophy  is  true. 

Such  are  the  necessary  consequences  of  the  essential 
principles  of  this  philosopiry.  We  may  safely  challenge 
the  world  to  show  that  we  have  misstated  its  principles, 
or  drawn  any  consequences  from  them  which  they  do  not, 
by  logical  necessity,  yield.  If  we  accept  its  principles  and 
deductions,  we  must  also  accept  these  consequences,  or 
involve  ourselves  in  the  grossest  inconsistencies  and  self- 
contradictions. 


336 


NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 


BEARING  OF  THE  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  NECESSARY 
DEDUCTIONS  OF  THIS  PHILOSOPHY  UPON  THE  DEDUCTIONS 
OF    SCEPTICISM. 

We  now  advance  to  a  consideration  of  the  bearing  of  the 
fundamental  principles  and  necessary  consequences  of  this 
philosophy  upon  the  deductions  of  Scepticism.  The  doc- 
trine of  Scepticism  has  already  been  stated,  and  need  only 
be  alluded  to  in  this  connection.  ■  This  doctrine  is  this : 
As  all  our  knowledge  of  realities  is  indirect  and  mediate, 
and  derived  ultimately  and  primarily  through  one  medium, 
sensation,  it  must  be  held  as  exclusively  phenomenal  and 
not  real,  and  can  never,  on  scientific  grounds,  be  held  as 
valid  for  truth,  that  is,  for  the  real  character  and  relations 
of  real  existences.  All  that  can  properly  be  claimed  for  it 
is  a  mere  relative  validity.  Further,  if  we  attempt  to  tran- 
scend the  limits  of  the  exclusively  phenomenal,  and  to  de- 
termine what  realities  do  and  do  not  exist,  we  shall  find  that 
we  have  attempted  an  absolute  impossibility.  .  A  priori, 
we  can  determine  nothing  in  regard  to  the  question,  what 
is  real,  — the  sphere,  and  the  exclusive  sphere,  of  a  priori 
knowledge  being  the  possible,  and  not  the  actual.  A  poste- 
riori, we  can  determine  nothing ;  for  this  form  of  knowl- 
edge, by  hypothesis,  pertains  exclusively  to  the  phenome- 
nal, and  not  to  the  real.  If  we  attempt  to  find  the  real 
through,  or  by  means  of,  the  phenomenal,  this  is  impossible  ; 
because  we  do  not  and  cannot  know  that  the  two  have 
any,  even  the  remotest,  resemblance  to  each  other.  The 
real  may  and  may  not  correspond  to  the  phenomenal.  But 
whether  such  correspondence  does  or  does  not  obtain,  we  have 
no  means  of  forming  even  a  rational  conjecture.  Hence,  of 
the  various  conceivable  theories  of  existence,  proximate  and 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  337 

ultimate,  all  that  we  can,  upon  scientific  grounds,  affirm  of 
any  or  all  of  them,  is  this  :  Each  system  alike  may  or  may 
not  be  true,  and  we  have  no  means  of  knowing,  or  even  of 
forming  a  probable  conjecture,  in  regard  to  the  question, 
which,  in  distinction  from  the  others,  is,  and  which  is  not, 
true.  We  cannot  prove  that  there  is  or  is  not  a  universe, 
material  and  mental,  corresponding  to  appearances  within 
and  around  us.  We  cannot  prove  that  the  God  of  Theism 
does,  or  that  he  does  not,  exist.  So  of  the  theory  of  Mate- 
rialism, on  the  one  hand,  and  of  Idealism  in  its  various 
forms,  on  the  other.  Hence,  we  are  utterly  free  from  all 
obligation  to  hold  any  one  theory  as  true  and  the  others  as 
false.  On  the  other  hand,  in  explaining  the  facts  of  nature, 
we  are  free  to  assume  for  the  time  any  theory  we  please  as 
true,  and  explain  the  facts  before  us  accordingly.  What 
we  are  prohibited  doing  is  dogmatizing,  that  is,  affirming 
any  one  theory  to  be  true,  and  as  true  imposing  it  upon 
others. 

THESE  DEDUCTIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM  VERIFIED  AS  NECESSARY 
CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  THIS 
PHILOSOPHY. 

Such  are  the  deductions  of  scepticism  from  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  this  philosophy.  Are  these  deductions 
valid  ?  This  is  the  great  question  now  before  us.  In  de- 
termining this  question,  different  aspects  of  the  subject 
present  themselves.  To  these  special  attention  is  now 
invited. 

The  convictions  and  affirmations  of  sceptics  themselves. 

Let  us,  in  the  first  place,   contemplate  the  convictions 
and  affirmations  of  sceptics  of  all  classes  upon  this  subject. 
29 


338  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

Ever  since  the  sensational  theory  has  been  developed, — 
and  it  was  one  of  the  earliest  that  was  developed,  —  a  very 
large  and  leading  class  of  philosophic  thinkers  have  pointed 
to  the  fundamental  principles  of  that  theory,  and  affirmed 
the  doctrine  of  scepticism  as  a  necessary  deduction  from 
the  same.  On  no  other  assumption  has  this  doctrine  ever 
been  advocated  but  this,  —  that  our  knowledge  is,  in  its 
nature,  exclusively  mediate,  or  phenomenal,  and  in  no 
form,  immediate,  or  real.  In  the  honest  judgment  of  all 
such  minds,  there  is  an  absolutely  necessary  connection  be- 
tween the  principle  under  consideration  and  the  doctrine 
deduced  from  it.  No  deduction  in  the  mathematics  is  to 
their  minds  more  certain  or  necessary  than  the  connection 
of  premise  and  conclusion,  principle  and  consequence,  in 
the  case  before  us.  Nor  has  any  philosopher  or  theologian 
ever  shown,  or  even  attempted  to  show,  that  this  necessary 
connection  does  not  exist.  The  sceptical  doctrine  has  been 
combated  on  other  grounds,  but  never  as  a  deduction  from 
the  principles  of  this  philosophy.  Why  this  silence  here  ? 
Because,  in  the  necessary  convictions  of  all  thinking  minds, 
no  other  doctrine  can  be  deduced  from  the  principles  of  this 
philosophy  than  that  under  consideration.  Of  no  conclu- 
sion is  the  sceptic  more  certain  than  of  this,  —  that,  granting 
the  fundamental  principles  of  this  philosophy,  the  truth  of 
his  doctrine  follows  by  absolute  logical  necessity  from  those 
principles.  The  reason  is  obvious.  This  relation  of  nec- 
essary antecedent  and  consequence  does,  in  fact,  obtain 
between  these  principles  and  this  doctrine.  There  is  no 
escaping  such  a  conclusion  but  by  closing  our  e}Tes  to  the 
light  of  truth. 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  339 

General  admissions  of  theists  ivho  advocate  this  philosophy. 

Among  the  advocates  of  Theism  who  hold  and  advocate 
the  validity  of  the  claims  of  this  philosophy,  there  exists  a 
general  unanimity  of  opinion  and  concession  on  the  subject 
before  us,  which  should  not  be  overlooked  in  this  connec- 
tion. We  know  of  no  theistical  writer  of  note,  in  this 
country  or  in  Europe,  who  holds  and  advocates  the  essential 
principles  of  this  philosophy,  who  does  not  admit  that  we 
have,  upon  scientific  grounds,  no  valid  evidence,  from  the 
facts  of  the  universe  as  given  in  our  intelligence,  of  the 
being  and  perfections  of  God.  Ever  since  the  time  of 
Kant,  in  Germany,  and  Coleridge,  in  England,  there  has 
been  among  theistic  thinkers  who  have  admitted  the  claims 
of  this  philosophy,  a  marked  and  growing  unanimity  of 
conviction  and  teaching  on  this  subject.  In  general,  if  not 
without  exception,  the  logical  or  scientific  argument  has 
been  given  up,  and  the  question  of  Theodicy  handed  over 
to  the  Reason,  to  "  the  grasp  of  intuition."  "  The  process 
of  thought,"  says  Prof.  Ilickok,  u  as  it  develops  itself  in 
reflection,  to  attain  the  truth  in  the  valid  being  of  the  self 
and  its  objects,  is  wholly  for  Rational  Psychology."  Now, 
why  have  all  such  thinkers  thus  abandoned  the  field  of  ex- 
perience, or  the  facts  of  the  universe  as  given  in  our  intel- 
ligence, as  the  basis  for  scientific  deduction  relatively  to 
the  problem  of  Theism  ?  Why  have  they  so  generally  if 
not  universally  admitted,  that  upon  scientific  grounds,  rel- 
atively to  "  the  things  that  are  made,"  we  have  no  valid 
proof  of  the  being  of  God  ?  But  one  answer  can  be  given. 
Those  thinkers  are  too  well  trained  in  the  processes  of 
logical  thought,  not  to  perceive  that  the  necessary  princi- 
ples of  their  philosophy  take  away  utterly  the  possibility 


340  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

of  finding  among  the  phenomena  of  nature  (appearances 
in  which  nothing  real,  as  it  is,  appears)  an}^  valid  proof 
whatever  of  the  nature  of  any  reality,  finite  or  infinite, 
much  less  of  the  being  and  perfections  of  the  great  First 
Cause  of  all  things.* 

The  validity  of  the  doctrine  of  Scepticism  a  necessary  deduc- 
tion from  the  fundamental  principles  of  this  philosophy. 

We  now  proceed  to  show  directly  that  the  validit}^  of  the 
doctrine  of  Scepticism  is  an  absolutely  necessary  deduction 
from  the  fundamental  principles  of  this  philosophy.  Ac- 
cording to  its  fundamental  principles,  all  perception,  all 
direct  and  immediate  knowledge  with  us,  pertains  exclu- 
sively to  the  phenomenal  and  not  to  what  is  real,  that  is, 
to  mere  appearances  in  which  no  substances,  —  real  exist- 


*  Mr.  Thomson,  for  example,  in  his  Christian  Theism,  as  we  have  shown  in 
the  Logic,  formally  admits,  rirst,  that  our  knowledge  of  the  infinite  has  no 
higher  validity  than  our  own  knowledge  of  the  finite,  —  and  then,  secondly,  af- 
firms absolutely,  that  if  the  question,  Is  our  knowledge  of  this  latter  kind  valid? 
is  pressed  upon  us,  all  basis  for  the  theistic  deduction  is  taken  away  at  once  and 
forever.  This  whole  treatise  is  based  upon  this  principle.  "We  profess  to 
find,"  he  says,  "in  the  foregoing  observations  a  basis  for  the  demonstration 
that  our  knowledge  of  the  Infinite  Being  is  as  valid  as  our  knowledge  of  the 
finite.  If  the  question  is  to  be  pressed  further,  it  must  be  admitted  assuredly, 
that  the  depths  of  being  are  unfathomable."  This  is  said,  after  a  distinct  and 
formal  admission,  that  the  various  theories  of  Materialism  and  Idealism  cannot 
be  refuted  on  scientific  grounds.  2s'ow,  when  we  admit  that  our  knowledge  of 
the  Infinite  Being  has  the  same  and  no  more  validity  than  our  knowledge  of  the 
finite,  we  must  and  ought  to  push  the  inquiry,  Is  the  latter  form  of  knowledge 
valid  ?  We  have  no  right  to  build  up  the  superstructure  ot  knowledge  on  such  a 
subject,  without  careful  inquiry  after  the  foundation  on  which  that  structure 
rests.  If  we  do  push  this  necessary  inquiry,  then  it  is  admitted  as  a  necessary 
deduction  of  this  philosophy,  that  the  whole  doctrine  of  Theism  i<  found  to  rest 
upon  "  airy  nothing."  Why  this  admission  ?  Because  the  author  knew  abso- 
lutely, and  every  real  thinker  cannot  but  know,  that  it  followed  as  a  necessary 
consequence  from  his  philosophy.  Nothing  remains  for  us  but  "the  palpable 
obscure  "  of  Scepticism.  There  is  no  escaping  such  a  conclusion,  and  thinkers 
of  all  classes  are  rapidly  advancing  to  an  absolute  unity  of  sentiment  on  this 
subject. 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  341 

ences,  —  as  they  are,  appear.  Realities  as  they  are,  whether 
finite  or  infinite,  proximate  or  ultimate,  lie  wholly  without 
and  beyond  the  sphere  of  perception  with  us.  Suppose  we 
attempt  to  transcend  the  sphere  of  the  phenomenal,  and  en- 
deavor to  determine  the  nature  and  character  of  the  real. 
This,  as  we  have  already  shown,  we  can  never  determine  a 
priori,  —  this  form  of  knowledge  pertaining  exclusively  to 
the  possible,  and  not  at  all  to  the  actual.  Equalty  impossi- 
ble is  it  for  us,  as  we  have  also  demonstrated,  to  determine 
the  nature  and  character  of  the  real  through  the  mere  phe- 
nomenal, inasmuch  as  we  have  no  means  whatever  of  deter- 
mining whether  the  two  do  or  do  not  correspond  with  each 
other.  All  this  is  self-evident,  as  a  necessary  consequence 
of  the  fundamental  principles  of  this  philosophy.  Suppose, 
now,  that  we  lay  down  the  proposition  that  the  real  does  in 
fact  correspond  with  the  phenomenal,  —  that  is,  that  there  is 
a  universe  material  and  mental  corresponding  to  what  ap- 
pears to  us  as  real.  How  can  we  determine  whether  this 
proposition  is  true  or  false  ?  The  thing  is  impossible,  if  the 
teachings  of  this  philosophy  are  true.  A  priori,  we  cannot 
affirm  that  such  a  universe  may  not  exist.  At  the  same 
time  it  is  impossible  for  us  thus  to  determine  whether  such 
a  universe  does  in  fact  exist,  or  not  exist,  any  more  than  we 
can  thus  determine  whether  Bonaparte  was  or  was  not  ac- 
tually defeated  at  Waterloo.  Equally  impossible  is  it  for 
us  to  determine  this  question  a  posteriori,  for  the  undeniable 
reason  that  we  have  no  means  whatever  of  comparing  the 
phenomenal  with  real,  and  finding  whether  they  agree  or  dis- 
agree. Nor  can  we,  from  the  mere  phenomenal  itself,  deter- 
mine what  is  real.  We  have  already  shown  that  we  cannot, 
according  to  the  teachings  of  this  philosophy,  determine 
what  sensation  is.  How  then  can  we  determine  through  it 
29* 


342  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

the  nature  of  its  cause  ?  The  thing  is  undeniably  impossi- 
ble. But  suppose  that  we  can  know  sensation  ?  What  is 
it?  A  mere  feeling  of  the  mind,  a  state  of  the  sensibility. 
How  can  we  prove  that  the  cause  of  such  a  state  must  be  a 
solid  and  extended  substance  ?  We  cannot  at  all  reason 
from  any  mere  feeling  to  the  nature  of  its  cause,  and  deter- 
mine the  latter  through  the  former.  This,  all  admit.  It 
follows,  then,  as  a  necessary  consequence,  that  we  cannot 
determine  whether  a  universe  corresponding  to  our  percep- 
tions and  apprehensions  does  or  does  not  exist?  So  far, 
therefore,  the  doctrine  of  Scepticism  follows  as  a  necessary 
deduction  from  the  fundamental  principles  of  this  philoso- 
phy. 

Suppose,  again,  that  we  lay  down  the  proposition  that 
God  —  the  God  of  Theism  —  exists.  How  can  we,  accord- 
ing to  the  principles  of  this  philosophy,  know  whether  this 
proposition  is  or  is  not  true  ?  All  that  we  can  determine  a 
priori  is,  that,  as  the  proposition  is  not  self-contradictory, 
it  may  be  true.  But  whether  it  is  or  js  not  true,  we  can 
thus  determine  absolutely  nothing.  How  stands  the  case 
when  we  attempt  to  determine  the  question  a  posteriori,  or 
by  an  appeal  to  the  facts  of  nature  as  given  in  our  intelli- 
gence? If  God  exists  at  all,  he  exists  as  the  real  ultimate 
cause  of  the  real  facts  of  a  real  universe.  To  know  him  as 
such  a  cause,  we  must  know  "the  things  that  are  made," 
and  know  them  as  they  are.  This  is  undeniable.  Now, 
from  all  knowledge  of  the  real  finite  we  are  wholly  precluded 
by  the  fundamental  principles  of  this  philosophy.  Till  we 
know  nature,  we  cannot  know  whether  realities  that  may 
properly  be  regarded  as  "  things  that  are  made"  do  or  do 
not  exist.  But  nature  itself  we  cannot  know,  according  to 
the  teachings  of  this  philosophy.   We  are  wholly  within  the 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  813 

veil  of  the  mere  phenomenal,  and  have  no  access  whatever 
to  the  real.  How  then  can  we  know  whether  a  real  cre- 
ator and  governor  of  a  real  universe  does  or  does  not  exist  ? 
The  thing  is  impossible.  The  proposition,  therefore,  God 
exists,  can  neither  be  proved  nor  disproved,  and  we  have,  as 
a  necessary  deduction  from  the  fundamental  principles  of 
this  philosophy,  the  second  element  of  the  doctrine  of  Scep- 
ticism. 

Let  us  next  contemplate  the  principles  of  the  hypothesis 
of  Ideal  Dualism,  to  wit,  that  two  unknown  and  unknow- 
able realities  (uoumena)  do  exist,  and  that  the  phenomenal, 
as  given* in  our  intelligence,  is  the  result  of  the  action-  and 
reaction  of  these  two  substances  upon  each  other.  It  will 
be  seen  at  once,  without  enlargement,  from  the  train  of  ar- 
gument pursued  above,  that  this  hypothesis,  like  those  just 
considered,  is  utterly  incapable,  on  the  principles  of  this 
philosophy,  of  proof  or  disproof.  As  we  do  not  and  cannot 
know  the  cause  of  the  phenomenal,  we  do  not  and  cannot 
know  whether  the  real  cause  is  or  is  not  given  in  this  hy- 
pothesis.    This  no  one  will  deny. 

We  will  next  contemplate  the  assumption  that  la}rs  at  the 
foundation  of  Materialism,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  Ideal- 
ism, on  the  other,  —  the  s}Tstem  just  named  excepted,  to 
wit,  that  but  one  principle  or  substance  of  all  things  does 
exist.  To  prove  or  disprove  this  proposition,  we  must 
know  things  as  thejr  are.  To  this  knowledge  we  can  make 
no  approach  according  to  the  fundamental  principles  of  this 
philosophy.  Of  realities  we  know  and  can  know  nothing. 
Of  the  phenomenal  we  do  not  and  cannot  know  whether  it 
is  the  result  of  the  action  of  one  or  of  many  real  substances. 
The  assumption  before  us,  therefore,  is  utterly  incapable  of 


344  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

proof  or  disproof.     There  is  no  possible  escape  from  this 
conclusion. 

Let  us  now  contemplate  some  of  the  applications  of  this 
principle,  as  given  in  the  hypothesis  of  Materialism  and 
Idealism.  As  we  do  not  know,  according  to  the  teachings 
of  this  philosophy,  what  matter,  on  the  one  hand,  or  spirit, 
on  the  other,  as  a  substance,  really  is,  and  as  we  cannot 
know  but  that  there  is  in  fact  but  one  principle  or  sub- 
stance as  the  basis  and  source  of  all  phenomena,  we  do  not 
and  cannot  know  but  that  the  hypothesis  of  Materialism,  on 
the  one  hand,  or  of  Idealism  in  any  of  its  forms,  on  the 
other,  may  be  true.  Each  hypothesis  stands  revealed  as  in 
itself  possibly  true,  and  we  have  no  means  of  determining 
whether  it  is  or  is  not  true.  As  a  possible  truth,  each  hy- 
pothesis  stands  before  us  as  absolutely  incapable  of  being 
proved  or  disproved.  We  may  challenge  the  world  to  show 
that  all  this  does  not  follow  as  a  necessary  consequence  of 
the  principles  of  this  philosophy.  We  will  take  as  an  illus- 
tration the  hypothesis  of  subjective  Idealism,  —  the  hypothe- 
sis which  locates  the  cause  of  sensation  within  the  limits  of 
the  subject  of  this  phenomenon.  As  sensation  in  its  pri- 
mary state,  according  to  the  teachings  of  this  philosophy, 
lies  wholly  beyond  the  sphere  of  consciousness,  how  do  we, 
how  can  we,  know  but  that  sensation  in  this  state  may  be 
the  exclusive  result  of  the  spontaneous  self-activities  of  the 
soul  itself,  —  activities  which  lie  still  farther  beyond  and 
below  the  reach  and  soundings  of  consciousness  ?  To  this 
question  this  philosophy  can  give  us  no  answer.  It,  there- 
fore, cannot  inform  us  or  demonstrate  to  us,  whether  the 
hypothesis  of  Subjective  Idealism  is  or  is  not  true.  So  of 
the  hypothesis  of  Materialism,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  Ide- 
alism in  all  its  forms,  on  the  other.     All  the  deductions 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  345 

which  this  philosophy  can  give  us  is,  that  each  of  these 
hypotheses  may  and  may  not  be  true,  and  that  each  alike, 
in  common  with  that  of  Realism,  is  utterly  incapable  of 
being  proved  or  disproved.  Thus  the  doctrine  of  Scepti- 
cism in  its  entireness  stands  before  us  as  a  necessary  deduc- 
tion from  the  fundamental  principles  of  this  philosophy. 
This  holds  equally  true  of  every  system,  whatever  its  feat- 
ures in  other  respects,  which  is  based  upon  the  assumption 
that  our  knowledge  of  the  primary  qualities  of  matter,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  of  mind,  on  the  other,  is  phenomenal  and 
not  real,  mediate  and  not  immediate,  representative  and  not 
presentative,  and,  therefore,  having  only  a  relative  and  not 
an  absolute  validity.  No  individual  holding  any  such  the- 
ory of  knowledge  can  be  anything  else  than  an  absolute 
and  universal  sceptic,  excepting  by  a  denial  of  the  immuta- 
bly necessary  consequences  of  his  own  principles,  and, 
therefore,  involving  himself  in  logical  inconsistency,  con- 
tradiction, and  absurdity.  Scepticism  has  absolute  self- 
consistency  relatively  to  its  own  fundamental  principles 
and  assumptions.  Theism,  resting  upon  any  system  but 
that  of  Realism,  presents  nothing  but  a  confused  mass  of 
monstrous  self-contradictions  and  absurdities.  We  wouir 
be  very  thankful  to  any  individual  who  would  show  us,  oj 
the  world,  that  we  have  erred  at  all  in  deducing  from  the 
essential  principles  of  the  philosophy  under  consideration 
their  necessary  logical  consequences. 

THIS     PHILOSOPHY   IN    ITS     FUNDAMENTAL     PRINCIPLES    FALSE, 
WHILE    THAT    OF    REALISM   IS    TRUE. 

How  can  we  escape  from  these  deductions  of  Scepticism  . 
On  one  condition  only :  a  denial  of  the  validity  of  the  fun 
damental  principles  of  this   philosophy,  and  an  affifmatioi. 


346  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

of  the  validity  of  those  of  Realism.  The  sceptical  syllogism 
is  this : 

Knowledge  exclusively  indirect  and  mediate,  with  its  log- 
ical antecedents  and  consequences,  can  have  no  real  and 
only  a  relative  validit}T. 

Our  knowledge  of  nature,  material  and  mental,  is  exclu- 
sively of  this  character. 

This  knowledge,  therefore,  has  no  validity  whatever  for 
truth.  Its  exclusive  validity  on  the  other  hand  is  only 
relative. 

The  syllogism  of  Realism  stands  thus : 

Presentative  knowledge,  that  is,  knowledge  direct  andim- 
medaite,  with  its  logical  antecedents  and  consequences,  must 
be  held  as  having  not  only  a  relative  but  also  an  absolute 
validity  for  the  real  existence  and  character  of  its  objects. 

Our  knowledge  of  mind,  on  the  one  hand,  as  a  real  sub- 
stance exercising  the  functions  of  thought,  feeling,  and  vol- 
untary determination  ;  and  of  matter,  on  the  other,  as  a  real 
substance  existing  exterior  to  the  mind,  and  as  such  an 
existence  possessed  of  the  real  qualities  of  extension  and 
form  ;  is  of  this  character,  being  given  in  consciousness  as 
direct  and  immediate,  or  presentative. 

This  knowledge,  therefore,  has  an  absolute  and  not  a 
mere  relative  validity,  and  mind,  on  the  one  hand,  and  mat- 
ter, on  the  other,  must  be  held  as  real  substances  actually 
possessed  of  the  distinct  and  opposite  qualities  named 
above. 

The  philosophy  which  we  have  been  considering,  by  neces- 
sary consequence  gives  us  the  first,  or  sceptical  syllogism, 
and  can  give  us  no  other.  It  is,  therefore,  properly  denomi- 
nated the  Sceptical  Philosophy.  Realism,  on  the  other 
hand,  by  consequence  equally  necessary,  gives  us  the  sec- 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  34  7 

ond  syllogism,  with  all  the  theistic  deductions  thence  aris- 
ing. It  may,  therefore,  with  equal  propriety,  and,  also,  as 
being  the  only  philosophy  which  does  or  can,  upon  scien- 
tific grounds,  yield  these  deductions,  be  denominated  the 
Theistic  Philosophy.  Let  us  now  turn  our  attention  to 
some  considerations  bearing  upon  the  question,  which  of 
these  systems  shall  be  regarded  as  true,  and  which,  conse- 
quently, as  false? 

This  sceptical  philosophy  cannot  possibly  be  proved  to  be  true, 
nor  that  of  Realism  proved  to  be  false. 

The  first  consideration  which  we  present  is  this  :  This 
sceptical  philosophy  can,  by  no  possibilit}^,  be  proved  to  be 
true,  while  it  is  equally  impossible  to  prove  that  of  Realism 
false.  A  priori,  we,  of  course,  cannot  determine  the  matter 
of  fact  to  which  category,  the  mediate  or  immediate,  the 
representative  or  presentative,  our  knowledge  of  nature 
does  belong.  This  is  self-evident.  Our  only  appeal  is  to 
consciousness.  Now,  who  will  pretend  that,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  we  are  conscious  of  knowing  matter,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  mind,  on  the  other,  only  mediately,  and  not  im- 
mediately? Who  will  pretend  that  we  are  conscious  of 
knowing  matter  exclusively  through  the  medium  of  sensa- 
tion, and  not  of  having  a  direct  or  presentative  knowledge 
of  it  as  having  a  real  exteriority,  extension,  and  form?  No 
philosopher  will  confront  the  facts  of  universal  conscious- 
ness by  making  any  such  assertions. 

It  is  a  singular  fact,  that,  while  many  philosophers  have 
asserted  the  principles  of  the  sensational  or  sceptical  phi- 
losophy, no  one  has  ever  presented  even  the  show  of  an 
argument  to  prove  it  true.  The  reader  will  search  in  vain 
throughout  the  work  of  Prof.  Hickok  for  any  form  or  ap- 


348  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

pcarance  of  an  argument  in  favor  of  his  theory  of  external 
perception.  The  title  of  his  work,  "  Empirical  Ps}Tchol- 
ogy,"  authorizes  us  to  expect  that  all  his  principles  and 
deductions  will  be  verified  by  an  appeal  to  consciousness. 
When  we  come  to  the  principle  which  he  lays  at  the  very 
foundation  of  the  whole  superstructure,  however,  —  his  the- 
ory of  external  perception,  —  here  we  look  in  vain  for  argu- 
ment, for  an  appeal  to  facts  of  conscious  experience.  All 
is,  mere  assumption  now,  and  nothing  else.  This  holds 
equally  true  of  every  philosopher  who  has  ever  advocated 
this  theory.  No  one  ever  did,  and,  we  may  confidently 
affirm,  no  one,  in  his  senses,  ever  will  attempt  to  prove  his 
theory  by  an  appeal  to  the  only  possible  source  of  proof, 
the  facts  of  conscious  experience.  The  reason  is  obvious. 
Every  thinking  mind  cannot  but  know  that  this  theory  is 
absolutely  incapable  of  being  proved  true  by  any  form  of 
rational  argument  whatever.  For  the  same  reasons  the 
theory  of  Realism  cannot  be  proved  to  be  false. 

No  antecedent  probability  in  favor  of  this  philosophy,  and 
against  that  of  Realism. 

Nor  can  there  be  shown  to  exist  any  form  or  degree  of 
antecedent  probability  in  favor  of  this  sceptical  philosophy, 
and  against  that  of  Realism.  The  idea  that  all  our  knowl- 
edge of  mind  and  matter  is  direct  and  immediate,  or  pre- 
sentative,  is  just  as  antecedently  probable  as  it  is  that 
it  should  all  be  indirect  and  mediate,  or  representative. 
Equally  probable  in  itself  is  it  that  this  knowledge  should 
be  partly  presentative  and  partly  representative,  as  that  it 
should  possess  one  or  the  other  of  these  exclusive  character- 
istics. There  are  no  external  or  internal  facts,  nor  any 
rational  considerations,  which  can  be  adduced  to  show  that 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT  COMPLETED.  349 

any  form  or  degree  of  antecedent  probability  exists  in  favor 
of  this  philosophy,  and  against  that  of  Realism.  To  every 
reflective  mind  the  truth  of  these  statements  will  appear  as 
undeniably  self-evident. 

There  is  the  greatest  antecedent  probability  against  this  phi- 
losophy, and  in  favor  of  that  of  Realism. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  can  most  readily  be  shown  that  the 
greatest  antecedent  probability  exists  against  this  philoso- 
ph}r,  and  in  favor  of  that  of  Realism.  The  former  theory 
affirms  that  a  mere  feeling  of  the  mind,  a  sensation  utterly 
void  in  itself  of  extension  and  form,  is  directly  and  immedi- 
ately perceived  by  the  mind,  such  being  the  nature  of  the 
intellect,  as  an  object  existing  wholly  external  to  the  mind 
and  independent  of  it,  and  having  as  such  object  real  exten- 
sion and  form.  The  latter  theory  affirms  that,  whatever 
object  is  presentatively  known  to  the  mind  as  having  these 
or  any  other  qualities,  said  qualities  really  and  truly  exist 
attaching  to  such  object.  Now,  which  in  itself  is  the  most 
antecedently  probable,  the  theory  that  the  intelligence 
should  be,  and  is,  so  constituted  that  a  mere  subjective 
feeling,  utterly  void  of  certain  qualities,  should  be  directly 
and  immediately  perceived  by  the  mind  as  an  external  ob- 
ject having  such  qualities,  or  the  theory  that  affirms 
that  what  the  intelligence  directly  and  immediately  per- 
ceives, as  such  object,  is  in  fact  what  it  is  presentatively 
known  and  affirmed  to  be  ?  We  affirm,  without  the  fear  of 
contradiction,  that  the  latter  theory  has,  in  view  of  every 
consideration  drawn  from  the  idea  of  mind  as  a  power  of 
knowledge,  from  all  our  intuitive  convictions,  from  all 
principles  of  science,  and  from  all  honorable  views  of  the 
Author  of  our  being,  infinitely  the  highest  antecedent  proba- 
30 


350  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

bility  in  its  favor.  Nor  do  we  think  that  any  candid, 
reflective  mind  will  question  the  truth  of  this  statement. 
80  far,  then,  we  have  advanced  on  perfectly  safe  grounds. 

This  philosophy  stands  revealed  as  false,  and  that  of  Realism 
as  true,  in  the  light  of  all  the  tests  of  truth  laid  down  by 
Prof.  Hickok  himself  and  in  the  light  of  all  other  valid 
tests. 

We  now  affirm  that  this  philosophy  stands  revealed  as 
false  in  its  fundamental  principles,  and  that  of  Realism  as 
true,  in  the  light  of  the  universal  criteria  of  truth  laid  down 
by  Prof.  Hickok  himself,  and  in  the  light  of  all  other  valid 
tests.  Speaking  of  common-sense,  our  author  uses  the  fol- 
lowing language : 

"  Rightly  used,  the  test  of  common-sense  is  conclusive, 
for  only  that  which  common-sense  sanctions  can  have  any 
place  in  our  ps}Tchology.  But  this  appeal  to  the  common- 
sense  must,  in  all  the  process,  be  legitimately  pursued. 
Three  important  rules  must  be  observed  in  order  to  insure 
a  safe  decision. 

"  1.  The  facts  must  be  within  the  range  of  the  common 
consciousness. 

"  2.  The  decision  must  be  general. 

"  3.  The  decision  must  be  unbiassed. 

u  These  three  requisites  in  the  application  of  common- 
sense,  the  competency,  generality,  and  honesty  of  the  decision, 
will  give  validity  to  any  fact  that  may  be  so  sustained." 

These  certainly  are  valid  tests  of  truth,  or  none  such 
exist.  What  are  the  bearings  of  these  tests  upon  the  ques- 
tion before  us  ?  To  this  question  special  attention  is  now 
invited. 

That  the  question  of  fact  whether  we  are  conscious  of  a 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT  COMPLETED.  351 

direct  and  immediate,  or  preservative  perception  of  matter, 
as  an  object  having  real  extension  and  form,  "  does  lie 
within  the  range  of  the  common  consciousness,"  and  that 
that  decision  is  strictly  u  general"  and  "  impartial,"  is  un- 
deniable. Nothing  whatever  exists  to  prevent  a  general  and 
impartial  decision  in  "the  common  consciousness"  on  this 
subject.  What  is  this  decision  ?  There  is  not  a  philosopher 
on  earth,  of  common  honesty,  and  who  has  any  regard  to 
his  own  reputation,  who  will  deny  that  in  the  consciousness 
of  the  act  of  external  perception,  universal  mind  is,  without 
prejudice,  distinctly  conscious  of  a  direct  and  immediate,  or 
presentative  perception  of  an  external  object,  an  object 
having  the  real  qualities  of  extension  and  form.  On  no 
question  whatever  is  the  decision  of  the  common  conscious- 
ness more  strictly  general  and  impartial  and  absolute  than 
on  this.  We  must,  then,  deny  utterly  the  validity  of  all 
our  author's  own  tests  of  truth,  or  affirm  that  his  theory  of 
external  perception  is  false,  —  utterly  so,  —  and  that  of 
Realism  true. 

In  another  place  our  author  thus  speaks  of  certain  deduc- 
tions of  the  German  philosophy:  "  But  it  is  itself  a  per- 
petual demonstration  against  this  conclusion  that  the  human 
mind  never  gave  submissive  assent  to  it."  Now,  for  this 
admitted  demonstrative  reason,  we  affirm  that  our  author's 
theory  is  demonstrably  false,  and  that  of  Realism  true. 
"The  human  mind  never  gave  its  submissive  assent"  to  the 
dogma,  that  in  external  perception,  when  we  are  conscious 
of  a  presentative  knowledge  of  an  external  object  having 
real  extension  and  form,  we  are  in  reality  only  perceiving 
our  own  mental  states,  to  wit,  sensations.  Kant  admits 
that  it  is  inherent  in  reason  to  believe  in  the  objective  va- 
lidity of  our  external  perceptions,  and  that  this  conviction 


352  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

so  immutably  inheres  in  the  universal  mind  that  no  deduc- 
tions of  philosophy  can  eradicate  it.  And  who  would  dare 
deny  such  statements?  The  very  criteria  of  universal 
truth,  on  the  authority  of  which  Prof.  Hickok  denies  cer- 
tain deductions  of  the  German  philosoplry,  affirms  abso- 
lutely and  demonstratively,  that  the  fundamental  principles 
of  his  own  philosophy  are  false,  and  those  of  Realism  true. 
There  is  no  escaping  this  conclusion. 

The  same  holds  equally  true  of  any  valid  criteria  of  truth 
that  can  be  adduced.  All  such  criteria,  without  exception, 
give  their  united  testimony  against  the  validity  of  the  fun- 
damental principles  of  this  philosophy,  and  in  favor  of  those 
of  Realism.  We  must  either  conclude,  therefore,  that  this 
philosophy  is  false,  or  that  we  have  no  criteria  by  which 
we  can  even  form  a  conjecture,  much  less  determine  with 
certainty,  what  is  true,  and  what  is  false. 

This  philosophy  affirmed  to  be  false,  and  that  of  Realism 
true,  by  the  united  convictions  of  universal  mind. 

We  have  already  anticipated,  in  some  form,  the  argument 
next  to  be  presented.  We  refer  to  the  necessary  intuitive 
convictions  of  universal  mind  upon  this  subject.  If  there 
is  any  point  in  which  the  necessary  and  intuitive  convic- 
tions of  the  universal  intelligence  absolutely  meet  and  har- 
monize, it  is  this :  that  we  do,  in  fact,  have  a  direct  and 
immediate  knowledge  of  mind  as  a  real  substance,  exercis- 
ing the  functions  of  thought,  feeling,  and  voluntary  deter- 
mination, and  of  matter  as  an  external  object  possessing 
the  qualities  of  real  extension  and  form,  and  in  the  convic- 
tion that  these  substances,  as  possessed  of  these  distinct 
and  opposite  qualities,  do  exist.  The  common  conscious- 
ness, the  intuitive  convictions  of  the  universal  mind,  and 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  853 

the  common-sense  of  the  race,  must  all  be  assumed  to  be  a 
lie,  and  that  without  any  evidence  whatever,  of  the  truth 
of  this  assumption,  or  any  antecedent  probability  in  its 
favor,  and  with  an  antecedent  probability  correspondingly 
strong  against  it,  or  we  must  affirm  this  philosophy,  in  its 
fundamental  principles,  to  be  false,  and  that  of  Realism 
consequently  true.  Every  advocate  of  this  philosophy  is 
perfectly  aware  that  he  has  against  him,  the  common-sense 
and  intuitive  convictions  of  the  race  upon  this  subject. 
And  when  we  refer  to  them  upon  the  subject,  he  cannot 
but  be  aware  that  he  has  no  real  reasons  whatever  by  which 
he  can  show  these  convictions  to  be  invalid.  Now,  while 
this  philosophy,  in  all  its  fundamental  principles,  thus 
stands  opposed  to  the  united  intuitive  convictions  of  uni- 
versal mind,  those  of  Realism,  in  their  entireness,  perfectly 
accord  with  these  convictions.  This  none  will  deny.  What 
higher  evidence  can  we  have,  in  the  absence  of  all  evidence 
to  the  contrary,  that  this  latter  theory  is  true,  and  the 
former  false  ?  We  leave  these  considerations  to  the  careful 
reflection  of  the  thoughtful  reader. 

TJiis  philosophy  affirmed  to  be  false,  and  that  of  Realism  true, 
by  the  direct  and  immediate  testimony  of  Consciousness. 

We  have  but  one  additional  argument  to  present,  in  ad- 
dition to  those  already  presented.  We  refer  to  the  direct 
and  immediate  testimony  of  universal  Consciousness.  We 
have  already  indicated  what  this  testimony  is,  and  have,  in 
other  connections,  fully  spread  out  this  whole  subject  be- 
fore the  reader's  mind.  We  need  not  repeat  here  what  has 
been  so  fully  presented  elsewhere.  The  argument  upon 
this  point  has  never  been  met,  and  we  are  quite  confident 
it  never  will  be.     The  fact  that  we  are  distinctly  conscious 

30* 


354  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

of  a  real  presentative  knowledge  of  matter,  for  example,  as 
an  external  object,  having  the  qualities  of  real  extension 
and  form,  is  absolutely  undeniable.  If  it  should  be  denied, 
the  denial  would  at  once  be  confronted  by  the  united  testi- 
mony of  universal  mind.  If  we  deny  the  validity  of  this 
form  of  knowledge,  we  impeach  the  intelligence  itself,  as  a 
faculty  of  knowledge,  and  thus  deny  the  possibility  of  valid 
knowledge  on  any  subject  whatever.  But  this  one  alterna- 
tive is  left  us,  to  admit  the  validity  of  our  knowledge  of 
matter,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  mind,  on  the  other,  for  the 
real  existence  and  character  of  their  respective  objects,  or 
to  affirm  the  intelligence  itself  to  be  a  lie,  and  nothing  else, 
and  thus  deny  the  possibility  of  valid  knowledge  on  any 
subject  whatever.  We  conclude,  then,  that  this  sceptical 
philosophy  is  nothing  else  but  "  science  falsely  so  called." 
It  is  a  crazy  and  rude  philosophy,  and  not  real  science, 
which  thus  denies  to  us  the  possibility  of  knowing  ourselves, 
external  nature,  immortality,  and  God. 

MISCELLANEOUS   TOPICS. 

We  now  advance  to  a  consideration  of  a  few  topics  of  a 
more  general  nature,  —  topics,  however,  which  have  a  fun- 
damental bearing  upon  our  present  inquiries. 

The  idea  of  a  positive  religion  having  its  basis  in  the  phi- 
losophy under  consideration. 

Among  these  topics,  we  will  first  contemplate  the  idea 
of  a  positive  religion  as  having  its  basis  in  the  system  of 
philosophy  which  we  have  just  investigated,  —  a  religion 
we  refer  to,  which  speaks  by  authority,  requiring  us,  under 
pains  and  penalties,  to  hold  certain  doctrines  as  true,  and 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT  COMPLETED.  355 

their  opposite  as  false,  and  certain  mental  states  and  courses 
of  conduct  as  right,  and  their  opposites  as  wrong.  We 
judge  that  we  are  perfectly  safe  in  the  affirmation  that  we 
have  rendered  it  demonstrably  evident  that  the  two  follow- 
ing propositions  follow  as  necessary  deductions  from  the 
fundamental  principles  of  this  philosophy,  to  wit:  1.  That 
the  being  and  perfections  of  God,  according  to  the  theistic 
hypothesis,  supposing  him  to  exist,  is  a  truth  utterly  un- 
ascertainable  by  us.  2.  That  an  authenticated  revelation 
from  him,  if  he  does  exist,  is  to  us,  in  our  present  relations 
to  the  real  facts  of  nature,  an  absolute  impossibility. 
Where,  then,  is  there,  or  can  there  be,  a  basis  for  a 
religion  speaking  to  us  by  divine  authority  ?  No  such  ba- 
sis does  or  can  exist.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Most  Hi^h, 
if  we  suppose  him  to  exist,  has,  as  we  have  already  stated, 
in  placing  us  in  such  relations  to  the  works  of  his  own 
hands,  given  us  the  most  positive  indication  that  he  possi- 
bly can,  that  it  is  his  will  that  we  should  not  act  religiously 
at  all,  or  treat  any  professed  revelation  from  him  as  a  real 
one.  We  hold  both  of  these  propositions  as  self-eviclently 
true. 

But  it  is  said,  by  the  advocates  of  this  philosophy,  that 
while  it  remains  true  that,  upon  rational  or  scientific 
grounds,  the  truth  of  the  being  of  God  is  wholly  unascer- 
tainable  by  us,  and  an  authenticated  revelation  from  him 
an  impossibility,  yet,  if  we  act  conscientiously  and  follow 
our  intuitive  convictions,  we  shall  act  religiously,  and  re- 
ceive and  treat  the  Bible  as  a  real  revelation  from  God. 
And  here,  it  is  affirmed,  lie  the  superlative  claims  of  this 
philosophy.  It  takes  the  whole  question  of  natural  and  re- 
vealed religion  entirely  out  of  the  domain  of  science,  or  of 
the  logical  faculty,  and  places  it  wholly  within  the  sphere 


OO'o  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

of  the.  conscience  and  intuition,  thus  making  its  claims  ab- 
solute. Just  as  if  the  sphere  of  the  conscience  and  intui- 
tion does  not  lie  at  the  very  centre  of  the  true  and  proper 
domain  of  real  science  !  What  a  strange  delusion  is  here. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  affirm,  without  the  fear  of  contradic- 
tion, that  it  is  an  absolute  intuition  of  the  universal  intelli- 
gence, that  we  cannot  be  morally  bound  to  treat  as  real 
any  being  or  object,  finite  or  infinite,  whose  existence  has 
not  been,  and  cannot  be,  ascertained  by  us  ;  and  that  an  un- 
authenticated  revelation  from  God  cannot  bind  the  con- 
science as  a  real  revelation  from  him.  Place  before  the 
conscience  the  proposition,  as  an  admitted  truth,  that  the 
facts  of  the  universe  as  revealed  to  man,  when  scientifically 
classified  and  elucidated,  leave  the  question  of  the  being  of 
God  utterly  unascertainable,  and  render  an  authenticated 
revelation  from  him,  if  he  does  exist,  an  impossibility,  and 
it  will  absolutely  absolve  us  from  all  obligation  to  act  as 
religious  beings,  much  less  as  Christians.  According  to 
the  intuitive  convictions  of  the  Universal  Intelligence,  also, 
we  shall  act  most  irrationally,  if  we  thus  act  at  all. 

The  bearing  of  this  philosophy  upon  the  doctrine  of  the  being 
of  God,  considered  as  a  probable  truth. 

The  utmost  that  can  be  said,  as  we  have  already  seen,  in 
favor  of  the  claims  of  theism,  according  to  the  fundamen- 
tal principles  of  this  philosophy,  is  this  :  that  it  stands  as 
one  among  a  certain  number  of  contradictory  lrypotheses 
of  ultimate  causation,  —  hypotheses,  some  one  of  which 
must  be  true,  while  each  has  precisely  equal  claims  to  va- 
lidity with  every  other.  The  question  which  we  now  pro- 
pound is  this :  Which  of  these,  the  theistic,  or  any  one  of 
the  antitheistic  hypotheses,  has,  in  the  light  of  the  funda- 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  357 

mental  principles  of  this  philosophy,  the  greatest  antece- 
dent probability  in  its  favor?  If  God,  as  a  self-conscious 
personality  possessed  of  the  attributes  of  absolute  infinity 
and  perfection,  which  is  the  theistic  hypothesis,  does  exist, 
we  must,  of  course,  suppose  that  all  realities,  as  they  are  in 
themselves,  are  fully  and  perfectly  known  to  him.  In  con- 
stituting mind,  it  is,  to  say  the  least,  just  as  conceivable, 
and  consequently,  in  itself,  just  as  possible  for  God  to  have 
so  constituted  it,  that  realities,  within  and  around  it  should 
be  to  it  objects,  while  it  should  sustain  to  them  the  relations 
of  a  power  of  real  knowledge,  as  that  he  should  have  so  con- 
stituted it,  as  this  philosophy  teaches  us  that  he  did,  that 
mere  feelings  of  the  mind  itself  should  be  perceived  by  the 
intelligence,  as  the  qualities  of  objects  external  to  the 
mind,  and  in  their  nature  wholly  unlike  the  objects  actu- 
ally perceived,  and  thus  making  perception,  when  under- 
stood, a  lie,  and  nothing  else.  In  itself,  we  affirm,  without 
fear  of  contradiction,  that  it  is  infinitely  more  probable, 
that  such  a  being,  in  constituting  the  human  intelligence, 
would  constitute  it  a  faculty  of  real  and  not  of  mere  rela- 
tive or  deceptive  knowledge.  On  the  supposition,  there- 
fore, that  the  mind  is  constituted  in  accordance  with  the 
principles  of  this  philosophy,  we  say  that  it  is  far  more 
probable  that  that  constitution  is  the  result  of  the  neces- 
sary action  of  some  law  inhering  in  nature,  than  that  it  is  the 
effect  of  the  voluntary  agency  of  such  a  being  as  the  God 
of  theism.  If  this  philosophy  is  true,  then,  any  hypothesis 
which  stands  opposed  to  that  of  theism,  has  far  more  ante- 
cedent probability  in  its  favor  than  the  latter.  We  submit 
this  deduction,  without  fear,  to  the  reflection  of  every  can- 
did inquirer  for  the  truth. 


358  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 


The  high  merit  often  ascribed  to  Kant  in  his  critique  on  the 
theistic  argument. 

As  the  result  of  his  examination  of  all  actual,  and,  as  he 
asserts,  of  all  possible  arguments  to  prove  the  being  of  God, 
Kant  affirms  that  the  theistic  hypothesis  is  wholly  inca- 
pable of  proof  on  scientific  grounds.  This  is  conceded  by 
not  a  few  theistic  writers  and  thinkers.  At  the  same  time, 
great  merit  is  ascribed  to  the  argument,  as  conducted  by 
this  author,  from  the  fact  that  that  argument  is  equally 
applicable  to  every  antitheistic  lrypothesis.  If  theism,  as 
this  philosopher  professedly  shows,  cannot  be  proved  true, 
neither,  and  for  the  same  reasons,  can  any  lrypothesis  op- 
posed to  theism,  be  proved  true.  Some  individuals  appear 
to  hail  this  conclusion  as  a  triumph  of  theism.  But  where 
has  Kant  really  and  truly  placed  us,  if  we  admit  the  valid- 
ity of  his  theistic  deductions?  Just  where  we  cannot, 
without  the  most  manifest  self-contradiction  and  absurdity, 
be  anything  else  than  absolute  sceptics.  If  no  one  hypoth- 
esis, as  Kant's  argument  professedty  shows,  can  be  proved 
true,  no  one,  for  the  same  reason,  can  be  proved  false.  All 
alike  stand  upon  the  same  basis,  and  scepticism  is  the  only 
true  philosophy.  This  is  just  where  this  author  intended 
to  place  us,  and  here,  if  we  maintain  logical  consistency, 
we  shall  remain,  or  deny  the  validity  of  this  philosophy. 
How  often  do  the  friends  of  truth  admit,  and  even  glory  in 
that  which  utterly  subverts  the  truth  itself!  The  truth  is, 
that  few  treatises  can  be  named,  more  utterly  subversive, 
on  the  one  hand,  of  all  religion,  and,  on  the  other,  more 
demonstrably  sophistical   and   fallacious,   than   is   Kant's 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT  COMPLETED.  359 

"  Critical  Inquiry  into  the  Grounds  of  Proof  for  the  Exist- 
ence of  God." 

Mr.   R.    W.   Emerson's  avowed  relations,   as  a  professed 
teacher  of  truth,  to  what  he  announces  as  such. 

It  will  be  recollected  by  many,  if  not  by  most  of  our 
readers,  when  Mr.  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson  had  began 
to  attract  public  attention  on  account  of  his  apparently 
lawless  and  wayward  modes  of  thinking,  that  he,  in  a  letter 
to  a  ministerial  friend,  —  a  letter  published  at  the  time, 
—  made  a  full  and  distinct  avowal  of  his  real  relations,  as  a 
professed  teacher  of  truth,  to  the  dogmas  which  he  avowed 
and  put  forth  as  such.  In  this  communication,  he  dis- 
tinctly avows  the  fact  that  he  had  no  reasons  whatever  to 
assign  to  himself,  or  to  the  public,  for  any  sentiment  which 
he  held  or  avowed  as  true,  and  that  he  was  the  weakest  of 
men  when  called  upon  to  assign  such  reason,  and  this  be- 
cause no  such  reason  whatever  existed  even  in  his  own 
mind.  He  simply  announced  what,  for  the  time  being,  ap- 
peared to  him  as  true,  and  that  without  himself  knowing, 
or  being  able  to  tell,  why  that  sentiment  thus  appeared  to  his 
mind.  Such  was  his  character  throughout  as  a  thinker. 
This  avowal  struck  the  public  as  very  singular  and  strange. 
Yet  there  was  in  it  the  most  rigid  and  logical  consistency 
with  the  philosophical  principles  which  lie  at  the  basis  of 
all  his  intellectual  activities.  Mr.  Emerson  is  a  self-con 
sistent  disciple  of  the  philosophy  which  we  have  been  eluci- 
lating.  With  him,  consequently,  aft  knowledge  pertain- 
ing to  realities,  objective  and  subjective,  has  no  real,  and 
only  a  relative,  validity.  Mind,  in  all  its  perceptions,  ex- 
ternal and  internal,  is  encircled  with  mere  appearances,  in 
which  no  realities  as  they  are  appear,  —  appearances  in 


360  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

which  "  the  things  which  we  invisage  are  not  that  in  them- 
selves for  which  we  take  them,  nor  are  their  relationships 
so  constituted  as  they  appear  to  us."     When  Mr.  Emerson 
sounded  the  depths  of  this  philosophy,  he  saw,  with  abso- 
lute distinctness,  that  it  left  the  mind  with  no  grounds  or 
reasons  whatever,  for  holding  any  one  doctrine  in  distinction 
from  any  other,  on  any  subject  as  true.     To  be  logically 
consistent,  therefore,  free  thiuking  must  become  the  law 
of  all  our  mental  activity.     Whatever,  at  any  one  moment, 
may  appear  to  any  mind  as  true,  let  that  mind  enunciate  as 
a  truth,  and  that  without  attempting  to  assign  to  itself  or 
the  public  any  reasons  of  any  kind  for  that  announcement. 
Here,  to  say  the  least,  is  the  merit  of  absolute  self-consist- 
ency ;  and  no  man,  holding  this  philosophy,  can  take  any 
other  position,  without  the  demerit  of  undeniable  logical  in- 
consistency and  self-contradiction.    Mr.  Emerson  has  rightly 
interpreted  the  philosophy  of  which  he  is  a  devoted  disciple, 
and  no  one  can  show  that  this  is  not  the  fact.     Nor  can 
any  one,  holding  in  common  with  this  individual  the  fun- 
damental principles  of  this  philosophy,  assign  any  valid 
reason  for  not  being,  not  only  almost,  but  altogether,  the 
lawless  free-thinker  that  Mr.  Emerson  is.     A  philosophy 
which  locates  the  mind,  as  this  does,  in  a  universe  of  mere 
appearances,  in  which  no  realities  as  they  are  do   or  can 
appear,  can  give  us  no  valid  criteria  of  truth  on  any  sub- 
ject whatever.     It  utterly  removes  all  grounds  and  rea- 
sons for  holding  any  one  sentiment  as  true  and  its  opposite 
as  false. 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT  COMPLETED.  361 


SCEPTICISM,  AS  A  SPECIAL  FORM  OF  THOUGHT. 
SCEPTICISM   NOT    WHOLLY    NEGATIVE    IN   ITS    CHARACTER. 

At  first  view,  Scepticism  presents  itself  as  "a  mere 
bundle  of  negations,"  merely  affirming  absolute  ignorance 
of  all  realities  of  every  kind,  and,  therefore,  making  no  posi- 
tive affirmations  or  denials  in  respect  to  them.  On  a 
nearer  view,  however,  Scepticism,  like  all  other  forms 
of  thought  and  belief,  has  its  positive  element,  to  wit : 
the  dogma,  that  all  our  knowledge  is  exclusively  phe- 
nomenal, mere  appearance  in  which  no  reality  whatever 
appears,  and  that,  consequently,  "  the  reality  existing  be- 
hind all  appearances  is,  and  must  ever  be,  unknown." 
Take  away  this  one  dogma,  and  this  system  falls  at  once, 
and  wholly  and  forever  disappears.  This  dogma  the  scep- 
tic adopts,  not  as  the  result  of  original  psychological  inves- 
tigation, but  as  a  truth  assumed  to  have  been  verified  as 
such  by  prior  dogmatic  systems,  to  wit,  Materialism  and 
Idealism.  Antitheism  has  never,  in  the  history  of  the 
world,  been,  for  any  considerable  time,  fixed  in  its  princi- 
ples or  form  ;  but  has  always  moved  round  in  a  circle,  oc- 
cupying, at  each  successive  stage  of  its  progress,  the  centre 
of  some  special  system  of  antitheistic  form  of  thought, 
which,  for  the  time,  obtained  popular  favor,  — these  forms 
of  thought,  also,  having  always  been  the  same  and  ever  follow- 
ing each  other  in  the  same  order.  For  a  time,  Materialism 
sways  the  popular  thought,  and  Antitheism  takes  on  the 
form  of  blank  Atheism.  Materialism  is  then  supplanted 
by  Ideal  Dualism  ;  this  is,  at  length,  superseded  by  Subjec- 
tive Idealism  ;  this,  by  Pantheism  ;  and  this  last,  by  Pure 


362  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

Idealism  or  Nihilism.  The  mind,  at  length  wearied  and 
dissatisfied  with  all  these  s}Tstems,  takes  refuge  in  Scepti- 
cism, beyond  which  there  is  no  advance.  Finding  this  the 
most  unsatisfactory  of  all  other  dwelling-places,  the  pop- 
ular mind,  as  far  as  it  has  swung  from  its  proper  moorings, 
returns  to  its  point  of  departure,  Materialism,  to  repeat 
the  same  circle  as  before.  Antitheism,  as  a  lost  spirit, 
has  ever  been  wandering  through  these  dry  and  barren  sys- 
tems, "  seeking  rest  and  finding  none,"  always  dwelling 
in  each,  and  taking  form  from  each,  so  long  as  it  com- 
manded popular  favor ;  appearing  first  of  all  as  blank 
Atheism;  then  as  "a  regulative  idea;"  then  as  "the 
substance  and  principle  of  all  things  ;  "  then  as  u  a  law  of 
thought ; "  and  lastly,  in  the  system  of  Scepticism,  as  "the 
unknowable  and  unknown," —  the  form  which  it  now  assumes. 
Let  us  now  turn  our  attention  to  the  positive  element  in  the 
sceptical  form  of  thought,  the  element  to  which  we  above 
referred.  This  element  takes  on  two  forms,  each  equally 
positive.  The  first  pertains  to  the  character  of  our  knowl- 
edge, and  may  be  thus  expressed :  I  do  know  that  my 
knowledge  is  all  exclusively  phenomenal,  mere  appearance  in 
which  nothing  real  appears.  The  second  pertains  to  our  re- 
lations to  all  realities  that  lie  behind  all  appearances.  This 
article  of  the  sceptic's  faith  may  be  thus  announced  :  /  do 
knoiv  that  I  do  not  know  anything  at  all.  These  two  articles 
embrace  and  express  the  sum  and  substance  of  his  entire 
creed.  This  phenomenal  character  of  all  our  knowledge 
pertains,  we  must  bear  in  mind,  not  merely  to  the  world 
itself,  but  to  all  specific  forms  of  being  and  of  life  which 
seem  to  have  existence  in  the  world,  as,  for  example,  the 
individual,  the  family,  the  community,  and  the  state.  In 
regard  to  all  forms  of  knowledge  pertaining  to  such  apparent 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  3G3 

realities,  his  creed  is  this  :  /  do  know  that  knowledge  per- 
taining to  these  and  all  other  seeming  realities  is  mere  ap- 
pearance, in  which  no  reality  appears.  I  do  know  that 
such  is  the  character  of  my  knowledge  of  those  seeming 
substantialities  represented  by  the  terms  father,  mother, 
brother  and  sister,  husband  and  wife,  friend  and  benefactor. 
In  regard  to  the  realities  which  lie  behind  all  these  appear- 
ances, i"  do  know  that  nry  ignorance  of  them  is  absolute. 
When  this  creed  is  fully  understood,  the  world  will  rise  up 
and  affirm  to  these  sceptics,  one  and  all  of  them,  Gentle- 
men, we  know  that  you  do  not  know  what  you  affirm  that 
you  do  know.  We  also  know  that  }tou  do  not  3Tourselves 
believe  your  own  creed.  You  are  not  and  cannot  be  such 
infinite  fools  as  to  put  real  faith  in  airy  such  absurdity  as 
that.  If  science  cannot  clear  the  brain  of  a  philosopher 
from  a  known  absurdity,  the  name  and  title  of  philosopher 
should  not  shield  him  from  the  reputation  of  holding  an 
absurdity.  But  what  are  the  essential  characteristics  of 
this  dogma  in  both  the  forms  above  stated?  On  this  subject 
we  remark,  — 

The  dogma  of  Scepticism  not  intuitively  true. 

1.  This  dogma,  in  neither  of  its  forms,  is  an  intuitive 
truth.  This  is  self-evident.  We  are,  in  fact,  conscious  of 
a  direct  and  immediate,  or  intuitive,  knowledge  of  matter 
as  an  actually  existing  realit}r  having  extension  and  form, 
on  the  one  hand ;  and  of  mind,  as  possessed  of  the  powers 
of  thought,  feeling,  and  voluntary  determination,  on  the 
other.  To  affirm  that  we  also  know  by  intuition  that  our 
knowledge  of  these  realities  is  exclusively  phenomenal,  is 
to  affirm  what  we  are  not  conscious  of,  in  the  first  instance, 
and  in  the  next,  to  make  intuitive  knowledge  contradict 


364  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

itself;  for  we  are  conscious  of  knowing  these  realities 
as  they  are  in  themselves,  that  is,  as  possessed  of  the 
actual  qualities  and  attributes  named  above.  To  affirm  that 
we  also  know  intuitively  that  wre  know  nothing  whatever  of 
these  realities,  is  to  affirm  that  knowledge  is,  and  is  not, 
knowledge,  —  in  other  words  still,  that  we  intuitively  know 
ourselves  to  be  utterly  ignorant  of  that  of  which  we  have 
an  intuitive  knowledge.  On  this  topic,  however,  we  need 
not  enlarge,  as  sceptics  themselves  do  not  regard  their  own 
dogma  as  having  intuitive  certainty. 

This  theory  opposed  to  the  absolute  testimony  of  Consciousness. 

2.  This  dogma  in  both  its  forms,  we  remark  in  the  next 
place,  stands  directly  opposed  to  the  absolute  testimony  of 
Consciousness.  If  we  are  conscious  of  any  fact  whatever, 
we  are  conscious  of  a  direct  and  immediate,  or  an  intuitive 
knowledge  of  both  matter  and  spirit  as  realities  possessed 
of  the  qualities  above  designated.  In  other  words,  we  are 
conscious  that  our  knowledge  of  these  realities  is  not  exclu- 
sively phenomenal,  but  has  absolute  validity  for  the  reality 
and  essential  characteristics  of  its  objects.  Sceptics  them- 
selves will  not  deny  the  truth  of  these  affirmations.  Hence 
we  remark,  — 

Also  opposed  to  the  intuitive  convictions  of  the  race. 

3.  That  this  dogma  in  both  forms  stands  opposed  to  the 
necessary  intuitive  convictions  of  the  race,  sceptics  them- 
selves included.  Whatever  theories  of  knowledge  individ- 
uals ma}'  entertain,  all  admit,  that,  from  the  constitution 
and  laws  of  the  Universal  Intelligence,  all  men  do  and  must 
believe  intuitively  in  the  reality  of  the  world  of  matter  and 
of  spirit,  and  in  the  validity  of  our  knowledge  of  the  same. 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT  COMPLETED.  365 

With  this  necessary  intuitive  conviction,  therefore,  the  scep- 
tical dogma  in  every  form  which  it  can  assume,  is  directly 
and  openly  confronted. 

Of  no  validity  as  an  inductive  truth. 

4.  As  an  inductive  propositiou,  the  only  form  in  which  it 
can  be  held,  this  sceptical  dogma  can  by  no  possibility  have 
any  real  validity.  An  inductive  proposition  which  stands 
in  direct  opposition  to  intuitive  knowledge,  as  this  dogma 
undeniably  does,  must  be  false.  The  basis  of  all  valid  de- 
duction is  intuition,  and  when  the  former  contradicts  the 
latter,  we  must  have  erred  in  our  deductions.  But  this  dog- 
ma not  onty  stands  in  open  opposition  to  empirical  intuition, 
the  absolute  testimony  of  Consciousness,  but  to  intuitive 
knowledge  which  has  necessary  or  apodictic  validity,  to  our 
intuitive  knowledge  of  time  and  space.  Time  and  space  are 
both  in  common,  as  we  have  already  seen,  represented  in 
the  universal  Consciousness  as  realities,  with  these  immuta- 
ble characteristics,  that  it  is  absolutely  impossible  for  us 
even  to  conceive  of  them  as  not  existing,  or  as  not  being  in 
themselves  the  identical  realities  which  in  human  thought 
they  are  represented  as  being.  Here,  then,  is  a  dogma 
which  affirms  our  absolute  ignorance  of  all  realities  of  every 
kind,  —  a  dogma,  which  b}^  no  possibility  can  be  true,  un- 
less necessary  knowledge,  which  it  is  impossible  for  us  to 
conceive  as  not  having  absolute  validity,  is  utterly  false. 

The  dogma  of  Scepticism  a  mere  assumption. 

5.  What,  then,  in  reality,  is  this  imposing  dogma  in  each 
of  its  forms  ?  It  is  and  must  be,  we  answer,  a  mere  assump- 
tion and  nothing  else,  —  an  assumption  wholly  unindicated 
by  the  intellect,  and  adopted  by  mere  force  of  will,  by  an 

31* 


366  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

act  of  self-compulsion.  No  higher  claims  can  possibly  be 
vindicated  for  it  by  any  facts  of  Consciousness,  or  by  any 
valid  deductions  of  science.  Void  utterly  of  all  claims  to 
any  place  as  an  intuitive  truth  or  principle  of  science, 
standing  in  direct  and  open  opposition  to  the  absolute  tes- 
timony of  Consciousness  and  the  intuitive  convictions  of 
the  race,  and  absolutely  void  of  all  validity  as  an  inductive 
truth,  it  stands  revealed  as  a  naked  assumption  forced  into 
the  sphere  of  human  thought  through  "  the  antitheses  of 
science  falsely  so  called." 

Arguments  adduced  to  sustain  this  assumption. 

6.  The  arguments,  or  rather  sophisms,  by  which  the  advo- 
cates of  the  sceptical  lrypothesis  have  endeavored  to  sustain 
the  validity  of  this  assumption,  have  already,  perhaps,  re- 
ceived a  sufficient  refutation.  As,  at  this  one  point,  the 
fundamental  issue  is  presented  between  the  sceptical  and 
the  theistic  philosophy,  and  as  we  here  meet  with  the  only 
appearance  of  argument  which  can  be  adduced  in  favor  of 
the  former  hypothesis,  we  crave  indulgence  for  a  fuller  ex- 
amination of  the  dogma  under  consideration  than  we  had 
ourselves  originally  intended.  The  advocates  of  this  dog- 
ma enter  into  no  proper  investigation  of  the  facts  of  Con- 
sciousness bearing  upon  the  subject.  On  the  other  hand, 
they  analyze  ideas  and  conceptions  existing  in  the  mind 
pertaining  to  matter,  spirit,  nature,  substance,  cause,  and 
God,  and  finding,  as  they  opine,  in  said  ideas  and  concep- 
tions, certain  elements  of  contradiction,  they  conclude  that 
human  knowledge  in  no  form  can  have  objective  validity. 
This  is  the  argument.  Let  us  now  contemplate  certain 
facts  and  considerations  having  a  final  bearing  upon  this 
subject. 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  307 

The  fact  that  existence  is  a  mystery  overlooked  in  this  argu- 
ment. 

(1.)  Those  wbo  employ  this  argument  forget  that  exist- 
ence itself,  aside  from  the  specific  forms  in  which  it  is  mani- 
fested to  us,  is  a  mystery,  —  a  mystery  which  lies  wholly 
below  and  bej'ond  our  comprehension.  If  we  attempt  to 
fathom  and  comprehend  the  deep  profound  of  being,  we 
shall,  of  course,  involve  ourselves  in  difficulties  and  per- 
plexities from  which  there  is  no  extrication.  When  we 
take  the  facts  of  existence  just  as  they  are  manifested  to 
us,  with  all  that  said  facts  imply ;  when,  upon  rigid  scien- 
tific principles,  we  classify  and  generalize  the  knowledge 
•we  thus  obtain,  and  deduce  from  it  all  the  conclusions  it 
yields,  in  moving  along  this,  the  only  track  of  true  science, 
no  contradictions  whatever  appear.  Suppose,  now,  that 
instead  of  thus  moving  along  the  line  of  scientific  inquiry 
and  deduction,  we  attempt  to  solve  all  the  extraneous  prob- 
lems which  the  mystery  of  being  involves,  and  refuse  to 
accept  as  real  what  we  actually  know  to  be  such,  until  these 
insolvable  problems  are  all  resolved  to  our  perfect  satisfac- 
tion. In  adopting  such  principles  and  such  a  method  of 
inquiry,  we  shall,  of  course,  ere  long  find  ourselves  involved 
in  an  endless  maze  of  inexplicable  contradictions.  If  we 
will  stop  right  here  and  take  a  sober  second  thought  upon 
the  subject,  we  shall  find  that  we  have  not  been  led  into 
these  perplexities  by  following  the  light  of  true  science,  but 
by  following  the  ignis  fatuus  of  "  science  falsely  so  called." 

Body,  for  example,  as  manifested  to  universal  mind,  is  a 
compound  constituted  of  simple  parts,  which,  of  course,  are 
not  compounded.  The  compound  we  perceive  ;  the  simple 
we  do  not  perceive,  but  apprehend  as  a  reality  necessarily 


368  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

implied  as  such  by  the  compound  which  is  known  to  be 
real.  Apprehended  as  a  compound  constituted  of  simple 
parts,  the  conception  of  body  involves  no  element  of  contra- 
diction whatever,  —  the  idea  of  the  compound  and  the  sim- 
ple being  perfectly  compatible  ideas,  and  they  yield  no  de- 
ductions involving  in  any  form  the  elements  of  contradic- 
tion. Suppose,  that  we  take  this  compound  and  push  the 
question,  How  far  can  the  principle  of  division  in  respect  to 
it  be  carried  ?  We  may  then  find  ourselves,  with  Mr.  Speir- 
cer  and  his  associates,  "  in  wondering  mazes  lost."  But 
what  has  all  this  to  do  with  the  other  question,  to  wit, 
whether  the  compound  constituted  of  simple  parts  does  in 
fact  exist?  Nothing  whatever.  The  question,  Whether 
the  compound  constituted  of  perfectly  simple  parts  does  in 
fact  exist,  and  the  other  question,  How  far  the  principle  of 
divisibility  in  respect  to  said  compound  may,  in  thought, 
be  carried,  are  questions  totally  distinct  the  one  from  the 
other,  —  questions  which  have  not  the  remotest  bearing 
upon  one  another. 

Take  one  other  illustration.  We  perceive  body  as  real, 
and  apprehend  space  as  a  reality  necessarily  implied  by 
that  of  the  object  perceived.  We  also  perceive  succession, 
and  apprehend  duration  or  time  as  similarly  implied.  When 
we  turn  our  contemplation  upon  these  implied  verities,  both 
in  common  present  themselves  to  thought  as  absolutely  in- 
finite, the  one  infinite  in  two,  and  the  other  in  all  direc- 
tions. On  further  reflection  we  find  it  utterly  impossible  to 
conceive  of  their  non-existence,  or  of  their  not  being  in  any 
respects  in  themselves  the  identical  realities  which  they  are 
represented  in  human  thought  as  being.  In  the  conceptions 
of  body  and  succession,  and  in  the  ideas  of  space  and  time, 
as  thus  given,  no  elements  of  contradiction  whatever  ap- 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  839 

pear.  The  same  holds  true  of  all  the  sciences,  pure  and 
mixed,  to  which  such  conceptions,  together  with  the  sub- 
jective knowledge  perceived  and  implied,  given  through 
Consciousness,  give  rise.  All,  throughout,  is  perfect  har- 
mony, with  the  utter  absence  of  all  appearance  of  contradic- 
tion, and  it  is  amid  such  problems  of  existence  exclusively 
that  true  science  conducts  us.  Its  light  never  "  leads  to 
bewilder,  or  dazzles  to  blind." 

Suppose,  now,  that,  turning  away  from  the  light  of  sci- 
ence, we  moot  such  questions  as  the  following :  Whether 
space  and  time  are  or  are  not  to  be  considered  as  "  entities 
or  the  attributes  of  entities ;  "  "  whether  space  and  time 
must  be  claimed  as  things,"  things  having  attributes ;  and, 
finally,  whether  extension  is  one  of  their  attributes?  It  is, 
by  mooting  these  identical  questions,  that  such  thinkers  as 
Mr.  Spencer  involve,  not  space  and  time,  but  themselves,  in 
endless  perplexities  and  contradictions.  But  what  have 
these  questions,  or  the  contradictions  which  their  attempted 
solution  implies,  to  do  with  the  other  question,  to  wit, 
Whether  space  and  time,  as  represented  in  human  thought, 
are  realities  ?  Nothing  whatever.  If  calling  them  entities, 
or  things,  or  attributes  of  the  same,  involves  the  subject  in 
contradictions,  true  science  requires  us  to  change  our  nomen- 
clature, and  not  to  deny  the  reality  of  objects  which  it  is 
absolutely  impossible  for  us  to  conceive  of  as  not  being, 
and  not  being  what  they  are  actually  represented  in 
thought  to  be.  Here  we  have  the  exclusive  source  and 
cause  of  all  the  perplexities  and  contradictions  which  such 
thinkers  imagine  to  exist  in  our  ideas  of  nature,  substance, 
cause,  time,  space,  and  God.  Such  contradictions  have  nc 
place  in  these  ideas  themselves,  but  have  being  exclusively 


370 


NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 


from  foreign  questions  which  false  science  forces  into  the 
sphere  of  human  thought  and  inquiry. 

That  the  terms  entities  and  tilings,  as  employed  by  Mr. 
Spencer,  are  identical  in  meaning  is  obvious  from  the  fact, 
that  in  the  same  paragraph  he  employs  them  interchangeably. 
Xow,  a  thing  is  not  space,  as  any  authoritative  dictionary 
m\\  show,  but  some  entity  or  substance  existing  in  space. 
To  reason  about  the  realities  represented  by  these  terms  as 
if  they  were  one  and  the  same,  will,  of  course,  involve,  not 
our  ideas  of  said  realities,  but  ourselves,  in  endless  contra- 
dictions. Take  these  realities,  as  actually  represented  in 
thought,  and  no  contradictions  can  be  found  in  them.  The 
idea  represented  by  the  term  space,  it  should  be  remem- 
bered, is  an  absolutely  simple  and  ultimate  idea,  —  an  idea 
utterly  unlike  any  other  that  exists  in  the  mind.  The  same 
holds  in  respect  to  the  idea  represented  03^  the  term  time. 
To  reason  correctly  about  the  realities  represented  by  these 
terms,  we  must  take  said  realities  just  as  they  are  repre- 
sented in  thought.  We  shall  then  find  that  our  ideas  of  said 
realities  are  absolutely  free  from  even  the  appearance  of 
contradiction. 

The   occasion  and  cause  of  the  seeming  contradictions  by 
which  the  argument  is  sustained. 

(2.)  The  occasion  and  the  cause  of  the  varied  contradic- 
tions which  philosophers  of  a  certain  school  professedly  find 
in  all  our  world  conceptions  and  necessary  ideas,  seem  to 
have,  thus  far,  escaped  the  notice  of  the  analyzers  of  human 
thought.  Let  us  turn  our  attention,  for  a  few  moments,  to 
this  subject.  We  shall  then  find,  that,  by  a  perfectly  ex- 
plicable process  of  thought,  these  philosophers  have  not 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  371 

found  the  contradictions  affirmed  by  them  to  exist,  but  that 
they  have  unconsciously  perpetrated  a  singular  deception 
upon  themselves.  The  idea  of  body,  for  example,  is,  as 
we  have  seen,  that  of  a  compound  made  up  of  simple  parts  ; 
the  two  classes  of  elements  entering  into  the  composition  of 
this  idea  being  given  by  the  two  primary  faculties,  Sense, 
the  faculty  of  external  perception,  and  Reason,  the  faculty 
of  implied  knowledge.  These  two  classes  of  elements,  the 
perceived  and  implied,  the  former  represented  by  the  term 
compound,  and  the  latter  by  the  word  simple,  on  being 
brought  within  the  sphere  of  Consciousness,  are,  by  a  sec- 
ondary intellectual  process  through  a  secondary  faculty,  the 
Understanding,  the  conceptive  faculty,  or  notion-forming 
power  of  the  mind,  —  these  two  classes  of  elements,  the  per- 
ceived and  implied,  are,  we  say,  by  this  secondary  faculty 
combined  into  a  specific  conception  represented  by  the  term 
hody.  Here  we  find  ourselves  in  the  presence  of  one  of  the 
fixed  laws  of  this  conceptive  faculty,  the  Understanding. 
If  through  the  action  of  this  facult}r  we  form  a  conception 
of  any  material  object,  —  a  conception  represented  by  the 
term  body,  —  we  must  blend  into  the  conception  the  two 
elements  under  consideration,  the  perceived  and  the  implied, 
the  idea  of  the  compound  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  the  simple 
on  the  other.  These  philosophers  affirm  that  our  idea  of  body 
is  self-contradictory,  and,  therefore,  of  impossible  objective 
validity.  To  prove  this,  the}-  must  take  this  conception  as 
given  in  Consciousness,  and  show  that  its  constituent  ele- 
ments are  incompatible  the  one  class  with  the  other.  What 
are,  in  truth,  the  constituent  elements  of  this  conception? 
The}'  are  that  of  a  compound,  on  the  one  hand,  and  those  of 
simples,  or  ultimate  elements  not  compounded,  on  the  other. 
This,  and  nothing  else,  is  the  conception  as  given  in  Con- 


372  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

sciousness.  Now,  there  is  undeniably  no  relation  of  in- 
compatibility existing  between  these  two  distinct  classes  of 
elements  in  respect  to  each  other.  The  idea  of  a  compound 
is,  in  no  sense  whatever,  incompatible  with  that  of  the 
simple.  Equally  compatible  is  the  latter  idea  with  the 
former.  This  is  undeniable.  In  the  same  manner,  it  may 
be  shown  that  not  one  of  our  real  world-conceptions  is,  in 
any  sense  or  form,  self-contradictory.  On  what  condi- 
tions would  such  conceptions  be  self-contradictory?  On 
such  conditions  exclusively  as  these,  that  our  conception 
of  body,  for  example,  is  wholly  that  of  a  compound  made 
up  entirely  of  parts  which  are  themselves  compounds,  and 
not  simples.  This  is  what  the  sceptical  philosophers  of  all 
schools  affirm  our  conception  of  body  to  be.  This  is 
what  all  the  philosophers  named  by  Mr.  Spencer,  from  Pro- 
tagoras to  Kant,  affirmed  of  this  conception.  In  the  name 
of  the  Universal  Intelligence,  we  affirm,  that  no  such  con- 
ception of  body  has  place  in  the  general  Consciousness  ;  that 
the  monstrous  absurdity  of  a  compound  constituted  ex- 
clusively of  compounded  parts  has  being  nowhere  but  in 
the  brain  of  a  self-deceived  and  crazy  philosopliy. 

How  do  these  philosophers  professedly  show  that  such  is 
the  character  of  our  world-conceptions?  In  this  form. 
Suppose  we  recur  to  the  conception  represented  by  the 
term,  body,  —  a  conception  constituted  of  the  two  elements 
referred  to,  —  the  idea  of  a  compound,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  of  the  simple,  on  the  other.  We  conceive  this  object, 
body,  to  be  divided.  We  then  attempt  to  form,  through 
the  Understanding,  a  conception  of  each  of  the  divided 
parts.  By  the  immutable  laws  of  this  faculty,  we  must 
conceive  of  said  parts,  if  we  form  conceptions  of  them  at 
all,   as   themselves   compounds   made   up   of  parts   more 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT  COMPLETED.  373 

simple  We  may  repeat  this  dividing  process  ad  infinitum, 
and  as  long  as  we  keep  the  divided  parts  within  the  sphere 
of  this  conceptive  faculty,  and  compel  it  to  form  concep- 
tions of  the  same,  so  long  shall  we  obtain  the  same  result 
as  before,  the  conception  of  a  compound  constituted  wholly 
of  uncompounded  parts.  If  we  assume  that  it  is  exclusively 
by  such  a  process  of  successive  divisions  and  bisections, 
that  we  obtain  our  idea  of  the  simple,  and  this  is  just  what 
these  philosophers  do  assume,  then  our  conceptions  of  body 
would  have  in  them  the  monstrous  absurdit}r  of  a  compound 
wholly  constituted  of  compounds.  It  is  by  no  such  pro- 
cess, however,  that  the  idea  of  the  simple  is  obtained.  On 
the  other  hand,  through  the  action  of  Sense,  the  facult}^  of 
external  perception,  the  compound  is  directly  and  immedi- 
ately given  as  real.  On  such  perception,  Reason  directly 
and  immediately  apprehends  the  simple,  as  necessarily  and 
absolutely  implied  by  the  compound  which  is  perceived. 
As  soon  as  these  two  elements,  the  perceived  and  the  implied, 
appear  in  Consciousness,  the  Understanding  takes  the 
initiative,  and  blends  said  elements  into  a  conception  rep- 
resented by  the  term  body.  Such  is  the  origin  and  genesis 
of  this  conception.  The  elements  entering  into  it  are  all 
absolutely  compatible  with  one  another,  and  it  is  only  by  a 
false  ps}'chological  process,  the  process  above  explained, 
that  these,  or  any  other  of  our  world-conceptions,  can,  by 
an}^  possibility,  be  made  to  appear  as  self-contradictory. 

Let  us  now,  for  a  moment,  contemplate  two  other  neces- 
sary laws  of  the  Understanding.  Two  other  elements  do 
and  must  enter  into  all  our  world-conceptions,  that  of  qual- 
ity given  by  perception,  and  that  of  substance  given  by 
Reason,  as  implied  by  the  quality  perceived.  Between 
these  two  elements  no  appearance  of  incompatibility  can  be 
32 


374  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

shown  to  exist.  Further,  body  is  conceived,  as  an  ex- 
tended substance,  existing  in  space  and  occupying  space. 
Here,  too,  the  same  relations  of  absolute  compatibility  as 
before,  do,  undeniably  obtain.  Space  is  given,  as  the 
place  of  body  and  substance  in  all  their  forms,  as  implied 
by  the  same,  and  as  the  necessary  condition  of  their  exist- 
ence. Suppose,  now,  that  we  take  idea  of  space,  force  said 
idea  into  the  sphere  of  the  Understanding,  and  compel  it 
to  form  a  conception  of  the  object  represented  by  the  term, 
space.  By  the  immutable  laws  which  control  the  action  of 
this  faculty,  it  will,  and  it  must,  in  such  a  case,  give  forth 
a  conception,  not  of  space  as  really  represented  in  human 
thought,  but  of  some  substance,  having  attributes,  —  that 
is,  of  some  object  existing  in  space.  Now,  if  we  confound, 
as  Mr.  Spencer  and  others  have  clone,  the  conception  thus 
obtained  with  our  idea  of  space,  then,  of  course,  and  not 
otherwise,  will  that  idea  appear  as  self-contradictory.  It 
is  by  just  such  unscientific  processes  as  these,  taking  con- 
ceptions and  ideas  from  the  cognizance  of  the  only  faculties 
to  whose  cognizance  t\\Qj  exclusively  belong,  and  forcing 
them  into  the  spheres  of  other  faculties  which  cannot  act 
upon  said  phenomena,  without  fundamentally  erring,  that 
all  our  world-conceptions  and  necessary  ideas  have  been 
made  to  appear  as  self-contradictory  and  absurd.  The 
error  of  such  processes,  and  the  nature  of  that  error,  are 
now  distinctly  exposed. 

All  the  sceptical  difficulties  equally  pertain  to  what  sceptics 
affirm  to  be  real. 

(3.)  Sceptics  of  all  schools,  as  we  remarked  in  another 
chapter,  admit  and  must  admit,  that  something  is  real,  appear- 
ances, to  say  the  least.     All  the  difficulties  and  seeming 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  375 

contradictions  which  they  affirm  to  exist  in  our  world-con- 
ceptions and  necessary  ideas  are  involved  in  all  their  force 
and  in  the  same  identical  forms,  in  the  idea,  the  validity  of 
which  they  admit  and  affirm,  to  wit,  that  something  does  in 
fact  exist.  That  which  is  equally  involved  in  all  conceiva- 
able  and  possible  hypotheses,  some  one  of  which  must  be 
true,  can  have  no  force  whatever  against  the  validity  of  any 
of  them.  Appearances,  for  example,  are  real.  This  none 
will  deny.  Now,  appearances  must,  if  they  do  occur,  occur 
somewhere  and  in  some  time.  But  this  implies  the  absolute 
validity  of  our  ideas  of  time  and  space,  and  involves  Mr. 
Spencer  in  all  the  contradictions  which  he  professedly  finds 
in  said  ideas.  There  is  not  a  difficulty  which  he  thinks  he 
finds  in  any  of  our  world-conceptions  which  may  not  be  dem- 
onstrated to  be  involved  in  every  conception  which  he  will 
affirm  must  be  true.  How  infinite,  then,  the  absurdity  of 
urging  these  difficulties  as  valid  for  the  invalidity  of  said 
conceptions ! 

The  sophistry  involved  in  this  argument  exposed. 

(4.)  An  ingenious  and  subtile  sophism  may  not  unfre- 
quently  be  most  effectively  exposed  by  applying  the  argu- 
ment to  some  specific  subject,  in  respect  to  which  it  is  well 
known  that  it  can  have  no  validity  whatever.  The  argu- 
ment by  which  certain  schools  in  philosophy  have  profes- 
sedly demonstrated  the  invalidity  of  all  our  world-concep- 
tions and  necessary  ideas  must  have  in  it  the  appearance 
of  conclusiveness.  Else  it  could  not  have  deceived  so  many 
exceeding!}^  shrewd  thinkers.  The  argument,  it  will  be 
remembered,  is  this  :  Our  world-conceptions  and  necessary 
ideas  cannot  have  real  objective  validity,  for  the  obvious 


376  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

reason,  that  they  all,  in  common,  are  self-contradictory, 
yielding  with  the  same  consecutiveness,  two  distinct,  oppo- 
site, and  irreconcilably  contradictory  propositions.  Take, 
for  example,  the  idea  of  body  as  made  up  of  simple  parts. 
From  this  idea,  the  two  contradictory  propositions  result, 
as  demonstrably  evident,  to  wit,  that  "  every  compound 
body  is  made  up  of  simple  parts,"  and  that  "  no  compound 
body  does  or  can  exist  which  is  made  up  of  simples."  So 
in  all  other  cases ;  and  there  is,  it  is  affirmed,  but  one 
escape  from  these  contradictions,  and  that  is,  to  deny  ut- 
terly the  validity  of  all  our  knowledge. 

Let  us  now  apply  this  argument  to  a  given  case.  We 
have,  seemingly,  to  say  the  least,  a  certain  book  before  us, 
—  a  book  affirmed  on  its  title-page  to  have  been  written  by 
a  certain  thinker  living  in  a  certain  locality  in  a  place  called 
England.  The  name  of  said  thinker  is  Herbert  Spencer. 
We  will  take  the  work  as  represented  in  the  thought  of  all 
who  seem  to  themselves  to  have  read  it,  and  will  demon- 
strate by  the  same  process  of  deduction  by  which  he  argues 
the  utter  invalidity  of  all  our  world-knowledge  and  neces- 
sary ideas,  that  no  such  work  as  the  one  which  seemingly 
lies  before  us,  does  or  can  have  being,  nor  can  there  be  any- 
where an}'  such  thinker  as  said  title-page  seemingly  affirms. 
Now  for  the  proof. 

This  seeming  work  is  or  is  not  the  product  of  a  thinking 
mind,  no  other  hypothesis  being  conceivable.  According  to 
the  philosophy  seeminghT  taught  in  this  seeming  produc- 
tion, both  the  hypotheses  above  stated  are  encompassed 
with  inextricable  difficulties  and  contradictions.  To  sup- 
pose it  to  be  the  product  of  such  a  thinker  is  to  affirm  as 
real  successive  events,  the  existence  of  the  cause,  and  the 
subsequent  occurrence  of  the   event.     This  would  imply 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  SI  7 

absolutely  the  real  validity  of  our  idea  of  time  ;  for,  if  suc- 
cession is  real,  time,  as  we  apprehend  it,  must  be  real  also. 
But  time  is  no  such  reality,  and  cannot  be,  according  to  the 
fundamental  teachings  of  this  book.  Such  a  supposition  is 
therefore  utterly  inadmissible.  On  the  other  hand,  to  sup- 
pose the  thoughts  apparently  contained  in  this  seeming  book 
not  to  be  the  product  of  a  thinking  mind,  is  to  affirm  an 
event  without  a  cause,  phenomena  without  a  subject,  and 
thought  without  a  thinker,  —  the  most  impossible  of  all  con- 
ceptions. There  is  but  one  possible  escape  from  these  pal- 
pable contradictions.  We  must  affirm  that  no  such  book, 
no  such  train  of  thought  as  that  seeming  book  seemingly 
contains,  and  no  such  thinker  as  this  book  and  train  of 
thought  are  referred  to,  have  or  can  have  being  anywhere, 
or  in  ai^  time.  We  would  be  thankful  to  any  one  who 
should  show  us  wherein  the  above  argument  is  not  perfectly 
parallel  to,  and  equally  conclusive  with,  that  by  which  our 
author  professedly  demonstrates  the  invalidity  of  all  our 
world-conceptions  and  necessary  ideas. 

There  is  a  still  more  fundamental  view  of  this  "  high  ar- 
gument." It  is  undeniable  that  the  author  of  this  work, 
if  he  exist  at  all,  is  either  "  in  his  head"  "  or  out  of  his 
head,"  no  other  supposition  being  possible.  Now,  from  the 
work  itself,  by  a  process  of  reasoning  identical  with  the  pro- 
cess in  Kant's  "  Antinomies  of  pure  Reason,"  of  which  the 
work  of  our  author  is  but  a  rehash,  we  can  demonstrate  the 
validity  of  both  the  above  propositions.  To  parallel  fully 
the  antinomies  we  will  argue  the  first  proposition  as  our 
Thesis,  and  the  second  as  our  Antithesis. 
32* 


378  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 


Thesis. 


To  demonstrate  the  thesis,  we  need  only  refer  to  the  gen- 
eral character  of  this  work,  —  to  the  undeniable  fact  that  it 
fully  realizes  the  idea  of  a  systematized  whole,  with  every 
part  in  its  proper  place.  No  thinker  who  was  not  in,  but 
"  out  of  his  head,"  could  originate  such  a  production.  The 
validity  of  our  thesis,  then,  has  been  fully  demonstrated. 

Antithesis. 

What  are  the  infallible  indications  that  a  thinker  is  and 
must  be,  "  out  of  his  head  "  ?  They  are  such  as  these  :  He 
will  deny  the  most  obvious  truths,  and  adopt  as  true  the 
wildest  conjectures  and  assumptions.  He  will  deny  propo- 
sitions whose  validity  has  been  established  by  the  most 
absolute  proof,  and  hold  as  demonstrated  truths  dogmas 
unsustained  by  any  form  or  degree  of  valid  evidence.  He 
will  treat  with  contempt  the  most  perfect  forms  of  thought 
conceivable,  and  manifest  great  respect  for  puerile  absurdi- 
ties. To  go  no  farther,  we  simply  add,  that  such  individ- 
uals will  regard  and  treat  elements  of  thought  the  most  ob- 
viously compatible  the  one  with  the  other,  as  irreconcilably 
contradictory  to  one  another,  and  then  avow  the  most  pal- 
pable contradictions  without  any  consciousness  of  their  real 
character  and  mutual  relations.  Who  can  doubt  that  a 
thinker  whose  productions  are  prominently  marked  by  all 
the  above  characteristics  must  be  "  out  of  his  head "  ? 
What  are  the  real  facts  of  the  case  in  regard  to  our  author 
as  presented  in  the  work  before  us  ?  We  will  give  a  few 
leading  and  characteristic  examples. 

Mr.  Spencer  has  been  during  his  entire  life  an  open-faced 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  379 

spectator  of  the  world  of  matter  and  of  spirit.  So  obvious 
to  himself  are  the  objects  which  he  perceives,  and  the  va- 
lidity of  his  knowledge  of  the  same,  that  it  is  utterly  impos- 
sible for  him,  excepting  "  when  he  begins  to  philosophize," 
to  doubt  for  a  single  moment  that  he  does  know  realities  as 
they  are.  So  obvious  is  the  absolute  validity  of  his  world- 
knowledge,  that  in  the  act  of  philosophizing,  while  he  is 
"  compelling  himself  to  treat  this  knowledge  as  nothing  but 
a  prejudice,"  the  conviction  that  his  philosophy  is  a  delu- 
sion, and  that  he  is  in  fact  "beholding  with  open  face" 
realities  as  they  are,  will  return  upon  him,  and  that  with 
immutable  fixedness.  Yet,  despite  all  this,  and  in  open 
opposition  to  the  absolute  testimony  of  his  own  conscious- 
ness, and  the  immutable  convictions  of  the  race,  and  with- 
out any  valid  evidence  whatever  on  the  other  side,  he  affirms 
that  he  does  know  that  all  this  knowledge  is  exclusively 
phenomenal,  —  mere  appearance,  —  and  that,  of  "the  reality 
behind  all  appearances,"  he  knows  nothing  at  all.  But  fur- 
ther than  this,  and  worse  by  far,  our  author  denies  wholly 
the  validity  of  forms  of  knowledge  given  in  his  own  and  the 
universal  Consciousness,  as  strictly  necessary  and  absolute. 
Of  space  and  time,  for  example,  he  has  perfectly  distinct 
apprehensions,  —  apprehensions  attended  with  the  absolute 
consciousness  that  it  is  utterly  impossible  for  himself  even 
to  conceive  of  them  as  unreal,  or  as  being  in  any  respects 
whatever,  as  realities,  different  from  what  he  apprehends 
them  to  be.  Yet,  with  an  absolute  consciousness  of  the  im- 
mutable characteristics  of  our  knowledge  of  these  eternal 
verities,  with  the  acknowledgment  before  him  of  all  philoso- 
phers from  Protagoras  to  Kant,  that  such  are  the  change- 
less characteristics  of  that  knowledge,  and  in  open  opposi- 
tion to  the  immutable  affirmations  of  his  own  and  of  the 


380  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

universal  Intelligence,  he  still  affirms  in  this  book  that  he 
does  know  that  our  knowledge  of  space  and  time  has  no  real, 
but  a  u  purely  relative  "  validity.  "  All  that  we  can  assert," 
he  says,  "is  that  space  is  a  relative  reality. "  The  same,  he 
afterwards  affirms  to  be  true  of  time.  Is  it  possible  for  us  to 
conceive  that  a  thinker  is  "in  his  head"  who  will  positively 
deny  such  consciously  obvious  and  absolute  truths  as  these? 
On  the  authority  of  the  most  shallow  sophisms  that  ever 
appeared  within  the  sphere  of  human  thought,  he  denies  ut- 
terly the  validity  of  all  our  world-knowledge  and  necessary 
ideas  of  every  kind,  and  that,  when  he  could  not  but  know,  if 
he  was  in  his  head,  that  the  same  objections  which  he  urges 
as  conclusive  against  the  possible  validity  of  the  forms  of 
knowledge  referred  to,  do  in  fact  lie  in  all  their  force  against 
forms  of  knowledge  the  absolute  validity  of  which  he  him- 
self admits  and  affirms,  to  wit,  the  idea  that  something  does 
exist.  He  thus  practically  denies  the  validity  of  the  prin- 
ciple, that  things  equal  to  the  same  things  are  equal  to  one 
another.  In  his  chapter  on  "  Ultimate  Scientific  Ideas,"  he 
thus  argues  against  the  monstrous  absurdity  of  Kant,  that 
space  and  time  are  nothing  in  themselves  but  "  a  priori  laws 
or  conditions  of  the  conscious  mind"  :  "If  space  and  time 
present  to  our  minds  belong  to  the  ego,  then  of  necessity 
they  clo  not  belong  to  the  non  ego.  Now,  it  is  absolutely 
impossible  to  think  this  "  (that  the}'  do  belong  to  the  ego). 
Again:    "The  direct  testimony  of  Consciousness  is,  that 

time  and  space  are  not  within  but  without  the  mind  ;  and 

• 
so  absolutely  independent  of  it  that  they  cannot  be  con- 
ceived to  become  non-existent,  even  were  the  mind  to  be- 
come non-existent."  Here  our  author  reasons  like  a  phi- 
losopher. To  be  self-consistent,  he  must  affirm  the  absolute 
validity,  throughout,  of  our  own  knowledge  of  these  reali- 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  381 

ties.     If  the  fact,  that  we  are  conscious  of  Space  and  Time 
as  exterior  to  and  independent  of  the  mind,  proves  that,  in 
.fact,  they  are  thus  exterior  and  independent ;  and  further, 
'if  the  fact  that  we  cannot  conceive  them  to  be  "  laws  or 
conditions  of  the  conscious  mind,"  proves  that  they  cannot 
be  such  laws  and  conditions,  —  and  all  this  our  author  abso- 
lutely affirms,  — then,  if  he  were  really  "  in  his  head,"  he 
would  admit  and  affirm  that  Space  and  Time  are  not  only 
realities  in  themselves,  but  the  identical  realities  that  we 
conceive  them  to  be.    We  have,  undeniably,  a  consciousness 
of  them,  not  only  as  realities,  but  as  realities  of  a  fixed  char- 
acter, and  all   this,  with  the  absolute  impossibility  of  con- 
ceiving that  they  are,  or  can  be,  in  any  respects,  different 
from  what  we  conceive  them  to  be.    But,  in  the  same  connec- 
tion, he  affirms  the  absolute  validity  of  the  direct  testimony 
of  Consciousness,  and  of  necessary  knowledge,  in  certain 
respects  in  regard  to  these  objects,  and  absolutely  denies 
the  validity  of  the  same  identical  testimony  and  knowledge 
relatively  to  the  same  objects  in  other  particulars  no  more 
fundamental.     Having  proven,  as  he  imagines,  that  Space 
and  Time  cannot  be  entities  or  things,  nor  the  attributes 
of  such  realities,  he  then  launches  off  into  the  following: 
strange  and   sweeping  deduction :  "  It  results,  therefore, 
that  Space  and  Time  are  wholly  incomprehensible.     The 
immediate  knowledge  that  we  seem  to  have  of  them  proves, 
when    examined,   to   be   total  ignorance."      He   had  just 
affirmed  our  knowledge  of  these  realities,  in  certain  partic- 
ulars perfectly  fundamental,  to  be  absolute.     Here,  on  the 
next  page,  he  affirms  our  ignorance  of  the  same  realities  to 
be  equally  absolute.     But  what  thinker,  who  is  "  in  his 
head,"  could  drawr,  from  the  premises  laid  down,  the  sweep- 
ing deduction  above  cited  ?   The  fact  that  we  do  know,  that 


382  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

Space  and  Time  are  not  things  nor  the  attributes  of  things, 
that  we  know  that  they  cannot  be  "  laws  or  conditions  of 
conscious  mind,',  and  that  they  are  absolutely  exterior  to 
and  independent  of  our  minds,  "  this  immediate  knowledge 
which  we  seem  to  have  of  them,  proves,"  he  says,  "  when 
examined,  to  be  total  ignorance,"  and  shows  them  to 
be  "  wholly  incomprehensible."  Further,  if  a  direct  and 
immediate  consciousness  of  an  object,  in  any  one  particu- 
lar, is  valid  for  the  reality  and  character  of  said  object  in 
that  one  respect,  the  same  form  of  consciousness  is,  and 
must  be,  valid  for  the  reality  and  character  of  all  objects  to 
which  it  pertains  in  the  same  form.  In  the  extracts  above 
given,  our  author  does  affirm  the  absolute  validity  of  this 
form  of  Consciousness  for  the  reality  aud  character  of  Space 
and  Time,  in  particulars  perfectly  fundamental.  In  the 
same  form,  we  have  undeniably  a  consciousness  of  both 
matter  and  spirit,  so  far  as  their  essential  characteristics 
are  concerned.  Our  author  affirms  the  absolute  authority 
of  Consciousness  in  the  former  case,  and  as  absolutely  de- 
nies it,  in  the  latter.  This  author,  therefore,  is  "  out  of  his 
head,"  or  things  equal  to  the  same  things  are  not  equal  to 
one  another.  In  this  book,  we  are  assured  that  there  is  a 
reality  higher  than  that  represented  in  the  idea  of  an  infi- 
nite and  perfect  personal  God,  as  much  higher  as  "  Intelli- 
gence will  transcend  mechanical  motion,"  and  that  we  must 
make  an  election  between  "  personality  and  something 
higher."  Why  did  he  not  assure  us,  to  reconcile  our  minds 
to  the  loss  of  our  hopes  of  immortality,  that  our  choice 
is  between  immortality  and  something  higher ;  that  there 
may  be  forms  of  non-being,  as  much  superior  to  conscious 
being  as  the  latter  is  superior  to  mere  mechanical  existence  ? 
The  idea,  also,  that  "  the  worlds  were   made  by  the  word 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT  COMPLETED.  383 

of  God,"  he  regards  as  deserving  no  higher  appellation 
than  "  the  carpenter  theory."  We  refer  to  such  facts  to 
show  how  palpably,  in  our  author's  mind,  things  which  dif- 
fer as  the  finite  and  the  infinite,  are  utterly  confounded, 
just  as  they  are  with  all  thinkers  who  are  out  of  their  heads. 
The  work  before  us  is  full  of  just  such  contradictions  and 
absurdities  as  those  above  adduced.  If  such  facts  and  con- 
siderations have  not  fully  demonstrated  our  Thesis,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  our  Antithesis,  on  the  other,  and  we  freely 
admit  that  they  have  not,  then  we  say  before  the  world, 
that  all  "  the  antitheses  of  science  falsely  so  called,"  to- 
gether with  all  "  the  antinomies  of  pure  reason,"  and  the 
mountain  ridges  of  contradictions  which  our  author  and 
others  professedly  find  in  our  world-conceptions  and  neces- 
sary ideas,  are  the  merest  sophisms  and  paralogisms  that 
ever  disgraced  science  during  the  history  of  the  race.  If 
it  is  claimed  that  these  antitheses,  antinomies,  and  affirmed 
contradictions,  are  valid  for  the  end  for  which  they  are  ad- 
duced, then  we  put  forward  our  Thesis  and  Antithesis,  as 
rendering  demonstrably  evident  the  fact,  that  no  such 
thinker  as  Mr.  Spencer  is  supposed  to  be,  and  no  such  work 
as  seemingly  comes  from  him,  and  no  such  train  of  thought 
as  is  seemingly  developed  in  that  work,  have,  or  can  have,  be- 
ing anywhere  in  Space  and  Time,  or  out  of  Space  and  Time. 
If  it  should  be  affirmed  that  such  forms  of  presentation  as 
we  have  just  exhibited  in  regard  to  our  author,  do  not  be- 
come the  dignity  of  the  Science  of  Natural  Theology,  we 
admit  the  fact,  and  confess  a  feeling  of  shame,  that  the 
sophistries  of  false  science  render  such  presentations  proper 
and  necessary.  Sophistry  is  always  undignified,  and  never 
permissible,  but  when  its  use  is  necessary  to  expose  soph- 
istry.    This  is  our  apology. 


384  NATURAL   THEOLOGY. 


THE    DESTINY    OF    THESE     TWO     HYPOTHESES,    THE      SCEPTICAL 
AND    REALISTIC,    OR   THEISTIC. 

We  are  now  prepared  for  a  deliberate  contemplation  of 
the  certain  destiny  of  these  two  distinct  and  opposite  hy- 
potheses, Realism,  and  with  it,  Theism,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  Scepticism,  on  the  other.  On  this  topic,  in  drawing 
the  disjunctive  argument  to  a  final  close,  we  would,  at  the 
expense  of  appearing  sometimes  rather  repetitious,  invite 
special  attention  to  the  following  important  suggestions  : 

The  one,  a  system  of  blank  Atheism.     The  other,  theistic  in 
all  its  principles  and  deductions. 

No  one  will  deny  the  fact,  that  Realism,  in  its  princi- 
ples and  logical  deductions,  is  throughout  strictly  theistic. 
Modern  Scepticism,  in  opposition  to  the  system  as  we  have 
defined  it,  and  as  it  was  in  former  years,  is  positive  Athe- 
ism, and  nothing  else.  While,  on  its  negative  side,  it  affirms 
the  Unconditioned  to  be  both  unknowable  and  unknown, 
on  its  positive  side,  it  denies  absolutely  of  said  Uncon- 
ditioned, intelligence,  sensibility,  free  will,  and  person- 
ality.  Whatever  else  may,  or  may  not,  be  real,  all  the  ele- 
ments embraced  in  the  idea  of  such  a  personality  being 
absolutely  self-contradictory  and  of  impossible  validity, 
such  a  personality  cannot  exist.  Such  are  the  absolute 
teachings  of  modern  Scepticism.  If  this  is  not  blank  Athe- 
ism, we  should  be  glad  to  know  what  is.  Any  system,  also, 
which  locates  the  Unconditioned  in  the  sphere  of  the  abso- 
lutely unknowable  and  unknown  is,  in  no  respects,  practi- 
cally different  from  Atheism,  and  is  fundamentally  subver- 
sive of  all  rational  worship.  To  worship  we  "  know  not 
what,"  is  pronounced  by  the  author  of  Christianity  to  be 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT  COMPLETED.  385 

an  irrational  service.  "We  know  what  we  worship,"  or 
Christ  is  not  "  a  teacher  sent  from  God."  Modern  Scepti- 
cism, however,  in  its  absolute  denial  of  the  existence  of  an 
intelligent  personal  God,  takes  rank  as  blank  Atheism,  or 
we  have  no  standard  definition  of  the  term  Atheism. 

All  thinkers  must  adopt  one  or  the  other  of  -these  hypotheses. 

The  time  has  arrived,  we  remark,  in  the  next  place,  when 
all  thinkers  must  adopt  one  or  the  other  of  these  systems,  as 
immutable  truths  of  science.  The  reason  is  obvious.  There 
is  no  intermediate  Irypothesis  on  which  they  can  make  a 
stand,  without  consciously  violating  their  own  convictions  of 
what  real  science  demands  of  them.  The  materialist,  as  we 
have  seen,  must  take  one  of  two  positions,  no  third  being 
possible,  —  that  our  knowledge  of  matter  is  direct  and  im- 
mediate, or  presentative,  and,  therefore,  valid  for  the  reality 
and  character  of  its  objects,  —  or  that  our  knowledge  of 
this  substance  is  indirect  and  mediate,  and,  therefore, 
utterly  void  of  such  validity.  In  taking  the  first,  the  only 
true,  position,  he  is,  at  once,  confronted  with  a  form  of 
knowledge  of  the  same  identical  character  as  the  other,  — 
a  form  of  knowledge  revealing  absolutely  the  existence  of 
another  substance  utterly,  in  all  its  fundamental  qualities, 
unlike  and  opposite  to  matter,  and  never  to  be  confounded 
with  it,  to  wit,  spirit.  Thus,  his  own  doctrine  becomes 
demonstrably  false.  If  he  takes  the  second  position,  then, 
by  his  own  hypothesis,  his  ignorance  of  the  nature  of  all 
substances  in  common,  is  absolute,  and  he  convicts  himself 
of  the  grossest  contradiction  and  absurdity  conceivable,  if 
he  asserts  his  own  doctrine  to  be  true  or  false.  Idealism 
sets  out  with  the  positive  affirmation,  that  we  know  nothing 
of  realities  of  any  kind,  as  they  exist  in  themselves,  "  but 


386  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

our  manner  of  perceiving  them  ;  "  that  "  with  this  only  we 
nave  to  do ; "  that  none  of  our  perceptions,  conceptions, 
ideas,  or  cognitions,  have  any  validity  for  real  existences 
in  themselves,  and  that  of  such  existences  our  ignorance  is 
necessary  and  absolute.  Now,  the  time  has  come,  or  will 
oon  come,  when  the  world  will  justly  laugh  at  the  philoso- 
pher, as  involving  himself  in  the  valid  charge  of  philosophic 
idiocy,  who  shall  profess  to  give  the  ontology  of  that  of 
which  he  himself  affirms  an  absolute  ignorance.  Material- 
ism and  Idealism,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind,  are  the  only 
conceivable  hypotheses  which  lie  between  Realism,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  Scepticism,  on  the  other.  Between  the  two 
last  named,  therefore,  all  thinkers  must  make  their  elec- 
tion. 

The  exclusive  sphere  of  Science  in  accordance  ivith  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  each  of  these  hypotheses  is  absolutely 
fixed  and  definable. 

Our  next  position  is  this :  The  true  and  only  valid 
sphere  of  Science  in  accordance  with  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  each  of  these  hypotheses  is  perfectly  fixed  and  de- 
finable. Realism  commences  with  the  original  intuitions 
of  the  Intelligence,  and,  upon  strictly  scientific  grounds, 
vindicates  for  said  intuitions  an  absolute  validity  for  the 
reality  and  character  of  their  respective  objects.  It  then, 
by  the  application  of  criteria  which  cannot  mislead,  discrimi- 
nates between  forms  of  knowledge  which  have  a  mere  rela- 
tive, and  no  real  validity,  on  the  one  hand,  and  those  which 
have  an  absolute  validity,  on  the  other,  and  by  a  rigid 
adherence  to  such  a  method  of  investigation,  the  only 
strictly  scientific  method  conceivable,  vindicates  for  science 
a  known  and  knowable  universe,  and  for  humanity  a  known 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT  COMPLETED.  387 

God.  By  the  strictest  application  of  scientific  principles, 
it  discriminates  between  all  forms  of  empirical  and  a  priori 
knowledge,  explains  fully  the  origin  and  genesis  of  each, 
demonstrates  the  real  relations  and  dependency  of  each  to 
and  upon  the  other,  and  thus  fully  elucidates  and  deter- 
mines the  nature,  and  sphere,  and  validity,  of  all  the  sci- 
ences, pure  and  mixed.  There  is  not  a  form  of  experience 
or  thought  that  has  being  in  the  mind,  Materialism,  Ideal- 
ism, and  Scepticism  included,  which  this  system  does  not 
fully,  and  that  upon  strictly  scientific  grounds,  explain  and 
elucidate.  The  true  and  proper  sphere  of  Realism,  there- 
fore, is  not  mere  appearances  in  which  no  reality,  as  it  is 
in  itself,  appears,  but  actual  realities  as  they  are,  to  wit,  — 
matter,  finite  spirit,  substance,  cause,  time,  space,  duty, 
immortality,  and  God,  the  infinite  and  perfect  mind,  —  a 
personal  God,  the  real  Father  of  our  spirits,  and  the  known 
Creator  and  Governor  of  a  known  universe. 

Scepticism,  on  the  other  hand,  affirms  absolutely,  that 
all  our  knowledge  of  realities,  within  and  around  us,  is  ex- 
clusively phenomenal,  mere  appearance,  in  which  110  reality 
whatever  appears,  and  "  that  the  reality  existing  behind  all 
appearances  is,  and  must  ever  be,  unknown."  What,  then, 
is  the  true  and  proper  and  exclusive  province  and  sphere 
of  science,  according  to  the  fundamental  principles  of  this 
hypothesis,  —  principles,  as  announced  by  its  own  leading 
advocates?  It  is  this,  and  nothing  else  than  this,  —  to 
classify  and  generalize  these  appearances.  With  realities  in 
themselves,  and  in  their  relationship  to  the  phenomenal, 
science,  as  limited  by  the  principles  of  this  lrypothesis,  has 
absolutely  nothing  whatever  to  do,  and  that  for  the  obvious 
and  undeniable  reason,  that  said  hypothesis  affirms  our  ab- 
solute and  hopeless  ignorance  of  these  realities  and  of  their 


388  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

• 

entire  relationships.  In  regard  to  the  questions,  whether  the 
realities  which  cause  these  appearances  are  in  themselves, 
exclusively  subjective  or  objective,  material  or  spiritual, 
personal  or  impersonal,  finite  or  infinite,  the  immutable 
principles  of  this  hypothesis  leave  all  such  questions  wholly 
undetermined  and  undeterminable.  If  the  advocates  of  this 
hypothesis  put  forth  any  affirmations,  or  positive  conjec- 
tures even,  in  regard  to  the  character  or  relations  of  these 
realities,  they  subject  themselves,  thereby,  to  the  just 
charge  of  hypocrisy  ;  inasmuch  as  they  thus  betray  an  in- 
ternal disbelief  in  their  own  openly  avowed  and  fundamen- 
tal principles.  Such  are  the  exclusive  spheres  clearly  and 
distinctly  marked  out  for  science,  by  the  essential  princi- 
ples of  these  two  distinct  and  opposite  hypotheses. 

Wh  He  the  exclusive  foundation  of  Realism  is  original  intui- 
tions, that  of  Scepticism  is  an  unauthorized  assumption. 

Another  fundamental  distinction  between  these  conflict- 
ing hypotheses  is  this  :  Realism,  as  we  have  already  shown, 
rests  exclusively  upon  original  intuitions  verified  by  scien- 
tific criteria,  as  possessed  of  an  absolute  validity  for  the 
reality  and  character  of  their  objects.  Scepticism,  on  the 
other  hand,  has  been  as  clearly  evinced,  as  having  no  other 
foundation  than  a  mere  assumption,  —  an  assumption,  void 
utterly  of  all  claims  to  the  high  prerogatives  of  a  first 
truth,  or  principle  of  science,  —  an  assumption,  in  favor  of 
which  no  form  or  degree  of  valid  proof,  evidence,  or  ante- 
cedent probability,  can  be  adduced,  and  which  has  been 
demonstrated  to  be  nothing  but  a  fundamental  error.  We 
refer,  of  course,  to  the  assumption,  that  all  our  knowledge 
of  realities  within  and  around  us  is  exclusively  phenomenal. 
Either  Consciousness  is  "  a  liar  from  the  beginning,"  or 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  389 

Scepticism  has  no  other  foundation  than  such  an  assump- 
tion as  that.  This  we  have  already  shown,  and  need  not 
enlarge  in  this  connection.  How  widely  diverse  must  be 
the  destiny  of  two  distinct  and  opposite  lrypotheses,  one  of 
which  must  be  true  and  the  other  false,  when  one  stands 
out  visibly  before  the  eye  of  the  mind  as  resting  upon  a 
strictly  scientific  basis,  and  the  other  as  resting  upon  no 
other  foundation  than  an  unauthorized  and  false  assump- 
tion ! 

The  principles  of  Realism  accord  with,  and  those  of  Scepti- 
cisyn  are  antagonistic  to,  the  intuitive  convictions  of  the  Uni- 
versal Intelligence. 

Another  fundamental  fact  having  a  corresponding  bearing 
upon  our  present  inquiries  is  this :  The  essential  principles 
and  deductions  of  Realism  correspond,  in  their  entireness, 
with  the  necessary  intuitive  convictions  of  the  Universal  In- 
telligence, while  those  of  Scepticism,  throughout,  stand  forth 
as  irreconcilable  antagonisms  to  said  convictions.  On  this 
subject  there  can  be  no  dispute.  The  Universal  Intelligence 
—  that  of  every  materialist,  idealist,  and  sceptic  included  — 
has,  in  its  natural  and  spontaneous  procedures,  affirmed 
absolute^  the  real  existence  of  matter  and  spirit  as  distinct, 
separate,  and  actually  known  entities,  and  also  that  of  sub- 
stance, cause,  space,  time,  and  a  personal  God.  Mind,  in 
its  natural  and  intuitive  procedures,  no  more  doubts  the 
reality  of  any  of  these  objects,  or  the  validity  of  its  knowl- 
edge of  the  same,  than  it  does  those  of  its  own  existence 
or  any  of  its  conscious  states.  Realism  recognizes  the  va- 
lidity of  such  procedures,  and  constructs  its  theory  of  exist- 
ence accordingly.  Scepticism,  without  any  valid  basis  for 
such  a  procedure,  impeaches  the  Intelligence  itself  of  fun 
33* 


390  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

d amenta!  error,  and  constructs  a  theory  of  existence  in  the 
real  validity  of  which  sceptics  themselves  no  more  believe 
than  the  rest  of  mankind,  excepting  in  those  moments  in 
which,  as  philosophers,  by  voluntary  acts  of  self-stultifica- 
tion, "they  compel  themselves  to  treat  as  a  prejudice"  what, 
in  all  times  in  which  they  are  possessed  of  common-sense, 
they  absolutely  know  to  be  real.  Now,  the  world — the  dis- 
ciples of  sober  science  included  —  will  not,  when  the  ques- 
tion is  distinctly  submitted,  be  long  in  deciding,  what  the 
history  of  philosophy  fully  justifies,  that  so-called  philoso- 
phers, after  "putting  themselves  into  a  state  of  not  know- 
ing," and  "  regarding  all  their  previous  knowledge  as  uncer- 
tain," and,  finally,  upon  mere  assumptions,  constructing 
S3rstems  of  Ontology  in  respect  to  the  existence  and  laws 
of  realities  of  which  they  themselves  affirm  their  ignorance 
to  be  absolute, — the  world,  we  say,  will  not  be  long,  nor 
wrong,  in  concluding  that  philosophers,  in  such  procedures 
as  these,  are  far  more  likely  to  err,  than  the  Intelligence 
itself  is,  in  all  its  natural  and  necessary  intuitions,  to  be  a 
lie.  Realism,  and  with  it  Theism,  in  being  thus  sustained 
by  the.  necessary  intuitions  of  the  Universal  Intelligence, 
will  ever  find  itself  in  a  citadel  of  impregnable  strength  ; 
while  Scepticism,  as  the  irreconcilable  antagonist  of  those 
intuitions,  must  fall  upon  the  rock  of  truth  and  be  broken 
there. 

Realism  furnishes  infallible  tests  of  truth,  while  Scepticism 
utterly  confounds  truth  with  error. 

Realism,  we  remark  in  the  next  place,  furnishes,  as  we 
have  shown,  universally  valid  tests  of  truth  and  error.  The 
sceptical  philosophy,  on  the  other  hand,  absolutely  con- 
founds truth  with  error.     As  all  our  knowledge,  according 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  391 

to  its  teachings,  is  exclusively  phenomenal,  mere  appear- 
ance in  which  no  reality  appears,  and  as  one  form  of  ap- 
pearance is  just  as  real  as  any  other,  it  is  just  as  true  as 
any  other.  All  is  true  and  equally  so,  or  all  in  commor 
is  utterly  false.  No  advocate  of  this  philosophy  can  give 
us  any  valid  criteria  on  the  authority  of  which  we  can  affirm 
of  different  forms  of  thought,  this  is  true,  and  that  is  false. 
or  by  which  we  can  affirm  of  any  form  of  activity,  this  is 
right,  and  that  is  wrong.  Scepticism,  as  we  have  said,  may 
classify  and  generalize  its  empty  appearances.  It  can  fur- 
nish no  tests,  however,  by  which  it  can  classify  or  generalize 
them  as  true  or  false,  right  or  wrong.  Appearance  is  what 
actually  appears  to  the  individual,  and  as  appearance  rep- 
resents no  reality  but  itself,  one  appearance  is  and  must  be 
just  as  real,  and,  consequently,  just  as  true,  as  any  other. 
Scepticism  can  never  free  itself  from  this  difficulty.  To 
such  individuals  as  Messrs.  Mansell  and  Spencer,  for  ex- 
ample, all  our  ideas  of  all  realities  in  common,  realities 
finite  and  infinite,  appear  as  utter  and  irreconcilable  con- 
tradictions. To  us,  all  these  seeming  contradictions  appear 
as  perfectly  explicable,  and,  when  explained,  utterly  disap- 
pear. Can  these  individuals  tell  which  of  these  forms  of 
appearance  are  true,  and  which  false,  both  being  equally 
real  in  themselves,  and  neither  class,  according  to  their 
philosophy,  representing  realities  as  they  are? 

Their  distinct  and  opposite  tendencies. 

If  we  should  refer  to  the  idea  of  utility  and  contemplate 
these  two  systems  with  reference  to  their  intrinsic  tenden- 
cies, the  contrast  between  them  we  should  find  to  be  infi- 
nitely wide  and  impressive.  There  is  not  a  demand  of  our 
intellectual  or  sensitive  nature  which  Realism  is  not  adapted 


392  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

to  meet.  It  opens  to  us  the  volume  of  universal  nature, 
mental  and  plrysical,  and  assures  us  that,  in  the  diligent 
study  of  that  volume,  we  are  perpetually  enriching  our 
minds  with  the  imperishable  treasures  of  truth  itself.  It 
sanctifies  all  the  relations  of  existence,  —  relations  individ- 
ual, domestic,  social,  civil,  and  religious,  —  by  presenting 
them  as  actual  and  known  realities,  imparting  a  solemn  and 
enduring  substantiality  to  the  individual,  the  family,  the 
community,  the  state,  and  the  race,  and,  in  all  relations  of 
existence,  rendering  that  all-overshadowing  idea  sacred,  — 
the  idea  of  duty.  It  meets  the  demands  of  our  higher  na- 
ture, —  the  moral  and  spiritual,  —  by  rendering  omnipresent 
in  thought  a  personal  God,  infinite  and  perfect,  and  im- 
presses us,  on  the  one  hand,  with  the  consciousness  of  the 
intrinsic  worth  of  our  deathless  spirits  by  the  revelation  of 
the  great  fact,  that  "  we  are  all  his  offspring ; "  and,  on  the 
other,  gives  us  an  object  upon  which  the  mental  powers 
may  forever  expand,  and  in  that  expansion  take  on  the  most 
perfect  forms  of  intellectual  and  moral  beauty  and  perfec- 
tion possible  to  our  nature.  To  the  instinctive  and  change- 
less desire  for  continued  existence,  it  opens  the  vista  of  an 
assured  immortality.  In  opening  upon  the  vision  of  the 
mind  a  knowable  and  known  universe,  it  assures  to  the  In- 
telligence a  solid  basis  for  an  authenticated  revelation  from 
the  "  Father  of  our  spirits."  There  is  not,  we  repeat,  an 
essential  demand  of  our  nature  to  which  this  system  does 
not  exist  in  fixed  adaptation.  Nor  is  there  a  solitary  ele- 
ment in  it  that  can  be  shown  to  tend  in  any  direction  but 
good,  and  that  in  the  highest  degree. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  not  a  solitary  element  or 
principle  in  the  sceptical  philosophy  that  has  the  remotest 
tendency  towards  anything  good.     Nor  is  there  a  single 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE    ARGUMENT   COMPLETED,  393 

demand  of  our  nature  which  any  such  element  or  principle  has 
the  least  adaptation  to  meet.  Instead  of  this,  its  exclusive 
tendency  is  to  induce  throughout  every  department  of  our 
nature  an  omnipresent  sense  of  hopeless  emptiness  and  des- 
olation. With  a  deathless  desire  in  the  centre  of  the  soul 
for  knowledge,  —  for  the  conscious  possession  of  the  price- 
less treasures  of  truth  itself,  —  all  realities,  under  the  influ- 
ence of  this  philosophy,  pass  away  to  an  unapproachable  dis- 
tance from  the  mind  into  the  eternal  regions  of  the  unknow- 
able and  unknown,  leaving  it  encircled  by  nothing  but 
empty  shadows,  less  substantial  than  the  shadow' which  is 
cast  by  a  real  shade,  — delusive  appearances  which  represent 
and  reveal  nothing  whatever  that  is  real.  To  those  ques- 
tions of  deathless  interest,  from  the  presence  and  pressure 
of  which  we  cannot  escape  if  we  would,  —  the  questions, 
What  am  I  ?  Where  am  I  ?  What  ought  I  to  be  ?  What 
ought  I  to  do  ?  Whither  am  I  bound  ?  —  all  such  questions 
this  philosophy  involves  in  "  a  darkness  which  may  be  felt," 
—  in  the  "  palpable  obscure  "  and  endless  contradictions  of 
"  Chaos  and  Old  Night."  Under  its  sightless  illuminations, 
also,  the  individual,  the  family,  the  community,  the  state,  and 
humanity  itself,  become  soulless  fabrications  as  unsubstan- 
tial as  "  the  baseless  fabric  of  a  vision."  The  more  fully 
the  mind  comprehends  the  principles  and  enters  into  the 
spirit  of  this  philosophy,  the  more  distinctly  conscious  does 
it  become  of  the  death-frosts  which  are  falling  upon  it,  until 
the  death-chill  becomes  as  absolute  and  permeating  through- 
out all  departments  of  our  mental  being,  as  we  should  feel 
through  all  the  vitalities  of  our  physical  nature  were  we 
encased  in  the  heart  of  an  iceberg.  "  I  would  give  all  the 
world,"  said  a  German  philosopher  of  this  school,  to  one  of 
our  ambassadors  to  a  foreign  court,  —  and  this  was  said  with 


394  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

bitter  weeping  and  tears, — "  I  would  give  all  the  world,  could 
I  believe  as  you  do  ;  if  I  could  have  faith  in  the  encircling 
presence  and  guardian  care  of  a  personal  God  whom  I  could , 
call  my  Father.  But  my  philosophy  has  taken  from  me  the 
possibility  of  believing."  An  accursed  philosophy  is  that 
which  thus  takes  from  the  heart  of  suffering  humanity  such 
an  object,  a  form  of  good  to  which  all  the  deathless  princi- 
ples of  our  immortal  natures  are  immutably  and  exclusively 
adapted.  From  what  good  motives  can  any  man  rob  the 
heart  of  that  eternal  good,  iu  the  place  of  which  nothing 
can  be,  substituted  but  what  tends  immutably  in  the  direc- 
tion of  death,  —  death  to  virtue,  and  death  to  real  happi- 
ness? From  no  commendable  intent  can  a  philosopher, 
though  he  does  so  under  the  professed  teachings  of  science, 
transform,  in  the  mind's  regard,  the  individual,  the  family, 
and  the  state,  from  substantial  and  sacred  creations  of  In- 
finity and  Perfection,  into  mere  shadows  of  no  realities 
known  or  knowable  to  the  mind.  Through  original  and 
necessary  intuitions,  and  by  a  most  rigid  classification  and 
generalization  of  the  facts  thus  revealed,  together  with  the 
equally  rigid  deductions  yielded  by  said  facts,  the  mind, 
keeping  all  the  while  strictly  within  the  natural  and  proper 
sphere  of  the  Intelligence,  and  never  violating  one  of  its 
natural  laws,  arrives  to  a  distinct  and  absolute  conscious 
knowledge  of  the  world  of  matter  and  spirit,  of  substance, 
cause,  personal  identity,  the  individual,  the  family,  the  state, 
duty,  time,  space,  immortality,  and  God  the  Infinite  and 
Perfect,  as  absolutely  real  and  known  verities  of  infinite 
worth.  Under  the  influence  of  the  knowledge  thus  acquired 
life  becomes  real  and  earnest,  existence  has  an  intelligible 
purpose  and  end,  and  we  know  what  we  are,  where  we  are, 
what  we  ought  to  be  and  do,  and  whither  we  are  bound. 


THE    DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT   COMPLETED,  395 

From  what  motives  of  utility,  permit  us  to  ask,  —  duty  out 
of  the  question,  —  can  a  philosopher  employ  his  high  men- 
tal gifts  in  persuading  mankind  that  all  this  knowlege  is  a 
mere  delusive  and  shadowy  appearance  in  which  no  reality 
appears  ?  What  form  of  good  can  he  hope  to  receive  by 
persuading  us  that  "the  things  which  we  invisage  are  not 
that  in  themselves  for  which  we  take  them,  neither  are  their 
relations  so  constituted  as  they  appear  unto  us;"  that 
these,  to  be  sure,  are  "  connatural  and  necessary  beliefs," 
—  beliefs  so  immutably  "  inhering  in  Reason  itself,"  that, 
by  no  scientific  deductions  can  we,  by  any  possibility,  di- 
vest ourselves  of  them,  —  beliefs,  however,  which  we  are  to 
u  compel  ourselves  to  treat  as  a  prejudice,"  that  is,  as  Kant 
expresses  it,  as  mere  "  tricks  played  upon  Reason"?  How 
long  will  such  a  useless,  ghostly  philosophy  maintain  its 
ascendency  over  the  human  mind, —  a  philosophy  utterly 
un sustained  by  any  valid  facts  whatever,  —  which  thus  re- 
verses all  the  natural  and  intuitive  procedures  of  the  Intelli- 
gence, —  which  does  murderous  violence  to  all  the  original 
instincts  and  laws  of  our  sensitive  nature,  —  which  stands 
out  visibly  before  the  mind  as  resting  upon  mere  assump- 
tions and  nothing  else,  and  which  by  no  possibility  can  be 
true,  unless  the  contradiction  can  hold,  that  knowledge  is 
not  knowledge  ? 

Realism  the  natural,  and  Scepticism  the  most  unnatural,  state 
of  thought  conceivable. 

We  have  yet  one  more  suggestion  to  make,  pertaining  to 
the  destiny  of  these  two  distinct  and  opposite  forms  of 
thought.  Realism,  throughout,  is  a  perfectly  natural  and 
genial  form  of  thought  and  belief.  This  is  universally  ad- 
mitted.    Scepticism  —  a  fact  which  none  will  deny — is  the 


396  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

most  unnatural  state  in  which  the  mind  can  possibly  find 
.tself.  Let  any  one  seriously  attempt  to  think  in  accord- 
ance with  the  fundamental  principles  of  this  philosophy, 
md  the  necessary  effect  upon  his  understanding  will  be,  in 
:he  language  of  a  distinguished  writer,  "  the  antithesis  to 
;hat  in  which  a  man  is  when  he  makes  a  bull."  In  other 
vords,  he  will  feel  as  if  he  "  had  been  standing  on  his  head." 
rhe  first  effect  upon  the  feelings,  after  the  momentary  ex- 
citement induced  by  new  views  is  passed,  will  be  a  state  of 
ltter  confusion  and  bewilderment,  as  if  *'  chaos  had  come 
igain."  The  final  result  will  be  a  sense  of  hopeless  be- 
reavement, abandonment,  and  lostness,  which  leave  the 
nind  dead  to  all  which  constitutes  its  true  and  proper  life, 
—  a  state  so  vividly  described  by  Byron,  —  a  state  ren- 
lered  real  in  his  experience  by  Scepticism,  on  the  one 
land,  and  vice  and  crime,  the  natural  daughters  of  Scepti- 
cism, on  the  other. 

"  And  dost  thou  ask,  what  secret  woe 
I  bear,  corroding  joy  and  youth, 
That  bids  me  loathe  my  present  state, 
And  fly  from  all  I  prized  the  most  ? 

"  It  is  not  love,  it  is  not  hate, 

Nor  low  ambition's  honors  lost, 
That  bids  me  loathe  my  present  state, 
And  fly  from  all  I  prized  the  most. 

"  It  is  that  weariness  which  springs 
From  all  I  meet,  or  hear,  or  see  ; 
To  me  no  pleasure  Beauty  brings; 
Thine  eyes  have  scarce  a  charm  for  me. 

"  It  is  that  settled,  ceaseless  gloom, 
The  fabled  Hebrew  wanderer  bore, 
That  will  not  look  beyond  the  tomb, 
But  cannot  hope  for  rest  before." 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  397 

How  long  will  the  general  mind  remain  under  the  influ- 
ence of  a  form  of  belief  so  unnatural,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
which  cannot,  in  its  final  results,  but  induce  "  that  state  of 
settled,  ceaseless  gloom  "  above  described  ? 

So  distinctly  conscious  are  modern  sceptics  of  the  impos- 
sibility of  securing  for  their  philosophy  a  permanent  ascen- 
dency with  the  public,  while  that  public  is  distinctly  aware 
of  the  real  character  of  the  system,  that  they  are  now  at- 
tempting to  secure  this  result  by  imposing  upon  said  pub- 
lic what  we  must  regard  as  known  deceptions.  Mr. 
Spencer,  for  example,  tells  us,  that,  in  regard  to  ultimate 
causation,  "  the  choice  is  not  between  personality  and  some- 
thing lower  than  personality  ;  whereas  the  choice  is  between 
personality  and  something  higher."  In  affirming  that  our 
choice  is  between  a  personal  God,  and  "  something  higher," 
he,  in  fact,  affirms,  as  the  result  of  the  principles  of  his 
philosophy,  that  one  or  the  other  of  these  objects  must 
exist.  He  thus  presents  to  the  mind,  as  the  crowning 
glory  of  said  philosophy,  an  object  of  positive  belief,  and 
thus,  also,  deceptively  meets  a  fundamental  want  of  our' 
being.  Now,  when  he  penned  those  lines,  he  could  not  but 
have  been  aware,  aside  from  the  intrinsic  absurdity  of  the 
dogma  presented,  that  the  fundamental  principles  of  his 
philosophy  present  us  with  no  such  alternative  as  that. 
"The  reality,"  lie  tells  us,  "  existing  behind  all  appear- 
ances, is,  and  must  ever  be,  unknown."  How,  then,  does  he, 
how  can  he  know,  that  any  such  choice  remains  for  us  ?  In 
affirming  that  such  choice  does  remain,  he,  in  truth,  affirms 
a  knowledge  and  comprehension  of  what  he  affirms  to  be 
unknowable  and  unknown.  He  thus  deceives  his  readers 
in  regard  to  the  principles  of  his  philosophy  by  professedly 
34 


398  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

giving  them  that,  the  possibility  of  which  that  philosophy 
denies,  to  wit,  an  object  of  positive  belief. 

Similar  remarks  are  equally  applicable  to  the  doctrine  of 
Force,  which  is  made  to  play  such  a  conspicuous  part  in  the 
teachings  of  the  advocates  of  this  philosophy.  They  every- 
where employ  the  term  force  as  if  it  represented  a  real 
entity  of  which  we  have  a  positive  conception.  Now,  their 
philosophy  denies  absolutely  the  being  of  an  entity  of  which 
we  have,  or  can  have,  any  such  conception.  In  these  writ- 
ings, this  term  has,  in  reality,  two  meanings :  the  appar- 
ent, by  which  the  masses  are  deceived,  and  the  real,  by 
which  it  represents  nothing  whatever,  but  an  utterly  un- 
known element  of  the  absolutely  unknowable  and  unknown. 
If  the  word  abracadabra  was  substituted  for  the  term  force, 
whenever  the  latter  term  appears  in  these  writings,  said 
writings  would  have  all  the  real  consecutiveness  and  con- 
clusiveness that  they  now  possess.  Now,  it  is,  by  such  de- 
ceptions, giving  to  mind  positive  objects  of  thought  and 
belief,  where  none  whatever  really  exist,  that  a  temporary 
ascendency  is  secured  for  this  philosophy  over  the  public 
mind.  The  mask,  however,  will  soon  drop  from  the  face 
of  this  "  Gorgon  dire,"  and  then,  mankind  will  flee  from  it 
as  they  would  from  the  embrace  of  a  vampire. 

Concluding  thought. 

We  here  draw  our  argument  on  this  greatest  of  all  themes 
to  a  close,  and  leave  the  subject  to  the  reflection  of  the 
reader.  Our  object,  throughout,  has-been  the  induction  of 
positive  conviction,  as  the  basis  of  a  consciously  rational 
faith  in  the  being  and  superintendence  of  an  infinite  and 
perfect  personal  God.     Our  work  must  speak  for  itself. 


THE   DISJUNCTIVE   ARGUMENT   COMPLETED.  399 

Bearing  of  the  doctrine  of  Probability  on  this  subject. 

It  may  be,  that  there  will  be  found,  here  and  there,  a  sol- 
itary individual  in  whose  mind  absolute  conviction  may  not 
have  been  induced.  To  such,  if,  unhappily,  any  such  there 
be,  we  would  say,  that  for  such  a  reason  you  are  by  no 
means  free  from  the  obligations  of  religion.  They  may 
still  remain  upon  you  in  all  their  force.  Two  hypotheses 
are  before  you,  the  Theistic,  and  that  of  Natural  Law. 
One  of  these  must  be  true.  In  favor  of  the  latter,  no  intel- 
ligent reader  of  this  treatise  will  pretend  that  there  exists 
any  form  of  proof,  positive  evidence,  or  antecedent  proba- 
bility. Even  probability  in  favor  of  the  former  hypothesis, 
in  all  such  cases,  and  that  on  all  such  subjects,  just  as 
strictly  and  sacredly  binds  the  conscience,  as  proof  the  most 
conclusive  and  absolute.  If  any  one  should  affirm  that  the 
argument,  as  we  have  conducted  it,  is  not  absolutely  de- 
monstrative, will  he  deny  that  it  throws  the  probabilities, 
as  infinity  to  unity,  in  favor  of  the  theistic  hypothesis  ? 
For  a  want  of  faith,  then,  in  an  infinite  and  perfect  per- 
sonal God,  every  man  must  stand  convicted  at  the  bar  of 
the  universal  Conscience  as  without  excuse. 


DATE  DUE 

APR  3  o  ia 

ib 

MJggpBBt 

